Should we adopt broad, anticipatory regulatory frameworks for AI to address its wide-ranging societal impacts? This Article argues that such a universal approach is misguided. Instead, it contends that we should adopt a two-track regulatory strategy that maintains agnosticism about AI’s uncertain long-term trajectory while implementing targeted interventions to address specific, documented harms in the present. The Article develops this argument through a case study of generative AI systems in digital media, examining how these technologies are reshaping the algorithmic dynamics of the public sphere. Tracing the ways in which AI-powered content generation and curation are amplifying long-standing challenges like the erosion of shared epistemic foundations, the entrenchment of echo chambers, and the concentration of informational power, the Article highlights the limitations of the EU’s horizontal AI Act and the potential of China’s more focused, domain-specific approach to regulating these harms. Drawing on this analysis, it makes the case for a hybrid governance model that combines targeted oversight of AI’s known dangers with a continuing spirit of regulatory humility and openness toward its transformative potential. In an age of rapid technological change, this balancing act offers a path beyond the false choice between reactive overregulation and reckless laissez-faire - one that remains attuned to AI’s contextual nuances while advancing the public interest.

The United States is peculiar in its widespread enforcement of consumers’ and workers’ adhesive arbitration agreements. Comparative law discussions of arbitration often note this U.S. peculiarity, and this article confirms it by contrasting the law of Germany, the EU generally, the UK, and Japan.

However, this article points out, the U.S. is also unusual in the civil litigation to which arbitration is an alternative. Enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements in the U.S. largely serves to override three other peculiarities of civil litigation in the U.S.: (1) the civil jury, (2) optout class actions, and (3) extensive discovery. Therefore, enforcing the arbitration agreements of U.S. consumers and workers generally moves their claims from the unusual procedure of U.S. courts to procedures closer to the global norm of comparable nations.

In addition, this article shows that the Federal Arbitration Act’s enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements contrasts with federal cases holding that the Seventh Amendment jury right may be traded away in a bench trial (“jury waiver”) clause only by “knowing” consent. However, these “knowing consent” cases are inconsistent not only with the Supreme Court’s FAA cases but also with cases enforcing adhesive forum selection clauses trading away the Seventh Amendment right. And they are also inconsistent with cases enforcing adhesive consent-to-jurisdiction clauses and adhesive security agreements, both of which trade away constitutional Due Process rights. In sum, contract law standards of consent generally govern both Seventh Amendment and Due Process rights, while cases requiring “knowing” consent for bench trial (“jury waiver”) clauses are outliers.

Finally, U.S. states are free to require higher standards of consent to trade away jury and Due Process rights except where a preemptive federal statute says otherwise. The FAA is such a federal statute. In contrast, no analogous federal statute governs bench trial clauses, forum selection clauses, consent-to-jurisdiction clauses, or security agreements. This observation largely explains the case law on these five types of contract clauses.

This Article is based on the author’s farewell speech at the Federal Constitutional Court on May 26, 2023.1

An enduring access-to-justice crisis leaves most low- and middle-income people without meaningful assistance for civil legal problems. In response, several U.S. jurisdictions have experimented with licensing legal paraprofessionals—such as Limited License Legal Technicians (LLLTs)—to provide a circumscribed set of services directly to the public. Using Washington State’s pioneering LLLT program and its successors as a case study, this Article argues that paraprofessional reforms have under-delivered because they replicate key features of the traditional professional model: substantial educational prerequisites, supervised practice requirements, and high-stakes examinations that raise entry costs, limit supply, and constrain scalability.

The Article contends that modern AI changes the production function of routine legal work—particularly client intake, document preparation, and the translation of facts into legally relevant narratives—yet AI deployed directly to consumers poses serious risks, including error, bias, confidentiality threats, and jurisdictional mismatch, and it cannot reliably identify when a matter requires escalation to a lawyer. The Article therefore proposes an “AI–paraprofessional fusion” model: purpose-built, jurisdiction-specific AI tools paired with lightly trained human paraprofessionals who provide process guidance, verify and quality-control outputs, and triage cases for escalation when warranted.

