Joseph Stalin and the Soviet party leadership launched a major propaganda campaign in 1931 that called for a new approach to Soviet history, not only for scholars and pedagogues but for society as a whole. A veritable “search for a usable past,” this initiative was to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the state and rally the population together in patriotic unity by connecting the prerevolutionary past to the Stalinist present. When this new historical line was finally unveiled in 1937, it challenged earlier Soviet sloganeering on subjects like nationalism, imperialism, and colonialism. This article examines how Stalin attempted to reconcile his new “usable past” with these other ideological priorities, focusing on a case study of the so-called Ukrainian question within the context of the USSR’s broader reevaluation of tsarist-era imperialism and colonial policy.

In this article, we explore intra-ethnic aspects of co-ethnic migration by members of the Slovak community from Serbia to Slovakia, both at the institutional level and at the level of intra-ethnic relations, and the boundaries between migrants and the established population. In the first part, we focus on the institutional framework of co-ethnic migration: the politicization of diaspora issues in Slovakia, the Slovak community in Serbia in the hierarchy of Slovakia’s diaspora policy, and co-ethnic relations as a subject of negotiations. In the second part, we investigate the role of language in co-ethnic migration, the situation of nonrecognition by co-ethnics in Slovakia, intra-ethnic boundary-making in everyday interactions, and the consequences of migration on intra-ethnic relations among those members of the community who did not migrate. We thus analyze the ongoing migration of the Slovaks of Vojvodina from Serbia into Slovakia, from the early 1990s onward, through a blend of perspectives “from above” and “from below.” This article is based on extensive fieldwork conducted among members of the Vojvodina Slovak community, both migrants and non-migrants who have remained in Vojvodina. Thus, the sending country (Serbia) and the receiving country (Slovakia) represent one research field. The data collected in the field have been complemented by legal documents and statistical data to gain an overview of the wider social and political structures within which the migration is taking place.

The securitization of Russian-speakers has been central to nation-building in Estonia and Latvia since they regained their independence in 1991. Securitization at the levels of discourse and policy varies over time as a result of historical legacies, Russia’s kin state activism, and the minority protection requirements of European institutions. This article introduces a typology that links discursive frames with policies to map securitizing trends in Estonia and Latvia after the Soviet collapse: securitizing exclusion — less accommodating policies are justified by presenting the minority as a threat to the state or core nation; securitizing inclusion — more accommodating policies are justified to “win over” the minority in order to decrease the threat; and desecuritizing inclusion — more accommodating policies are justified on grounds of fairness or appropriateness without reference to security. The utility of the typology is demonstrated by analyzing frames in the public broadcast media and recent policy developments in Estonia and Latvia immediately following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis points to increasing convergence across countries in favor of securitizing exclusion. The analysis points to increasing convergence across countries in favor of securitizing exclusion. We conclude by evaluating these trends in light of minority mobilization and recent data on support for the active defense of the state among Russian-speakers and titulars.

This article analyzes the key factors behind the securitization of Ukraine’s small ethnic Hungarian minority in recent years and how they affect local interethnic as well as interstate relations. It draws on elite interviews conducted in the Ukrainian-Hungarian borderland, and other sources including speech acts. Four underlying factors were identified. The first two are Hungary’s kin-state aid and dual citizenship law, which have empowered Ukraine’s ethnic Hungarians, with the community appearing larger and potentially more threatening in the eyes of the majority population than its mere size justifies. The other two factors are Ukraine’s language policy and Transcarpathia’s future being subject of conspiracy theories in light of Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine, which have negatively affected interethnic ties, although somewhat less in the borderland than between Hungary and Ukraine at large. In Transcarpathia, our different informants had diverging perceptions of who is stirring tensions but agreed that actors from outside their region were to blame. Overall, what has emerged is a clash of Hungary’s kin-state politics and Ukraine’s nation-state-building efforts. The article ends with more general implications for kin- and host-state relations in times of conflict.

To what extent can de facto states act autonomously vis-à-vis their patron states and domestic societies? This article draws on theories of clientelism in international relations to develop a novel argument explaining the agency of de facto states. Examining two strategic triangles—Russia–Transnistria–Moldova and US–Taiwan–China—it demonstrates that interrelated domestic factors such as robust political competition, democratic pluralism, reimagined national identities, and big business shape the autonomy of de facto states in Eastern Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, the structured focused comparison of Transnistria and Taiwan indicates that the agency of de facto states declines when rising parent states and dissatisfied patron states challenge the status quo, engaging in great power competition. Their autonomy varies across areas of low and high politics, as patron states prioritize military-security issues and interfere less in the economic and cultural affairs of the de facto states.

