1 Introduction
Kripke frame semantics has proven a valuable tool for the study of propositional modal logics. Despite the by now well-known phenomenon of propositional Kripke incompleteness, examples of Kripke incomplete propositional modal logics are uncommon and rather contrived. By contrast, in predicate modal logic, Kripke incompleteness is common, and the predicate counterparts of many simple Kripke complete propositional logics are Kripke incomplete. Thus, the boundaries of usefulness of Kripke frame semantics for predicate modal logics are not very well understood. Additionally, canonical models for predicate modal logics are not as well-behaved as canonical models for propositional logics: many predicate logics, despite being Kripke complete, are not canonical, that is, they are not validated by their canonical frames, which need to be modified to obtain completeness. As a result, completeness proofs in predicate modal logic are often rather nontrivial.
In this paper, we study Kripke completeness of predicate modal logics with propositional axioms of bounded alternativity, customarily called
$\boldsymbol {alt}_n$
. Propositional logics axiomatized by these formulas, as well as their propositional extensions, called logics of bounded alternativity, have been extensively studied. In particular, F. Bellissima showed that all monomodal logics of bounded alternativity are Kripke complete.Footnote
1
We consider minimal predicate logics
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
containing axioms
$\boldsymbol {alt}_n$
as well as their predicate extensions with propositional axioms of reflexivity, transitivity, and both, respectively,
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
,
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
, and
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
. We show, using selective weak submodels [Reference Shehtman7] of canonical models, that
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
are strongly Kripke complete, for every
$n \geqslant 1$
.Footnote
2
We also show, using Kripke bundle semantics [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Chapter 5], that, unlike propositional logics
$\mathbf {K4Alt}_n$
, predicate logics
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
are Kripke incomplete for every
$n \geqslant 1$
(Kripke incompleteness of
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
, for every
$n \geqslant 2$
, follows easily from [Reference Ghilardi3]). Lastly, we give explicit axiomatizations of Kripke completions of
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_1$
and
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2$
.
The paper is structured as follows.
$\S $
2 contains preliminaries on predicate modal logics. In
$\S $
3, we prove Kripke completeness of logics
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
. In
$\S $
4, we establish Kripke incompleteness of
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
and of some related logics. In
$\S $
5, we axiomatize Kripke completions of
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_1$
and
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2$
. We conclude, in
$\S $
6, with directions for future work.
2 Preliminaries
This section is mostly meant to fix terminology and notation; more background on predicate modal logic can be found in [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2].
The (first-order) predicate modal language contains the following symbols: a countable set
$\mathit {Var}$
of individual variables; for every
$n \geqslant 0$
, a countable set
$\{P^n_k\mid k \geqslant 0\}$
of n-ary predicate letters (nullary predicate letters are also called proposition letters); the propositional constant
$\bot $
; the binary Boolean connective
$\rightarrow $
; the quantifier symbol
$\forall $
; and the unary modal operator
$\square $
.Footnote
3
Thus, formulas are defined by the following grammar:
where
$x, x_1, \ldots , x_n \in \mathit {Var}$
. We omit parentheses after proposition letters, and so write
$P_k$
instead of
$P^0_k()$
. The logical symbols
$\top $
,
$\wedge $
,
$\vee $
,
$\neg $
,
$\leftrightarrow $
,
$\Diamond $
, and
$\exists $
are treated as standard abbreviations. We also define, for every formula A and every
$n \geqslant 0$
,
If
$\Gamma $
is a set of formulas, then
The free variables of a formula A are referred to as parameters of A. We write
$A(x_1,\ldots ,x_n)$
to mean that formula A contains parameters
$x_1,\ldots ,x_n$
, possibly among others. A formula without parameters is called a sentence. If
$\Gamma $
is a set of formulas, then
. The universal closure of a formula A is denoted by
$\overline {\forall } A$
.
A propositional formula is a formula containing neither quantifiers nor predicate letters other than proposition letters. A closed propositional formula is a propositional formula without proposition letters.
By a predicate modal logic we mean a set of formulas including both the classical predicate logic
$\mathbf {QCL}$
and the minimal normal modal propositional logic
$\mathbf {K}$
, and closed under Substitution (Sub), Modus Ponens (MP), Generalization (Gen), and Necessitation (Nec). Henceforth, by logic simpliciter we mean a predicate modal logic and by propositional logic we mean a normal propositional modal logic. If
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a propositional logic, the minimal predicate extension of
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is denoted by
$\mathbf {Q} \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. Thus, the minimal predicate modal logic is
$\mathbf {QK}$
. The minimal logic including a logic L and a set
$\Gamma $
of formulas is denoted by
$L + \Gamma $
(similarly for propositional logics and formulas).
Proposition 2.1. Let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
and
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }'$
be propositional logics. Then,
-
(1) $\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }'$
implies
$\mathbf {Q} \boldsymbol {\Lambda } \subseteq \mathbf {Q} \boldsymbol {\Lambda }'$
; -
(2) $\mathbf {Q} \boldsymbol {\Lambda } + \Gamma = \mathbf {Q} (\boldsymbol {\Lambda } +\Gamma )$
, for every set
$\Gamma $
of propositional formulas; -
(3) $\mathbf {Q} \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is conservative over
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Proof. (1) and (2) follow easily from definitions; for (3), see [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Proposition 2.15.9].
We next recall definitions of some propositional formulas and logics considered later on (here,
$n \geqslant 1$
):
A Kripke frame is a pair
$F=(W, R)$
where W is a non-empty set of worlds, or points, and R is a binary accessibility relation on W. We use standard abbreviations: for all
$u \in W$
and
$U \subseteq W$
,
A propositional Kripke model over the Kripke frame
$F = (W, R)$
is a pair
$(F,\xi )$
where
$\xi = ( \xi _u \mid u \in W )$
is a family of Boolean-valued valuations: each
$\xi _u$
is a function sending proposition letters to
$\{1,0\}$
.
The definition of truth of a propositional formula A at a world u of a Kripke model M is standard (see, e.g., [Reference Chagrov and Zakharyaschev1]); as usual, we write
$M,u \models A$
if A is true at u in M. If F is a Kripke frame and A is a propositional formula, then we say that
-
• A is locally valid at a world u of F, and write $F, u \models A$
, if
$M, u \models A$
holds for every model M over F; -
• A is (globally) valid on F, and write $F \models A$
, if
$F, u \models A$
holds for every world u of F.
If F is a Kripke frame, then the set
$\{A \mid F\models A\}$
is called the propositional modal logic of F and is denoted by
$\mathbf {L}(F)$
; by Soundness theorem, this set is, indeed, a propositional modal logic.
We next recall the well-known local validity conditions of some propositional formulas.
Proposition 2.2. Let
$F = (W, R)$
be a Kripke frame and let
$u \in W$
. Then,
-
(1) $F, u \models \boldsymbol {alt}_n$
iff F is n-alternative at u, that is, iff
$|R(u)| \leqslant n$
; -
(2) $F, u \models \boldsymbol {ref}$
iff u is reflexive, that is, iff
$u \in R(u)$
; -
(3) $F, u \models \boldsymbol {4}$
iff F is transitive at u, that is, iff
$R(R(u)) \subseteq R(u)$
.
Proposition 2.3. Let
$F = (W, R)$
be a transitive Kripke frame and let
$u \in W$
. Then,
$F, u \models \boldsymbol {ma}$
iff the world u sees a maximal world of F, that is, iff
$\exists v \in R(u)\, R(v) = \{ v \} $
.
A predicate Kripke frame is a pair
$\boldsymbol {F} = (F, D)$
where
$F = (W, R)$
is a Kripke frame and
$D = (D_u)_{ u \in W }$
is a system of non-empty domains satisfying the expanding domains condition:
$D_u \subseteq D_v$
whenever
$u R v$
. A predicate Kripke model over the predicate Kripke frame
$\boldsymbol {F}$
is a pair
$\boldsymbol {M} = (\boldsymbol {F}, \xi )$
where
$\xi $
is a family
$(\xi _u)_{u \in W}$
of valuations: each
$\xi _u$
is a function sending n-ary predicate letters to subsets of
$D_u^n$
. Since
$D^0_u=\{\varnothing \}$
, it follows that, for a proposition letter
$P_k$
, either
$\xi _u(P_k) = \{ \varnothing \}$
or
$\xi _u(P_k) = \varnothing $
; we identify
$\{ \varnothing \}$
with
$1$
and
$\varnothing $
with
$0$
.
Let
$\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )$
be a predicate Kripke model and let
$u \in W$
. A
$D_u$
-sentence is an expression obtained from a formula by replacing each parameter by (a syntactic copy of) an element of
$D_u$
. The truth relation
$\models $
between a world u of a model
$\boldsymbol {M}$
and a
$D_u$
-sentence A is defined by recursion:
-
• $\boldsymbol {M}, u \models P_k^n(a_1, \ldots , a_n)$
if
$(a_1, \ldots , a_n) \in \xi _u(P_k^n)$
; -
• $\boldsymbol {M}, u \not \models \bot $
; -
• $\boldsymbol {M}, u \models A \to B$
if
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \not \models A$
or
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models B$
; -
• $\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \forall x\, A(x)$
if
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models A(a)$
whenever
$a \in D_u$
; -
• $\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \square A$
if
$\boldsymbol {M}, v \models A$
whenever
$v \in R(u)$
.
We say that a predicate formula A is
-
• locally true at a world u of a model $\boldsymbol {M}$
(also written
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models A$
) if
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \overline {\forall } A$
; -
• (globally) true in $\boldsymbol {M}$
(also written
$\boldsymbol {M} \models A$
) if
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models A$
holds for every world u of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
; -
• locally valid at a world u of a predicate Kripke frame $\boldsymbol {F}$
(also written
$\boldsymbol {F}, u \models A$
) if
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models A$
holds for every model
$\boldsymbol {M}$
over
$\boldsymbol {F}$
; -
• (globally) valid on $\boldsymbol {F}$
(also written
$\boldsymbol {F} \models A$
) if
$\boldsymbol {F}, u \models A$
holds for every world u of
$\boldsymbol {F}$
; -
• valid on a class $\mathscr {C}$
of predicate Kripke frames if
$\boldsymbol {F} \models A$
holds for every
$\boldsymbol {F} \in \mathscr {C}$
.
