The Security Network and Its Facets

The most significant sphere in which Israel's Security Network is manifest is the political society. From 1948 onward, but more conspicuously since 1967 because of Israel's overwhelming military victory, actors within the DE and its retirees have effectively monopolized the definition of, and the setting of priorities regarding, Israel's national security, the allocation of state resources, and other political, social, and economic matters. At the same time, retired and serving security officials penetrated, merged with, and established close links with actors in Israel's political and bureaucratic sectors on both the national and local levels. Fourteen retired army officers were elected as heads of municipalities in 1993, seventeen were elected in 1998, and nineteen were elected in 2003 (many others serve in other capacities in most municipalities). Thus, an article in the IDF Veterans Association bulletin contended: “No doubt, there is a clear recognition of the managerial and executive capacities of IDF retirees in the municipalities, on all levels and positions. These retirees continue to contribute to Israel's public affairs, as they were educated and experienced in the school of the IDF.”²²

The second sphere where the impact of the Network is apparent is Israel's civil society. One example is the movements in the realm of national security, such as the left-leaning Council for Peace and Security (CPS) and the rightist Security and Peace, which despite their political differences nonetheless share the view that the DE itself is beyond criticism. Thus, when Chief of Staff (CS) Moshe Yaalon was invited to speak before the CPS in August 2004 and one of its members criticized the IDF and its CS for what he described as their immoral conduct vis-à-vis the Palestinians, nearly all his colleagues attempted to silence him.²³

The Network's third facet is its role in Israel's economy, where the DE presides over large industries and effectively controls vast public resources. The DE controls approximately half of Israel's land resources and a significant part of its airwaves,²⁴

and according to a recent article, “defense products and systems account for 32 percent of Israeli industrial exports.”²⁵ In addition, many retired security officials serve as directors of large public and private firms, and under their influence and directorship, substantial segments of private industry have become security oriented. This factor considerably influences Israel's foreign policy and global orientation; thus, it has established close relationships with countries such as Singapore, South Africa, Turkey, Slovenia, and, more recently, with China and India, all of which have purchased Israeli weapons, obtained training by Israeli experts, and in certain cases conducted joint research projects with Israel's DE. In recent years, Israeli sales of military equipment to India and China created severe tensions with the United States.²⁶

The fourth sphere where Israel's Security Network has been visible is the public discourse on national security as well as the formulation of the country's educational policies. In addition to the military censorship on all items dealing with national security, because of the predominance of the Network and their dependence on it for continuous flow of information, journalists generally exercise self-restraint, and military correspondents in both state-owned and private radio and TV channels, who depend almost entirely on the DE for information, more often than not reflect its positions and serve as it unofficial spokesmen.²⁷

At the same time, those analyzing the DE more critically—who are, of course, not part of the Network—are subject to pressures.²⁸ The area of public education, in turn, features several groups led by former security officials that advocate reforms, often stressing the causal linkage between the performance of Israel's educational system and its national security (see below).

Because of the informal nature of Israel's Security Network and its behind the scenes activities and because of the frequent changes in its composition due to old age, death, and loss of stature, it is difficult to determine the exact number of its members at a given time, provide an accurate description of its structure, or present a full assessment of its impact. Nevertheless, the next section presents some telling evidence regarding its size in the Knesset and the government.

How the DE Monopolized Israel's National Security Policies

This section discusses the process whereby Israel's Security Network came to play a pivotal part in determining the state's national security policy. As we suggest, in some instances this resulted in more bellicose behavior by Israel toward its neighbors. However, what is more important is how Israel's national security became monopolized by “experts,” who effectively marginalized other actors from “their” turf. Indeed, whereas during the first two decades of independence conflicts occurred mainly between civilian and military leaders, the conflicts that took place since 1967 were, in many cases, within the Network itself.

As noted by historians and sociologists, because of an inherent continuity in its historical development, any discussion of the process of state formation in Israel and the making of its political society and civil society, including the relationship between its civilian and military realms, must begin with the Yishuv during the last two decades before 1948.⁴¹

This observation also applies to the structure and roles of the Yishuv's military forces. The emphasis here is on the latter and their penetration into and shaping of the political, social, economic, and discursive subsystems of the Yishuv.

Until World War II, the Yishuv mainstream (“Organized Yishuv”) established and commanded two paramilitary organizations, Haganah and Palmach, whereas the Revisionists (extremist nationalist movement) had two autonomous organizations, Etzel and Lehi. These forces were relatively small, utterly dependent on the relevant parties and political institutions, and reliant on few “professionals,” mostly volunteers. Except for certain, quite primitive weapons production and storage facilities, they did not penetrate other subsystems of the Yishuv.