Finally, because unauthorized-practice rules are state-created constraints that helped produce today’s scarcity, the Article argues that the AI infrastructure enabling this model should be developed and maintained as a public good—auditable, updateable, and broadly accessible—rather than left solely to private market incentives. This approach offers a scalable path for United States jurisdictions—and potentially others—to expand competent, lower-cost legal assistance while preserving safety through human oversight and clear escalation channels.

The following Article deals with the prerequisites required for effective arbitration agreements in Germany, thereby comparing it with US law. It will be shown that the main obstacle for the effectiveness of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts is the requirement of a formally separated, personally signed written document as set out in § 1031 Sec. 5 ZPO. Contrary to consumer contracts, there is no specific form requirement in business contractual. This statutory concept surprises because the effectiveness mainly depends on formal, non-material requirements. Taking this into account, the following Article will highlight the question whether the current legal framework is ensuring an informed consent.

Since the public release of ChatGPT in November 2022, the artificial intelligence (AI) landscape is undergoing a rapid transformation. Currently, the use of AI chatbots by consumers has largely been limited to image generation or question-answering language models. The next generation of AI systems, AI agents that can plan and execute complex tasks with only limited human involvement, will be capable of a much broader range of actions. In particular, consumers could soon be able to delegate purchasing decisions to AI agents acting as “Custobots.” Against this background, the Article explores whether EU consumer law, as it currently stands, is ready for the rise of the Custobot Economy. In doing so, the Article makes three contributions. First, it outlines how the advent of AI agents could change the existing e-commerce landscape. Second, it explains how AI agents challenge the premises of a human-centric consumer law which is based on the assumption that consumption decisions are made by humans. Third, the Article presents some initial considerations how a future consumer law could look like that works for both humans and machines.

This article synthesizes the insights of all contributors to the Bremen symposium and the contributions to this Special Issue, seeking to identify key themes and ideas for advancing a coherent regulatory approach to consent in dispute resolution agreements. By highlighting both shared concerns and divergent legal techniques, the project aimed at informing future scholarly and policy debates on this critical issue of contract law and private international law.

This Article examines the “human in the loop” argument regarding the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in court proceedings, challenging the intuition that AI assistance is inherently less problematic than full delegation. It argues that even limited AI support can risk blurring the lines between human and AI decision-making, posing significant dangers for human judgment in critical judicial functions.

The Article starts out by identifying the main arguments in favor of human oversight and categorizing them into technological, legal, and psychological reasoning in Section B. It then shifts focus to the potential dangers of applying the “human in the loop” concept to judicial decision-making in Section C. The analysis highlights the fundamentally different modes of operation between humans and AI, particularly in handling natural language and legal reasoning. Furthermore, it explores how human judges might become over-reliant on AI, effectively acting as “rubber stampers” and leading to eroding human vigilance, skills, and independent judgment. To illustrate the complexities of these dynamics, the Article categorizes various AI tools used in court proceedings based on their degree of involvement and effect on judicial decision-making in Section D.

The Article concludes by urging us to rethink our current understanding of “co-working” with AI as a universal remedy and putting emphasis on a clear division of labor instead, as discussed in Section E. For those scenarios where human and AI contributions are deeply interwoven, the Article stresses the need for making a conscious decision whether AI or a human judge should perform the underlying tasks in the future.

Humanoid robots, with their capacity for human-like interaction and autonomous decision-making, present novel legal challenges in accident scenarios. This Article argues that existing Chinese accident law cannot fully accommodate accidents involving humanoid robots because hybrid human-algorithm control, adaptive machine learning, and embodied human-like interaction together destabilize traditional assumptions about fault, causation, proof, and remedy. To address these shortcomings, the Article proposes a reconstructed liability system that (1) establishes robust evidentiary processes for determining fault, (2) implements “reasonable person” technical standards for humanoid robot behavior, (3) designates manufacturers as the “least cost avoiders,” and (4) considers behavioral correction and retribution for robots to address victims’ psychological needs. This approach aims to foster an “accidental utopia” where innovation and safety are harmonized.