The following is well known (see, e.g., [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 3.2.23]) and easy to check.
Proposition 2.4. Let
$\boldsymbol {F} = (F, D)$
be a predicate Kripke frame and let A be a propositional formula. Then,
$\boldsymbol {F} \models A$
iff
$F \models A$
.
If
$\mathscr {C}$
is a class of predicate Kripke frames, then the set of all predicate formulas valid on every frame from
$\mathscr {C}$
is called the logic of
$\mathscr {C}$
and denoted by
$\mathbf {L}(\mathscr {C})$
. The following is well known.
Theorem 2.5 (Soundness theorem)
For every class
$\mathscr {C}$
of predicate Kripke frames, the set
$\mathbf {L}(\mathscr {C})$
is a predicate modal logic.
If L is a propositional logic and F is a Kripke frame such that
$F \models L$
, then F is said to be an L-frame; similarly for predicate logics and frames.
Definition 2.6. A predicate formula A is a logical consequence in Kripke semantics of a logic L, also written
$L \models _{\mathcal {K}} A$
, if every predicate L-frame validates A.
Let L be a predicate logic. If
$L = \mathbf {L}(\mathscr {C})$
, for some class
$\mathscr {C}$
of predicate Kripke frames, then L is called Kripke complete.Footnote
4
The smallest Kripke complete logic extending a logic L is called the Kripke completion of L and is denoted by
$\widehat {L}$
. It should be clear that
$\widehat {L} = \{A\mid L\vDash _{\mathcal {K}} A\}$
.
The following fact is an easy consequence of Propositions 2.1 (3) and 2.4.
Proposition 2.7. Let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
be a propositional logic. If
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete, then
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete.
We next recall the definitions of subframes and submodels:
-
• a Kripke frame $F' = (W', R')$
is a subframe of
$F = (W, R)$
(in symbols,
${F' \subseteq F}$
) if
$W' \subseteq W$
and
$R' = R \upharpoonright W'$
; if, additionally,
$R(W') \subseteq W'$
, then
$F'$
is a generated subframe of F (in symbols,
$F' \sqsubseteq F$
); -
• a propositional Kripke model $M' = (W', R', \xi ')$
is a submodel of
${M = (W, R, \xi )}$
(in symbols,
$M' \subseteq M$
) if
$(W', R') \subseteq (W, R)$
and
$\xi ' = \xi \upharpoonright W'$
; if, additionally,
$(W', R') \sqsubseteq (W, R)$
, then
$M'$
is a generated submodel of M (in symbols,
$M' \sqsubseteq M$
).
We use analogous notions and notation for predicate Kripke frames and models:
-
• a predicate frame $\boldsymbol {F}' = (W', R', D')$
is a subframe of
$\boldsymbol {F} = (W, R, D)$
(in symbols,
$\boldsymbol {F}' \subseteq \boldsymbol {F}$
) if
$(W', R')\subseteq (W, R)$
and
$D' = D \upharpoonright W'$
; if also
${(W', R') \sqsubseteq (W, R)}$
, then
$\boldsymbol {F}'$
is a generated subframe of
$\boldsymbol {F}$
(in symbols,
$\boldsymbol {F}' \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {F}$
); -
• a predicate Kripke model $\boldsymbol {M}'=(W', R', D',\xi ')$
is a submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )$
(in symbols,
$\boldsymbol {M}' \subseteq \boldsymbol {M}$
) if
$(W', R', D') \subseteq (W, R, D)$
and
$\xi ' = \xi \upharpoonright W'$
; if also
$(W', R') \sqsubseteq (W, R)$
, then
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
is a generated submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
(in symbols,
$\boldsymbol {M}' \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}$
).
The smallest generated subframe of a frame F containing a world u is denoted by
$F {{\uparrow }} u$
; similar notation is used for predicate frames and models.
The following is well known (see, e.g., [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 3.3.18]).
Proposition 2.8.
-
(1) Let $\boldsymbol {M}$
and
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
be predicate Kripke models such that
$\boldsymbol {M}' \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}$
. Then, for every world u of
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
and every
$D_u$
-sentence A, $$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{lcl} \boldsymbol{M}', u \models A & \iff & \boldsymbol{M}, u \models A. \end{array} \end{align*} $$
-
(2) Let $\boldsymbol {F}$
and
$\boldsymbol {F}'$
be predicate Kripke frames such that
$\boldsymbol {F}' \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {F}$
. Then, for every predicate formula A, $$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{lcl} \boldsymbol{F} \models A & \Longrightarrow & \boldsymbol{F}' \models A. \end{array} \end{align*} $$
We also recall that a p-morphism of a Kripke frame
$F = (W, R)$
onto a Kripke frame
$F' = (W', R')$
is a surjection
$f \colon W \to W'$
such that
$f(R(u)) = R(f(u))$
, for every
$u \in W$
; if there exists a p-morphism of F onto
$F'$
, we write
$F \twoheadrightarrow F'$
. It is well known that
$F \twoheadrightarrow F'$
implies
$\mathbf {L}(F) \subseteq \mathbf {L}(F')$
.
3 Kripke completeness of
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
To prove Kripke completeness of logics
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
, we use selective weak submodels [Reference Shehtman7, Section 6] of canonical models [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Chapter 6]. These resemble both selective filtrations [Reference Shapirovsky, Shehtman, Balbiani, Suzuki, Wolter and Zakharyaschev5] in propositional modal logic and elementary submodels in classical model theory.
In this section, we work with languages expanded with individual constants that are used as individuals of canonical models. All the constants are assumed to come from some universal countable set
$\mathcal {U}$
. Since the set
$\mathcal {U}$
is fixed throughout this section, it is mentioned only when necessary. A subset
$\mathcal {C}$
of
$\mathcal {U}$
is small if the set
$\mathcal {U} - \mathcal {C}$
is infinite.Footnote
5
A theory is a set of sentences, possibly with constants from
$\mathcal {U}$
.
The set of constants occurring in a theory
$\Gamma $
is denoted by
$D_\Gamma $
; the set of all sentences with constants from
$D_\Gamma $
is called the language of
$\Gamma $
and denoted by
$\mathcal {L} (\Gamma )$
. A theory
$\Gamma $
is small if
$D_\Gamma $
is small.
Let L be a logic. We say that a formula B is L-derivable, and write
$\vdash _{L} B$
, if there exists a formula
$A(x_1,\ldots ,x_n) \in L$
and constants
$c_1,\dots ,c_n$
such that
$B = A(c_1,\dots ,c_n)$
. If
$\Gamma $
is a theory and A is a formula possibly containing constants, we say that A is L-derivable from
$\Gamma $
, and write
$\Gamma \vdash _{L} A$
, if there exists a derivation of A using L-derivable formulas and members of
$\Gamma $
as axioms and (MP) and (Gen) as rules of inference (note that neither (Sub) nor (Nec) is allowed).
If L is a logic and
$\Gamma $
is a theory, then, as usual,
$\Gamma $
is L-consistent if
$\Gamma \not \vdash _{L} \bot $
; if, additionally,
$\Gamma $
is maximal among L-consistent theories included in
$\mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, then
$\Gamma $
is L-maximal. The following facts are well known.
Lemma 3.1. Let
$\Gamma $
be an L-consistent theory. Then,
$\Gamma $
is L-maximal if and only if, for every
$A \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, exactly one of A and
$\neg A$
belongs to
$\Gamma $
.
Lemma 3.2. Let
$\Gamma $
be an L-maximal theory. Then,
-
(1) $A\in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
and
$\Gamma \vdash _L A$
imply
$A\in \Gamma $
. (In particular,
.Footnote
6
) -
(2) $\Gamma $
is conjunction-closed (i.e.,
$A \wedge B \in \Gamma $
iff both
$A \in \Gamma $
and
$B \in \Gamma $
).
If
$\Gamma $
is a theory, we define
$\square ^- \Gamma := \{ A \mid \square A \in \Gamma \}$
and
$\square \Gamma := \{ \square B \mid B \in \Gamma \}$
. Then, Lemma 3.1 and definition of
$\Diamond $
imply the following.
Lemma 3.3. Let
$\Gamma $
and
$\Delta $
be L-maximal theories such that
$\mathcal {L}(\Gamma ) = \mathcal {L}(\Delta )$
and
$\square ^- \Gamma \subseteq \Delta $
. Then, for every
$D_\Gamma $
-sentence A,
The following well-known fact (see, e.g., [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 6.1.16]) is a simple consequence of Lindenbaum lemma.
Lemma 3.4 (Existence lemma)
Let
$\Gamma $
be an L-consistent theory such that
$\Diamond A \in \Gamma $
. Then, there exists an L-maximal theory
$\Delta $
such that
$D_\Gamma = D_\Delta $
and
$\square ^- \Gamma \cup \{ A \} \subseteq \Delta $
.
The following definition is well known from classical predicate logic.
Definition 3.5. A theory
$\Gamma $
is Henkin if, for every formula
$\exists x\, A(x) \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, there exists
$c \in D_\Gamma $
such that
$(\exists x A(x) \to A(c)) \in \Gamma $
.
We next define theories used as points of canonical models.
Definition 3.6. Let L be a predicate logic. An L-place is a small L-maximal Henkin theory.
The following is well known (see, e.g., [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 6.1.9]).
Lemma 3.7 (Henkin–Lindenbaum lemma)
Every small L-consistent theory is included into an L-place.
Definition 3.8. The canonical predicate Kripke frame for a predicate logic L is the tuple
$\boldsymbol {\mathit {F}}_L := (\mathit {W}_L, R_{L}, D_L)$
where
-
• $\mathit {W}_L$
is the set of all L-places; -
• $\Gamma \, R_{L}\, \Delta := \square ^- \Gamma \subseteq \Delta $
; -
• $D_{L} (\Gamma ) = D_\Gamma $
.
It is not hard to see that
$\boldsymbol {\mathit {F}}_L$
is a predicate Kripke frame: if
$\Gamma \, R_{L}\, \Delta $
and
$c \in D_\Gamma $
, then, by Lemma 3.2 (1),
$\square (P(c) \to P(c)) \in \Gamma $
, and so
$P(c) \to P(c) \in \Delta $
, meaning that
$c \in D_\Delta $
.