This pattern had changed during the latter stages of World War II, and more so in the years immediately preceding 1948. This expansion and penetration began during the period when David Ben-Gurion, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, assumed the political responsibility for the security of the Yishuv in general and for running the Haganah and the Palmach in particular. The other senior positions in the DE were held, however, by more junior politicians, not professional fighters. This finding meant that, until that point, and except for tactical decisions pertaining to military clashes with the British or the Palestinians, the politicians firmly controlled the militias. It also meant that the “professional” military commanders were authorized to deal mostly with pure security matters.

The personnel changes in the command of the Yishuv defense forces were accompanied by three major developments. The first was that Jewish soldiers, who had served in the British army during World War II, began joining these forces, especially the Haganah. Ben-Gurion, who respected their professional capabilities, encouraged this trend. In turn, it marked the beginning of the professionalization of the commanding ranks, particularly of this purportedly nonpoliticized organization. The second development was that there was a significant increase in manpower, material resources, purchase of weapon systems, and equipment for these organizations, and hence a significant increase in budgetary allocations. The third interconnected development was a gradual penetration of the defense organizations into other subsystems of the Yishuv—especially the production and procurement of arms and the establishment of various facilities such as camouflaged weapons storage caches, camps, offices, and research and development.⁴²

Thus, to all intents and purposes, it was during that period (from the early 1940s up to 1948) that what we call the Security Network was created, began to spread, and became active in various civilian subsystems of the Yishuv. Although purportedly Ben-Gurion was running the show, actually an increasing number of functionaries, especially “professional” military persons and civilian officials, became intimately involved in policymaking and decision making. Their activities helped extend the Network and its impact.

The 1948 war only expedited these processes. The simultaneous dismantling of all four underground militias, their partly voluntary and partly imposed amalgamation and the establishment of the IDF, the rapid substantial increase in the latter's size, and the growing size and importance of the secret services (which became known as the Mossad and Shin Bet), on the one hand, and the transformation of the Yishuv's political and bureaucratic institutions into state agencies, and the retirement of several young officers, on the other hand, created organizations that developed autonomously. One pattern did not change, however: the very intimate informal connections between security and politics. Because each of the four prestate militias had been organized by a political group or institution that held firm ideological views, their members generally shared these ideologies. In other words, since those early days of Israel, there have been inherently close links between ideology, politics, and military service. This pattern was maintained in the newly established IDF and the secret services, where certain units were “reserved” for members of certain political movements. It created a tradition of deep involvement of Israel's DE in ideological debates that determined the state's politics, to the point that this was perceived as natural and legitimate.⁴³

Rather than in peace agreements, the 1948 war ended in Armistice Agreements between Israel and its neighbors. This unfortunate ending from an Israeli perspective created an ingrained perception that the new state would rely on its sword for many years to come. The frequent clashes with Arab states and the Palestinians that occurred later fostered a persistent Israeli self-image of a state facing a continuous existential threat and being under siege.

This situation was advantageous to the DE, because it entailed a permanent need for its expertise, and the result was the investment of enormous resources in its agencies in the following decades. The unbeatable combination of Israeli political–military–economic isolation that fostered a strong sense of the need for self-reliance, the persistent image of continuous existential threat, and the substantial resources placed at the disposal of the DE, created the foundations for the expanding informal autonomy of the latter and its domineering involvement in matters far beyond the strict defense issues. An early proof of the IDF's deep involvement in most civil spheres and its disregard for due procedures is supplied by the protocol of an Israeli cabinet meeting in November 1948, just six months after the state's establishment. During the meeting, minister after minister, virtually all of them, bitterly complained about the IDF's penetration into their civilian areas of responsibility, and its acting according to its commanders' whims. Thus, the minister of transportation complained about the IDF constructing roads and airstrips wherever it had chosen; the minister of agriculture bemoaned the IDF building camps and holding military exercises on agricultural lands without the ministry's approval; and the minister of finance charged that the IDF had far exceeded the budgetary allocations approved by the cabinet and the Knesset.⁴⁴

At the same time, the IDF increased and established its predominance in the spheres of strategic and tactical planning in the intertwined areas of defense and foreign relations, in effect marginalizing the Foreign Ministry.⁴⁵

Concurrently, the secret services, chiefly the Shin Bet, became the main source for information, assessment, and policymaking regarding Israel's Palestinian citizens. Since 1967, they have performed the same functions vis-à-vis the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

The strength of Israel's DE in the early decades of independence is demonstrated by its ability to act autonomously of the politicians. During the 1948 war, various offensive operations and strategic and tactical moves were planned and implemented by the IDF, and the same applies to the moves leading to various periods of ceasefire, their actual beginning and ending. Only some of the operations conducted during that war had been previously discussed and approved by the cabinet. Moreover, most military operations were of the “rolling” type, leaving the IDF with plenty of room for maneuver vis-à-vis both the political leaders and its Arab opponents. Ending the military operations that had been approved by the cabinet, in many cases, was decided by the IDF. Thus, only after immense pressure did the IDF acquiesce to the politicians' orders to withdraw from the areas it had occupied in the northern part of the Sinai and the Gaza Strip.⁴⁶

