Hostname: page-component-7b7567c8c-tnkh4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-17T16:06:11.941Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

REDUCING COMPOSITIONAL TO DISQUOTATIONAL TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2009

VOLKER HALBACH*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy New College, University of Oxford
*
*NEW COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD, FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY, OX1 3BN OXFORD, UK E-mail:volker.halbach@new.ox.ac.uk
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the 'Save PDF' action button.

Disquotational theories of truth, that is, theories of truth based on the T-sentences or similar equivalences as axioms are often thought to be deductively weak. This view is correct if the truth predicate is allowed to apply only to sentences not containing the truth predicate. By taking a slightly more liberal approach toward the paradoxes, I obtain a disquotational theory of truth that is proof theoretically as strong as compositional theories such as the Kripke–Feferman theory, although it doesn’t probe the compositional axioms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2009