Definition 3.9. The canonical predicate Kripke model for a predicate logic L is the Kripke model
$\boldsymbol {M}_L := (\boldsymbol {\mathit {F}}_L, \xi _L)$
where
$\boldsymbol {\mathit {F}}_L$
is the canonical predicate frame for L and
$(\xi _{L})_\Gamma (P^n_k) := \{ \mathbf {c} \in D_\Gamma ^n \mid P^n_k (\mathbf {c})\in \Gamma \}$
, for each n-ary predicate letter
$P^n_k$
.
Note that, since the individuals of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
are constants, if
$\Gamma $
is an L-place, then
$D_L(\Gamma) $
-sentences are precisely the members of
$\mathcal {L} (\Gamma )$
. The following is well known (see, e.g., [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Theorem 6.1.21]).
Theorem 3.10 (Canonical model theorem)
Let L be a predicate logic. Then,
-
(1) For every $\Gamma \in \mathit {W}_L$
and every
$A \in \mathcal {L} (\Gamma )$
, $$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{lcl} \boldsymbol{M}_L, \Gamma \models A & \iff & A \in \Gamma. \end{array} \end{align*} $$
-
(2) For every formula B,
$$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{lcl} \boldsymbol{M}_L \models B & \iff & B \in L. \end{array} \end{align*} $$
Definition 3.11. A predicate logic L is canonical if it is valid on its canonical predicate Kripke frame, that is, if
$\boldsymbol {\mathit {F}}_L \models L$
.
If a theory
$\Gamma $
contains no occurrences of constants from
$\mathcal {U}$
, we say that
$\Gamma $
is a theory without constants.
Definition 3.12. A theory
$\Gamma $
without constants is satisfiable in a predicate Kripke model
$\boldsymbol {M}$
if there exists a world u of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
such that
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \Gamma $
.
Definition 3.13. A logic L is strongly Kripke complete if every L-consistent theory without constants is satisfiable in a model over an L-frame.
Remark 3.14. Analogously to the situation in propositional logic,Footnote
7
every canonical logic is strongly Kripke complete [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 6.1.24].Footnote
8
However, canonical predicate modal logics are scarce [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Section 6.1]. In particular, logics
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
are not canonical since in their canonical predicate frames every place
$\Gamma $
containing
$\Diamond \top $
sees infinitely many places with constants not in
$D_\Gamma $
: indeed, since
$D_\Gamma $
is small, there exists an infinite set
$\mathcal {C} = \{ c_i \mid i \in \omega \}$
of constants with
$D_\Gamma \cap \mathcal {C} = \varnothing $
. Since
$\Diamond \top \in \Gamma $
, by Existence and Henkin–Lindenbaum lemmas,
$\Gamma $
sees an L-place, say
$\Delta $
; then, each theory
is L-consistent and small, and so is included into an L-place
$\Delta ^{\prime }_i$
that can be constructed not to contain any constants from
$\mathcal {C} - \{c_i\}$
(this might require an infinite set of additional constants, which is available to us due to cardinality considerations). Then,
$\Gamma $
sees each
$\Delta ^{\prime }_i$
, and all of them are distinct.
We next show that, despite not being canonical,
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
are strongly Kripke complete.
Definition 3.15. A Kripke frame
$(W', R')$
is a weak subframe of a Kripke frame
$(W, R)$
if
$W' \subseteq W$
and
$R' \subseteq R$
. A predicate Kripke model
$\boldsymbol {M}' = (W', R', D', \xi ')$
is a weak submodel of a predicate Kripke model
$\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )$
if
$(W', R')$
is a weak subframe of
$(W, R)$
and both
$D'=D \upharpoonright W'$
and
$\xi ' = \xi \upharpoonright W'$
; if, additionally, for every
$u \in W'$
and every
$D_u$
-sentence A,
then
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
is a selective weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
, also written as
$\boldsymbol {M}' \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
.
Note that weak subframes differ from subframes: in weak subframes it is possible that
$R' \subset R \upharpoonright W'$
, while in subframes
$R' = R \upharpoonright W'$
. The following is easy to check.
Lemma 3.16. If
$\boldsymbol {M}' \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}$
, then
$\boldsymbol {M}' \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
.
Due to the Canonical model theorem, in the particular case when
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is a canonical model, the condition
$(sel)$
can be rewritten as follows:
Lemma 3.17. Let a Kripke model
$\boldsymbol {M}' = (W', R', D', \xi ')$
be a weak submodel of
${\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )}$
. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
-
(1) $\boldsymbol {M}' \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
; -
(2) for every $u \in W'$
and every
$D_u$
-sentence A, $$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{lcl} \boldsymbol{M}, u \models A & \iff & \boldsymbol{M}', u \models A. \end{array} \end{align*} $$
Proof. (1)
$\Rightarrow $
(2): We proceed by induction on A, written using only logical symbols
$\bot $
,
$\to $
,
$\forall $
, and
$\Diamond $
. We only consider the case
$A = \Diamond B$
, leaving the rest to the reader.
First, suppose that
$u \in W'$
and
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \Diamond B$
. Since
$\boldsymbol {M}' \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
and
$u \in W'$
, there exists
$v \in R'(u)$
such that
$\boldsymbol {M}, v \models B$
. Then, by inductive hypothesis,
$\boldsymbol {M}', v \models B$
, and so
$\boldsymbol {M}', u \models \Diamond B$
.
Next, suppose that
$\boldsymbol {M}', u \models \Diamond B$
. Then there exists
$v \in R'(u)$
such that
$\boldsymbol {M}', v \models B$
. Since
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
is a weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
, we know that
$R' \subseteq R$
, and so
$v \in R(u)$
. By inductive hypothesis,
$\boldsymbol {M}, v \models B$
. Hence,
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \Diamond B$
.
(2)
$\Rightarrow $
(1): We show that (sel) holds for
$\boldsymbol {M}$
and
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
. Let
$u \in W'$
and let A be a
$D_u$
-sentence such that
$\boldsymbol {M},u \models \Diamond A$
. Then, by (2),
$\boldsymbol {M}',u \models \Diamond A$
, and so
${\exists v \in R'(u)\, \boldsymbol {M}', v \models A}$
, which, by (2), is equivalent to
$\exists v \in R'(u)\, \boldsymbol {M},v \models A$
.
Lemma 3.18. Let
$\boldsymbol {M}$
,
$\boldsymbol {M}'$
, and
$\boldsymbol {M}"$
be predicate Kripke models. Then,
-
(1) $\boldsymbol {M}" \Subset \boldsymbol {M}'$
and
$\boldsymbol {M}' \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
imply
$\boldsymbol {M}" \Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
; -
(2) $\boldsymbol {M}' {\uparrow } u\Subset \boldsymbol {M}$
implies
$\boldsymbol {M}'{\uparrow } u\Subset \boldsymbol {M}{\uparrow } u$
.
Proof. (1) Follows from Lemma 3.17.
(2) If
$\boldsymbol{M}' \uparrow u \Subset \boldsymbol{M}$
, that
$\boldsymbol {M}'{\uparrow } u$
is a weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}{\uparrow } u$
. Also, if v is a world from
$\boldsymbol {M}' {\uparrow } u$
(and hence from
$\boldsymbol {M} {\uparrow } u$
), then, by Lemma 3.17 and Proposition 2.8(1),
Hence, by Lemma 3.17,
$\boldsymbol {M}'{\uparrow } u\Subset \boldsymbol {M}{\uparrow } u$
.
Definition 3.19. A quasi-canonical model for a predicate logic L is a selective weak submodel of the canonical model for L.
Definition 3.20. A predicate logic L is quasi-canonical if, for every L-place
$\Gamma $
, there exists a quasi-canonical model over an L-frame containing
$\Gamma $
.
Theorem 3.21. Every quasi-canonical logic is strongly Kripke complete.
Proof. Let L be a quasi-canonical logic and let
$\Gamma _0$
be an L-consistent theory without constants. By Henkin–Lindenbaum lemma, there exists an L-place
$\Gamma $
such that
$\Gamma _0 \subseteq \Gamma $
. Hence, by the Canonical model theorem,
$\boldsymbol {M}_L, \Gamma \models \Gamma _0$
.
Since L is quasi-canonical, there exists a weak selective submodel
$\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )$
of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
such that
$(W, R, D) \models L$
and
$\Gamma \in W$
. By Lemma 3.17,
$\boldsymbol {M}, \Gamma \models \Gamma _0$
. Hence, L is strongly Kripke complete.
We now turn to proving our main result in this section. If
$\Gamma $
is an L-place, we set
Due to Henkin–Lindenbaum lemma, for each
$\Delta \in C(\Gamma )$
, we can choose some
$\Delta ^\circ \in W_L$
with
$\Delta \subseteq \Delta ^\circ $
; then, we put
We emphasise that
$C^\circ (\Gamma )$
contains exactly one
$\Delta ^\circ \in W_L$
for each
$\Delta \in C(\Gamma )$
; this implies that
$|C^\circ (\Gamma )| \leqslant |C(\Gamma )|$
. Note that
$C^\circ (\Gamma )$
is not uniquely determined by
$C(\Gamma )$
, since we choose each
${\Delta }^\circ $
arbitrarily. Also note that
$C^\circ (\Gamma )\subseteq R_L(\Gamma )$
.
Lemma 3.22. For every
$D_\Gamma $
-sentence A,
Proof. By Existence lemma and definition of
$C(\Gamma )$
, there exists
$\Delta \in C(\Gamma )$
such that
$A \in \Delta $
; since
$\Delta \subseteq \Delta ^\circ $
, surely
$A \in \Delta ^\circ $
.
We now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.23. Let
$L \in \{\mathbf {QAlt}_n, \mathbf {QTAlt}_n\}$
, with
$n \geqslant 1$
. Then, L is quasi-canonical and, hence, strongly Kripke complete.
Proof. Let
$\boldsymbol {M}_L = (\mathit {W}_L, R_{L}, D_L, \xi _L)$
be the canonical model for L and let
$\Gamma _0 \in \mathit {W}_L$
. We obtain a selective weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
over an L-frame containing
$\Gamma _0$
. First, we prove the following.
Lemma 3.24.
$|C (\Gamma )| \leqslant n$
, for every
$\Gamma \in W_L$
.
Proof. Suppose, for contradiction, that
$\Delta _0, \ldots , \Delta _{n}$
are distinct theories from
$C (\Gamma )$
.