During the 1950s, it was the IDF that initiated and executed dozens of limited and extensive retaliatory operations. Frequently, the attempts, for example, of Israel's moderate Prime Minister (PM), Sharett, to control and limit these retaliatory actions failed. The army's goal was to push the Arab states and Israel toward a war, and these retaliations indeed paved the way to the 1956 war. In fact, the IDF's initial combative moves in the Sinai that opened the war were never approved by the politicians; they were planned and executed according to the ideas and inclinations of CS Moshe Dayan, and some of his generals, especially Ariel Sharon.⁴⁷

Similarly, in the last phase of the 1967 war, IDF generals did not heed the cabinet's instructions to avoid reaching the bank of the Suez Canal.⁴⁸ Establishing the ceasefire line on the bank of the Canal, which obstructed the free passage of commercial ships, was among the causes for the War of Attrition in 1969–70.⁴⁹ The casualties inflicted on Israel during that war, in turn, led to the construction of the Bar-Lev Line, a massive system of fortifications along the waterline that offered lucrative contracts to Israel's leading construction firms but eventually had disastrous results in the 1973 war. During that war too, military commanders, once again especially Sharon, disregarded orders coming from the civilian leaders, particularly concerning the offensive over the Suez Canal with the purpose of carrying the war to its western bank.⁵⁰

In the mid-1970s, members of the Security Network were active in forging Israel's policy toward Lebanon (see below). Rather than the civilian politicians, members of the Security Network were mainly responsible for the initiative of bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, for which, according to David Ivry, then Israeli air force commander, the military had been preparing for a long time.⁵¹

Israel's invasion into Lebanon in June 1982 was yet another example of an initiative primarily taken by the IDF, in close cooperation with the defense minister and the Mossad. Although there were differences among these actors (e.g., regarding Israel's alliance with the Phalanges), all shared the view that war was in Israel's best interest. Thus, Defense Minister Sharon, a veteran Network member, and CS Rafael Eytan misled PM Menachem Begin, the cabinet, the Knesset, and the general public about the war's true purposes: to reach Beirut, establish a pro-Israeli government there, expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Syria from Lebanon, and take control of its southern part.⁵² The role of the Security Network in determining Israel's Lebanese policy in the war's aftermath was also pivotal (see later).

The same pattern continued to govern the IDF's behavior during the two Palestinian Intifadas. During the first Intifada in 1987, it was the IDF that determined the tactics intended to quell the Palestinian uprising. The IDF, which made no secret of its combative preparations since the Oslo Agreement of 1993, also played the critical role in the escalation in 2000, which stemmed, at least in part, from its policy of massive retaliation against Palestinian demonstrators.⁵³

During the second Intifada, it was the DE, with the vocal encouragement of members of the Network (e.g., Uzi Dayan, former head of the National Security Council), which determined the route of the Separation Barrier built in the West Bank but without consulting key civilian players such as the Office of the State Attorney at the Ministry of Justice. The result was not only a barrier that caused much suffering to the Palestinians living in its proximity, but also one that had to be altered occasionally with great expenses and which was difficult to defend before the Israeli Supreme Court and the International Court of Justice at The Hague.⁵⁴

Four episodes in Israel's military history demonstrate the problematic relations between the IDF and members of the Network, on the one hand, and the civilian politicians, on the other hand. First there was the “generals' revolt” against the politicians' control over the military during the 1948 war.⁵⁵

Then there was the second “revolt,” on the eve of the 1967 war, when the general staff demanded to launch a preemptive war and PM Eshkol wanted to pursue a diplomatic solution first. Outraged by Eshkol's “hesitancy,” members of the IDF general staff, with the active support of other Network members, practically forced him to appoint former CS Dayan as defense minister, in what was later termed a “quasi-military coup.”⁵⁶ Eshkol's coalition was also enlarged to include the Likud, and Israel's first National Unity Government was formed. This move legitimized the Likud, which had been in opposition for two decades, and contributed to its ascendance to hegemonic power a decade later. A third episode is what Peri calls the “Democratic Putsch of 1999.”⁵⁷ During the elections held that year, numerous members of the Network, including approximately a hundred retired army officers, joined hands to replace PM Benjamin Netanyahu with “one of their own”—former CS Ehud Barak. This action, which some consider to be legitimate,⁵⁸ in fact represented a successful attempt by the Network to mobilize its members to preserve its hegemonic role in the political society, against the backdrop of a supporting public that considered military leaders to be far more credible than their civilian counterparts.⁵⁹ The fourth case, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, is discussed below.

