Because I find that in Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) target article there is much that is agreeable, my point is not whether their notion of selfish goal is correct and useful but rather to what extent it is. Another way to put this is to say that their article attempts to draw distinct conclusions that are not equally supported. Specifically, it is one thing to say that (1) “goals influence a person as if the goals themselves were selfish and interested only in their own completion” (abstract, para. 1), it is another to say that (2) “a person's behaviors are indirectly selected at the goal level but expressed (and comprehended) at the individual level” (abstract, para. 2), it is yet another to say that (3) the conscious self “is not so much involved in the guidance of our purposive behavior so much as it is in the business of producing rationalizations” (sect. 5.2, para. 9). The first conclusion is strongly supported by H&B's arguments, especially by what the authors dub the “reconfiguration principle”: the evidence that goals constrain “the person's cognitive and affective machinery for the purpose of facilitating goal pursuit” (sect. 4.3, para. 1) irrespective of whether those goals are conscious or not. That conclusion, however, does not imply that goals are never selected at the individual – or, as I would say, the “personal” – level. And the claim that goals are not selected at the personal level does not imply that, once selected, conscious goals cannot have a role in guiding behavior over and beyond mere rationalizations.
The fact that those conclusions are not equally warranted is somehow concealed by H&B's choice to limit their considerations to a specific subset of the goals underlying actions. H&B make it explicit that they are “more interested in time-limited instrumental behaviors enacted in the current situation” (sect. 2.2., para. 2) than in long-term, chronic goals; besides, they are less focussed “on the very concrete actions that can be described in fully objective terms (e.g., pressing a button; opening a door)” (sect. 2.2., para. 2) than “on higher-level end-states that provide those actions with meaning” (sect. 2.2., para. 2). A typical example of the goals they are concerned with is the goal of being either cooperative or competitive in a given time-limited task.
Here, the first thing to note is that abstract goals of this sort are not the ones that are ordinarily expected to fall within the focus of attention. Any human action involves the representation of a multiplicity of goals at different levels of abstraction, not all of which can be consciously attended during processing (Mazzone & Campisi Reference Mazzone and Campisi2013). Because it is possible that we consciously attend concrete goals more than higher-level ones (e.g., the goal of performing a task more than the goal of being cooperative or competitive while performing that task), then by restricting considerations to the latter, H&B may have failed to look in the right place in order to assess the role of consciousness in guiding behavior.
To be sure, H&B insist that there are strong similarities between conscious and unconscious goals (they call it the “similarity principle”). But this can hardly mean that it makes no difference whether conscious processes are involved in guiding behavior or not. H&B implicitly acknowledge this point insofar as they recognize in passing that conscious processes are superior to unconscious ones “in serving integrative functions” (sect. 5.1, para. 1) and allow for “metacognitive abilities” and “tighter executive control over the initial impulses to action” (sect. 3.4, para. 2). Moreover, the cognitive system for guiding behavior is said to be “less centralized in the absence of consciousness” (sect. 3.1, para. 4). But then, contrary to the thesis (3) above, it seems not to be the case that conscious and unconscious goals – though similar in some respects – have identical functions except for the role that conscious goals play in post hoc rationalizations. The above quotations suggest a role for consciousness in the assessment of coherence between goals and, therefore, in their integration. This could have effects that go well beyond mere post hoc rationalizations for the purpose of social accountability.
Let us note that the notion of selfish goal is said to account for why there are inconsistencies in human behavior at the personal level. But again, one would wonder whether the role of conscious self in preventing inconsistencies is not underestimated as a consequence of how H&B select the goals under consideration. Not only, as noted above, abstract motivations, such as being cooperative, are less likely to be consciously attended than concrete goals. Moreover, abstract motivations of that sort are not the kind of things that can be selected once and for all. On the contrary, we expect that there is a balance between cooperation and competition to be struck on a case-to-case basis: people are not expected to be either coherently cooperative or coherently competitive across any possible action. In order to assess whether goals are coherently pursed or not, we should rather look to more concrete goals and especially to long-term goals. It is here that we can possibly find cases of conscious selection and the effects of conscious adoption of goals.
One case in point is that of addictions. H&B themselves repeatedly address this issue, but their emphasis is on automaticity. However, one might focus instead on how addictions can be resisted when the conscious self is engaged in a search for rational coherence. For example, people may decide to give up smoking because they appreciate the rational relationship with their larger purpose of pursuing wellness (goal selection). Moreover, the decision to give up smoking may affect behavior in the long run in many ways, including the conscious search for appropriate strategies to that end. Rational coherence has some role to play here.
In sum, conscious and unconscious goals similarly reconfigure the person's cognitive and affective machinery. Besides, goals can be automatically selected and pursued. But they can also be consciously selected and pursued, and this may increase coherence at the personal level.