While the motivations of individuals to become foreign fighters have been at the forefront of academic interest, an important motive—revenge—has so far remained under-researched. Drawing on the case study of pro-Ukrainian Chechen foreign fighters self-deployed in the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War, this article seeks to fill the gap in the extant literature by identifying and conceptualizing revenge. This article posits that two intertwined motives—revenge for perceived historical injustices and revenge for personal wrongs—have played an important role in motivating Chechens to become foreign fighters in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. This article suggests that while revenge might be a potent driving force of foreign fighting, its appeal may be stronger in the cultures of honor with the persisting notion of retaliation.

Debates on the connection between human trafficking and war have been discussed in wars and conflicts across the globe. Russia’s war on Ukraine has brought this relationship to the forefront again, questioning whether trafficking flows have increased, examining the types of trafficking in war, and determining the conditions (if any) that make it flourish. This article examines human trafficking in Ukraine before the war and during limited and total war to determine how governments with robust anti-trafficking institutions negotiate anti-trafficking responses over different stages of war. The main research question of this study aims to determine how different stages of the war in Ukraine have changed human trafficking dynamics and responses over time. Using data from interviews and participant observations from Ukraine, I analyze the different types of human trafficking characteristics and flows, conditions that create vulnerabilities, and prevention tools that have been used in different periods. I theorize that war fundamentally alters human trafficking prevention but a foundation of prevention tools before war means that governments are better able to respond to human trafficking dynamics and flows when war occurs. Ukraine offers a unique and important perspective from which to examine human trafficking dynamics and the consequences of war due to a stable government, external aggressor, and clear path for those fleeing the violence to the European Union. The results show that Ukraine’s strong prevention efforts before the war helped shape responses after the war and full-scale invasion began. The data revealed that human trafficking is a longer-term form of gender-based violence in war because the exploitation is prolonged and there is a delay in identifying victims.

This article aims to analyze the impact of memory on security/foreign policy using the example of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bilateral relations. The basis for these considerations is the concept of ontological security. It indicates the construction of the identity of the state and is implemented through political decisions and social practices (for example remembering important historical events). Here, memory is treated as a social construct. In addition, the article focuses on memory leading to the formation of state identity, also seen in the international sphere. Historical memory has a considerable impact on bilateral relations between countries that used to be in conflict, like Serbia and BiH. In the example analyzed, leaders use historical memory to create separate identities, commemorate chosen and appropriate victims/heroes or important dates, historical sites, monuments events and develop selective narratives. The most significant elements in the analysis of the historical memory of Serbia and BiH relations are (1) the goals of foreign and security policy of Serbia and BiH (2) the contemporary narrative of the Srebrenica genocide and its perception by governments of Serbia, BiH, and by Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks, and (3) an official Srebrenica commemoration (memorials, Srebrenica Memorial Day).

The aim of the article is to analyse, in a diachronic perspective, the street names in today’s Berlin whose bases are geographical names referring to places in contemporary Poland. The analysis reveals a purposeful city-text that supports the nation-building narrative: either by mapping the state’s actual geography at the moment of the name’s bestowal, or by including the territories claimed (literally or metaphorically), beyond the current borders at the time of the naming. However, the degree to which these street names and the intention behind them are decipherable today remains questionable. Once meaningful for their original creators, today they are partly or completely semantically oblique to the general public, as evidenced by their contemporary reception.

This article links two borderlands: the Italo-Slovene and the Slovene-Hungarian in the aftermath of the First World War. It focuses on the wartime refugees from the hinterlands of Trieste who, in accordance with agrarian reform, which the Yugoslav state began in 1919, were settled as colonists on the new Hungarian-South Slav border in the early 1920s. By using memoir literature and “ego documents,” the article tackles several aspects, including the refugee experience and social assistance during the First World War, the political motivation of the land reform, and the lived experiences of the colonists. In Yugoslavia, the agrarian problem was considered to be one of the most important issues facing the new state. The land reform aimed to solve social and national problems more than to improve the agricultural production of the state. In the example of the Prekmurje region, this article aims to show that interwar colonization succeeded in impacting the Hungarian–Slovene language border but failed miserably to ensure social transformation and security for the impoverished population.

