Non-compete clauses (NCCs) are widely used and discussed, but often too narrowly. While conventional accounts focus on the benefits of NCCs to employers, Harrison Frye has proposed that they can also serve employees by acting as a clear, costly signal. I argue that both views rely on an overly narrow analysis. A wider view shows that NCCs cause market failures, undermining their utility as protective or signalling devices. Because of these negative effects, I extend Frye’s account to argue that NCCs should be used only as targeted interventions under exceptional conditions, if they are used at all.

This paper develops a parallel between prudence and population ethics. I argue that developing a standard guiding the evaluation of the comparative prudential value of different lives is challenging because it shares a similarity with population ethics: In both contexts, we assess the comparative value of populations of person-stages/people, which may vary in number and level of well-being. Based on this analogy, I show that Arrhenius’ fifth impossibility theorem can be applied to prudence. I develop and compare five possible escape routes: Critical-Level Views, Totalism, Limited Aggregation, Nebel’s Lexical Threshold View and what I call the Negative Lexicality View.

This article defends a new type of preferential hiring. Rather than compensating groups for past or present employment-related discrimination, it seeks to ensure that groups with disproportionate unemployment rates that are due significantly – but not necessarily wholly – to their members having relatively narrow competencies, such as autistic individuals and people with hearing loss, ADHD and lower education levels, are prioritized for jobs that match their abilities. After defending such competency-based preferential hiring based on its benefits for persons with narrower competencies and for societies more broadly, I address several criticisms, including concerns that this approach may be stigmatizing.

Ideal Contractualism views principles of justice as corresponding to what rational, mutually disinterested persons would collectively choose behind a veil of ignorance. It is well-known that Ideal Contractualism faces profound challenges in accounting for justice between generations. We present a unified solution to these problems that involves rejecting the assumption that the parties conceive of their choices as causally efficacious and assumes instead that the parties choose in light of the news value of their decision. And we explore what concrete principles would be chosen by the parties as governing intergenerational justice against the backdrop of this assumption.

In this paper, I investigate how parents should talk to their children about injustice. In doing so, I use the non-ideal theory debate in political philosophy to show how the questions traditionally asked there can give substantive guidance to parents. I also contribute to that debate by showing how attention to injustice conversations (a) leads us to ask new questions and develop new modelling tools; (b) can help us to resolve the questions traditionally asked in the debate in a more direct way; and (c) can serve as a model for bringing together substantive and methodological questions in non-ideal theory.

Buchak’s risk-weighted expected utility considers not just the probability of an outcome, but also the probability of getting a strictly better outcome, when weighting the contribution that outcome gives to the evaluation of a gamble. It uses a risk-weighting function $R$ sending probabilities in $\left[ {0,1} \right]$ to decision weights $\left[ {0,1} \right]$. I adapt this to allow weights in any real interval. Finite intervals yield nothing new, but if the interval is infinite, then the resulting rule can incorporate maximin or maximax preferences (or both!) while still satisfying stochastic dominance. There are advantages to working with marginal risk-weighting, $R$’s derivative, $r$.

This paper concerns the difficulty of avoiding an additive version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion. An impossibility theorem is provided which shows that we cannot avoid this version of the Repugnant Conclusion even if we deny the Mere Addition Principle and closely related principles which place limits on the badness of adding happy people, such as “Dominance Addition” and additive “Non-Sadism” conditions. I argue that the impossibility theorem shows that the additive version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion cannot reasonably be avoided by population-ethical means alone. One must instead either deny structural conditions such as acyclicity, adopt a radically unorthodox fixed-population axiology, or accept this version of the Very Repugnant Conclusion.

It is often thought that compulsory retirement funding gains support from paternalistic considerations. This paper examines this claim. I argue that compulsory retirement funding is more coherent when understood as an attempt at temporal smoothing than counterfactual insurance. An implication is that any paternalistic case for retirement funding faces problems that are more severe than they would be if compulsory retirement funding were insurance. I label these the problems of ‘inverted bias’ and of the ‘arbitrariness of income from labour’. The paper then makes some suggestions about how these points about paternalism bear on the problem of justice in retirement funding.

This paper engages with recent work on formalization in economics to develop a new perspective on mathematization. Boylan and O’Gorman draw on foundations of mathematics to argue that classical mathematics is inappropriate for economics; intuitionistic foundations and constructive mathematics should be used instead. The use of real analysis would be blocked and equilibrium results undermined. I argue that their line of thought faces several challenges; however, I then draw on their analyses and the philosophy of applied mathematics to propose a novel approach in which questions about mathematization are properly understood as questions about the contextual aptness of relevant idealizations.

I argue against John, Millum and Wasserman’s position that telic prioritarianism justifies morally acceptable discrimination against persons with disabilities. I propose alternative considerations that explain why disability discrimination in the lifesaving cases JMW discuss is morally problematic.

Chung (2023) purports to derive conditions under which a Utilitarian society, which maximizes total welfare, Pareto dominates a Rawlsian society, which maximizes the income of the least advantaged members of society. We show that Chung’s analysis is doubly flawed. First, his analysis assumes that a Rawlsian government chooses an inefficient tax rate when it could do otherwise. Second, his analysis violates his assumption that citizens must choose a non-negative amount of labour. We show that Chung’s headline result does not hold once we enforce this assumption.