Emotions and their sociopolitical impact have received increasing scholarly attention. However, it remains largely unclear whether emotional expression within surveys is subject to social desirability bias. By drawing on impression management theory and the disclosure decision model, I argue that emotional expression is likely prone to social desirability bias in interviewer-administered survey modes and test my hypotheses on mixed-mode ANES data. The findings demonstrate that respondents significantly underreport negative emotions—anger and fear—when interviewed face-to-face as compared to online. Furthermore, positive emotions, such as hope and pride, are not exempt from biased reporting related to interview mode. These results highlight the risks of estimating emotions and their salience by either relying on interviewer administration or combining survey modes.

Congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives and voters’ policy preferences is fundamental to representation and democratic accountability. Can we anticipate a closer alignment between voters’ policy preferences and the policies explicitly adopted by elected representatives on the more electorally significant issues? We address this question using a simple game theoretic model, where we demonstrate that greater salience of a particular issue in elections leads to less congruence between the policies implemented by elected representatives compared to voters’ policy preferences on that very issue. This finding carries significant implications for the connection between electoral salience and representation on valence issues, and has particular relevance for understanding the democratic foundations of security and counterterrorism policies.

Industrial concentration has increased in recent years with large companies consolidating their dominant positions. Concentrated markets are thought to benefit large firms as they earn elevated profits and gain political influence. Antitrust law is the main policy tool to reduce concentration. Calls to strengthen antitrust have come from the political left and the right, yet we know little about public support for such policies. We test how economic, moral, and democratic concerns influence support for antitrust. We find that the public does not respond to the consumer price benefits of antitrust but is moved by arguments invoking concerns for fairness and the importance of maintaining democratic institutions. We find that Republicans and Democrats often respond in divergent ways, with Republicans being less supportive of antitrust when informed that it could punish successful companies, whereas Democrats are more concerned about using antitrust to curb corporate influence. The findings accord with a general concern on the left for limiting business influence in politics and a concern on the right for maintaining business growth.

When do citizens want a dominant political leader? A prominent Conflict-Sensitivity Hypothesis suggests such preferences arise during intergroup conflict, yet it remains untested in a real war. We report results from an experiment embedded in a two-wave panel survey with 1,081 Ukrainians (811 re-interviewed) at the start of Russia’s 2022 invasion. We find that respondents generally value competence and warmth over dominance in leaders. Yet, war increases preferences for dominance and reduces preferences for warmth and competence. Emotional reactions to war also relate to leader trait preferences: Ukrainians who react with aggressive emotions display enhanced preferences for all leader traits, whereas fearful reactions leave trait preferences mostly unaffected. These findings advance our understanding of how war shapes leader preferences.

Can the “us versus them” dynamic in politics undermine support for democracy even in the absence of strong party identification? While much is known about affective polarization in the USA, its impact on democratic commitment in other contexts remains understudied. We examine Chile’s 2022 plebiscite, where voters decided whether to approve or reject a new constitution amid low levels of party trust and identification. Through an experiment using an unobtrusive primer, we successfully induced short-term affective polarization, heightening animosity across multiple dimensions. Our findings show that individuals primed to this polarization significantly reduced their support for democracy, mirroring patterns observed in the USA. These results emphasize the importance of studying affective polarization, especially in regions with fragile democratic histories.

While we witness historic changes taking place in the conception and practice of citizenship, we know little about the political consequences it may bring. What are the effects of citizenship, as a status and a process, on political engagement? To gain leverage in addressing this question, we draw on citizenship categories that combine birthplace and the number of citizenship held. We compare US-born dual citizens to both naturalized-dual citizens and US-born mono citizens, which allows us to distinguish between the potential effects of socialization and the additional legal status. The study analyses two large nationally representative samples, presenting the first look at dual citizens in the United States. Results indicate that among dual citizens, those born in the US tend to participate more in politics than immigrants who naturalized. Among US-born citizens, the political participation of dual and mono citizens varies depending on the type of political activity. The study contributes to theoretical discussions on the relationship between an evolving citizenry and democratic participation.

Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.

In recent decades, activists and leaders of government and nongovernment organizations have increasingly and explicitly called for greater attention to human dignity in their efforts to promote pro-social relations. In this study, we investigate whether appeals to this core human value actually influence how individuals act with regard to those who might be otherwise ignored or neglected. Using the digital advertising platform on Facebook, we randomly assign ads to over 90,000 adult American users to estimate the effects of dignity appeals on their likelihood of engaging with content concerning people facing homelessness or incarceration. Consistent with preregistered hypotheses and specifications, we find that adding dignity appeals increases the likelihood of positive reactions to such ads, but only when the vulnerable are considered less “blameworthy” for their situation.

Recent research suggests that local exposure to refugees does not increase support for far-right parties. We challenge this null result by drawing on granular data from Berlin in the wake of the Syrian refugee crisis. While prior work in the German context has generally assumed that refugee exposure is exogenous at the local level, we demonstrate that refugee housing was disproportionately concentrated in neighborhoods with young, non-citizen residents. To address this selection bias, we harmonize in-person and mail-in precinct boundaries across elections and implement a difference-in-differences design with synthetic precincts. We find that localized exposure to refugee housing did increase support for the far-right in the 2017 federal elections. However, this backlash is geographically narrow in scope. Our findings nuance prior research by demonstrating that even if sociotropic concerns dominate electoral responses to the refugee crisis, voters’ responses are consistent with group threat theory at the local level.

