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COUNTERFACTUALS AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 July 2017

PETER FRITZ*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas, University of Oslo
JEREMY GOODMAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Southern California
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, CLASSICS, HISTORY OF ART AND IDEAS UNIVERSITY OF OSLO POSTBOKS 1020 BLINDERN 0315 OSLO, NORWAY E-mail: peter.fritz@ifikk.uio.no
† DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 3709 TROUSDALE PARKWAY LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA, USA 90089 E-mail: jeremy.goodman@usc.edu
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Abstract

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This article explores the connection between two theses: the principle of conditional excluded middle for the counterfactual conditional, and the claim that it is a contingent matter which (coarse grained) propositions there are. Both theses enjoy wide support, and have been defended at length by Robert Stalnaker. We will argue that, given plausible background assumptions, these two principles are incompatible, provided that conditional excluded middle is understood in a certain modalized way. We then show that some (although not all) arguments for conditional excluded middle can in fact be extended to motivate this modalized version of the principle.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017