Since
$D_{\Delta _i} = D_\Gamma $
, (that is,
$\mathcal {L}(\Delta _i) = \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, for all
$i \leqslant n$
), and since all these theories are maximal, we know that, for all
$i, j \in \{0, \ldots , n\}$
with
$i \ne j$
, there exists
$A_{ij} \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
such that
$A_{i j} \in \Delta _i$
and
$A_{i j} \notin \Delta _j$
. Let
$B_i := \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} A_{ij}$
. Since every
$\Delta _i$
is maximal, it follows, by Lemma 3.2(2), that
$B_i \in \Delta _j$
iff
$i = j$
, and thus, by Lemma 3.1,
$(B_i\wedge \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} \neg B_j)\in {\Delta }_i$
, for all
$i \leqslant n$
. Since
$\mathcal {L}(\Delta _i) = \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, we know that
$(B_i\wedge \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} \neg B_j) \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, and so, by Lemma 3.3,
$\Diamond (B_i\wedge \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} \neg B_j) \in \Gamma $
.
Since
$\Gamma $
is L-maximal, it follows, by Lemma 3.2(2), that
$\bigwedge \limits _{i = 0}^{n} \Diamond (B_i \wedge \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} \neg B_j) \in \Gamma $
. On the other hand, the sentence
$\neg (\bigwedge \limits _{i = 0}^{n} \Diamond (B_i \wedge \bigwedge \limits _{j \ne i} \neg B_j))$
is a substitution instance of
$\boldsymbol {alt}_n$
; hence, it is L-derivable, and so, by Lemma 3.2 (1), belongs to
$\Gamma $
. This contradicts L-consistency of
$\Gamma $
.
We now proceed with the proof of the theorem, distinguishing two cases.
Case
$L = \mathbf {QAlt}_n$
: We construct the frame
$(W,R)$
of a sought selective weak submodel
$\boldsymbol {M}$
of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
by recursion. To that end, we define an increasing sequence
$(W_k,R_k)_{k < \omega }$
of weak subframes of the canonical frame
$(W_L,R_L)$
.
Steps 0 and 1: Put
$W_0 := \varnothing $
,
$W_1 := \{\Gamma _0\}$
, and
$R_0 := R_1 := \varnothing $
.
Step
$(k+1)$
, with
$k> 0$
: Suppose the frames
$(W_k,R_k)$
and
$(W_{k-1},R_{k-1})$
have been defined. Call the worlds from the set
$W_{k} - W_{k-1}$
new at this step. Put
Next, for every
$\Gamma \in W_{k+1}$
, put
Then,
$W_k\subseteq W_{k+1} \subseteq W_L$
and
$R_k\subseteq R_{k+1} \subseteq R_L $
. In particular, if there are no new worlds, that is, if
$W_k=W_{k-1}$
, then
$W_{k+1}=W_k$
and
$R_{k+1}=R_k$
.
Lastly, we put
and
$\boldsymbol {M} := (W, R, D, \xi )$
.
We next prove that
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is a weak selective submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
based on an L-frame.
First, we show that
$(W, R, D) \models L$
. It follows from the definition of our sequence of weak frames that, if
$\Gamma $
is new at step
$k+1$
, then
$R_{k+1}(\Gamma )=C^\circ (\Gamma )$
and
$R_{i+1}(\Gamma ) = R_{i}(\Gamma )$
, for every
$i \geqslant k+1$
. Hence, if
$\Gamma \in W$
, then
$R(\Gamma )=C^\circ (\Gamma )$
, and so
$|R(\Gamma )|=|C^\circ (\Gamma )|\leqslant |C(\Gamma )|$
. Thus, by Lemma 3.24,
$|R(\Gamma )| \leqslant n$
, which is equivalent, by Proposition 2.2(1), to
$(W, R) \models \boldsymbol {alt}_n$
and so, by Proposition 2.4, and Soundness theorem, to
$(W, R, D) \models L$
.
Next, since
$R(\Gamma )=C^\circ (\Gamma )$
for every
$\Gamma \in W$
, it follows from Lemma 3.22 that
$(\textit {cm-sel})$
holds for all
$\Gamma \in W$
and
$A \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
. Hence,
$\boldsymbol {M}\Subset \boldsymbol {M}_L$
.
Thus,
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is a quasi-canonical model for L over an L-frame containing
$\Gamma _0$
. Therefore, L is quasi-canonical.
Case
$L = \mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
: As in the previous case, we construct the sequence
$(W_k,R_k)$
of weak subframes of
$(W_L, R_L)$
by recursion. In this case,
$R_L$
is reflexive, and we need to ensure reflexivity of R. The recursion proceeds similarly to the previous case, with one modification: since
$\square ^- \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma $
, it follows that
$\Gamma \in C(\Gamma )$
, and so we can choose
$\Gamma ^\circ $
to be
$\Gamma $
itself, thus making sure that
$\Gamma \in C^\circ (\Gamma ) (= R(\Gamma ))$
. Then, by Propositions 2.2(2) and 2.4, and Soundness theorem,
$(W,R,D)\models L$
, and so
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is a quasi-canonical model for L based on an L-frame. Hence, L is quasi-canonical.
We next show that strong Kripke completeness is preserved if we add to the logics from Theorem 3.23 closed propositional formulas (i.e., propositional formulas without proposition letters). First, we recall the following [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Lemma 6.1.25(1) and (2)].
Proposition 3.25. Let L and
$L'$
be logics such that
$L \subseteq L'$
. Then,
-
(1)
; -
(2) $\boldsymbol {M}_{L'} \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}_{L}$
.
Next, we prove that quasi-canonicity is preserved under the addition of closed propositional formulas.
Theorem 3.26. If L is a quasi-canonical logic and X is a set of closed propositional formulas, then the logic
$L+X$
is quasi-canonical.
Proof. Let
$L' := L + X$
and suppose that
$\Gamma _0 \in W_{L'}$
. By Proposition 3.25(1),
${\Gamma _0 \in W_{L}}$
. Since L is quasi-canonical, there exists a model
$\boldsymbol {M} = (W, R, D, \xi )$
such that
$\boldsymbol {M} \Subset \boldsymbol {M}_{L}$
,
$(W, R, D) \models L$
and
$\Gamma _0 \in W$
. We show that
$\boldsymbol {M} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0$
is a weak selective submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L'}$
based on an
$L'$
-frame, which proves that
$L'$
is quasi-canonical.
In view of Lemma 3.16,
$\boldsymbol {M} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0\Subset \boldsymbol {M} \Subset \boldsymbol {M}_L$
; hence, by Lemma 3.18,
$\boldsymbol {M} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0\Subset \boldsymbol {M}_L{{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0$
. Since, by Proposition 3.25(2),
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L'} \sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}_{L}$
and since
$\Gamma _0 \in W_{L'}$
, it follows that
$\boldsymbol {M}_L{{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0\sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}_{L'}$
. Hence, by Lemma 3.18(1),
$\boldsymbol {M} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0\Subset \boldsymbol {M}_{L'}$
.
Since, by Canonical model theorem,
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L'} \models X$
, it then follows by Lemma 3.17, that
$\boldsymbol {M} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0 \models X$
. Since X contains only closed propositional formulas, whose truth does not depend on valuations, it follows that
$\boldsymbol {F}{{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0 \models X$
, where F = (W, R, D) is the frame underlying
$\boldsymbol {M}$
.
Moreover, since
$\boldsymbol {F} \models L$
, it follows, by Proposition 2.8(2), that
$\boldsymbol {F}{{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0 \models L$
. Thus, by Soundness theorem,
$\boldsymbol {F} {{\uparrow }} \Gamma _0 \models L + X\, (= L')$
.
Corollary 3.27. Let X be a set of closed propositional formulas. Then, for every
$n \geqslant 1$
, logics
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n + X$
and
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n + X$
are quasi-canonical, and hence strongly Kripke complete.
We conclude this section with an observation that will be used in
$\S $
5.
Proposition 3.28. The intersection of two quasi-canonical logics is quasi-canonical.
Proof. Let
$L_1$
and
$L_2$
be quasi-canonical logics and let
$L := L_1 \cap L_2$
. Suppose that
$\Gamma \in W_L$
. We obtain a selective weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
over an L-frame containing
$\Gamma $
.
First, note that
$\Gamma \in W_{L_1} \cup W_{L_2}$
: otherwise, there exists a finite subset X of
$\Gamma $
that is both
$L_1$
-inconsistent and
$L_2$
-inconsistent; hence,
$\vdash _{L_1} \neg \bigwedge X$
and
$\vdash _{L_2} \neg \bigwedge X$
, and so
$\vdash _{L} \neg \bigwedge X$
, in contradiction with L-consistency of
$\Gamma $
.
Now, suppose that
$\Gamma \in W_{L_1}$
(if
$\Gamma \in W_{L_2}$
, the argument is similar). Since
$L_1$
is quasi-canonical, there exists a model
$\boldsymbol {M}\Subset \boldsymbol {M}_{L_1}$
based on an
$L_1$
-frame containing
$\Gamma $
. By Proposition 3.25,
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_1}\sqsubseteq \boldsymbol {M}_L$
, and so, by Lemma 3.16,
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_1}\Subset \boldsymbol {M}_L$
. Hence, by Lemma 3.18(1),
$\boldsymbol {M} \Subset \boldsymbol {M}_L$
. Since the frame of
$\boldsymbol {M}$
validates
$L_1$
and
$L \subseteq L_1$
, it surely validates L. Thus,
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is a sought selective weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_L$
, and so L is quasi-canonical.
4 Kripke incompleteness of
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
and some related logics
In this section, we prove Kripke incompleteness of some logics
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
where
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is either a propositional extension of
$\mathbf {K4Alt}_n$
or a closely related logic.
4.1
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
We begin with the simple case of logics
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
with
$n \geqslant 2$
. Recall that a propositional logic is locally tabular if, for every
$n \geqslant 0$
, it contains only finitely many pairwise non-equivalent formulas in n variables.
Theorem 4.1. If
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a locally tabular propositional logic such that
$\mathbf {S4}\subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
and
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete, then
$\mathbf {S5}\subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Proof. Since
$\mathbf {S4}\subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
and
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete, it follows, by [Reference Ghilardi3, Theorem 7.3], that either
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \subseteq \mathbf {S4.3}$
or
$\mathbf {S5}\subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. Since
$\mathbf {S4.3}$
is not locally tabular, and local tabularity is preserved for extensions, surely
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\not \subseteq \mathbf { S4.3}$
. Hence,
$\mathbf {S5}\subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Corollary 4.2. For every
$n \geqslant 2$
, the logic
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
is Kripke incomplete.