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Because I find that in Huang & Bargh's (H&B's) target article there is much that is agreeable, my point is not whether their notion of selfish goal is correct and useful but rather to what extent it is. Another way to put this is to say that their article attempts to draw distinct conclusions that are not equally supported. Specifically, it is one thing to say that (1) “goals influence a person as if the goals themselves were selfish and interested only in their own completion” (abstract, para. 1), it is another to say that (2) “a person's behaviors are indirectly selected at the goal level but expressed (and comprehended) at the individual level” (abstract, para. 2), it is yet another to say that (3) the conscious self “is not so much involved in the guidance of our purposive behavior so much as it is in the business of producing rationalizations” (sect. 5.2, para. 9). The first conclusion is strongly supported by H&B's arguments, especially by what the authors dub the “reconfiguration principle”: the evidence that goals constrain “the person's cognitive and affective machinery for the purpose of facilitating goal pursuit” (sect. 4.3, para. 1) irrespective of whether those goals are conscious or not. That conclusion, however, does not imply that goals are never selected at the individual – or, as I would say, the “personal” – level. And the claim that goals are not selected at the personal level does not imply that, once selected, conscious goals cannot have a role in guiding behavior over and beyond mere rationalizations.
The fact that those conclusions are not equally warranted is somehow concealed by H&B's choice to limit their considerations to a specific subset of the goals underlying actions. H&B make it explicit that they are “more interested in time-limited instrumental behaviors enacted in the current situation” (sect. 2.2., para. 2) than in long-term, chronic goals; besides, they are less focussed “on the very concrete actions that can be described in fully objective terms (e.g., pressing a button; opening a door)” (sect. 2.2., para. 2) than “on higher-level end-states that provide those actions with meaning” (sect. 2.2., para. 2). A typical example of the goals they are concerned with is the goal of being either cooperative or competitive in a given time-limited task.
Here, the first thing to note is that abstract goals of this sort are not the ones that are ordinarily expected to fall within the focus of attention. Any human action involves the representation of a multiplicity of goals at different levels of abstraction, not all of which can be consciously attended during processing (Mazzone & Campisi Reference Mazzone and Campisi2013). Because it is possible that we consciously attend concrete goals more than higher-level ones (e.g., the goal of performing a task more than the goal of being cooperative or competitive while performing that task), then by restricting considerations to the latter, H&B may have failed to look in the right place in order to assess the role of consciousness in guiding behavior.
To be sure, H&B insist that there are strong similarities between conscious and unconscious goals (they call it the “similarity principle”). But this can hardly mean that it makes no difference whether conscious processes are involved in guiding behavior or not. H&B implicitly acknowledge this point insofar as they recognize in passing that conscious processes are superior to unconscious ones “in serving integrative functions” (sect. 5.1, para. 1) and allow for “metacognitive abilities” and “tighter executive control over the initial impulses to action” (sect. 3.4, para. 2). Moreover, the cognitive system for guiding behavior is said to be “less centralized in the absence of consciousness” (sect. 3.1, para. 4). But then, contrary to the thesis (3) above, it seems not to be the case that conscious and unconscious goals – though similar in some respects – have identical functions except for the role that conscious goals play in post hoc rationalizations. The above quotations suggest a role for consciousness in the assessment of coherence between goals and, therefore, in their integration. This could have effects that go well beyond mere post hoc rationalizations for the purpose of social accountability.
Let us note that the notion of selfish goal is said to account for why there are inconsistencies in human behavior at the personal level. But again, one would wonder whether the role of conscious self in preventing inconsistencies is not underestimated as a consequence of how H&B select the goals under consideration. Not only, as noted above, abstract motivations, such as being cooperative, are less likely to be consciously attended than concrete goals. Moreover, abstract motivations of that sort are not the kind of things that can be selected once and for all. On the contrary, we expect that there is a balance between cooperation and competition to be struck on a case-to-case basis: people are not expected to be either coherently cooperative or coherently competitive across any possible action. In order to assess whether goals are coherently pursed or not, we should rather look to more concrete goals and especially to long-term goals. It is here that we can possibly find cases of conscious selection and the effects of conscious adoption of goals.
One case in point is that of addictions. H&B themselves repeatedly address this issue, but their emphasis is on automaticity. However, one might focus instead on how addictions can be resisted when the conscious self is engaged in a search for rational coherence. For example, people may decide to give up smoking because they appreciate the rational relationship with their larger purpose of pursuing wellness (goal selection). Moreover, the decision to give up smoking may affect behavior in the long run in many ways, including the conscious search for appropriate strategies to that end. Rational coherence has some role to play here.
In sum, conscious and unconscious goals similarly reconfigure the person's cognitive and affective machinery. Besides, goals can be automatically selected and pursued. But they can also be consciously selected and pursued, and this may increase coherence at the personal level.