However, the growing involvement of the Security Network in making war and the way the conflicts between Israeli military and civilian leaders over the best ways to conduct wars were replaced by conflicts within a predominant Network are only part of the picture. The other side of the same coin is the decisive involvement of serving and retired army generals and other security officials in negotiations with Israel's Arab neighbors.

Again, this pattern can be traced back to Ben-Gurion, his cabinet, and the role of the IDF command in 1948–49. Many generals (Dayan, Yigal Alon, Yitzhak Rabin, Yehoshafat Harkabi, Mordechai Maklef, and others) actively participated in the armistice talks, leaving their fingerprints on most agreements on Israel's interim borders. Military officers also participated—and dominated—the armistice commissions formed in 1949.⁶⁰

This pattern persisted during the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, for example, retired General Aharon Yariv was instrumental in the talks with the Egyptians at the end of the 1973 war. Although CS Mordechai Gur was skeptical of President Sadat's intentions in the late 1970s, retired generals Dayan and Ezer Weizman played a significant role in reaching the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978.⁶¹

Later, in the 1990s and early in this decade, other generals, such as Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Uzi Dayan, and Uri Saguy, actively participated in most of the talks with Jordan and Syria, as well as in various contacts with the Palestinians. Again, their role was not limited to discussing security issues, but also to legitimizing the talks. This was particularly evident in the Israeli–Palestinian track, where security officials gradually took over the negotiations, replacing the civilians who initiated the Oslo process. In this case, the result was a peace agreement with an overly strong emphasis on security matters. In the course of this process, retired security officials (e.g., former Shin Bet official Yossi Ginosar) even assumed the role of special emissaries to the Palestinian leadership.

More recently, security officials participated in the talks concerning the U.S.-sponsored “roadmap,” whereas others took part in drafting the unofficial Geneva Accord. The public criticism of the Sharon government's policy vis-à-vis the Territories by four former Shin Bet directors in November 2003—which, yet again, is best explained as an intra-Network conflict—is also illustrative.⁶²

This intensive involvement attests to the DE's considerable influence on Israeli public discourse and behind the scenes decision making. Indeed, in present-day Israel, security officials are deemed indispensable not only for their professional expertise, but also because only they can legitimize war and peace.⁶³

The Growing Involvement of Retired Security Officials in Israel's Politics

Before 1955, the year that Israel's seventh cabinet was formed, not a single former security official served in its government.⁶⁴

Then, during the period 1955–61, there was one former security official, and in the period 1961–67, two. In the latter two periods, retired security officials served as ministers of transportation, agriculture, and labor. However, in June 1967, an important change occurred: the National Unity Government, formed during the “Waiting Period” that preceded the war, not only had three former security officials but also featured them in the positions of deputy Prime Minister (Yigal Alon) and Defense Minister (Dayan). The next cabinet (1969–74) also had three retired security officials, whereas the next three cabinets, which followed the 1973 war and governed up until 1981, had five each. By then, former security officials were in charge of more areas, including trade, industry and development, and information. In the 1974–77 period, a former CS, Rabin, served as Israel's PM for the first time. In the second and third Likud governments (1981–84), there were three and four former security officials, respectively. The three National Unity governments that followed (1984–90) included six, six, and seven former security officials, respectively. By now, former security officials served as ministers of education, science and development/technology, communication, health, foreign affairs, police, and, of course, defense. The fourth Likud government (1990–92) and the subsequent Labor government (1992–95) each had five retired security officials, and the next two cabinets—first Labor and then Likud—had four each. The number of former security officials in the next cabinet (1999–2001) again jumped to seven: the PM (Barak), who also served as defense minister, two of his three deputies, and the ministers of communication, housing, science, culture and sport, tourism, transportation, industry and trade, and regional development. Israel's next cabinet, the National Unity Government (2001–3), had six former security officials, and the current cabinet (2003–) started off with four and, at the time of writing, has six.

Examining the post of prime minister also yields interesting results. Before 1992, only two PMs (Rabin and Peres) had a significant background in the DE, whereas all others were party functionaries. However, since 1992, only one PM (Netanyahu, 1996–99) had a modest security background (he compensated for this by appointing general Yitzhak Mordechai as his defense minister), whereas all other contenders for the job were retired security officials. This development was preceded by the monopolization of the position of defense minister by former security officials since 1967. Indeed, with the exception of Begin (May 1980–August 1981), this position has never since been conferred on anyone without significant experience in security matters. It should be mentioned in this regard that the cooling off period after the retirement of former officers and before entering the political and bureaucratic arenas was always short; but during the past two decades it has become even shorter and some security officials became ministers, MKs, and senior functionaries in both the public and private sectors immediately after their retirement.

Several interesting conclusions can be gleaned from these data. In the early decades of independence, former security officials were by and large absent from the state's highest formal policymaking body, the cabinet, in which civilians—mostly party officials—were predominant. This is not to say, however, that security officials did not have major impact on policymaking in that period (discussed earlier).