Proof. By Segerberg’s theorem [Reference Chagrov and Zakharyaschev1, Theorem 12.21],
$\mathbf {S4Alt}_n$
is locally tabularFootnote
9
Since
$\textbf {S5}$
is refuted on a two-element chain, which validates
$\mathbf {S4Alt}_n$
, surely
$\textbf {S5} \not \subseteq \mathbf {S4Alt}_n$
. Hence, by Theorem 4.1,
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
is Kripke incomplete.
4.2 Logics between
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
For incompleteness proofs in this section we use Kripke bundle semantics, which we now briefly recall (for more details, consult [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Chapter 5]).
A Kripke bundle is a tuple
$\mathbb {F} = ( F, D, \rho )$
where
$F = (W, R)$
is a Kripke frame,
${D {\kern-1pt}={\kern-1pt} ( D_u {\kern-1pt}\mid{\kern-1pt} u {\kern-1pt}\in{\kern-1pt} W )}$
is a family of non-empty disjoint domains, and
${\rho {\kern-1pt}={\kern-1pt} (\rho _{uv} \mid (u, v) {\kern-1pt}\in{\kern-1pt} R )}$
is a family of inheritance relations
$\rho _{uv} \subseteq D_u \times D_v$
satisfying the constraint that
$\rho _{uv}(a) \ne \varnothing $
whenever
$u R v$
and
$a \in D_u$
(i.e., every individual has at least one inheritor in each accessible world).
A model over a Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}$
is a pair
$\mathbb {M}=(\mathbb {F},\xi )$
where
$\xi $
is a family
$(\xi _u)_{u \in W}$
of valuations: each
$\xi _u$
is a function assigning to each n-ary predicate letter a subset of
$D_u^n$
. The truth relation
$\models $
between a world u of a model
$\mathbb {M}$
and a
$D_u$
-sentences A is defined by recursion:
-
• $\mathbb {M}, u \models P(a_1, \ldots , a_n)$
if
$(a_1, \ldots , a_n) \in \xi _u(P)$
; -
• $\mathbb {M}, u \not \models \bot $
; -
• $\mathbb {M}, u \models A \to B$
if
$\mathbb {M}, u \not \models A$
or
$\mathbb {M}, u \models B$
; -
• $\mathbb {M}, u \models \forall x\, A(x)$
if
$\mathbb {M}, u \models A(a)$
whenever
$a \in D_u$
; -
• $\mathbb {M}, u \models \square A (a_1, \ldots , a_n)$
, with distinct
$a_1, \ldots , a_n \in D_u$
, if $$ \begin{align*}\begin{array}{c} \forall v \in R(u)\, \forall b_1 \in \rho_{uv} (a_1) \ldots \forall b_n \in \rho_{uv} (a_n)\,\, \mathbb{M}, v \models A (b_1, \ldots, b_n). \\ \end{array} \end{align*} $$
Notice that, if a constant a occurs in a
$D_u$
-sentence A several times, then determining whether
$\mathbb {M}, u \models \square A$
involves substituting, for every
$v \in R(u)$
, the same
$v$
-inheritor for every occurrence of a in A.
A formula is (globally) true in a Kripke bundle model if its universal closure is true at every world of the model. A formula A is strongly valid on a Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}$
, also written
$\mathbb {F} \models ^+ A$
, if every substitution instance of A is true in every model over
$\mathbb {F}$
(notice that this notion differs from that of validity on Kripke frames).
The following is well known [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Proposition 5.2.12].
Proposition 4.3. For every Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}$
, the set
$\{ A \mid \mathbb {F} \models ^+ A \}$
is a predicate modal logic.
Definition 4.4. With a Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F} {\kern-1pt}={\kern-1pt} ( W, R, D, \rho )$
, we associate a family
${\{F_k \mid k {\kern-1pt}<{\kern-1pt} \omega \}}$
of propositional Kripke frames, in the following way: set
$D_0 := W$
and
$R_0 := R$
, and, for every
$k> 0$
, set
We will be using the following well-known [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Proposition 5.3.7] criterion of strong validity of propositional formulas on Kripke bundles.
Proposition 4.5. Let
$\mathbb {F}$
be a Kripke bundle and A a propositional modal formula. Then
$\mathbb {F} \models ^+ A$
iff
$F_k \models A$
, for every
$k < \omega $
.
We now prove that, if
$n \geqslant 1$
, then every logic between
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
is Kripke incomplete. To that end, we use the following sentences:
We recall that
$\models _{\mathcal {K}}$
denotes consequence in Kripke semantics.
Lemma 4.6. If
$n \geqslant 1$
, then
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n \models _{\mathcal {K}} A_n$
.
Proof. Fix
$n \geqslant 1$
and suppose that
$\boldsymbol {F} = (W, R, D)$
is a
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
-frame. By Proposition 2.4,
$(W, R) \models \mathbf {K4Alt}_n$
, and so, by Proposition 2.2(1) and (3), R is transitive and
$|R(u)| \leqslant n$
, for every
$u \in W$
. To prove that
$\boldsymbol {F} \models A_n$
, we assume that
$\boldsymbol {F}, u_0 \models \Diamond ^{n+1} \top $
to show that
$\boldsymbol {F}, u_0 \models \Diamond \forall \mathit {ref}$
, for an arbitrary
$u_0$
from
$\boldsymbol {F}$
. Since
$\boldsymbol {F}, u_0 \models \Diamond ^{n+1} \top $
, there exist
$u_1, \ldots , u_{n+1} \in W$
such that
$u_0 R u_1 \ldots u_n R u_{n+1}$
; hence, by transitivity,
$u_0Ru_i$
, for every
$i \in \{1, \ldots , n+1\}$
. Since
$|R(u_0)| \leqslant n$
, there exist
$i, j \in \{1, \ldots , n+1\}$
such that
$i\neq j$
and
$u_{i} = u_j$
. Since R is transitive, it follows that
$u_i$
is reflexive. Hence,
$\boldsymbol {M},u_i \models \square P(a) \rightarrow P(a)$
, for every model
$\boldsymbol {M}$
over
$\boldsymbol {F}$
and every
$a\in D_{u_i}$
. Thus,
$\boldsymbol {F}, u_i \models \forall \mathit {ref}$
, and so
$\boldsymbol {F}, u_0 \models \Diamond \forall \mathit {ref}$
.
Lemma 4.7.
$\mathbf {QSL4}~\mathrel {\not \vdash }~ A_n$
.
Proof. In view of Proposition 4.3, it suffices to obtain a Kripke bundle strongly validating
$\mathbf {SL4}$
, but not
$A_n$
. To that end, we use a Kripke bundle from [Reference Shehtman7] (see Figure 1):
Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}_0$
.

To see that
$\mathbb {F}_0 \not \models ^+ A_n$
, consider the model
$\mathbb {M}_b = (\mathbb {F}_0, \xi )$
where
$\xi _u(P) = \{ b \}$
. Since
$R(u)=\{u\}$
,
$\rho _{uu}(a)=\{b\}$
, and
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \models P(b)$
, it follows that
${\mathbb {M}_b, u \models \square P(a)}$
. Since also
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \not \models P(a)$
, it follows that
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \not \models \square P(a) \to P(a)$
and so
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \not \models \forall \mathit {ref}$
. Since u sees only itself,
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \not \models \Diamond \forall \mathit {ref}$
. On the other hand, since R is serial,
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \models \Diamond ^{n+1} \top $
. Hence,
$\mathbb {M}_b, u \not \models A_n$
, and so
$\mathbb {F}_0 \not \models ^+ A_n$
.
That
$\mathbb {F}_0 \models ^+ \mathbf {SL4}$
was observed in [Reference Shehtman7, Proof of Lemma 5.12]: by Proposition 4.5, it suffices to check that, for every propositional frame
$F_k = (D_k, R_k)$
associated with
$\mathbb {F}_0$
(see Definition 4.4),
$F_k \models \mathbf {SL4}$
; this holds since every
$R_k$
is transitive and functional (and, hence,
$1$
-alternative).
Theorem 4.8. Let
$n \geqslant 1$
. Then, every logic between
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
is Kripke incomplete.
4.3 Extensions of
$\mathbf {QK4.1}$
For the proofs in this section, we use the sentence
Lemma 4.9.
$\mathbf {QK4.1}\vDash _{\mathcal {K}} B_1$
.
Proof. Suppose that
$\boldsymbol {F} =(W,R,D)$
is a
$\mathbf {QK4.1}$
-frame, and so, by Proposition 2.4,
$(W,R)\models \mathbf {K4.1}$
. Then, by Propositions 2.2(3) and 2.3, R is transitive and every world from W sees a maximal world.
To prove that
$\boldsymbol {F} \models B_1$
, we consider a model over
$\boldsymbol {F}$
and, assuming that, in that model,
$u \models \Diamond \square \exists x P(x)$
, show that
$u \models \Diamond \exists x\square P(x)$
. Since
$u \models \Diamond \square \exists x P(x)$
, there exists
${v \in R(u)}$
such that
$v \models \square \exists x P(x)$
. Let w be a maximal world accessible from
$v$
. Then,
$w \models \exists x P(x)$
, and so
$w \models P(a)$
, for some
$a \in D_w$
. Since w is maximal, surely
$w \models \square P(a)$
, and so
$w \models \exists x \square P(x)$
. Since R is transitive,
$w \in R(u)$
; hence,
$u \models \Diamond \exists x\square P(x)$
.
Lemma 4.10. Let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
be a Kripke complete propositional extension of
$\mathbf {K4.1}$
such that
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \ne \mathbf {Triv}$
. Then, either
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {SL4}$
or
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
.
Proof. First, we recall that
$\mathbf {K}+\boldsymbol {ma}\vdash \Diamond \top $
: since
$\mathbf {K}\vdash \square \top $
, it follows that
$\mathbf {K}+\square \Diamond \top \rightarrow \Diamond \square \top \vdash \square \Diamond \top \rightarrow \Diamond \top $
; since
$\mathbf {K}\vdash \square \bot \rightarrow \square \Diamond \top $
, it then follows that
$\mathbf {K}+\boldsymbol {ma}\vdash \square \bot \rightarrow \Diamond \top $
, and so
$\mathbf {K}+\boldsymbol {ma}\vdash \Diamond \top $
. Thus, every Kripke frame validating
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is serial.
