Transitional justice (TJ) emerged during the consolidation of the liberal international order (the LIO). It was deemed to flow from, and contribute to, the emergence of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in post-authoritarian and post-conflict states. The LIO generated material and discursive support for processes of accountability, truth, repair and guarantees of non-repetition. The LIO is now widely perceived to be under significant threat with the rise of authoritarian states (most notably China and a revanchist Russia) and the erosion of liberal democratic values in the US and Europe. Some worry that TJ may have peaked and is doomed to decline in this more challenging ecology. This article is an attempt to show how the material and discursive environments of TJ have altered with the decline of the LIO and the rise of a multipolar world. In material terms, there are fewer democratic transitions that might facilitate the type of state-level rule of law or rights-promoting impact associated with accountability, truth or reparation processes, while liberal peacebuilding is now far less premised on democratisation and human rights that post-conflict TJ processes built upon. In a world where authoritarian rejections of human rights and the rule of law meet widespread support and where a chastened liberal West resiles from effectively exporting or supporting norms like TJ, there is also a lowering of the argumentative burden for those who want to outright defy, water down or find workarounds for TJ.

This paper examines the relationship between feminist manifestos and constituent power, focusing on the Chilean feminist movement. Manifestos have long been an influential political tool in shaping political identities and claiming power. However, they are often overlooked in constitutional law. This paper addresses this gap by exploring feminist manifestos, which have been pivotal in denouncing historical exclusion, forming political groups and asserting constituent power. Drawing on the work of Ruth Houghton and Aoife O’Donoghue, the paper investigates how feminist manifestos challenge traditional notions of constituent power. However, it argues that their performative conception of power overlooks the vital role of political representation. The paper argues that political representation is crucial for a fully realised theory of feminist constituent power, as it enables collective action and democratic participation. By looking at the Chilean feminist movement’s involvement in the 2019–2022 constitution-making process, the paper demonstrates how feminist movements, through strategies such as manifestos and strikes, can influence constitutional change, while also highlighting the limitations of excluding political representation from the conversation. Ultimately, the paper asserts that feminist manifestos can reimagine constituent power, but their full potential is limited without a comprehensive understanding of political representation.

What explains when states derogate from international human rights law during the COVID-19 pandemic? Conventional understanding of treaty derogations suggests that domestic democratic structures, not the crisis at hand, explain derogation submissions. I argue that during COVID-19, global crisis measures mattered. WHO legitimacy and issue framing of the crisis made states more likely to perceive the pandemic as a severe one and derogate from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Using country-day level from January 2020 to February 2021 analysis of over 70,000 observations, I test the determinants of ICCPR derogations during the COVID-19 pandemic. I find that global crisis measures of WHO responses and global COVID-19 deaths were significant, positive indicators of ICCPR derogations while domestic crisis measures were not. This piece contributes to our understanding of how states use international law during crises, derogations, international organization legitimacy and of human rights law during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In fragile contexts, the state is sometimes unable to effectively perform some of its fundamental functions, such as the provision of public services, law-making, or territorial governance. Multinational corporations sometimes step in to perform these functions by leveraging their political power. On the one hand, this facilitates the enjoyment of fundamental rights for the affected citizens; on the other hand, it risks undermining the relationship between citizens and the state itself, further weakening its foundations. This paper aims to identify a normative criterion to navigate this phenomenon, drawing on theory of positive constitutionalism to do so.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility and adaptability of democratic orders. While confinement accelerated cross-border ‘tele-life’, rights and protections remained territorially locked. This essay argues that democracy need not be tied to the Westphalian state: it can be re-imagined as unterritorial democracy – voluntary, overlapping and portable communities of belonging. Building on panarchist thought, Austro-Marxist proposals for non-territorial autonomy and Jewish Bundist experiments with cultural self-rule, I advance a model of pan-citizenship and polycentric governance in which rights and representation follow persons rather than places. The contribution is threefold: (1) a genealogy that situates unterritorial democracy within longer traditions of political imagination; (2) analytical criteria – membership portability, competence clarity, equity and accountability – that render such institutions evaluable; and (3) contemporary proto-examples – from diaspora voting to indigenous electoral registers – showing that elements of unterritorial democracy already exist. By integrating historical, analytical and empirical strands – and by engaging debates on emergency powers and derogations of rights – the essay positions unterritorial democracy as a normative horizon for global constitutionalism, inviting person-linked indicators capable of capturing democratic belonging within a framework of multiterritorial pluralism. In this way, the essay contributes to both the normative debates and the methodological agenda of global constitutionalism.

Both Canada and the European Union feature multiple overlapping legal systems, each with independent sovereignty claims and distinctive cultural traditions. Courts in both settings have therefore been forced to reckon with ‘constitutional pluralism’.

In Canada, the contested relationship between Indigenous and settler legal orders has been mediated largely through s35, which recognizes Aboriginal rights, and s25 which shields them from the Canadian Charter. The resulting jurisprudence has focused on protecting cultural difference by creating limited spaces of autonomy within the Canadian state but has largely neglected questions of sovereignty.