In the same way that the 1967 war had accelerated the “securitization” of Israel's cabinets, the Lebanese War expedited it from 1984. Again, the immediate political context was the formation of the second National Unity Government, which evinced the inability of the two major parties to go at it alone. Indeed, during the crises of 1967 and 1984 (and, to some extent, in 2001), national unity was deemed a virtue, and those representing it best were former security officials, who were appointed to key government positions. This finding suggests that the historical pattern of civil–military relations in Israel, at least since 1967, has ceased to be conflictual: the growing penetration of retired security officials into the political society has ultimately reshaped it, and struggles over security policies now occurred within the DE and/or among different actors in the Security Network.

Since 1992, that is, in the wake of the first Intifada and the Gulf War, a similar process has taken place. Not only was the DE not confronted for its inability to crush the Palestinian revolt (or deter Iraq from launching some forty missiles at civilian targets in Israel in 1991), but Rabin, the figure most associated with the army's predicament in 1987, became the country's PM and defense minister. The same applies to Sharon, the PM at the time of writing. This finding suggests that ups and downs in the performance of Israel's DE were not a crucial factor in determining who would be appointed as defense minister or as PM. The growth of Israel's Security Network and its penetration into the political realm, in other words, was not a function of the success of a particular defense policy but, rather, stemmed from the relative power of the DE compared with the weakness of the political parties.

These conclusions are reinforced when examining Israel's legislature. The number of MKs with security backgrounds rose from 0 percent in the period 1948–51, 2.5– 3.4 percent in 1955–65, and 4.1 percent in 1965–74, to 8.3 percent in 1974–77 (and again in 1981–84), to 12.5 percent in 1977–81, and to a steady 10–11.6 percent since 1984.⁶⁵

Ideologically and because of their military service, which creates certain behavioral patterns, retired security officials were, perhaps not surprisingly, inclined toward the more hawkish poll of the political spectrum, although there were exceptions. Thus, although a few did join smaller parties—with more representing left-wing parties in the period 1974–81 and 1984–88, and more representing right-wing parties in 1981–84 and since 1988—the majority have joined parties located at the center of Israel's political spectrum, particularly Labor (five to six MKs since 1965), Likud (two to three MKs since 1974, except the period 1977–81 when it had four MKs) and various center parties (most notably Dash with five MKs in 1977). In fact, security officials sometimes approached, or were courted by, both Labor and Likud, ultimately accepting the highest bid. This was the case, for example, with former army generals Sharon, Mordechai, Shaul Mofaz, and ex-Shin Bet official Ehud Yatom, who wavered and finally joined the Likud, and former generals Ephraim Sneh, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Matan Vilnai, Amram Mitzna, and Dani Yatom, who wavered and joined the Labor. Other former generals, like Yigael Yadin, Meir Amit, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and others, were instrumental in Israel's short-lived center parties in the 1977 and 1999 elections. Because of this pattern of affiliation and thanks to their hawkish positions, former security officials had much better chances to influence policymaking in a political system that has been dominated by the two largest parties and their coalitional partners, especially when national security matters continued to be paramount.

How do these processes fit two other significant developments in Israel in recent decades: first, the change in political views toward right-wing and ultrareligious ideologies and parties; second, the growing emphasis on individualism and the rapid dismantling of the welfare state? As we have seen, the number of former security officials joining right-wing parties since 1988 has been higher than those in leftist parties, and since 1984, it has been equal to, or slightly higher than, the number of those joining Likud. It could also be argued that the Network has adapted itself to, and perhaps encouraged, both processes. On both the political and socioeconomic levels, retired security personnel who joined center-right–wing or right-wing parties legitimized these parties.⁶⁶

However, former security officials also benefited from and enhanced the second development: with their own economic status assured (see later), they could use their careers in the DE as a springboard to senior positions.

Ramifications

As suggested by the above discussion, the expansion of Israel's Security Network through the years has hindered the ability of “pure” civilian institutions to control it and counter its influence on its democratic regime.⁶⁷

This situation is even more noticeable when considering the various dimensions of the Network, that is, the linkage between actors operating within the DE and Israel's politics, society, economy, and the public discourse. Even after the glamour of the DE began to fade as a result of its debacles in the 1973 and 1982 wars and the two Intifadas, the participation of its retired officials in these spheres did not decline. Indeed, our data suggests that the Network is still spreading, not least because of the well-established practice of “a friend brings a friend,” Israel's version of the old-boy network. One explanation for this is that security officials who take on civilian posts find it easier to perform when joined by their former colleagues to whom they remain loyal even after retirement. Indeed, retired security officials have come to one another's help in their time of need, including testifying in courts on their behalf (e.g., former Defense Ministers Sharon and Mordechai), holding ceremonies in their honor in military facilities after they were convicted (e.g., retired IDF colonel and Mossad official Yaacov Nimrodi, who also owns the daily Maariv), and working to obtain their release from enemy hands after dubious business deals (e.g., retired IDF colonel Elhanan Tenebaum, who was kidnapped by Hizbullah). Yet another factor, which is also at the backdrop of the cases discussed below, is the weakness of Israel's civil society and political society, mainly in terms of their financial and organizational capacities.