By assumption, there exists a Kripke frame F such that
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }={\textbf {L}}(F)$
. As we have seen, F is serial; moreover, since
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \ne \mathbf {Triv}$
, this frame is not a singleton. Hence, there exists a nontrivial rooted generated subframe
$G = (W, R)$
of F, and so, by Generation lemma (the propositional version of Proposition 2.8(2)),
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }={\textbf {L}}(F)\subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G)$
.
Now, consider Kripke frames (see Figure 2)
One can show, using standard modal logic arguments, that
${\textbf {L}}(G_1) = \mathbf {SL4}$
and
${\textbf {L}}(G_2) = \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
. (The simplest way is to use Bellissima’s completeness theorem mentioned in the introduction and consider rooted frames validating these logics: there are only a few possibilities.)
Kripke frames
$G_1$
(left) and
$G_2$
(right).

Figure 2. Long description
The figure consists of two separate directed graphs.
In the left panel, G 1, there are two nodes labeled a and b. A horizontal arrow points from node a on the left to node b on the right. Node b has a circular arrow representing a self-loop.
In the right panel, G 2, there are two nodes labeled c and d. Node c on the left has a circular arrow representing a self-loop. A horizontal arrow points from node c to node d on the right. Node d also has a circular arrow representing a self-loop.
Next, we show that either
$G \twoheadrightarrow G_1$
or
$G\twoheadrightarrow G_2$
.
Let
$u_0$
be the root of G (thus,
$W = \{u_0\} \cup R(u_0)$
) and
$C_0$
be the cluster of G containing
$u_0$
. Since G is nontrivial and
$G \models \boldsymbol {ma}$
, it follows, by Proposition 2.3, that G is not a cluster; hence,
$C_0 \neq W$
. Now, if
$u_0$
is irreflexive, then there exists a p-morphism of G onto
$G_1$
sending
$u_0$
to a, and all other points to b. If, on the other hand,
$u_0$
is reflexive, then there exists a p-morphism of G onto
$G_2$
mapping
$C_0$
to c and
$W -C_0$
to d.
Thus, either
$G \twoheadrightarrow G_1$
or
$G\twoheadrightarrow G_2$
, and so either
${\textbf {L}}(G)\subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G_1) (= \mathbf {SL4})$
or
${\textbf {L}}(G)\subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G_2) (= \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2)$
, which proves the lemma.
Remark 4.11. In fact, Lemma 4.10 holds for arbitrary, maybe Kripke incomplete, nontrivial extensions of
$\mathbf {K4.1}$
; we give here a sketch of the proof.
First, consider a propositional logic
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
in the language with a fixed finite set of proposition letters (such logics are called weak) containing
$\boldsymbol {ma}$
and
$\boldsymbol {4}$
. Let M be the weak canonical model of
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
and let F be its underlying frame. In F, all maximal clusters are singletons. If
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \ne \mathbf {Triv}$
, then F must contain points at the next level (i.e., points of depth
$2$
); see, e.g., [Reference Chagrov and Zakharyaschev1, Section 8.7]. Let
$\mathit{u}$
be such a point. Then,
$M {\uparrow } u$
is finite, and all its points are definable by formulas. By Canonical model theorem,
$M\models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
; hence, by Generation lemma,
$M{\uparrow } u \models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. Since all subsets of
$M {\uparrow } u$
are definable, it follows that
$F{\uparrow } u\models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. The proof of Lemma 4.10 shows that either
$G_1$
or
$G_2$
is a p-morphic image of
$F{\uparrow } u$
; therefore, either
$G_1\models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
or
$G_2\models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Now, let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
be a logic in countably many proposition letters and let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\upharpoonright n$
be its fragment in
$\mathit{n}$
proposition letters. Then, as we have seen, either
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\upharpoonright n \subseteq \mathbf {SL4}$
or
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\upharpoonright n \subseteq \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
. If infinitely many of these weak logics are included into
$\mathbf {SL4}$
, then
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {SL4}$
. Otherwise,
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\upharpoonright n\subseteq \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
, for every sufficiently large
$\mathit{n}$
, which implies that
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
.
Another proof is based on the (probably, folklore) fact that the lattice of extensions of
$\mathbf {K4}$
is partitioned into slices numbered
$1,2,\ldots ,\omega $
. In our case,
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is not in slice 1, so it is included into a maximal logic of slice 2. The latter is a logic of a two-element chain containing reflexive or irreflexive points. Since
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\supseteq \mathbf {K4.1}$
, this chain is isomorphic either to
$G_1$
or to
$G_2$
.
Lemma 4.12.
$\mathbf {QSL4}\,\mathrel {\not \vdash }\, B_1$
.
Proof. In view of Proposition 4.3, it suffices to obtain a Kripke bundle strongly validating
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
, but not
$B_1$
. We use the Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}_0$
from the proof of Lemma 4.7. We know that
$\mathbb {F}_0 \models ^+ \mathbf {QSL4}$
, so it remains to show that
$\mathbb {F}_0 \not \models ^+ B_1$
.
To that end, consider the model
$\mathbb {M}_a = (\mathbb {F}_0, \theta )$
where
$\theta _u(P) = \{a\}$
. Since, in this model,
$u \models P(a)$
, surely
$u \models \exists x P(x)$
, and so, by triviality of R, also
$u \models \Diamond \square \exists x P(x)$
. On the other hand, since
$u \not \models P(b)$
, it follows that
$u \not \models \square P(a)$
and
$u \not \models \square P(b)$
, and so
$u \not \models \exists x \square P(x)$
. Hence,
$u \not \models \Diamond \exists x \square P(x)$
.
Lemma 4.13.
$\mathbf {QS4.1Alt}_2\,\mathrel {\not \vdash }\, B_1$
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the previous lemma. We use the Kripke bundle defined as follows (see Figure 3):
Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}_1$
.

To prove that
$\mathbb {F}_1 \models ^+ \mathbf {QS4.1Alt}_2$
, we consider the associated family
$\{ F_k = (D_k,R_k) \mid k < \omega \}$
of Kripke frames and show that
$F_k \models \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
, for every
$k < \omega $
.
Since
$F_1$
is isomorphic to the frame
$G_2$
from the proof of Lemma 4.10, we know that
$F_1 \models \mathbf {S4.1Alt}_2$
.
Now, let
$k \geqslant 1$
and let
$\mathbf {b} = (b,\ldots ,b) \in D_k$
. We show that, for every
$\mathbf {c}\in D_k$
, either both
$\mathbf {c}=\mathbf {b}$
and
$R_k(\mathbf {c})=\{\mathbf {c}\}$
, or else both
$\mathbf {c}\not =\mathbf {b}$
and
$R_k(\mathbf {c})=\{\mathbf {c},\mathbf {b}\}$
.
If
$\mathbf {c} = \mathbf {b}$
, then, since
$\rho (b) = \{ b \}$
, surely
$R_k(\mathbf {c}) = R_k(\mathbf {b}) = \{\mathbf {b}\} = \{\mathbf {c}\}$
.
Now, let
$\mathbf {c} \ne \mathbf {b}$
and suppose that
$\mathbf {e} \in R_k(\mathbf {c})$
. Then, by definition of
$\rho $
, for every
$i \in \{ 1, \ldots , k\}$
,
and either
$c_i = a\, \Longrightarrow \, e_i = a\, (= c_i)$
for every i, or
$c_i = a\, \Longrightarrow \, e_i = b$
for every i. In the former case,
$\mathbf {e} = \mathbf {c}$
, while in the latter,
$\mathbf {e} = \mathbf {b}$
. Thus,
$R_k(\mathbf {c})=\{\mathbf {c},\mathbf {b}\}$
.
To show that
$\mathbb {F}_1 \not \models ^+ B_1$
, we use the model
$\mathbb {M}_1 = (\mathbb {F}_1, \theta )$
with
$\theta _u(P) = \{a\}$
. In this model,
$u \models \exists x P(x)$
, and so
$u \models \Diamond \square \exists x P(x)$
. On the other hand,
$u \not \models \square P(a)$
and
$u \not \models \square P(b)$
, and so
$u \not \models \Diamond \exists x\square P(x)$
. Thus,
$\mathbb {F}_1 \not \models ^+ B_1$
.
Theorem 4.14. If
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a propositional extension of
$\mathbf {K4.1}$
such that
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete, then
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }=\mathbf {Triv}$
.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \ne \mathbf {Triv}$
. By Proposition 2.7,
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete. Hence, by Lemma 4.10 and Proposition 2.1(1), either
$\mathbf {QK4.1} \subseteq \mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \subseteq \mathbf {QSL4}$
or
$\mathbf {QK4.1} \subseteq \mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \subseteq \mathbf {QS4.1Alt}_2$
. Thus, by Lemma 4.9,
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \models _{\mathcal {K}} B_1$
, while, by Lemmas 4.12 and 4.13,
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\not \vdash B_1$
, in contradiction with Kripke completeness of
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
4.4 Extensions of
$\mathbf {QD4}$
For the proofs in this section, we use the sentence
Lemma 4.15. If
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a locally tabular extension of
$\mathbf {K4}$
, then
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda } \models _{\mathcal {K}} B_2$
.
Proof. Let
$\boldsymbol {F} = (W, R, D)$
be a
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
-frame. Then, by Proposition 2.4,
$(W,R) \models \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. By Segerberg–Maksimova theorem [Reference Chagrov and Zakharyaschev1, Theorem 12.21],
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
has a finite transitive depth. Hence, every point from W sees a maximal cluster.
To prove that
$\boldsymbol {F} \models B_2$
, we consider a model over
$\boldsymbol {F}$
and, assuming that, in that model,
$u \models \Diamond \square \Diamond \exists x P(x)$
, show that
$u \models \Diamond \exists x \square \Diamond P(x)$
.
