While it is evident that the burden-sharing proposed by the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) is a form of solidarity, it remains to be seen whether this represents solidarity between states to the exclusion of refugees themselves. If so, this may justify the critical conclusion drawn by renowned refugee scholar James Hathaway that the GCR is a cop-out by the global North to pick and choose who, when and how they want to share the burden of refugee protection rather than a form of solidarity. This article therefore considers whether the solidarity and community foreseen by the GCR have made things better for refugees who are supposed to be the primary beneficiaries or merely better for the refugee hosts. Recognizing that the basis of the GCR is the rights-based approach of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, this article argues that an investigation is warranted into whether the solidarity envisioned by the GCR can operate as a legal concept in this context and therefore hold the international community accountable for the protection of refugees.

The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) was developed to introduce simple, up-to-date business laws in its member states. It has various goals, including harmonizing business laws, attracting foreign investment in its member states and promoting broader economic integration across Africa. At its initial development stage, OHADA chose a path dependence route, which positively impacted the achievement of some of its initial goals. While OHADA has been widely praised for its efficient business laws, its commitment to path dependence is likely to create a trap for the organization, hindering its further progress. This article analyses the unification of law in African former colonies from the critical perspective of path dependence theory. It examines how OHADA’s legal choices have impacted its various objectives at different stages of its development. Ultimately, the article proposes that OHADA amend its legal framework to achieve its broader aspirations.

Grassroots participation in Nigeria’s democratic governance, through the local government system, has remained a problem, even with the Constitution guaranteeing democratically elected local government councils and their autonomous operation as a third tier of government. The state governments have continued to encroach upon the autonomy of the local governments, thus hindering effective grassroots participation in democratic governance. To address this, the Supreme Court, in a majority judgment in Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State and 35 Others, reaffirmed the democratic status and autonomy of local government councils. This article examines the extent to which the judgment guarantees the independence of the local governments; it finds that the judgment has been more symbolic than impactful in resolving the issues of local governments’ autonomy. It therefore advocates for constitutional alterations to explicitly define the status and functions of the local governments in Nigeria.

The Constitution of Uganda does not expressly provide for citizens’ right to participate in law-making processes. However, it can be inferred from the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy and Article 38(1) of the Constitution. The drafting history of Article 38 shows that Ugandans are expected to participate in all affairs of government. In Male Mabirizi and Others v Attorney-General and Others, Supreme Court judges invoked foreign case law to interpret Article 38 as requiring meaningful public participation in the law-making process; however, in Hon. Fox Odoi and Others v Attorney-General and Others, it was held that those criteria were not applicable. I argue that the Constitutional Court erred in this, and that the process followed to pass the Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (Amendment) Act (2025) did not meet the criteria of meaningful participation. It was also contrary to the practice adopted by Parliament in processing other bills.

This article examines the ethnic and gender quotas that have been applied to Burundi’s Constitutional Court since 2019. It shows that while gender quotas aim to make the court reflective or to remedy past injustices, ethnic quotas serve multiple roles: securing ethnic peace, de-escalating conflict or confirming power balances. Our analysis challenges scepticism about judicial quotas and independence, arguing that quotas do not inherently undermine legal merit, particularly when constitutional values are at stake. However, the position-sharing model poses risks to judicial independence, potentially diminishing court legitimacy. We highlight the complexities of combining ethnic and gender quotas, and we develop a typology of courts with such quotas, categorizing Burundi’s Constitutional Court as a blend of reflective, affirmative action, position-sharing and power-sharing. By examining Burundi’s experience, the article contributes to the debate on judicial quotas in segmented societies and the impact of identity-based representation on constitutional design, post-conflict governance and judicial independence.

Despite the fact that traditional mediation is one of the main dispute resolution mechanisms in Malawi, the country’s formal legal and institutional frameworks pay little attention to its place in enhancing access to justice. This article analyses the extent to which Malawi’s traditional mediation law, practice and institutions promote access to justice. It relies on African mediation theory to argue that the reason why traditional mediation continues to be a favoured dispute resolution mechanism is because of its communitarian nature in its quest to restore harmony in society.

