Phillips et al.'s target article, calls for a shift in focus in theory-of-mind research. More specifically, it proposes a new way to understand theory of mind; one that is – unlike previous versions – deeply grounded on comprehending others' minds in relation to the lived world. This affords the authors to formulate an account of knowledge that is relational and factive in character. In addition, such an account is not reducible to the capacity of attributing true belief and is not modality specific, hence not necessarily innate.
We believe that the empirical findings presented in this target article, pointing out the ontological priority of representations of knowledge over representations of beliefs and the crucial role of the former in facilitating learning from others – can be used to shed light on the debate between externalists theories of cognition in the cognitive sciences. More specifically, we believe it is possible to successfully apply Phillips et al.'s results in the debate between the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, Reference Clark and Chalmers1998) and forms of enactivism (such as Noë, Reference Noë2004; Thompson & Stapleton, Reference Thompson and Stapleton2009).
The extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, Reference Clark and Chalmers1998; Farina, Reference Farina2020) is a thesis about human cognition that claims that the cognitive processes that make up our minds can (under specific conditions, the so-called glue and trust conditions) reach beyond the boundaries of individual organisms, so as to include as proper, constitutive aspects of the organism's physical and socio-cultural environment (Kiverstein, Farina, & Clark, Reference Kiverstein, Farina and Clark2013). In other words, the extended mind thesis sees the body and the environment (or the technological artefacts located in it with which we reliably interact) as precious – sometimes constitutive resources (Farina, Reference Farina2013; Farina & Levin, Reference Farina, Levin, Michael and ThomasIn Press) – that we can use in order to enhance our cognitive states.
Research on the extended mind thesis is often said to be arising from functionalist views concerning the “multiple realizability” of cognitive processes and indeed quite a few extended mind theorists (such as Wheeler, Reference Wheeler2005) are extremely sympathetic to functionalist and mechanistic accounts of the mind. This means that they believe that mental states are identified by their causal roles and not merely by the medium that realizes them (this understanding is grounded on the so-called parity principle). However, there is also a second strand of research characterizing the extended mind thesis, which is more concerned with the complementarity of inner and outer and so with how internal (neural) and external (extra-neural) resources can work together and eventually become integrated or amalgamated (Rowlands, Reference Rowlands2010), so as to form a new, enriched system of cognitive analysis (Menary & Protevi, Reference Menary and Protevi2007; Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, Reference Sutton, Harris, Keil and Barnier2010). Crucially, neither of these versions of the extended mind thesis gives up the computational power of our brains nor it repudiates the notion of minimally robust representations (Clark & Toribio, Reference Clark and Toribio1994).
On the contrary, enactivism, in all its different strands (see Ward, Silverman, & Villalobos, Reference Ward, Silverman and Villalobos2017, for a review) attempts to ground cognition in the biodynamics of living biological systems; hence, it describes cognitive behaviour not only as deeply rooted in our engaged, bodily lives but more profoundly as emerging holistically from the structural coupling and adaptive interplay between the organism and its ecological surroundings (Gallagher & Zahavi, Reference Gallagher and Zahavi2020; Noë, Reference Noë2004; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, Reference Varela, Thompson and Rosch1991). Consequently, this theory (inspired by phenomenology as well as by Gibson's ecological psychology, Reference Gibson1979) tends to replace the notion of representation with that of sensorimotor contingencies (patterns of contingencies that hold between the movements the perceivers make and what they are able to perceive) and intersubjective affordances (Zahavi, Reference Zahavi2002). In addition, in some versions of enactivism (such as Hutto's and Myin's radical enactivism, Reference Hutto and Myin2012), this move is accompanied by a contextual progressive repudiation of computationalism. Thus, enactivism (in all its various forms, albeit with different degrees of radicality) asserts that cognitive processes are not content-involving, hence not representation hungry.
We believe that Phillips et al.'s empirical results in showing that representations of knowledge are more basic than representations of beliefs might be used to infer that such a knowledge must be, not only ontologically prior to the other one, but also content-involving and therefore intrinsically representational.
Following the authors' hypothesis that “the primary function of knowledge representation” is “facilitating learning from others” (a claim that might, in principle, be compatible with both extended and enacted accounts), we notice that the former may nevertheless serve this function better than the latter. Contrary to enactivism, which sees cognition as holistically arising from the sensorimotor activity taking place within living biological systems, we claim that the extended mind theory – through is adoption of representations of knowledge and its computationalist/mechanistic roots – provides us with a clearer, more “objective,” and perhaps less confused understanding of both the external world in which “others” happen to be, and of the mechanisms that regulate their interactions. This is because in the extended account the elements of a cognitive system that determine the production of knowledge are not meshed indistinguishably together – quite the opposite their respective functions, contributions, and roles can be clearly individuated at any point in time.
Yet we acknowledge that the findings presented in Philips and colleagues' target article cannot be taken to adjudicate the complex debate between these two theories of cognition. This is also because these results are drawn from a very specific and limited domain of inquiry, that of theory of mind. In addition, Phillips et al.'s findings await further replication. Nevertheless, it seems to us that they can be profitably used to suggest an inversion in terms of the debate between extended and enacted.
In summary, we believe that Phillips and colleagues' results may allow to mount as sustained defence of extended over enacted, as the former can describe learning from others about the external world and the related process underlying the production of knowledge within a much clearer theoretical framework, one that is content-involving and does not renounce computation or representations. We believe this is a significant implication of this target article for current debates in empirically informed philosophy of mind.
