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The motivational self is more than the sum of its goals
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 April 2014
Abstract
I present evidence in favor of an overarching motivational self: a mental function that regulates expression of multiple goals. Goals often conflict with each other, and the role of a motivational self is to consciously or unconsciously prioritize pursuit of these goals. When observing inconsistency in expression of goals, it is therefore useful to consider whether the motivational self is attempting to balance between conflicting goals or if such inconsistency results from temporary self-control weakness.
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In explaining the interplay between multiple goals, one theoretical approach assumes an overarching entity that organizes expression of different goals: the “motivational self.” In contrast, another approach assumes an unorganized and unguided competition between goals of different importance (e.g., goal shielding theory, Shah et al. Reference Shah, Friedman and Kruglanski2002; the planner-doer model, Thaler & Shefrin Reference Thaler and Shefrin1981). The “Selfish Goal” model fits within the latter approach. It assumes goals operate autonomously in a somewhat random and chaotic order. The metaphor of genes competing for expression leads to the thought-provoking conclusion that there is no organization, coordination, or for that matter, a motivational self.
Huang & Bargh (H&B) present compelling evidence in favor of a Selfish Goal model. However, it might be also useful to consider the evidence in favor of a motivational self – that is, a centralized self-regulatory function that coordinates multiple goal pursuit, often outside of conscious awareness. Let me clarify that indeed people hold coexisting, often conflicting goals, and these goals compete with each other for limited resources (i.e., time, effort, and attention). The multiple goals people hold are also often inconsistent with each other (e.g., work and family goals) or directly undermine each other (e.g., saving and spending goals). I further agree with the assumption that situational cues (i.e., primes) trigger the activation of goals and influence judgment, feelings, and behavior. Thus, goal expression is subject to contextual cues, and because multiple goals coexist and people respond to different contextual cues, their goal pursuits often appear erratic.
However, there is evidence pointing at a motivational self that guides regulation of multiple goals. In what follows, I present three sources of evidence in favor of a motivational (centralized) self: the quest for multifinal means, the order of goal expression, and the exercise of self-control.
1. The quest for multifinal means
Goal Systems Theory suggests a guiding principle in action selection is the desire to find multifinal means, defined as means that serve multiple goals simultaneously (Kruglanski et al. Reference Kruglanski, Shah, Fishbach, Friedman, Chun, Sleeth-Keppler and Zanna2002). For example, the task of choosing lunch food is often guided by (and a compromise between) several conflicting goals (e.g., hedonic pleasure, saving time and money, etc. Köpetz et al. Reference Köpetz, Faber, Fishbach and Kruglanski2011). Thus, individuals do not simply juggle between their goals. Rather, the motivational self searches for a compromise all goals can “live with.”
2. Order of goals expression
Research on the expression of multiple goals suggests that what seems erratic is often orderly. There are two basic patterns of coordination between multiple goals: expression of one goal can increase the likelihood of expressing this goal again and inhibits competing goals, or expression of one goal leads to expression of another goal. The first pattern – “highlighting” goals – promotes consistency, whereas the second pattern – “balancing” between goals – promotes inconsistency. Indeed, consistency theories (Bem Reference Bem and Berkowitz1972; Festinger Reference Festinger1957; see also Bandura Reference Bandura and Dienstbier1991) document a pattern of highlighting goals, whereas research on cybernetic self-regulation (Carver & Scheier Reference Carver and Scheier1998; Higgins Reference Higgins1987) and licensing (Monin & Miller Reference Monin and Miller2001) documents a pattern of balancing goals (e.g., discriminating after expressing egalitarian views).
Research on Dynamics of Self-Regulation theory explores some of the variables that lead people to follow one order versus another. This research documented, for example, that uncommitted individuals and novices tend to highlight goal pursuit – they are more likely to adhere to a goal after they have pursued it. In contrast, committed individuals and experts balance their goals – they are more likely to adhere to a goal if they have previously pursued a different goal, in a dynamic of balancing (Fishbach et al. Reference Fishbach, Eyal and Finkelstein2010). Research on learning goals makes a similar distinction: people respond to success by either increasing or decreasing academic pursuits, depending on people's implicit theory (Dweck & Leggett Reference Dweck and Leggett1988).
Exploring the psychological variables that lead people to follow one pattern versus the other suggests an order in multiple goal pursuit, which implies a centralized motivational self. What appears to be inconsistency in goal expression often reflects a particular pattern: highlighting or balancing goals. And when researchers observe inconsistency, it is useful to ask if the goals were selected with respect to each other and if it is the pursuit of one goal that justifies pursuing another, inconsistent goal – for example, whether saving justifies subsequent spending behavior.
3. Self-control
Self-control research provides another source of evidence for a motivational self. According to self-control theory, individuals are not passive or helpless in pursuing multiple goals. These goals are often of varied importance: an individual would like to be financially responsible but is tempted to splurge, or she wishes to maintain good health while also feeling tempted by unhealthy foods. In these situations, self-control facilitates the pursuit of the more important goal and inhibit the tempting goal, often without conscious awareness (Fishbach & Converse Reference Fishbach, Converse, Vohs and Baumeister2010). Self-control is a limited resource (Baumeister et al. Reference Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven and Tice1998) and people vary in their self-control ability (Mischel et al. Reference Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez1989). Both temporary and personality weaknesses can explain giving in to temptation, in particular after a period of overriding goal pursuit. Thus, the motivational self's limitations, rather than its absence, often accounts for the pursuit of conflicting goals. When the motivational self is strong, behavior is often more orderly.
In summary, what appears as inconsistency often reflects a certain pattern of goal expression and coordination. There is evidence for a guiding, overarching self-regulatory system, which organizes multiple goal pursuit: the motivational self. It sometimes fails but nonetheless exists, and it is more than the sum of one's goals.