The Public Discourse and the Educational System

The first case that we discuss is the gradual, but nonetheless persistent, penetration of former security officials into the sensitive sphere of education, which characterized early periods in Israel's history but has become more pronounced in recent years, and their growing impact on policymaking in this sector.

In late 2004, it was announced that, according to a new project initiated by the Ministry of Education and the army's education branch, army officers at the rank of lieutenant colonel would be positioned in seventy-four high schools throughout the country to “accompany” students in the eleventh and twelfth grades who are nearing their military draft, until they join the IDF. In fact, this program, called the “The Next Generation” and which elicited some resistance from Israeli intellectuals, only served to formalize a situation that has been in place for some time.⁶⁸

First, the invitation of army officers to speak before high school pupils on the military service and other matters had already been a common practice in Israel. Second, various aspects of the school curriculum (e.g., physical education and Shelah, Hebrew acronym for “field, nation, society”) have been geared to prepare students for military service.⁶⁹ Third, the integration of dozens of former security officials in Israel's educational system, as part of their growing involvement in municipal politics as mayors and members of municipal councils had already gained momentum. In recent years, these former officials have become teachers and principals of prestigious schools throughout the country.⁷⁰ This process was encouraged by a special program called Tzevet (Team),⁷¹ funded by the Ministry of Education, which prepares retired army officers and other security personnel to serve as principals and teachers at educational institutions. According to data from 2001, more than 300 officers trained by Tzevet had been integrated in schools throughout the country since 1987.⁷² In addition, a former colonel in the IDF was appointed deputy director of the Ministry of Education, the highest professional position in the educational system.⁷³

Two additional processes, which also intensified in recent years, complement these trends. The first is the emergence of civil society movements led by retired security officials in the realm of education (e.g., Citizens for Education in Israel, chaired by a former air force chief and a former director of the Mossad, which is part of the Forum for National Responsibility, a group headed by a former IDF general).⁷⁴

These movements advocate reforms in Israel's educational system, making an explicit linkage between the situation of the latter and IDF's qualitative edge. A second process is the growing number of former security officials employed by various research institutions affiliated with Israel's universities and private colleges. At present, two of these—the former head of the IDF's colleges and a former director of the Shin Bet—serve as Chief Executive Officers of colleges.

Together, these factors mean that many members of the Network are in a position to disseminate the traditions and worldview of the Network throughout Israel's educational system. They also demonstrate the manifold ways in which their influence is exercised.

These developments can be seen as part of a process whereby the discursive realm of the Israeli polity is becoming increasingly securitized. Indeed, recent years have seen the involvement of scores of retired security officials in the media, especially the radio and TV but also in the press, where they often address matters that have little to do with security. Initially, these were lower ranking officers.⁷⁵

However, in the past few years, and especially during and in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq, retired army generals were appointed as commentators for the various radio and TV channels. In addition, senior retired security officials write regular and op-ed articles in all major newspapers. That the IDF continues to operate its own radio station, liberal as it may seem, reinforces and perhaps epitomizes this situation, especially when its reporters, many of whom are conscripts, later join other media channels. More often than not, all these actors present the views and attitudes of the Security Network and support—rather than criticize— the DE.

Determining Israel's National Budget

According to data from September 2005, the actual budget of Israel's Defense Ministry in the period 1999–2004 has exceeded the budget officially approved by the government by 10–15 percent,⁷⁶

but without informing the cabinet, the Knesset, or the public. This section attempts to elucidate this puzzle by focusing on how the budget for 2004 was determined.

For several months in 2003 Israel's Treasury, headed by Minister of Finance Netanyahu, had been announcing its intention to make a deep cut in security allocations for 2004, as part of its overall plan to cut government expenditures, and it appeared that this time it would get its way. First, on the one hand, the overall economic situation in Israel was grave and seemed to require drastic measures; on the other hand, the security situation improved somewhat. Second, the Ministry of Finance managed to make substantial cuts in other areas, most notably health, social security, wages, and education. The DE too, it was argued, must contribute its share. Third, the destruction of the Iraqi army significantly reduced the so-called existential threat to Israel, allowing for deep cuts in the IDF's ground forces. Fourth, a media virtuoso, Netanyahu, who was also the probable heir to PM Sharon, led the campaign. Fifth and finally, security experts, economists, and journalists supported the Treasury in its quest, and the media was flooded with reports on the excessive privileges of military personnel and op-eds urging the government to introduce long-awaited reforms in the DE.⁷⁷

The original allocation for security purposes for 2003 had been NS 33.6 billion, but the DE later received “supplements” that increased it to NS 36.5 billion. The Treasury had hoped to reduce the base budget for 2004 by NS 3 billion, that is, to NS 30.6 billion, whereas the IDF sought an allocation similar to the one it received for 2003.

