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The identification of factors influencing emotional adjustment after injury may elucidate the design of assessment and treatment procedures in emergency medicine settings and suggest targets for early intervention to prevent the later development of psychological impairment. Personal, social, and material resources may be influential factors and require further evaluation.
Hypotheses:
Greater experiential avoidance, social constraints on discussing the trauma experience, and loss of material resources would be associated with more of the symptoms of posttraumatic stress and depression following traumatic injury.
Methods:
Participants (n = 47) at a mean of 7.4 months post-injury, completed a telephone interview assessment, including evaluation of sociodemographic characteristics, conservation of resources, social constraints, acceptance and commitment, and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and depression. Hypotheses were tested using multivariate regression analyses.
Results:
Only greater social constraints were uniquely predictive of greater PTSD symptomatology. Higher levels of experiential avoidance, social constraints, and loss of material resources all were associated with greater levels of depression.
Conclusion:
Assessment of personal coping style, receptivity of social network, and loss of potential material resources following traumatic injury may facilitate identification of individuals at-risk for poorer post-injury adaptation. Psychosocial interventions targeting such individuals may be promising.
Since the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction or other industrial chemicals present worldwide security and health concerns. On-scene medical triage and treatment in such events is crucial to save as many lives as possible and minimize the deleterious effects of the toxic agent involved. Since there are many chemicals that can be used as potential terrorist weapons, the medical challenge for the emergency medical services (EMS) is a combination of: (1) recognizing that a chemical terrorist attack (non-conventional) has occurred; and (2) identifying the toxic agent followed by proper antidotal treatment. The latter must be done as quickly as possible, preferably on-scene. The most valuable decision at this stage should be whether the agent is organophosphate (OP) or not OP, based on clinical findings observed by pre-trained, first responders. This decision is crucial, since only OP intoxication has readily available, rapidly acting, onscene, specific agents such as atropine and one of the oximes, preferably administered using autoinjectors. Due to the lack of a specific antidote, exposure to other agents (such as industrial chemicals, e.g., chlorine, bromide, or ammonia) should be treated on-scene symptomatically with non-specific measures, such as decontamination and supportive treatment. This paper proposes an algorithm as a cognitive framework for the medical teams on-scene. This algorithm should be part of the medical team's training for preparedness for chemical terrorist attacks, and the team should be trained to use it in drills. Implementing this path of thinking should improve the medical outcome of such an event.
In 2003, a major power outage occurred in the midwest and northeast United States affecting some 50 million people. The power outages affected multiple systems in state and local municipalities and, in turn, affected public health.
Methods:
Semi-structured interviews were conducted using open-ended questionnaires, with a convenience sample of state- and locally selected subject matter experts from Ohio, Michigan, and New York. Respondents were interviewed in groups representing one of five areas of interest, including: (1) emergency preparedness; (2) hospital and emergency medical services; (3) municipal environmental systems; (4) public health surveillance and epidemiology; and (5) psychosocial and behavioral issues. The reported positive and negative impacts of the power outage on public health, medical services, and emergency preparedness and response were documented. Responses were categorized into common themes and recommendations were formulated.
Results:
The amount of time that the respondents' locations were without power ranged from <1 hour to 52 hours. Many common themes emerged from the different locations, including communications failures, alternate power source problems, manpower and training issues, and psychosocial concerns. There was minimal morbidity and mortality reported that could be attributed to the event.
Conclusion:
Power outages negatively impacted multiple municipal infrastructures, and affected medical services, emergency response, and public health efforts. Previous federal funding positively impacted public health and emergency response capabilities. Recommendations were made based upon the common themes identified by the respondents.
Recommendations may assist state and local health departments, medical service providers, and emergency responders in planning for future power outage problems.
No universally accepted methods for objective evaluation of the function of the Incident Command System (ICS) in disaster exercises currently exist. An ICS evaluation method for disaster simulations was derived and piloted.
Methods:
A comprehensive variable list for ICS function was created and four distinct ICS evaluation methods (quantitative and qualitative) were derived and piloted prospectively during an exercise. Delay times for key provider-victim interactions were recorded through a system of data collection using participant and observer-based instruments. Two different post exercise surveys (commanders, other participants) were used to assess knowledge and perceptions of assigned roles, organization, and communications. Direct observation by trained observers and a structured debriefing session also were employed.
