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Perspectives from ethnography on weak and strong reciprocity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2012
Abstract
To add ethnographic perspective to Guala's arguments, I suggest reasons why experimental and ethnographic evidence do not concur and highlight some difficulties in measuring whether positive and negative reciprocity are indeed costly. I suggest that institutions to reduce the costs of maintaining cooperation are not limited to complex societies.
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References
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Guala's target article makes a most welcome contribution to the discussion of strong reciprocity, crossing disciplines to compare the findings of economic experiments and ethnographic evidence from small-scale egalitarian societies, “in the wild.” It comes as no surprise to anthropologists that the two do not concur; cooperation in the wild is tamed by emotions accompanying kinship, a factor lost in experiments that hinge on anonymity (Wiessner Reference Wiessner2009). Moreover, the one-shot material consequence of punishment in experiments in no way parallels the multi-shot social consequences of the same in real life. Grudges from punishment, particularly by third parties, are infinitely retrievable and accrue; punishment begs retribution, petty or pernicious, that so disrupts cooperation.
Significant also is Guala's point that positive and negative strong reciprocity are not the flip side of the coin. Cooperation in small-scale societies is driven largely by benefits, not by blows, whether social or physical. Strong punishers are not rewarded for their sacrifices while strong positive reciprocators are revered. Among the Kalahari Bushmen, pushing back to regulate weak reciprocity provides the spice of daily life, but frequent harsh punishers, particularly the few third party punishers, are despised and called tshi n!ai or “biting thing.” In 62% of Bushman conversations that involved some social sanctioning where the camp leader was present, the leader refrained from sanctioning in order to save his clout for subsequent mediation (Wiessner Reference Wiessner2005).
Whether positive and negative reciprocity are costly and thus truly “strong” is difficult to measure in the field. For the six out of 124 cases of sanctioning among the !Kung Bushmen that I evaluated as costly, three were over land rights, two over sexual promiscuity, and one over deposing an aging leader. The costs of reacting immediately were most likely to have been lower than the consequences of no action for the land and sex disputes. More than five coalition members shared costs of sanctioning in all cases because the offender threatened the entire community. In contrast, acts that appear to be positive strong reciprocity are frequent in small-scale societies. I say “appear” because positive strong reciprocity builds reputation or symbolic capital that may be cashed in years later (Bourdieu Reference Bourdieu1977). A few studies suggest that the costs of generous acts are balanced out by benefits in the long-run (Smith et al. Reference Smith, Bleige-Bird and Bird2003; Wiessner Reference Wiessner2002).
Sophisticated institutions to manage sustained cooperation are not unique to complex societies. For example, compensation, a form of restorative justice, practiced in Melanesia (Lemonnier Reference Lemonnier1990; Strathern Reference Strathern1971; Trompf Reference Trompf1994; Wiessner & Tumu Reference Wiessner and Tumu1998) puts a neat twist on strong negative and positive reciprocity. The victim's kin require the offender and his kin to pay compensation for insult, injury, homicide, or destruction of property; else they threaten violent retribution. If the offending parties come up with a generous payment, they receive fame and acclaim, turning punishment to positive strong reciprocity. Lasting ties are renewed and new ones may be created to produce a win–win situation. People in small-scale societies are well aware of the costs of punishment; institutions to reduce those costs did not wait for the Leviathan.