The DE proved a formidable opponent. In what has become an annual ritual in Israel, the IDF, supported by the Security Network, underscored the threats to Israel's national security, and argued that responsibility for cuts in security allocations in such perilous times would rest on the civilians' shoulders.⁷⁸

Characteristically, CS Yaalon likened the army's negotiations with the Ministry of Finance to a “Turkish bazaar,” adding that the latter was not authorized (!) to make decisions on cuts in the security budget because it would not be responsible for their consequences. The Treasury's behavior, he stated, was “on the threshold of irresponsibility.”⁷⁹ Instead of reprimanding him, Defense Minister Mofaz, a former CS, accused the Treasury of stabbing the DE in the back, adding that the proposed budgetary cut would place Israel under an “unreasonable threat.”⁸⁰ Other retired security officials also joined the struggle. Some published a newspaper ad explicitly warning the cabinet not to “shatter our security” by opening an “internal front” against the security forces “who are fighting day by day and hour by hour for the security and future of the state of Israel.”⁸¹ Others used their civilian positions to make the military's case. The military-affairs correspondent of channel 2—and a lieutenant colonel in the army reserves—argued that the proposed budgetary cut would “destroy” the DE.⁸² MK Sneh, a retired brigadier who chairs the subcommittee for defense preparedness in the Committee of Foreign Affairs and Security, also warned against an additional cut in security allocations. Because his was one of the only civilian institutions acquainted to a certain degree with the details of the security budget, his stance was particularly significant.⁸³

Thus, and despite the public support for the Treasury's moves, the DE, through the Network, managed to reduce the proposed cut in its budget, especially after PM Sharon—yet another retired general—personally intervened in the matter and ruled against a drastic cut. Initially, the PM ruled that the allocation for security for 2004 would be NS 32.85 billion—NS 0.75 billion less than the base budget for 2003 and NS 3.65 billion less than the overall budget for 2003—but the next day, he increased the cut to NS 1.07 billion, leaving the base budget at NS 31.78 billion. In late 2003, the Knesset approved a budget of NS 29.9 billion for security purposes. This was after its Committee for the Security Budget, which is made up of members of the Knesset's Finance and Foreign Affairs and Security Committees, refused to vote on the proposed budget (NS 32.4 billion), after Mofaz, Yaalon and his deputy appeared before it and criticized it.⁸⁴

Finally, in April 2004, the Knesset's Finance Committee decided to raise the security budget to NS 35 billion, only slightly less than the NS 36.4 billion demanded by the DE in late 2003, and with other resources, especially the U.S. military aid, it now stood at NS 47.13 billion. The Treasury's initiative was thus all but reversed.⁸⁵

This case demonstrates the extent to which Israel's Security Network influences major policymaking issues that have wide political, social, and economic ramifications, even when initially the circumstances are seemingly unfavorable for the Network.

Shaping Israel's Policy Vis-à-Vis Lebanon

Much of the writing on Israel's policy toward Lebanon from the latter's “collapse” in 1975–76 until Israel's unilateral withdrawal from its self-declared “Security Zone” in South Lebanon in May 2000 contextualizes it within Israel's continuous efforts to address its broader “security dilemma” in the Middle East.⁸⁶

With regard to Lebanon, these efforts included reaching formal and informal arrangements with its neighbors, such as the “red lines” agreement with Syria in 1976, the ceasefire with the PLO in 1981–82, and the 17 May 1983 accord with Lebanon; alliances with Christian militias in the border area and the Phalanges; and occupying parts of Lebanon during the Litany Operation of 1978, the Lebanon War (1982–85), and the period of the “Security Zone” (1985–2000).

However, how could this involvement, which lasted for two decades and a half, persist despite significant developments in Israel's close environment such as the removal of the bulk of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon in 1982, the considerable weakening of Syria in the early 1990s, and Lebanon's resuscitation in the early 1990s? It is here that special attention must be given to the impact of Israel's Security Network, both in the sense of informal ties forged between acting and retired security officials and shared notions and conceptions regarding Israel's national security and the means to advance it.