Results:
A total of 45 volunteers participated in the exercise that included 20 mock victims. First, mean, and last victim delay times (from exercise initiation) were 2.1, 4.0, and 9.3 minutes (min) until triage, and 5.2, 11.9, and 22.0 min for scene evacuation, respectively. First, mean, and last victim delay times to definitive treatment were 6.0, 14.5, and 25.0 min. Mean time to triage (and range) for scene Zones I (nearest entrance), II (intermediate) and III (ground zero) were 2.9 (2.0–4.0), 4.1 (3.0–5.0) and 5.2 (3.0–9.0) min, respectively. The lowest acuity level (Green) victims had the shortest mean times for triage (3.5 min), evacuation (4.0 min), and treatment (10.0 min) while the highest acuity level (Red) victims had the longest mean times for all measures; patterns consistent with independent rather than ICS-directed rescuer activities. Specific ICS problem areas were identified.
Conclusions:
A structured, objective, quantitative evaluation of ICS function can identify deficiencies that can become the focus for subsequent improvement efforts.
WHO Special Report: Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia
This is a summary of the proceedings of the Conference on the Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia that was convened by the sunami World Health Organization in Phuket, Thailand from 04–06 May 2005. It contains reviews of the experiences of the health sector and early recovery fol following the Earthquake and Tsunami with emphasis onwhat was done well and what could have been done better and the lessons learned that can be incorporated into actions that will mitigate the damage created by future events. It outlines the national and international responses and recovery and the actions taken and not taken by the international community in support of the countries affected. Specific issuesaddressed include: (1) needs assessments; (2) coordi- coordination; (3) filling gaps in essential services, and (4) capacity building at the country level. Each of these aspects is analyzed as to its: (1) appropriateness; (2) adequacy; (3) effectiveness; (4) efficiency; and (5) connectedness.
Much of what occurred provided benefits to the stricen population, but there is substantial room for improvement through implementation of the lessons learned. These lessons must be converted into actions in order to mitigate the damagesustained and to enhance our responses to the damage from future
The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (Hospital Emergency Incident Command System), nowin its third edition, has emerged asa popular incident command system model for hospital emergency response in the United States and other countries. Since the inception of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in 1991, several events have transformed the requirements of hospital emergency management, including the 1995 Tokyo Subway sarin attack, the 2001 US anthrax letter attacks, and the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreaks in eastern Asia and Toronto, Canada.
Several modifications of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System are suggested to match the needs of hospital emergency management today, including: (1) an Incident Consultant in the Administrative Section of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System to provide expert advice directly to the Incident Commander in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) emergencies as needed, as well as consultation on mental health needs; (2) new unit leaders in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of contaminated or infectious patients in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear emergencies; (3) new unit leaders in theOperations Section to coordinate mental health support for patients, guests, healthcare workers, volunteers, anddependents in terrorismrelated emergencies or events that produce significant mental health needs; (4) a new Decedent/Expectant Unit Leader in the Operations Section to coordinate the management of both types ofpatients together; and (5) a new Information Technology Unit Leader in the Logistics Section to coordinate the management of information technology and systems.
New uses of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System in hospital emergency management also are recommended, including: (1) the adoption of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System as the conceptual framework for organizing all phases of hospital emergency management, including mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; and (2) the application of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System not only to healthcare facilities, but also to healthcare systems.
Finally, three levels of healthcare worker competencies in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemare suggested: (1) basic understanding of the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System for all hospital healthcare workers; (2) advanced understanding and proficiency in the Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systemfor hospital healthcare workers likely to assume leadership roles in hospital emergency response; and (3) special proficiency in constituting the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System ad hoc from existing healthcare workers in resource-deficient settings. The Hospital Emergency Incident Command System should be viewed asa work in progress that will mature as additional challenges arise and ashospitals gain further experience with its use.
This is the text for the Opening Address for the Conference, Health Aspects of the Tsunami Disaster in Asia, convened by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Phuket, Thailand, 04-06 May 2005. The frightening reality of the costs (human and material) must be balanced by what has been and can be learned that, if applied, can make the world more resilient for the next event. At the time of this Conference, we are moving from response to recovery. The immediate conclusion relates to the consequences of the realization of a truly interdependent world. Given the huge resourcesmade available, there is an increased need for accountability. Several factors will bear heavily on the outcomes: (1) risk of loss of momentum; (2) ensuring that no gaps in services occur; (3) ensuring that already marginalized communities do not become forgotten or even more marginalized; (4) support and respect of national leadership; (5) commit to enhanced coordination; and (6) develop mechanisms for joint and shared assessments. The available resources must be used to stablize the livelihoods of people for years. Lastly, the reliability and sustainability of the important contributions of the military and the commercial private sectors for future events must be established