In the target article, Levine et al. propose that ideal moral judgments are those that would be agreed to by rational bargaining agents. These are formally specified by Nash, Reference Nash1950 bargaining solutions. In contrast, we argue that while Nash equilibrium may characterize what people actually do (at least some of the time), rational contractualism has no inherent moral standing. Such “rational” solutions are sometimes seen as fair, but often they are morally neutral. More troubling, as we will show, Nash bargaining solutions can result in outcomes that are widely viewed as immoral. It may be considered smart (but, notably, not necessarily good, high-minded, or admirable) for a person, A, to determine how far another person, B, can be pushed in a deal. Finding that breaking point at which person A gets as much as they can and gives up as little as they must, whether by direct negotiation or by mental simulation, should provide the maximum return for A. Two negotiators may each push each other to their limit and thus end at a “rational” solution. Furthermore, both parties may be better off making, rather than not making, the deal. But even though rational contractualism may often provide a good approximation to what people do in the world, the claim to moral significance is lacking.

In the case in which both parties are equal – they have the same utility functions – then the Nash solution results in resources being split evenly, maximizing both aggregate and mutual benefit. We agree that it is likely that most people would perceive this solution to be fair and good. But, of course, many theories make this prediction. The problem for rational contractualism comes when risk aversion and utility functions are unequal. A major theoretical contribution of Nash, Reference Nash1950, as noted and discussed by Levine et al. in their target article, is that it can take into account such differences. But in these cases, there exists a set of Nash bargaining solutions that satisfy the conditions for Pareto optimality but are flagrantly not moral. We posit that rational contractualism is neither inherently moral nor immoral. Rational solutions may be found anywhere along the dimension: moral, morally neutral/irrelevant, or immoral.

To evaluate this possibility, we conducted an experiment in which participants read two scenarios describing negotiations resulting in Nash bargaining equilibria. Both scenarios consisted of two parties with different utility functions. In both of the scenarios, both agents were better off taking the deal than rejecting it. In the first scenario, the resource in the negotiations was relatively high-stakes (a life-saving drug); in the second, the resource was relatively low-stakes (festival tickets). We recruited 100 participants from the USA and UK on Prolific (43 females, 57 males; age: M = 40.2, SD = 12.8). The study was preregistered on AsPredicted #227369. All materials and data can be found on OSF (http://bit.ly/4doFBz5). Participants read one scenario (randomly assigned) and responded whether they perceived the outcome of the negotiation to be moral, immoral, or not related to morality. After responding to the first scenario, participants read and responded to the second scenario. The order was randomly assigned.

Participants were told: “The Oxford English Dictionary defines morality as ‘Of or relating to human character or behavior considered as good or bad; of or relating to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the actions, desires, or character of responsible human beings; ethical.’ Given this definition and your own understanding of morality, is the outcome [of the negotiation] Moral, Immoral, or Not related to morality?”

The scenarios were: (1) “A Life-Saving Drug: Pharmaceutical Company A developed a life-saving drug. Healthcare providers enter negotiations with Company A to settle on a price for this drug. Because only Company A has developed this drug, it has strong bargaining power. The outcome of the negotiation is that the price of the drug is much higher than the cost of R&D and production such that Company A makes a huge profit and the patients who need this drug will have to pay exorbitantly high prices (which is still better than dying).” (2) “Festival Tickets: Kai bought tickets for a popular music festival for ＄200. He decided to sell his tickets on a secondhand site. Devi is looking to buy tickets on the secondhand site because the original tickets are sold out. The day before the festival, Devi and Kai negotiate about the price of the tickets, and they agree on a price of ＄2,000 because Devi can’t find any cheaper tickets for sale.”

Table 1 shows all ratings of morality. A large majority of participants rated the drug scenario outcome as immoral. We had, however, thought that people would rate the ticket scenario as morally neutral. A majority of our participants, though, thought that it, too, was immoral. As compared to the drug outcome, however, three times as many participants viewed the ticket outcome as simply not related to morality. Tellingly, very few people rated the outcome of either scenario as moral.

Table 1.

Percentage ratings for the two scenarios

Our results stand in contrast to the core tenet of the target article and show that rational contractual agreements are not necessarily perceived as moral. Indeed, the present instances were perceived as being immoral. We used only two scenarios, but, sadly, there are many others that come to mind in which the more vulnerable party, as a result of that vulnerability, is willing to accept outcomes that are not, themselves, moral, despite benefiting both parties and being rationally Pareto efficient. We suggest that morality involves a set of beliefs or values guiding decision-making that serves, in part at least, to prevent the player with the better hand from taking advantage of the player with the worse hand. It protects rather than exploits the vulnerable. Utilitarianism and deontology are two such frameworks in which this overriding process can happen.