As in the other territories it occupied, the ambiguity surrounding Israel's military presence in South Lebanon provided a hospitable climate for the Security Network to expand, both in terms of the prerogatives of its members and their ties with other actors. Already in 1976 it was the DE that established ADAL (Hebrew acronym of the South Lebanon Area), which provided military and humanitarian support to the local Christian militias and maintained effective control over parts of this region well before 1982.⁸⁷

Similarly, and on a much larger scale, in the period 1985–2000 Israel's self-declared “Security Zone” was administered exclusively by the DE, through the Office of the Coordinator of Israel's Operations in Lebanon (CIOL) and the IDF's Liaison Unit to Lebanon (LUL). Because in this period the army reserves did not serve in South Lebanon, and because media reporters who entered the area mostly engaged in “embedded journalism,” it is easy to comprehend why the Israeli public knew very little about the Security Zone up to the late 1990s. In addition, most journalists covering the area identified with the IDF's mission there and, in many cases, had intimate ties to acting and former security officials. Finally, some retired security officials, including at least one former LUL chief, served as media commentators on military affairs, and in this capacity continued to present the DE's position.⁸⁸

Economic factors should be considered in this respect as well. In the period 1986–2000, approximately 2,500 Lebanese militiamen served in the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and were on Israel's payroll,⁸⁹

and each earned $400–500 per month, reaching a total of approximately $17 million for the entire period. SLA officials enjoyed an additional income from various “taxes” imposed on commodities entering the Security Zone.⁹⁰ In addition, approximately 2,500–5,000 Lebanese workers, each of whom earned $350–750 per month, were employed in construction, agriculture, industry, and the hotel sector in northern Israel.⁹¹ Although these laborers earned more than five times that of their counterparts in other parts of Lebanon,⁹² they were dependent on the SLA: they could enter Israel only if sponsored by its members (most were their relatives) and had to pay their “sponsor” approximately $50 per month, as well as an additional 10 percent, which went to the SLA command.⁹³ Israeli employers, who were encouraged to hire Lebanese workers, also benefited from this arrangement, because the latter did manual labor jobs and were not represented by Israel's labor union. For some of the northern settlements, and especially those near the border checkpoints, this situation was particularly advantageous. Metula, for example, became a popular tourist resort for Israelis and Lebanese, as well as an unofficial “hub” for all those who mattered regarding the Security Zone—politicians, reporters, and IDF and SLA officers. Israeli firms, in their turn, sold soft drinks, alcoholic beverages, clothing, medicine, and fruit and vegetables to Lebanon.⁹⁴ As in the past, Israeli construction firms profited from building massive fortifications in and around the Security Zone, and from the continuous efforts of the LUL and its Civilian Assistance Unit to improve the infrastructure there as a counterweight to the enticements and pressures of the government in Beirut and Hizbullah.⁹⁵ Finally, one could mention Lebanese and Israeli networks of smugglers and drug traffickers, which capitalized on the virtually open border between the two states.

In the latter half of the 1990s, and especially after two IDF helicopters collided in February 1997 leaving 73 Israeli soldiers dead, the public debate in Israel concerning its presence in Lebanon intensified, ultimately prompting its leaders to outbid one another over who would get Israel out of there first. One way to consider this episode is to regard it as a triumph of Israel's civil society, which managed to overcome the resistance of the DE to any change in its Lebanese policy. Another, which seems more convincing in light of that mentioned earlier, is to view it as an essentially intra-Network dispute. Unlike Ben-Gurion and Eshkol, who faced the “revolts” of 1948 and 1967, respectively (see earlier), PM Barak, who initiated and carried out the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, was himself a member of the Network and, as senior officer and CS, had been intimately involved with the formulation of Israel's policy in Lebanon. This enabled him to disregard the apocalyptic warnings of the IDF general staff, as well as the opposition of other Network members (e.g., the CIOL and some media correspondents). Whereas civil society groups, especially the “Four Mothers” movement, were indeed active in campaigning for an Israeli withdrawal, they were ultimately successful not because they offered a civil alternative to the current policy but because they managed to prove—by embracing the hegemonic discourse of national security and by recruiting “specialists,” mostly retired security officials—that its military logic was flawed.

However, creating a rift within the Network was no easy task. Several cabinet ministers, such as Sneh and Ben-Eliezer, who had laid the groundwork for the Security Zone during their military service, were personally committed to the SLA.⁹⁶

Indeed, it took several major blows sustained by the IDF in Lebanon, as well as two unsuccessful large-scale military operations in 1993 (Accountability) and 1996 (Grapes of Wrath)—as well as the helicopter crash the next year—to tilt the scale. That a rift was created within the Security Network in this period is evinced by the fact that some of its members later accused PM Barak of the “worst of sins,” namely, of showing weakness in the face of Arab pressures, particularly after the outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada.⁹⁷

The considerable impact of the Security Network on determining Israel's Lebanese policy for at least a quarter of a century leads one to ponder the extent of its role with regard to other contentious areas, especially the West Bank and Gaza since 1967. Indeed, several recent publications suggest that informal ties between acting and retired security officials, on the one hand, and certain civilian actors, including those involved in real estate and economic and agricultural enterprises, on the other hand, have been highly influential in shaping Israel's long-term policies.⁹⁸

We intend to explore these extremely significant issues in future publications.