This article focuses on the Australian implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations, so-called ‘soft law’ instruments, which represent the international standards in Counter Terrorist Financing (CTF) but which force legislators to conform. The article will fill the gaps existing in the literature today by focusing on the origins and motives of broad CTF legislation in Australia, then detailing each of the FATF's CTF Recommendations and the ways in which they are implemented in Australia. This approach differs significantly from other literature in the field, which deals solely with Australian implementation of one of the FATF's components. The current paper's examination will reveal the CTF regime in Australia, a decade after the FATF's first CTF Mutual Evaluation Report on Australia, and its decisive influence.

The statutory office of Commonwealth Ombudsman was created in 1977, as part of the new federal administrative law. In this article, marking the 40th anniversary of the appointment of the first Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor Jack Richardson, the author describes the early history, including the resistance in some quarters to the model adapted from Sweden. He describes the innovations of the first ten ombudsmen and the frustrations and difficulties they faced. He then identifies ten issues on the future of the office: (1) whether it should be directly linked to the Parliament; (2) whether it should be served by a select committee; (3) how its funding should be maintained; (4) protecting the Ombudsman title; (5) retaining ministerial support in circumstances of differences; (6) overcoming official resistance; (7) addressing judicial hostility; (8) embracing new technology and generic reform; (9) embracing self-criticism and human rights analysis; and (10) engaging with comparative and international outreach and innovation.

It is frequently said that Australian administrative law does not have, and cannot accommodate, a doctrine of deference. These statements, from judges and commentators, tend to cite the High Court's decision in Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission as authority. In that case, the High Court of Australia indicated that Australia's strict separation of powers, as manifested by the legality/merits distinction, does not allow courts to defer to administrative bodies in determining the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions. Since Enfield, there have been considerable developments in the application, and theorisation, of deference across the common law world. This article examines developments in the UK and Canada, and argues that they show that there is no single ‘doctrine’ of deference – deference is applied in administrative law in a range of ways. I argue that some of the ways in which Canadian and UK courts apply deference are not dissimilar from the principles Australian courts already apply in reviewing executive action. I argue that Australian law may benefit from greater attention to, and wider application of, these deferential principles, in order to curb judicial intrusion into administrative discretion.

In its first 60 years the High Court showed a complete deference to English precedent, and did not of itself initiate changes to common law doctrines. The High Court took its first steps towards autonomy in common law matters only in the 1960s when it abandoned its policy of following decisions of the House of Lords, thereby ending the practice of automatically incorporating English common law developments into Australian law. It is shown that the Court acquired a willingness to overturn ‘recent’ common law rules (those of 20th century origin) after the abolition of appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council in the 1970s. The elimination of appeals from State Supreme Courts to the Privy Council in the 1980s led to a further broadening of the range of doctrines the Court was prepared to reconsider. Notably, since the 1990s, the Court has shown its willingness, in compelling circumstances, to overrule ancient common law doctrines acquired before Federation. This paper gives a detailed account of the emergence and expansion of the High Court's willingness to overrule common law precedent. It reveals how the High Court's autonomy in common law matters was developed in distinct stages that are linked to Australia's changing legal, political and socio-economic ties with Britain, and its growing sense of an independent national identity.

Courts and tribunals have distinct roles within the Australian administrative law system at the federal level, and to a lesser extent, in the states and territories. Questions of law are for the courts, and questions of fact are for the executive and tribunals. From time to time this orthodoxy is questioned. Suggestions are made that the courts are increasingly tending to intrude into the province of tribunals. Using cases as illustrations, this article explores five relevant jurisdictional areas —from appeals on a question of law to deference under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 10(2)(b)(ii)—to test the accuracy of the suggestion.

Australia has welcomed new business investment of $200 billion for integrated gas projects. However lower than expected tax receipts have tempered the early optimism of project benefits. In particular, petroleum resource rent tax (PRRT) revenues since the 2002–03 financial year have fallen. These reduced revenues have raised concerns about the effectiveness of petroleum taxation in Australia and pressured the Australian Government to call for a review of the PRRT in late 2016. Examined are the modifications necessary to the petroleum fiscal regime to address one of the PRRT Review's aims of providing an equitable return to the Australian community. Findings from a case study of an operational gas project include the need for PRRT modifications, and the addition of royalties for particular integrated natural gas projects in Commonwealth waters. The article is significant for its unique overview of Australia's petroleum taxation since the fall in oil prices from mid-2014 and the rise of gas export projects. This interdisciplinary and empirical research forms an important contribution to the current Commonwealth PRRT Review through its recommendations for change to the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax Assessment Act 1987 (Cth). It calls for more uniform federal legislation for the taxation of petroleum resource projects.

The duty to observe the requirements of procedural fairness is well settled in Australian administrative law. So too is the variable content of that duty and the possibility that it may be limited or excluded by legislation expressed in suitably clear terms. One key aspect of fairness that is not yet clear is its purpose. Why do courts require those who exercise public or official power to act fairly? The question cannot be fully answered by reliance on legislative intent or reference to the common law because recourse to one or both of these possible sources of the duty to act fairly does not necessarily answer why that duty is drawn from the common law or implied as part of statutory interpretation. This article examines recent steps by courts and commentators that suggest an exploration of the purpose of fairness may be beginning to occur.

Are legislators’ subjective motives relevant to the constitutional validity of an Act? In the USA, an Act may be found to be unconstitutional because legislators were motivated by a desire to discriminate against religion or interstate trade. The High Court has rejected such an enquiry in cases concerning ss 92 and 116 of our own Constitution. This article examines how, with substantially similar constitutional protections, the courts of these two countries have arrived at opposing views on the relevance of ‘motive evidence’. The High Court can avoid recourse to motive evidence because, when compared with its US counterpart, it applies a clearer test in the religion cases, and a more nuanced approach to proportionality testing in the interstate trade cases. This is the preferable approach.

Concentrating on Canadian experience, specifically litigation under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the ‘Charter’), this article seeks to reconcile the access to justice benefits of summary procedures with the government litigant's duty to act in the public interest (or as a ‘model litigant’) and uphold the rule of law. Though acknowledging the benefits that can result from the use of summary procedures to end litigation, the authors observe that compliance with strict requirements in procedural law are frequently dispensed with in the Charter context. In fact, summary procedures can have a devastating effect on the development of Charter rights. The authors ultimately posit that the government should have a duty of restraint in using summary procedures to end public law litigation, and courts should be reluctant to permit the government to preclude such litigation aimed at advancing the evolution of the Charter from reaching hearings on the merits.