Australia is following in the footsteps of the UK and US and embracing the discourse and regulatory technologies associated with modern slavery regulation. This paper offers a critical perspective on this development. It begins with a brief account of the concept's rise to prominence, and discusses the political economy in which it is embedded. It then explores some of the advantages, as well as the pitfalls, associated with the frame, and its associated regulatory approaches, techniques and discourse. The authors raise three broad sets of concerns. The first goes to the danger of exclusively focusing on criminal justice responses to penalise and deter those who practice modern slavery while neglecting other approaches that may help address the causes of the phenomenon. The second set of concerns goes to the tendency to exaggerate the transformative potential of one of the dominant regulatory responses in this area: the mandatory corporate supply chain reporting provision. The third set of concerns relate to the implications of addressing issues of worker exploitation and mistreatment through a modern slavery and human trafficking approach rather than through other well established and newer regulatory means. To support the third argument, the authors compare the modern slavery approach with two alternate approaches: labour regulation and human rights due diligence. The authors emphasise the need for vigilance to ensure that the embracement of a modern slavery frame does not shift attention (and resources) away from more thorough and effective means of securing greater corporate accountability for labour standards in supply chains.

A secular approach has dominated federal studies, perhaps because there seems a natural fit between federalism and secularism. However, the federal systems or practices of Asia bring that close association into question, and the federal accommodation of religious demands has not been examined fully. This article focuses on how religion has been approached, accommodated or resisted in federal and quasi-federal states in Asia. We select India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal as cases. We first explore the relationship between federalism, secularism and religion, and find that secular values at the point of federalisation played an important role in federalism's establishment, but that they were later modified in the practice of federal accommodation of religion. We also identify and examine the federal governance of religious diversity, which features three types of accommodation—centrally-based, unit-based and group-based accommodation—with accommodative practices sometimes being for the benefit of a majority religion, and sometimes for a minority one.

Predictions have been made about the inevitable demise of judicial review of executive action on the grounds of ‘reasonableness’ for some time. This is especially heightened as and when other substantive grounds of judicial review–for example, proportionality and review for material error of fact–emerge and gain traction. It is argued that these newer grounds are much better suited to the task of reviewing the substance of executive decision-making and they, therefore, reduce the appetite for reasonableness review. This paper considers attempts to retain such review in England, Australia and Canada, notwithstanding the flourishing of other substantive grounds of review. It evauates the reasons, particular to each jurisdiction, for retaining reasonableness review. In the English context, it could be a useful tool to slow down advances in the scope of review. In the Australian context, it could be a suitable vehicle for the incremental expansion of substantive review relative to proportionality, in a way that is not too disruptive of the relatively conservative approach to judicial review on questions of substance. In the Canadian context, it is the only counterpoint available to correctness as a standard of review in the area of substantive review. It could be argued that the retention of a standard of review–like reasonableness–that has a tendency towards deference is misplaced in an era where there appears to be a growing interest in strengthening a culture of justification in the executive through stronger judicial review. Here the aims of the paper are modest. It is not being suggested that reasonableness review should be the sole or primary ground for substantive review. Instead, the paper argues that there is some merit in retaining a tool that is more readily capable of a deferential application (relative to proportionality or correctness as standards of review). The merit of reasonableness review lies in its cautious approach rather than its potential to grow into a strong or sufficient tool of review and, indeed, it is not necessary for it to do so in today's substantive review landscape.

Kenya's form of quasi-federalism termed devolution was introduced under the Constitution of Kenya (2010) (‘2010 Constitution’). This governance system establishes 47 county governments which are constitutionally independent sub-national units with direct election of county level leaders. Given the complexity of devolution's relationship to national politics, as well as the broad variation in how devolution has unfolded in the 47 counties since 2013, this article argues in favour of a situation-specific assessment of devolution in Kenya. This analysis departs from the emerging scholarly consensus of devolution in Kenya represented in two predominant approaches. One approach contends that devolution in Kenya has simply devolved corruption and patronage from the national to the county level. Another approach argues that devolution has so far been relatively successful because it has introduced a new political system at the county level that has a robust system of checks and balances but that has empowered a new dynamic in Kenya's politics at the sub-national level. This article argues the first approach paints the emerging devolution experience with a broad brush that is not reflected in every county or even on every issue. This article has more in common with the second view. However, we argue for a more situation-specific, case by case analysis of devolution to show variations in how devolution has or has not facilitated the delivery of services and opportunities that were prior to 2013 likely to be unavailable particularly in the most economically disadvantaged counties.