Phillips et al.'s target article, calls for a shift in focus in theory-of-mind research. More specifically, it proposes a new way to understand theory of mind; one that is – unlike previous versions – deeply grounded on comprehending others' minds in relation to the lived world. This affords the authors to formulate an account of knowledge that is relational and factive in character. In addition, such an account is not reducible to the capacity of attributing true belief and is not modality specific, hence not necessarily innate.
We believe that the empirical findings presented in this target article, pointing out the ontological priority of representations of knowledge over representations of beliefs and the crucial role of the former in facilitating learning from others – can be used to shed light on the debate between externalists theories of cognition in the cognitive sciences. More specifically, we believe it is possible to successfully apply Phillips et al.'s results in the debate between the extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, Reference Clark and Chalmers1998) and forms of enactivism (such as Noë, Reference Noë2004; Thompson & Stapleton, Reference Thompson and Stapleton2009).
The extended mind thesis (Clark & Chalmers, Reference Clark and Chalmers1998; Farina, Reference Farina2020) is a thesis about human cognition that claims that the cognitive processes that make up our minds can (under specific conditions, the so-called glue and trust conditions) reach beyond the boundaries of individual organisms, so as to include as proper, constitutive aspects of the organism's physical and socio-cultural environment (Kiverstein, Farina, & Clark, Reference Kiverstein, Farina and Clark2013). In other words, the extended mind thesis sees the body and the environment (or the technological artefacts located in it with which we reliably interact) as precious – sometimes constitutive resources (Farina, Reference Farina2013; Farina & Levin, Reference Farina, Levin, Michael and ThomasIn Press) – that we can use in order to enhance our cognitive states.
Research on the extended mind thesis is often said to be arising from functionalist views concerning the “multiple realizability” of cognitive processes and indeed quite a few extended mind theorists (such as Wheeler, Reference Wheeler2005) are extremely sympathetic to functionalist and mechanistic accounts of the mind. This means that they believe that mental states are identified by their causal roles and not merely by the medium that realizes them (this understanding is grounded on the so-called parity principle). However, there is also a second strand of research characterizing the extended mind thesis, which is more concerned with the complementarity of inner and outer and so with how internal (neural) and external (extra-neural) resources can work together and eventually become integrated or amalgamated (Rowlands, Reference Rowlands2010), so as to form a new, enriched system of cognitive analysis (Menary & Protevi, Reference Menary and Protevi2007; Sutton, Harris, Keil, & Barnier, Reference Sutton, Harris, Keil and Barnier2010). Crucially, neither of these versions of the extended mind thesis gives up the computational power of our brains nor it repudiates the notion of minimally robust representations (Clark & Toribio, Reference Clark and Toribio1994).
On the contrary, enactivism, in all its different strands (see Ward, Silverman, & Villalobos, Reference Ward, Silverman and Villalobos2017, for a review) attempts to ground cognition in the biodynamics of living biological systems; hence, it describes cognitive behaviour not only as deeply rooted in our engaged, bodily lives but more profoundly as emerging holistically from the structural coupling and adaptive interplay between the organism and its ecological surroundings (Gallagher & Zahavi, Reference Gallagher and Zahavi2020; Noë, Reference Noë2004; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, Reference Varela, Thompson and Rosch1991). Consequently, this theory (inspired by phenomenology as well as by Gibson's ecological psychology, Reference Gibson1979) tends to replace the notion of representation with that of sensorimotor contingencies (patterns of contingencies that hold between the movements the perceivers make and what they are able to perceive) and intersubjective affordances (Zahavi, Reference Zahavi2002). In addition, in some versions of enactivism (such as Hutto's and Myin's radical enactivism, Reference Hutto and Myin2012), this move is accompanied by a contextual progressive repudiation of computationalism. Thus, enactivism (in all its various forms, albeit with different degrees of radicality) asserts that cognitive processes are not content-involving, hence not representation hungry.
We believe that Phillips et al.'s empirical results in showing that representations of knowledge are more basic than representations of beliefs might be used to infer that such a knowledge must be, not only ontologically prior to the other one, but also content-involving and therefore intrinsically representational.
Following the authors' hypothesis that “the primary function of knowledge representation” is “facilitating learning from others” (a claim that might, in principle, be compatible with both extended and enacted accounts), we notice that the former may nevertheless serve this function better than the latter. Contrary to enactivism, which sees cognition as holistically arising from the sensorimotor activity taking place within living biological systems, we claim that the extended mind theory – through is adoption of representations of knowledge and its computationalist/mechanistic roots – provides us with a clearer, more “objective,” and perhaps less confused understanding of both the external world in which “others” happen to be, and of the mechanisms that regulate their interactions. This is because in the extended account the elements of a cognitive system that determine the production of knowledge are not meshed indistinguishably together – quite the opposite their respective functions, contributions, and roles can be clearly individuated at any point in time.
Yet we acknowledge that the findings presented in Philips and colleagues' target article cannot be taken to adjudicate the complex debate between these two theories of cognition. This is also because these results are drawn from a very specific and limited domain of inquiry, that of theory of mind. In addition, Phillips et al.'s findings await further replication. Nevertheless, it seems to us that they can be profitably used to suggest an inversion in terms of the debate between extended and enacted.
In summary, we believe that Phillips and colleagues' results may allow to mount as sustained defence of extended over enacted, as the former can describe learning from others about the external world and the related process underlying the production of knowledge within a much clearer theoretical framework, one that is content-involving and does not renounce computation or representations. We believe this is a significant implication of this target article for current debates in empirically informed philosophy of mind.
Conflict of interest
None.