The boom in survey experiments in international relations has allowed researchers to make causal inferences on longstanding foreign policy debates such as democratic peace, and audience costs. However, most of these experiments rely on mass samples, whereas foreign policy is arguably more technocratically driven. We probe the validity of generalizing from mass to elite preferences by exploring preferences of ordinary U.S. citizens and foreign policy experts (employees of the U.S. Department of State) in two identical conjoint experiments on democratic peace. We find that experts are not only more opposed to military actions against other democracies than members of the public—but also that overall preferences about the matters of war and peace are stronger among foreign policy professionals.

Research on economic voting shows that negative economic events typically reduce government support. However, we argue that external economic shocks may have the opposite effect: when faced with a foreign economic threat, voters will rally behind their government despite worsening economic perceptions. Using the unexpected collapse of Lehman Brothers (15 September 2008) as a case, we analyze European Social Survey data from six countries and find that while satisfaction with national economies declined, satisfaction with governments gradually rose. We document that rising media and political attention coincided with a rally effect fueled by past opposition voters and muted opposition elites. These findings demonstrate that foreign economic shocks influence democratic accountability and the ability of governments to act during hard times.

The increasing multimodality (e.g., images, videos, links) of social media data presents opportunities and challenges. But text-as-data methods continue to dominate as modes of classification, as multimodal social media data are costly to collect and label. Researchers who face a budget constraint may need to make informed decisions regarding whether to collect and label only the textual content of social media data or their full multimodal content. In this article, we develop five measures and an experimental framework to assist with these decisions. We propose five performance metrics to measure the costs and benefits of multimodal labeling: average time per post, average time per valid response, valid response rate, intercoder agreement, and classifier’s predictive power. To estimate these measures, we introduce an experimental framework to evaluate coders’ performance under text-only and multimodal labeling conditions. We illustrate the method with a tweet labeling experiment.

Hate speech is widely seen as a significant obstacle to constructive online discourse, but the most effective strategies to mitigate its effects remain unclear. We claim that understanding its distribution across users is key to developing and evaluating effective content moderation strategies. We address this missing link by first examining the distribution of hate speech in five original datasets that collect user-generated posts across multiple platforms (social media and online newspapers) and countries (Switzerland and the United States). Across these diverse samples, the vast majority of hate speech is produced by a small fraction of users. Second, results from a pre-registered field experiment on Twitter indicate that counterspeech strategies obtain only small reductions of future hate speech, mainly because this approach proves ineffective against the most prolific contributors of hate. These findings suggest that complementary content moderation strategies may be necessary to effectively address the problem.

Is an autocracy’s official rhetoric a reliable proxy for forecasting military escalation? While the conventional hands-tying mechanism argues that official rhetoric binds leaders to stated positions and limits their ability to back down, recent scholarship on bluster suggests that autocracies may employ hawkish rhetoric to justify de-escalation ex-post. This study evaluates these competing perspectives by analyzing China’s official rhetoric and military behavior in the Taiwan Strait from 2016 to 2022. Employing a word-embedding approach, I construct an original Chinese-language lexicon capturing implicit threats from over two million state-media articles. I show that increases in China’s implicit threats toward Taiwan are associated with a higher likelihood of military escalation, implying that official rhetoric conveys predictive information rather than mere cheap talk.

This study examines whether women politicians address violence against women (VAW) more effectively than their male counterparts at the local level in Mexico. Using a regression discontinuity design that leverages close mayoral elections, we find that women mayors reduce some of the most egregious violent crimes committed against women, with estimates suggesting a 64.7% reduction in homicides of women over their 3-year terms. As evidence of potential mechanisms, we find that women mayors actively work to combat VAW, appoint more women to leadership and support roles, and expand specialized services for crime victims. These findings suggest that women’s representation in local politics may be an important factor in advancing women’s safety.

Scholars know little about participation in consultative events such as town halls, and even less about newer modalities, such as telephone town halls. We study participation in such events with a large, randomized field trial in which Australian voters received varying invitations to a telephone town hall with their representative. In addition to invitations framed prospectively or retrospectively, a control condition provided no rationale for participation. Surprisingly, the control group had higher acceptance rates than retrospective for both events, and for prospective in May. After accounting for this, treatment groups remained on the call longer, significantly for prospective in July. We see no differences by gender, but the youngest cohort had higher acceptance rates in the prospective condition than in the control for both events.

How did the COVID-19 outbreak affect citizens’ democratic preferences? Were the changes persistent or temporary? We track a representative sample of Spanish citizens before, during, and after the pandemic, with eight survey waves from January 2020 to January 2024. We compare democratic attitudes before and after the pandemic with individual fixed effects models. We identify a sharp increase in preferences for technical rather than ideological policy-making at the very onset of the pandemic, as well as significant changes in voters’ preferences for competent rather than honest politicians. These changes are sudden and persistent over 4 years. Using a set of repeated survey experiments, we also document a widespread willingness to sacrifice rights and freedoms to deal with the pandemic as compared to other global threats, such as international terrorism and climate change. But this effect quickly faded over time. Overall, we identify significant changes in democratic attitudes during the pandemic and a durable shift in technocratic preferences that outlived the pandemic, setting the conditions for the long-term legacies of COVID-19 on democracy.