Framed within discussions on how law operationalizes race and ethnicity, the authors provide a description of how anti-Semitic racially exclusionary legislation identified, classified, and operationalized the Jewry in Hungary between 1920 and 1944.

This article analyzes the patriotic turn in Holocaust memory politics, exploring the processes through which the narrative of a morally upright national majority has been pitted against transnational entities such as the European Union. The EU is considered to foster multiculturalism, leading to interpretations of what some perceive as national guilt. The article investigates invocations of shame and pride in Czechia and Slovakia, two countries that are often overlooked in works on Holocaust memory politics yet are symptomatic of larger changes in the region and history appropriation in general. Building on research into emotional communities, it traces how and why political actors across the ideological spectrum have adopted notions of pride to mobilize domestic audiences against “accusations” of local guilt and complicity in the Nazi genocides of Jews and Roma. By doing so, our article demonstrates how Holocaust memory has become entangled with Europeanization and highlights the role of emotions in shaping national identity and belonging.

This article presents a novel approach to explain ethnopolitical mobilization among Kosovo Albanian miners during the winter of 1988–1989. Based on a close reading of the mining enterprise’s journal, it identifies three factors accounting for the rising politicization of ethnicity in microlevel dynamics within the Trepça mining enterprise. First, the article points at ethnic grievances in intra-elite managerial tensions and miners’ unrest. It relates these to structural conditions generated by the shifting cultural divisions of labor in Kosovo mining. Second, the article looks at counter-mobilizational dynamics among Kosovo Albanian miners, which were directly provoked by Serbian ethnopolitical mobilization during Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power. In a final step, the article reconstructs socio-occupational realignments taking shape in the particular decision-making structures of the mining enterprise. Against a background of internal power struggles and reorganizations, the executive management and the miners found themselves on the defensive against party representatives and managerial competitors. Making use of the enterprise’s institutional setup, they established a strong ethnopolitical alliance, which culminated in the underground strike of February 1989. The article suggests that this approach can be valuable to study other cases of intersecting social and ethnopolitical mobilization.

The article analyses how Russian state-controlled media adapt narratives across their language versions to speak to specific national audiences. These media support the Kremlin by echoing its strategic narratives in the international arena. Our article stems from the assumption that the media tailor the narratives and do not deliver homogenous news. Texts published since the initial days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine were analyzed from Sputnik Czech Republic, Germany, and Sputnik World, known to spread the Russian regime’s propaganda. The central question was how the Russian regime depicted and explained the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 in the chosen languages. Qualitative coding based on a predefined codebook, modified with codes inductively acquired during the analysis, was used to deeply understand strategic narratives and identify key differences among the Russian regime’s influence campaigns in various national contexts. Some narratives were found to differ based on the national contexts, strengthening the initial assumption. However, analyzed texts also consistently depict Russia as a victim and the West as a threat across the language versions.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Georgia became a key destination for Russian migrants, who significantly influenced the local housing market. This article explores the impact of the influx of Russian migrants into Tbilisi, which caused a surge in rental prices and aroused feelings of social insecurity among Georgian citizens. Using qualitative methods, including social media analysis and semi-structured interviews, the study investigates the emergence of “informal sanctions” imposed by Georgian Airbnb and Booking.com hosts as a means of expressing political dissatisfaction with their own government and protecting national interests. This article identifies four patterns of informal sanctions, such as rejecting, discomforting, avoiding, and exploiting Russian tenants, which reflect a form of patriotism from below. We argue that these spontaneous, everyday practices of resistance lead to the politicization of mundane host-tenant relations and the collective stereotyping of a migrant group in a time of insecurity. The theoretical proposition here is that everyday nationalism is closely related to informality, which opens the possibility of examining grassroots responses to perceived threats and tactics of resistance, with implications for broader social dynamics in times of ongoing geopolitical conflict and wartime migration in Eastern Europe.

