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A semiring-based trace semantics for processes with applications to information leakage analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2014

MICHELE BOREALE ,
DAVID CLARK  and
DANIELE GORLA
MICHELE BOREALE
Affiliation:
Dipartimento di Statistica, Informatica, Applicazioni – Univ. di Firenze. Viale Morgagni 65, 50134 Firenze, Italy Email: boreale@dsi.unifi.it
DAVID CLARK
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science, University College London, Gower Street, WC1E 6BT London, United Kingdom Email: david.clark@ucl.ac.uk
DANIELE GORLA
Affiliation:
Dip. di Informatica – Univ. di Roma ‘La Sapienza’. Via Salaria 113, 00198 Roma, Italy Email: gorla@di.uniroma1.it
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Abstract

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We propose a framework for reasoning about program security building on language-theoretic and coalgebraic concepts. The behaviour of a system is viewed as a mapping from traces of high (unobservable) events to low (observable) events: the less the degree of dependency of low events on high traces, the more secure the system. We take the abstract view that low events are drawn from a generic semiring, where they can be combined using product and sum operations; throughout the paper, we provide instances of this framework, obtained by concrete instantiations of the underlying semiring. We specify systems via a simple process calculus, whose semantics is given as the unique homomorphism from the calculus into the set of behaviours, i.e. formal power series, seen as a final coalgebra. We provide a compositional semantics for the calculus in terms of rational operators on formal power series and show that the final and the compositional semantics coincide. This compositional, syntax-driven framework lays a foundation for automation and abstraction of a quantified approach to flow security of system specifications.

Information

Type
Special Issue: Quantitative Information Flow
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 25 , Issue 2: Quantitative Information Flow , February 2015 , pp. 259 - 291
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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