In Europe, the relationship between European Union and member-state law has been mediated through an emergent judicial dialog which allows each court to maintain its sovereignty claim by making its acceptance of the other’s authority conditional. The resulting jurisprudence focuses on sovereignty without dealing as closely with questions of difference.

The two contexts therefore represent divergent approaches to shared conceptual and practical problems. To my knowledge, however, no scholarship has seriously compared the two. The following article takes a modest step towards filling this lacuna, introducing European thinkers to Canadian constitutional pluralism and vice versa before reflecting on some of the ways further comparative research can add depth to existing comparative literature, deepen our understanding of constitutional pluralism as a theory and, in particular, raise important questions about constitutional pluralism’s relationship to liberalism.

Strikes against public policies have often been classified as illegal political strikes. Nevertheless, the concept of social movement unionism (SMU) describes how trade unions in some countries have become active players in social struggles, alongside social organizations and protest groups, by using political strikes. Although the International Labor Organization (ILO) prohibits purely political strikes, it recognizes the legitimacy of protest strikes concerning public issues. In this respect, the article combines the notion of global constitutionalism with the concept of SMU to explore the issue of political strikes in times of social or democratic struggles. Global constitutionalism regards certain international principles as paramount, offering them a status akin to constitutional law. Drawing on the intersection of the theory of SMU with the concept of global constitutionalism, the article suggests that strikes against governmental policy, framed as part of broader social protests, can effectively oppose controversial public policies. The article claims that protest strikes should be recognized as legitimate exercises of workers’ freedom of association, based on the application of relevant ILO principles through global constitutionalism.

This article examines the paradoxical effects of international legal accountability processes on the international law of intelligence. In response to increasing exposure of their intelligence activities, liberal democracies have shifted from a national security culture of secrecy to one of legal rationalisation, offering legal justifications to defend and legitimate contested practices. Rather than improving compliance, accountability processes have enabled states to strategically reshape legal norms to accommodate their preferred policies. Focusing on how legal justifications affect international law’s constraining function, the article analyses the effects of legal justifications on three dimensions of legal norms: obligation, precision and delegation. Intertwining doctrinal legal analysis with International Relations scholarship on rhetorical and justificatory approaches to international law, it identifies four causal mechanisms through which strategic legal justifications decrease law’s constraining power on state behaviour and facilitate norm evasion. The article demonstrates how strategic uses of international law for legitimation purposes can gradually alter legal norms without formal changes to legal texts or institutions, ultimately decreasing international law’s constraining power. Shedding light on the limits and risks of legalisation as a regulatory strategy, these findings raise important questions about the effectiveness and adequacy of legal accountability strategies, particularly strategic litigation, in inducing behavioural change.

The Nordic countries have often been portrayed as pioneers of human rights and international law. However, few are aware that court-protected human rights played an almost negligible role in post-Second World War Scandinavia. Instead, scepticism towards natural law thrived, and minimalist procedural democracy alongside legal positivism positioned ‘the people’ as represented in parliament at the apex of the democratic hierarchy. Therefore, while the desire to impose judicial limits on parliamentary majorities after the Second World War came to dominate most international constitutional discourse as a combination of judicial review and rights, the Nordics cultivated a form of political and even anti-constitutionalist position long before the term gained popularity elsewhere. This article presents the untold story of how and why the Nordics became a symbol of procedural democracy and majoritarianism, making it challenging for the region to embrace a European constitutional order in full. It also argues that by having few judicial safeguards in place nationally, the Nordic countries are badly positioned in the event of a populist or illiberal takeover. The article warns that a procedural and anti-constitutional democracy model, still strongly hailed in the Nordic countries and increasingly prominent in recent constitutional literature, may legitimate illiberal leaders around the globe with its strong link between the idea of unconstrained power of the majority and the right to rule. It may also, in a European context, significantly obstruct the European Court of Justice’s efforts to flesh out a stronger European constitutional democracy.

This article examines the relevance of ‘deliberative’ constitutionalism – the idea that democratic deliberation ought to inform our expectations of constitutional law and processes – to constitutional moments in non-state contexts. More specifically, it explores the ways in which extending a deliberative constitutional lens to non-state spaces can both enrich our understanding of the legal-political dynamics within these spaces and, in turn, inform the field of deliberative constitutionalism itself. To do this, it takes an empirical approach to interpret and analyse a constitutional process through which a university student union reinvented its own democratic structures, in significant part through a ‘deliberative mini-public’ of everyday members. Drawing on interviews, observations and records, it demonstrates that a deliberative constitutional lens maps onto and usefully interprets the democratic process in this context while also offering empirical insight into an underexplored dimension of deliberative constitutionalism: that is, connections between deliberative approaches ‘to’ constitutional reform and the resulting constitutional features ‘from’ which subsequent political deliberation flows. It shows how the former carries ‘through’ into the latter by way of the internalization of deliberative norms resulting from both direct and indirect experience with deliberative approaches.