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FIELD’S SAVING TRUTH FROM PARADOX: SOME THINGS IT DOESN’T DO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 July 2011

DONALD A. MARTIN*
Affiliation:
Departments of Mathematics and Philosophy, University of California, Los Angeles
*
*DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES, 520 PORTOLA PLAZA, BOX 951555, LOS ANGELES, CA 90095–1555
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Abstract

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I will discuss Field’s book mainly by comparison with Saul Kripke’s Outline of a Theory of Truth. I will point out important properties of Kripke’s “least fixed point” that are absent from Field’s constructions and theory. I do this not to demean Field’s superb work on truth but rather to suggest that there may be no really satisfactory conditional connective for languages containing their own truth predicates.

Information

Type
Author meets his critics Forum
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2011