We commend Levine and colleagues on proposing an ambitious and integrative theory of moral decision-making. We find ourselves in broad agreement with the theory, although we argue that it does not go far enough. The theory focuses on (implied or actual) negotiation over elements including which moral standards to employ and whether to judge outcomes versus actions. It neglects, however, a crucial aspect of human moral psychology: moral judgments – and the cognitive processes underlying them – function not only as an evaluation of actions or events but also as signals of an individual’s moral character and social reputation. This signaling function introduces important strategic considerations, as individuals must navigate what their morally relevant thoughts, feelings, and behaviors convey to themselves and others in complex social environments.

Levine and colleagues briefly acknowledge the role of social evaluation in moral judgment, stating that “People do not just evaluate acts, consequences, and agreements, but also other people” (sect. 6, para 2). However, this phrasing arguably understates the centrality of social perception and meta-perception in moral decision-making. Individuals do not merely infer traits – such as warmth, competence, and moral character – from others’ moral decisions (Rom, Weiss, & Conway, Reference Rom, Weiss and Conway2017); these inferences meaningfully shape downstream social behaviors, including trust and social role selection (Everett et al., Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016). Yet, individuals make more than trait-level attributions: they also infer the underlying mental states or “mental occurrents” driving moral decisions, such as the degree of concern for victims or commitment to moral rules (Critcher, Helzer, & Tannenbaum, Reference Critcher, Helzer and Tannenbaum2020). Such inferences carry distinct social consequences. For example, individuals who reject sacrificial harm based on rigid rule adherence are often perceived as more self-righteous than those who reject it due to emotional concern for victims, despite endorsing the same moral judgment (Weiss et al., Reference Weiss, Burgmer, Rom and Conway2024).

Moreover, individuals demonstrate metacognitive sensitivity: they understand how different moral judgments appear to others, strategically adjusting their moral judgments to imply particular traits or decision styles in line with perceived expectations in a given context (Rom & Conway, Reference Rom and Conway2018). Hence, moral judgments do not merely reflect deliberation over optimal strategies for determining right action or desirable outcomes; they also function as negotiations of moral selves, shaped through the communication and inference of underlying psychological constructs or mental occurrents. Individuals care deeply about their moral self-image and reputation (Heiphetz et al., Reference Heiphetz, Strohminger, Gelman and Young2018), and they strategically use moral decision-making and moral communication to bolster this self-concept (Rothschild & Keefer, Reference Rothschild and Keefer2017; Brady & Van Bavel, Reference Brady and Van Bavel2025). Given the ubiquity of self-comparison (Gerber, Wheeler, & Suls, et al., Reference Gerber, Wheeler and Suls2018), the presence of ostensibly more virtuous others can pose a threat to one’s moral self, eliciting shame or defensiveness (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, Reference Monin, Sawyer and Marquez2008). Accordingly, the processes described by Levine et al. triple theory of moral cognition must also account for the reputational and relational dimensions of moral judgment. That is, moral evaluations are influenced not only by (implied or actual) negotiation over the appropriateness of moral considerations themselves but also by the perceived implications of how and why one considers such things for one’s moral self and the moral selves of others.

Considering how individuals interpret the psychological mechanisms behind others’ moral decisions may help to clarify when and why they prefer one mode of reasoning over another. Levine and colleagues hypothesize that “the higher the stakes of a moral decision, the greater the cost of a suboptimal choice. Thus, like unique situations, high-stakes situations should favor those mechanisms of moral judgment that achieve greater accuracy at the cost of effort” (sect 5.1.1, para 5). Although this hypothesis holds in some domains, it does not fully account for findings pertaining to high-stakes moral dilemmas – such as life-and-death scenarios – where responses often reflect heuristic adherence to deontological rules rather than calculated utilitarian reasoning (Bostyn, Roets, & Conway, Reference Bostyn, Roets and Conway2022; Piazza & Landy, Reference Piazza and Landy2013). However, these seemingly suboptimal responses may serve an important social function: they signal traits such as warmth, reliability, and trustworthiness, which are attributes of a desirable, cooperative partner (Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016; Sacco & Brown, Reference Sacco, Brown, Lustgraaf and Hugenberg2017).

From a functionalist perspective – one broadly aligned with the authors’ approach – the attribution of underlying mechanisms in others’ moral judgments carries socially relevant information about the decision maker, rather than merely indicating commitment to abstract principles or concern for outcomes. These attributions can inform expectations and interactions. For example, a person who consistently adheres to moral rules may be expected to do so across context, whereas one who is primarily guided by emotional responses may well be particularly swayed by appeals involving wide-eyed adorable victims in need of rescue. Meanwhile, a third person who demonstrates a carefully calculative approach to morality may donate to effective altruism charities, regardless. Moreover, consistency and social orientation in moral judgments might serve as further cues to character. An individual perceived as stable and consistent in their moral judgments is often trusted more than one perceived as erratic. Similarly, judgments that reflect interpersonal concern, such as signaling care for others, may enhance trustworthiness. Importantly, patterns of moral reasoning across contexts also reveal subtle but socially meaningful distinctions. For instance, someone who rigidly follows rules in interactions with polite others but relaxes them for entitled others communicates something quite different than someone who reverses that pattern.

In summary, we commend the authors for advancing a compelling theory of moral cognition. Nonetheless, we contend that further elaboration is needed on the role of social perception and meta-perception in shaping and interpreting moral judgments. The selection and use of different moral considerations in context are themselves socially informative acts. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of morality requires integration of these cognitive systems into the dynamic, socially embedded contexts in which they are deployed.