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Asymmetric Information, Debt Capacity, and Capital Structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2018

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Abstract

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Capital structure choice based on costs associated with asymmetric information is examined in order to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order and trade-off theories. In the model, both the face value of debt and the restrictiveness of the associated debt covenants are chosen as part of the financial structure, allowing a more complete characterization of this decision. Debt structure choice balances ex ante adverse selection against ex post moral hazard, providing a natural integration of the pecking order and trade-off theories and the development of interesting empirical implications.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2018