This article examines the unexpected revival of Rodina (Motherland), a nationalist party that had been suppressed in 2006 for its embrace of “orangist,” anti-Putin politics. Five years later, Rodina was relaunched in response to the crisis of the Medvedev–Putin “tandemocracy.” This article shows that Rodina played a central role in the Kremlin’s “managed nationalism,” which sought to direct the energies of Russian nationalists into loyalist channels. In particular, it illuminates three ways that Rodina facilitated collaboration between nationalists and the regime. First, it helped to integrate nationalists into the All-Russia Popular Front, the umbrella structure that was created as a vehicle for Putin’s return to the presidency. Second, it served as a counterrevolutionary force by drawing nationalists from the “white ribbon” protest movement into two Kremlin-supported initiatives: the “conservative turn” and a media campaign against non-Slavic immigration. And third, it acted as a proxy for the Russian state during the annexation of Crimea and the conflict in southeast Ukraine, recruiting nationalists to serve as separatists and cultivating the support of European radical nationalists. In these three ways, Rodina contributed both to Russia’s autocratization and to the growing influence of nationalist ideas in public discourse.

While historical narratives of the communist legitimation of power in Yugoslavia have often marginalized perspectives of lesser-known civil servants, this study highlights the crucial role of Dr. Rudolf Bićanić, a renowned Yugoslav economist. Departing from the diplomatic, foreign political, and military perspectives when investigating the Yugoslav émigré government actions, this article explores the ideas espoused, networks created, and actions performed by Bićanić across diverse transnational settings. Bićanić’s lens as a vice-governor of the Yugoslav National Bank demonstrates that the debates regarding the future social and economic policies shaped the transition process between the two Yugoslav states. Driven by a mission to enhance peasant living conditions in Yugoslavia, Bićanić embarked on a brief yet impactful governmental career from 1941 to 1945. The article posits that Bićanić’s anti-government propaganda disseminated through the United Committee of South Slavs and his financial malversations led to the transfer of economic and political legitimacy over Yugoslavia in April 1944 to the National Liberation Council. With this action, Bićanić accelerated the signing of the Tito-Šubašić agreement in June 1944, which empowered him to negotiate the post-war reconstruction aid and loans in Washington, DC, carving a unique path for Yugoslavia between socialism and capitalism.

The author examines Ľudovít Štúr (1815–1856), the main representative of the Slovak national movement in the 1840s, and his personal ethos in the struggle for the rights and freedom of the Slovak ethnic group. Štúr paid great attention to the development of the ethnic, social, and political awareness of Slovaks. In this effort, the Slovenskje národňje novini (Slovak National Newspaper) played an important role, through which Štúr and the representatives of the Slovak national movement shaped and spread its social and political program, the aim of which was both the fight against the national oppression of the Slovaks, but also the achievement of equal rights for the Slovak ethnic group in Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy.

The COVID-19 pandemic was a critical event that has challenged regionalist-secessionist parties to maintain their dominance at the regional level, because it has questioned the attractiveness of the idea of independence for the electorate. Nevertheless, the results of the regional elections 2021 in Catalonia and Scotland brought about the success of regionalist parties with secessionist demands. This study analyzes regionalist parties’ strategies in the 2021 regional elections in Catalonia and Scotland, advancing our understanding of their strategic choices to get/remain in office. This study employed the Regional Manifesto project methodological approach to perform a manual content analysis of party positioning and selective emphasis. Additionally, it advances the distinction between blurring and subsuming strategies through a frame analysis of electoral campaigns. The results suggest that regionalist parties mainly use subsuming and two-dimensional strategies to gain electoral success and that the exact strategic choices depend on the structure of the competition. The research confirms the framing of territorial demands primarily in socioeconomic rather than political terms, as proposed by the FraTerr Project. However, regionalist parties have avoided radicalizing their social demands owing to the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our article describes the lifecycle of Lithuania’s Electoral Action of Poles–Christian Families Alliance (LLRA-KŠS) party that has been a part of country’s political landscape for near 30 years. Despite its seemingly ethnic program, the party has a poor track record for delivering on its electoral promises. Yet, it has been continuously supported by the majority of Polish-speakers in Lithuania. The background of the nationalizing state, which encourages the party elites to conflate substantive representation with the signposting of ethnic identity in party politics, offers one of the reasons for the LLRA-KŠS’s electoral success. Although the party effectively consolidated its regional electorate, it came to control service delivery to their ethnic constituency by engaging in pork barrel politics. Poor performance in recent national and municipal elections put this strategy to bond with its voters into question, casting doubt on the LLRA-KŠS’s ability to survive as an ethnic party in the long term.