Since
$u \models \Diamond \square \Diamond \exists x P(x)$
, there exists
$v\in R(u)$
such that
$v \models \square \Diamond \exists x P(x)$
. Let
$C\subseteq R(v)$
be a maximal cluster. Then, there exist
$w \in C$
and
$a \in D_w$
such that
$w \models P(a)$
. But then
$w \models \square \Diamond P(a)$
: if
$t \in C$
, then
$D_t = D_w$
and so
$a \in D_t$
, which together with
$w \in R(t)$
gives us
$t \models \Diamond P(a)$
; since
$R(w) = C$
, it then follows that
$w \models \square \Diamond P(a)$
. Thus,
$w \models \exists x \square \Diamond P(x)$
, and so, by transitivity,
$u \models \Diamond \exists x \square \Diamond P(x)$
.
Lemma 4.16. Let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
be a locally tabular extension of
$\mathbf {D4}$
such that
$\mathbf {S5} \not \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
. Then, either
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {SL4}$
or
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq \mathbf {S4Alt}_2$
.
Proof. The argument is similar to that of Lemma 4.10.
It is well known that every locally tabular logic has the finite model property, and so is complete with respect to a class of rooted finite frames. Since
$\mathbf {S5} \not \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
, there exists a rooted finite
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
-frame
$G = (W, R)$
that is not a cluster. Since
$\mathbf {D} \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
, the frame G is serial. Let u be the root of G and C the cluster containing u.
We now argue similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.10. If u is irreflexive, there exists a p-morphism from G onto
$G_1$
sending u to a and all other points to b. If, on the other hand, u is reflexive, then there exists a p-morphism from G onto
$G_2$
mapping C to c and
$W-C$
to d. Thus, either
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G) \subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G_1)(= \mathbf {SL4})$
or
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G) \subseteq {\textbf {L}}(G_2) (= \mathbf {S4Alt}_2)$
.
Remark 4.17. Local tabularity of
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is not essential for the previous lemma; the argument is similar to one at the end of Remark 4.11: if
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is not in the first slice, then it is included into the logic of a two-element chain with reflexive or irreflexive points; since
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\vdash \Diamond \top $
, this chain is isomorphic either to
$G_1$
or to
$G_2$
.
Lemma 4.18.
$\mathbf {QSL4}\,\mathrel {\not \vdash }\, B_2$
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.12; we use the Kripke bundle model
$\mathbb {M}_a$
defined there. Since we already know that the underlying Kripke bundle validates
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
, we only need to show that
$\mathbb {M}_a, u \not \models B_2$
.
Since, in this model,
$u \models \exists x P(x)$
and R is trivial, it follows that
$u \models \Diamond \square \Diamond \exists x P(x)$
. On the other hand, since
$u \not \models P(b)$
, it follows that
$u \not \models \Diamond P(b)$
; hence,
$u \not \models \square \Diamond P(a)$
and
$u \not \models \square \Diamond P(b)$
, and so
$u \not \models \exists x \square \Diamond P(x)$
. Thus,
$u \not \models \Diamond \exists x \square \Diamond P(x)$
, due to triviality of R.
Lemma 4.19.
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2\,\mathrel {\not \vdash }\, B_2$
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 4.13; we use the Kripke bundle
$\mathbb {F}_1$
and the model
$\mathbb {M}_1$
defined there. We only need to show that
$\mathbb {M}_1, u \not \models B_2$
.
In this model,
$u \models \exists xP(x)$
, and so
$u \models \Diamond \square \Diamond \exists x P(x)$
. On the other hand,
$u \not \models \Diamond P(b)$
, and so
$u \not \models \square \Diamond P(a)$
and
$u \not \models \square \Diamond P(b)$
. Hence,
$u \not \models \exists x\square \Diamond P(x)$
, and so
$u \not \models \Diamond \exists x\square \Diamond P(x)$
.
Theorem 4.20. Let
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
be a locally tabular extension of
$\mathbf {D4}$
such that
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is Kripke complete. Then
$\mathbf {S5} \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.14. By Lemmas 4.15, 4.18, and 4.19,
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\not \subseteq \textbf {SL4}$
and
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }\not \subseteq \textbf {S4Alt}_2$
. Hence, by Lemma 4.16,
$\mathbf {S5} \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
Remark 4.21. Note that Theorem 4.20 generalizes Theorem 4.1. There exists a continuum of locally tabular extensions of
$\mathbf {D4}$
that are not extensions of
$\mathbf {S4}$
(this can be shown, e.g., by constructing a continuum of
$\mathbf {GL}$
-frames of height
$3$
not reducible to each other and then making their maximal points reflexive). Hence, Theorem 4.20 implies the existence of a continuum of Kripke incomplete modal predicate logics not covered by Ghilardi’s theorem [Reference Ghilardi3, Theorem 7.3].
5 Kripke completions
In this section, we axiomatize Kripke completions for some of the Kripke incomplete logics considered in
$\S $
4. We recall the following notation introduced in
$\S \S $
2 and 3: the Kripke completion of logic L is denoted by
$\widehat {L}$
; if L is a logic,
$\Gamma $
is a set of formulas, and A is a formula, then
$\Gamma \vdash _L A$
means that A is derivable from
$\Gamma $
using theorems of L and rules (MP) and (Gen).
5.1 Completion of
$\mathbf {QSL4}$
Let
Lemma 5.1.
$\mathbf {QSL4} \models _{\mathcal {K}} \square \forall \mathit {ref}$
.
Proof. It is not hard to see that the propositional logic
$\mathbf {SL4}$
has only two Kripke frames: a reflexive singleton and a frame isomorphic to the frame
$G_1$
from the proof of Lemma 4.10. So, in every QSL4-frame, starting from any world, in a single step we reach a reflexive world; this world validates
$\forall \mathit {ref}$
.
The following result was stated, without proof, in [Reference Shehtman7, Section 6].Footnote 10
Theorem 5.2.
$\widehat {\mathbf {QSL4}} = L_0$
.
Proof. In view of Lemma 5.1, it suffices to show that
$L_0$
is Kripke complete. Due to Theorem 3.21, it is enough to prove that
$L_0$
is quasi-canonical. Let
$C(\Gamma )$
be defined as in
$\S $
3.
First, we notice that, if
$\Gamma \in W_{L_0}$
, then
$C(\Gamma )$
is a singleton: since
$L_0 \vdash \Diamond \top $
, we know that
$\Diamond \top \in \Gamma $
and so, by Existence lemma,
$C(\Gamma ) \ne \varnothing $
; also,
$L_0 \vdash \boldsymbol {alt}_1$
, and so, by Lemma 3.24,
$|C(\Gamma )| \leqslant 1$
.
Now, suppose that
$\Gamma \in W_{L_0}$
. To prove the existence of a quasi-canonical model containing
$\Gamma $
, we consider two cases.
Case
$C(\Gamma ) = \{\Gamma \}$
: In this case,
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_0}\upharpoonright \{\Gamma \}$
is a weak selective submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_0}$
since
$\Diamond A \to \square A \in \Gamma $
, for every
$A \in \mathcal {L}(\Gamma )$
, and
$\square ^- \Gamma \subseteq \Gamma $
. Also, the base predicate frame
$\boldsymbol {F}$
validates
$L_0$
: since the underlying Kripke frame F is a reflexive singleton, surely
$F \models \mathbf {SL4}$
, and so, by Proposition 2.4,
$\boldsymbol {F} \models \mathbf {QSL4}$
; moreover, by Lemma 5.1,
$\mathbf {QSL4} \models _{\mathcal {K}} \square \forall \mathit {ref}$
, and so
$\boldsymbol {F} \models \square \forall \mathit {ref}$
.
Case
$C(\Gamma ) = \{{\Delta }\}$
, with
${\Delta } \ne \Gamma $
: We start by showing that, in this case,
${\Delta } R_{L_0} {\Delta }$
.
First, we note that
$\mathbf {SL4} \vdash \square \boldsymbol {ref}$
, which can be shown either semantically, using Kripke completeness of
$\mathbf {SL4}$
, or syntactically, using
Second, by [Reference Shehtman7, Proposition 3.10],
$L_0 \vdash \square A$
whenever
$A\in \mathbf {QT}$
; in particular,
$L_0 \vdash \square \overline {\forall } (\square B\rightarrow B)$
, for every formula B. Thus, by Lemma 3.2(1),
$\square \overline {\forall } (\square B\rightarrow B)\in \Gamma $
, and so, since
$\Gamma R_{L_0} {\Delta }$
,
Now, to prove that
${\Delta } R_{L_0} {\Delta }$
, we assume that
$\square C(\mathbf {a})\in {\Delta }$
, where
$\mathbf {a}$
is a list of constants, to show that
$C(\mathbf {a})\in {\Delta }$
. Since, by (5.1),
it follows that
and so, by (MP),
$C(\mathbf {a})\in {\Delta }$
.
Since
${\Delta } R_{L_0} {\Delta }$
, we know that
${\Delta } \in C(\Delta )$
, and so, since
$C(\Delta )$
is a singleton,
${C(\Delta ) = \{{\Delta }\}}$
. It follows that
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_0}\upharpoonright \{\Gamma ,{\Delta }\}$
is a selective weak submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_0}$
. The underlying Kripke frame
$\boldsymbol {F} := \boldsymbol {F}_{L_0}\upharpoonright \{\Gamma ,{\Delta }\}$
is isomorphic to the frame
$G_1$
from the proof of Lemma 4.10, and so
$\boldsymbol {F} \models \mathbf {SL4}$
. Then, by Proposition 2.4, Lemma 5.1, and Soundness theorem,
$\boldsymbol {F} \models L_0$
.
5.2 Completion of
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_1$
Let
$A_1$
be as defined in
$\S $
4.2 and recall that, by Lemma 4.6,
Theorem 5.3.
$\widehat {\mathbf {QK4Alt}_1} = \mathbf { QK4Alt}_1 + A_1$
.
Proof. Let
$L_1:=\mathbf { QK4Alt}_1 + A_1$
. In view of (5.2), it suffices to prove that
$L_1$
is Kripke complete. Again, we show that
$L_1$
is quasi-canonical. To this end, we prove a series of lemmas.
Lemma 5.4.
$L_1 + \Diamond ^2 \top = L_0$
.
Proof. Since
$\mathbf {K} + \Diamond ^2\top \vdash \Diamond \top $
, it follows that
$L_1+\Diamond ^2\top \supseteq \mathbf { QSL4}$
. Also, due to
$A_1$
,
and so, due to
$\boldsymbol {alt}_1$
,
Hence,
$L_0 \subseteq L_1+\Diamond ^2\top $
.