The rights of Deaf persons need to be respected in order to prevent discrimination and ensure equality in Kenya’s criminal courts. Inclusive communication in the country’s criminal justice system is key and can only occur when information that is passed and received is understood by both the Deaf and hearing parties. The aim of this article is to determine how Deaf people can be supported and accommodated in order to ensure their effective participation at all levels of Kenya’s criminal justice system. With the backdrop of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the author contends that the State has an obligation to put in place reasonable accommodation and other accessibility measures that go beyond the provision of mere sign language interpretation, if the right to participation of Deaf witnesses is to be fully realized in the country’s criminal justice system.

South Africa’s democracy is 30 years old, and for 30 years the courts have been interpreting the right of access to adequate housing found in section 26 of the Constitution. Many parts of this right have been developed; one such development is that courts have found that the right includes a duty on the state to provide (temporary) emergency alternative accommodation in eviction matters to those facing homelessness. Throughout the years, courts have grappled with the suitability of this alternative accommodation; it finally seems like some clarity has been reached regarding when alternative accommodation would be considered suitable, due to the courts’ recent acceptance of alternative accommodation offered by the state as suitable. This article considers how the courts currently determine the suitability of emergency accommodation and what types of alternative accommodation has been accepted; it further explores the issues arising from these findings.

The writer, Chimamanda Adichie, was sent out of an Nsukka chapel for wearing a short-sleeved blouse. The TV presenter, Funmi Iyanda, was harassed by police for wearing a knee-length dress. Nigeria’s response to a suit at the ECOWAS Court of Justice brought by an actress, Dorothy Njemanze, included that she “dress[ed] naked or half naked”. Firdaus Amasa was initially denied call to the Nigerian bar because she wore a hijab beneath her lawyer’s wig, and several young women have been decamped from the mandatory National Youth Service Corps programme for wearing skirts instead of trousers and shorts. Analysing the above incidents, alongside the Supreme Court’s decision in Lagos State Government v Abdulkareem, this article finds that though it is easier to enforce women’s rights to choose their dress when religious liberty is engaged, the constitutionally guaranteed protection against degrading treatment is one thread that runs across all instances of policing women’s dress. Consequently, prioritizing dignity rights for Nigeria’s womenfolk will shield them from indignities associated with policing their dress choices.

Surrogacy, the engagement of third parties to perform biological roles, presents complex regulatory dilemmas. It raises questions about the ethics of commercializing human reproduction, especially when viewed through natural and cultural lenses. This article discusses the relevance of geopolitics in regulating artificial reproductive technology (ART) in Nigeria. It espouses the traditional health norm development approach to reproductive governance and dwells on surrogacy as a gendered concept, as it affects different categories of people in different ways in Nigeria. It examines Nigeria’s dominant cultural and religious ideologies against the extant legal framework, including family laws and judicial authorities. The article identifies the loopholes and relevance of geopolitics in the development of ART norms in Nigeria. There have been attempts to regulate ART to exclude recognizing surrogacy. The article concludes that the uncoordinated regulation is due to the geographical and socio-political norm development experience in the country. It recommends a cautious re-evaluation of the regulation of surrogacy through adopting Eager’s norm development approach. This position aims to redress the challenges confronting women in reproduction, in line with international norm development.

South Africa is the most unequal society in the world, and this is exacerbated by the enduring legacy of apartheid. Policy and statutory interventions have been introduced to address inequality, albeit with minimal success. This article argues that the persistence of inequality necessitates a more profound normative recalibration within corporate law. It proposes incorporating the values of transformative constitutionalism, distributive justice and Ubuntu into corporate law, conceptualized as transformative corporate law. This reorientation enhances the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) model by shifting its emphasis from a predominantly shareholder-centric focus towards a more inclusive stakeholder model. The article situates shareholder primacy as occupying “the right”, stakeholderism “the left” and the ESV model “the centre” of the corporate governance spectrum. South Africa’s extreme inequality demands a paradigm shift that moves decisively towards the centre-left, a position embedded in the African philosophy of Ubuntu and termed the “progressive ESV” model in this article.