Looking at Italy, the article argues that government serves as an intervening variable that can mediate the implication of federalism and social division. Its overall argument is that the Italian state maintained its unity through a governmental practice of configuring social division so as not to align on the North/South divide, while engaging in a comprehensive devolution of competencies to the subnational level. Through readings of Carlo Cattaneo and Guiseppe Mazzini, the first part of the article considers the conjunctural factors that allowed for the creation, against all odds, of Italy as a unitary state. The second part considers by what strategies the political parties colluded in preserving the unity of the national territory, and by what forms of devolution power was transferred to the subnational level. In conclusion, the article considers the rise of federalism in Italian politics from the 1990s.

An influential theory, sometimes called the ‘fragmentation hypothesis’, proposes that divided political systems will tend to empower courts because they make it more difficult for political elites to coordinate court-curbing retaliation. Another influential perspective proposes that federal systems are conducive to judicial empowerment because they create a demand for the authoritative adjudication of jurisdictional boundaries and/or they facilitate judicial supremacy over constitutional meaning. If both of these theories are correct, we might expect consociational (ie, power sharing) federations to be especially hospitable to the emergence of powerful courts. With reference to the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article questions this conclusion; it is theorized here that core features of consociational federation will tend to undermine the growth and maintenance of judicial power.

Aspects of an entrenched constitution that were essential parts of founding compromises, and justified as necessary when a constitution was first adopted, may become less justifiable over time. Is this the case with respect to the structure of the United States Senate? The US Senate is hardwired in the Constitution to consist of an equal number of Senators from each state—the smallest of which currently has about 585,000 residents, and the largest of which has about 39.29 million. As this essay explains, over time, as population inequalities among states have grown larger, so too has the disproportionate voting power of smaller-population states in the national Senate. As a result of the ‘one-person, one-vote’ decisions of the 1960s that applied to both houses of state legislatures, each state legislature now is arguably more representative of its state population than the US Congress is of the US population. The ‘democratic deficit’ of the Senate, compared to state legislative bodies, also affects presidential (as compared to gubernatorial) elections. When founding compromises deeply entrenched in a constitution develop harder-to-justify consequences, should constitutional interpretation change responsively? Possible implications of the ‘democratic’ difference between the national and the state legislatures for US federalism doctrine are explored, especially with respect to the ‘pre-emption’ doctrine. Finally, the essay briefly considers the possibilities of federalism for addressing longer term issues of representation, polarisation and sustaining a single nation.

Canada's constitutional distribution of authority between the provinces and federal government leaves no room for Indigenous self-government, but there are increasingly vocal calls for change. Whether Indigenous peoples are acknowledged as one of Canada's founding nations alongside its English and French settlers, or are recognized as distinctive peoples within its multicultural society, these calls affirm Indigenous peoples as sovereign nations deserving of at least some of the powers that the provinces have. The Constitution Act 1982 provides a different mechanism of legal protection for Indigenous peoples, recognizing and affirming already existing Indigenous rights. Canada's Indigenous rights jurisprudence, however, pulls against the sovereignty that underlies federalism. The courts have understood Indigenous rights such that accessing their protections denies to Indigenous peoples the autonomy to define themselves as member nations of Canada's multicultural society. As a normative point, this paper argues that we should embrace constitutional Indigenous rights as a vehicle for Indigenous sovereignty, because it brings federalism and Indigenous rights together as a theoretically coherent foundation for Indigenous self-government in Canada. As a descriptive point, the paper argues that the jurisprudence itself already contains the resources to support a sovereignty-affirming reading of the Constitution's Indigenous rights provisions.