Intellectual clashes over the nature of international law have been raging throughout the traceable history of the discipline. Naturalists, positivists, idealists, pragmatists, formalists, realists, and so forth, have striven to put forward and defend credible paradigms of international legal order. The common characteristic of each new wave of criticism has been its unsettling disposition. It arrived stridently with questions and doubts, often seeking reform and often reconceptualization and transcendence. A second common characteristic, notably in the post-enlightenment period, has been the marginalized position of the debate on the merit of each new wave, within and outside legal academia. Indeed, debate over unsettling questions seems to have been exempted from the habitual professional responsibilities of the overwhelming majority of international lawyers. Existential anxieties of this sort have been relinquished to that class of academics usually referred to as jurisprudes or legal theorists. ‘Practicing’ international lawyers, so it is often argued, need not concern themselves with ‘theory’. Their mission is to provide tangible answers to practical problems and, for this task, ‘theoretical’ debate is irrelevant: its outcome is indeterminate, abstract, and, thus, of limited usability. In some cases ‘theoretical’ even becomes a pejorative term, synonymous with counter productive or parasitic.

The 1999 Annual Meeting of the ASIL exhibited a rare diversity of panels and speakers. The paradigm of an ‘inclusive’ professional community, shared by this Meeting, is well in line with a more general understanding of international law as an inclusive, unified discipline. This Editorial begins investigating this image of unity and its consequences for the ways ‘difference’ is encountered in professional debate.

Dr René Lefeber stayed at the helm of the Leiden Journal of International Law as its Editor-in-Chief for more than four important years (1996–2000), marked by innovation and change in practically every aspect of the Journal. Barely two years after a profound re-organization, the Journal's volume was doubled with three issues per year in 1997, and four issues in 1998. Meanwhile, the number of pages, the quality, and the diversity of published material saw dramatic growth. The section on Hague International Tribunals became a standard feature; a sub-section on the International Criminal Court was set up in 1998 to regularly cover ongoing developments in this important institution; an annual specialized bibliography on dispute settlement was introduced; and regular Editorial notes by members of the Board figured in each issue. All in all, a very different Journal than the one handed down four years earlier.

The article introduces innovative means by which states can express their consent to be bound by treaties. Such innovative means have been incorporated in some multilateral environmental agreements that were concluded in December 1999 and January 2000. It is discussed whether limits of law-making have been transgressed by the use of these innovative means as the law of treaties allegedly presupposes that states actually give their consent to new treaty obligations, take some active step to express their consent to such obligations and do so at a time that the obligations were in existence and were known to them.

Increasingly the UN is ‘subcontracting’ peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. The ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone is an example. Some members of ECOMOG have been accused of violating international humanitarian law. These accusations have not been adequately addressed by ECOMOG nor by the UN. The limited attention paid to this problem by the UN in ‘subcontracted’ operations contrasts with increased concern with respect for international humanitarian law by forces under UN command and control. It is argued that the UN should ensure that ‘subcontracting’ does not lead to lowering standards of international humanitarian law.

Article 27 ICC Statute has proven to cause compatibility problems with regard to immunity provisions in national constitutions. States have, however, indicated readiness to overcome these problems. On the other hand, Article 98 forms the pivot of the latest attempt of the United States, a non-signatory state, to ensure a de facto immunity from ICC jurisdiction for US nationals. This editorial sets out the contrasting approach of states to the ICC and concludes that the US Proposal for a Rule to 98(2) would have had the effect that the rule encompassed in Article 27 ICC Statute would in practice not apply to nationals of non-state parties.

There is no unanimity in the international community about the legality of NATO's use of force in Kosovo in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO has acted without Security Council authorization and its arguments for a humanitarian intervention are legally inconsistent. It has set a dangerous precedent. This editorial analyses the legal framework and complexities of the Kosovo crisis and its repercussions on the concept of ‘justified use of force’.

The 1999 Kosovo crisis has forced the European Union to finally give concrete form to its ambitions in the sphere of the common foreign and security policy. At a time when agreement on defence issues seems out of reach, the member states' focus is on the development of a crisis management capability. It is argued that when the Union's diplomatic structures are complemented with military and civilian crisis response tools, much needed balance will be given to the Union's persona as an economic giant and a political dwarf. The article includes a number of measures which should be taken with a view to reinforcing and extending the Union's external role in this field.