The converse inclusion
$L_1 + \Diamond ^2\top \subseteq L_0$
holds since
$\mathbf {K4Alt}_1\subseteq \mathbf {SL4}$
,
$\mathbf {SL4} \vdash \Diamond ^2\top $
, and
$\mathbf {QSL4}\vdash \square \forall \mathit {ref} \rightarrow \Diamond \forall \mathit {ref}$
.
Lemma 5.5. For every
$n \geqslant 0$
,
Proof. Let
Then, by substitution,
and so, by
$\mathbf {K}$
,
Hence, by
$\boldsymbol {alt}_1$
,
and so, by classical logic,
Hence, by monotonicity of
$\square $
, for every
$k \geqslant 0$
,
Eventually, by induction on n, using (5.3) and (5.4), we obtain that, for every
$n \geqslant 0$
,
Lemma 5.6. For every formula B,
Proof. We use deduction theorems from [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2]. By Lemma 5.4,
$L_0=L_1+\Diamond ^2\top $
. So assume that
$L_1+\Diamond ^2\top \vdash B$
. Then, by [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Theorem 2.8.4],
Thus, for some
$n \geqslant 0$
,
Due to
$\boldsymbol {alt}_1$
and the substitution into
$A_1$
,
Hence, by Lemma 5.5, for every
$n \geqslant 0$
,
and so, by (5.5),
Hence, by Deduction theorem,
Now, put
Lemma 5.7.
$L_1+\square ^2\bot =L_2$
.
Proof. Since
$\mathbf {K} \vdash \square ^2 \bot \to \square ^2 P$
, and so
$\mathbf {K} \vdash \square ^2 \bot \to (\square P \to \square ^2 P)$
, it follows that
Also, by classical logic,
Hence,
$L_1+\square ^2\bot \subseteq L_2$
. The converse inclusion is trivial.
Lemma 5.8. For every formula B,
Proof. By Lemma 5.7,
$L_2 = L_1 + \square ^2\bot $
. So assume that
$ L_1 + \square ^2\bot \vdash B$
. It follows, as in the proof of Lemma 5.6, that, for some
$n \geqslant 2$
,
Since, for every
$m \geqslant 2$
,
it follows that
$\square ^2\bot \vdash _{L_1} B$
, and hence,
$L_1\vdash \square ^2\bot \rightarrow B$
.
Lemma 5.9.
$L_1 = L_0\cap L_2$
.
Proof. The inclusion
$L_1\subseteq L_0\cap L_2$
follows immediately from Lemmas 5.4 and 5.7.
For the converse, assume that
$A\in L_0\cap L_2$
. Then, by Lemma 5.6,
$L_1\vdash \Diamond ^2\top \rightarrow A$
and, by Lemma 5.8,
$L_1\vdash \square ^2\bot \rightarrow A$
. Since
$\mathbf {K}\vdash \Diamond ^2\top \vee \square ^2\bot $
, it follows that
$L_1\vdash A$
.
We now complete the proof of Theorem 5.3: By Theorems 3.23 and 3.26,
$L_2$
is quasi-canonical. As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 5.2,
$L_0$
is also quasi-canonical. Hence, by Lemma 5.9 and Proposition 3.28,
$L_1$
is quasi-canonical.
5.3 Completion of
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2$
Define, for every
$n \geqslant 1$
,
Now, define
Lemma 5.10.
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2 \models _{\mathcal {K}} q\vee \square (q\rightarrow \overline {\forall }C^{+n})$
.
Proof. Let
$\boldsymbol {F} = (W,R,D)$
be a
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2$
-frame and let
$\boldsymbol {M}$
be a model over
$\boldsymbol {F}$
. Supposing that
$\boldsymbol {M},u \not \models q$
, we show that
$\boldsymbol {M},u \models \square (q\rightarrow \overline {\forall }C^{+n})$
, for every
$n \geqslant 1$
.
Assume that
$uRv$
and
$\boldsymbol {M},v \models q$
. Then,
$u \ne v$
. Since
$(W,R) \models \mathbf {S4Alt}_2$
, it follows that
$R(u)=\{u,v\}$
and
$R(v)=\{v\}$
. Hence, for all
$a_1,\ldots ,a_n\in D_v$
,
and so
$\boldsymbol {M}, v \models \overline {\forall }C^{+n}$
. Since
$R(u)=\{u,v\}$
and
$\boldsymbol {M},u \not \models q$
, it follows that
$\boldsymbol {M}, u \models \square (q\rightarrow \overline {\forall }C^{+n})$
.
Theorem 5.11.
$\widehat {\mathbf {QS4Alt}}_2 = L_3$
.
Proof. In view of Lemma 5.10, it suffices to prove that
$L_3$
is Kripke complete; to that end, we show that
$L_3$
is quasi-canonical.
Let
$\Gamma $
be an
$L_3$
-place. Since
$L_3 \vdash \square P \to P$
, the canonical frame
$\boldsymbol {F}_{L_3}$
is reflexive. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3.24, we see that
$|C(\Gamma )| \leqslant 2$
; moreover, due to reflexivity, we may assume that
$\Gamma \in C^\circ (\Gamma )$
. We consider two cases.
Case
$C^\circ (\Gamma ) =\{\Gamma \}$
: In this case,
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_3}\upharpoonright \{ \Gamma \} $
is a selective submodel of
$\boldsymbol {M}_{L_3}$
. The underlying predicate Kripke frame
$\boldsymbol {F}$
is a reflexive singleton with a domain; hence,
$\boldsymbol {F} \models \mathbf {QTriv}$
, and so, since
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2 \subseteq \mathbf {QTriv}$
, also
$\boldsymbol {F} \models \mathbf {QS4Alt}_2$
. Thus, by Lemma 5.10,
$\boldsymbol {F} \models L_3$
.
Case
$C^\circ (\Gamma ) = \{\Gamma ,{\Delta }\}$
, with
${\Delta }\neq \Gamma $
: In this case, there exists a
$D_\Gamma $
-sentence A such that
$A \notin \Gamma $
and
$A \in \Delta $
. Then, by Lemma 3.3,
$\Diamond A\in \Gamma $
. By substitution, for every formula B,
and so, since
$A\not \in \Gamma $
, we know that
$\square (A\rightarrow \overline {\forall }(\Diamond B\rightarrow B))\in \Gamma $
. Then, since
$\square ^-\Gamma \subseteq {\Delta }$
, it follows that
$A\rightarrow \overline {\forall }(\Diamond B\rightarrow B)\in {\Delta }$
.
Now, let
$\Theta $
be an
$L_{3}$
-place containing
${\Delta }$
. Then,
$A, A\rightarrow \overline {\forall }(\Diamond B\rightarrow B)\in \Theta $
, and so, by (MP), for every formula B,
But then
$\boldsymbol {M} := \boldsymbol {M}_{L_3}\upharpoonright \{\Gamma ,\Theta \}$
is selective: if
$\Diamond B(\mathbf {a})\in \Theta $
, for a
$D_\Theta $
-sentence
$B(\mathbf {a})$
, then, due to (5.6),
$\Diamond B(\mathbf {a})\rightarrow B(\mathbf {a}) \in \Theta $
, and so
$B(\mathbf {a}) \in \Theta $
. That
$\boldsymbol {M}$
is based on an
$L_3$
-frame is proved as in the preceding case.
6 Final remarks
First, we note that adding the Barcan formula to some logics studied in this paper, such as
$\mathbf {QAlt}_n$
,
$\mathbf {QTAlt}_n$
,
$\mathbf {QK4Alt}_n$
,
$\mathbf {QS4Alt}_n$
,
$\mathbf {QK4.1Alt}_n$
, and
$\mathbf {QS4.1Alt}_n$
yields Kripke completeness. This follows from the Tanaka–Ono theorem on Kripke completeness of minimal constant-domain extensions of universal propositional logics [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2, Theorem 7.4.7],Footnote
11
[Reference Tanaka, Ono, Zakharyaschev, Segerberg, de Rijke and Wansing11].
Second, our results can be transferred to logics with equality: by Theorem 3.8.7 from [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2], strong Kripke completeness with respect to Kripke frames with equality is preserved for minimal extensions with equality.
Still, the results of this paper can be viewed as a small part of the study of Kripke completeness in first-order modal logic. Although the boundaries of Kripke completeness can hardly be identified, it seems reasonable to find them for special kinds of logics, such as logics
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
where
-
(1) $\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is tabular; -
(2) $\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a logic of a finite tree; -
(3) $\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a logic of a finite
$\mathbf {GL}$
-tree; -
(4) $\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is a logic of a finite
$\mathbf {S4}$
-tree; -
(5) $\mathbf {Alt}_1 \subseteq \boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
.
We conjecture that, for all logics
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
from (2) and (3),
$\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
are Kripke complete.
This paper also touched on the problem of axiomatizing Kripke completions. Proposition 3.12.8 from [Reference Gabbay, Shehtman and Skvortsov2] implies that if a propositional logic
$\boldsymbol {\Lambda }$
is elementary, then the predicate logic
$\widehat {\mathbf {Q}\boldsymbol {\Lambda }}$
is recursively axiomatizable; in particular, so are completions of logics mentioned in (1) through (5) above. However, finding explicit axiomatizations of these logics may be hard. In particular, the problem remains unresolved for the following logics related to this paper:
$\widehat {\mathbf {Q}\mathbf {S4Alt}_n}$
with
$n> 2$
and
$\widehat {\mathbf {Q}\mathbf {K4Alt}}_n$
with
$n> 1$
. Other important logics for which this question is open are the Kripke completions of
$\mathbf {QS4}+\boldsymbol {bd}_n$
and
$\mathbf {QGrz.3}+\boldsymbol {bd}_n$
, where
$\boldsymbol {bd}_n$
is the axiom of transitive depth n.
Another direction for future research concerns determining whether Kripke completions are finitely axiomatizable. This problem is open, in particular, for
$\widehat {\mathbf {QS4Alt}_2}$
and for many logics from [Reference Shehtman7].
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. Preliminary results presented here have been published in [Reference Shehtman and Shkatov9].
Funding
The work of the first author is an output of the research project (HSE-BR-2025-84) implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at HSE University.