The adoption of the Statute of an International Criminal Court in July 1998 is widely regarded as a major step forward in international criminal law. The United States, however, does not share this point of view in all respects. It particularly fears that the Statute will allow prosecution of American peacekeepers for political instead of legal reasons. This article examines the provisions of the Statute in the light of that fear. It concludes that not only is such a fear unjustified, the United States position may have disastrous consequences for efforts in peacekeeping.

It has to date not been examined in-depth what correlative rights and obligations the breach of an erga omnes obligation or an erga omnes right may entail. In his Separate Opinion in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, Judge Weeramantry devotes one section to the legal consequences of the involvement of erga omnes obligations in inter partes judicial procedures. This editorial analyses the relevant parts of Judge Weeramantry's Separate Opinion and explores the impact it may have on future litigation involving erga omnes issues.

On 22 November 1996, the Council of the European Union adopted a framework regulation and agreed to joint action to ‘protect’ the interests of the European Union and its citizens against the extraterritorial application of legislation by non-member states. These measures were adopted in response to the extraterritorial application of certain measures by the United States, concerning trade with and investment in Cuba, as well as investment in Iran and Libya. These United States measures apply to all natural and legal persons irrespective of their nationality, residency, or place of activity. Thus, even nationals of a member state of the European Union residing and active in the European Union must comply with the United States measures. The enactment of this legislation marks a new episode in the on-going battle between the United States and the European Union over the frontiers of a state's (or an international organization's) jurisdiction to prescribe. This time, however, the European Union counteracted by the adoption of measures which can partly be characterized as retorsion measures and partly as countermeasures. The adoption of these measures by the European Union raises questions with respect to the legitimacy of the retorsion measures and the legality of the countermeasures.

Let's assume, if only for the sake of argument, that the Chechen people have the right to self-determination. Since the massive indiscriminate use of military force by Russia in December 1994, it is arguable that the Chechen people's right to internal self-determination has evolved into a right to external self-determination, i.e., into a right to secede from Russia. This is a reasonable assumption as we, as well as others, have pointed out on several occasions. However, the legal analysis has not been taken beyond this point. In this editorial, the legal consequences of the lawful exercise of the right to external self-determination by the Chechen people will be explored, albeit tentatively.

In recent publications a rising tide of criticism directed against the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is discernible, principally concerning whether or not the ICTY grants the accused a fair trial. The perceived lack of ability, or willingness, to satisfy the highest standards of human rights concerning the right of accused to a fair trial is regarded as a death-knell both for the broad acceptance of the ICTY's jurisprudence as well as the prospects for a permanent international criminal court. While most of the criticism centres around the interpretation and application of provisions of the ICTY's Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence addressing the right to a fair trial, some of it concerns the vigorousness with which ICTY officials insist upon the surrender of indicted persons. With all due respect these commentators, by applying norms that are not wholly applicable, misconceive the threat to the accused's fair trial rights.

In January 1996, tension escalated in the south-eastern Aegean as a result of Turkey's challenge of Greek sovereignty over the Imia rocks. Turkish ‘journalists’ from the newspaper Hurriyet occupied the Greek rocks and took down the Greek flag. This led to a build-up of Turkish and Greek naval forces near the rocks, thus creating a potential source of armed conflict. The tension was reduced after diplomatic intervention by the United States. However, there was a surprising absence of initiative on the part of the European Union in spite of the fact that the external borders of one of its member states had been challenged. The following will be a very brief account of the incident and the arguments of both parties, as evidenced primarily by their respective verbal notes.

On 21 July 1995, Greece ratified the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter the 1982 Convention). The entry into force of a widely accepted and comprehensive law of the sea convention has been a consistent objective of successive Greek administrations since negotiations began over two decades ago. Greece was very active during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III]), voting in favour of the Convention and its Final Act with the intention of ratifying it at a later date. This article discusses the political and substantive context of the Greek ratification of the 1982 Convention by considering its impact upon Greek law of the sea interests and assessing its implications for Greek-Turkish relations in the Aegean Sea.

The Rwanda Tribunal is an independent judicial institution established by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It is the first international court having competence to prosecute and punish individuals for egregious crimes committed during an internal armed conflict. While the Government of Rwanda was a member of the Security Council and participated in the negotiations regarding the creation of the Tribunal, there were significant differences of opinion between it and the Council regarding the Tribunal's jurisdiction and competence. This article discusses the special features of the Rwanda Tribunal, as compared to the Yugoslavia Tribunal.