It is really hard for me to concentrate on writing this commentary, because I'm worried about so many other things besides this. It is March 12, 2011, and my worries of the day include: (a) whether the reactors affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan will melt down, spewing radiation across that country and, potentially, the world; (b) whether Libya will end up continuing with the Gaddafi dictatorship or fall to the rebels; (c) whether there is any prospect of my getting a raise in the next several years, given the total mess of state governments in the United States; and (d) whether our 2-month-old triplets will get through the night peacefully or whether instead tonight will prove to be a “screamer.” Surely you can understand how these issues can seem more important than writing a commentary! I hate it when radiation leaks from a nuclear reactor all across the world! I also hate not getting a raise for several years on end.
Come to think of it, problems such as these are what frustrate me with the literature on human thinking, and in particular, on reasoning. The field has done a marvelous job of studying the problems that consume us just so little of the time. I'm used to this. My own field is human intelligence, and it too specializes in studying the problems that are easy to quantify (e.g., how should we measure IQ) rather than the problems that are important (e.g., if humans are so smart and their IQs increasing over the generations, why are they destroying the world in which they live?). As a field, psychology has mastered the study of the expedient instead of the consequential.
Although the psychology of reasoning has overwhelmingly concentrated on deductive reasoning, most problems we deal with in our everyday lives are inductive. And even when inductive reasoning has been studied, much of the work (including my own early work) has focused on IQ-test-like problems such as analogies, series completions, and classifications, or on problems that lend themselves to the potential application of quantifiable formulas. But the problems we most often face are not like these at all. What are the kinds of reasoning problems of consequence that people face?
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If I continue to smoke, what is the likelihood that smoking will kill me or cause me grievous illness?
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If I continue to gamble at the rate I am gambling, what is the likelihood I will drive myself and my family into financial ruin?
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If I try meth or cocaine or some illegal drug once, what are the chances I will become addicted?
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What are the chances that the sexual encounter I'm planning will end up giving me VD?
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If I marry the woman (man) I'm dating, what are the chances that it will end in divorce, and especially, an ugly divorce?
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If I keep gaining weight, what are the chances I'll end up with Type II diabetes?
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If I take this job, will I get tenure or end up jobless after a few years?
These are the kinds of problems that weigh heavily on people's minds and have profound consequences. What is odd is how little psychologists of reasoning have given them any thought, perhaps because they are hard to study and harder, if one does study them, to lead to articles in prestigious journals that are more concerned with tightness of design and analysis than with the real-world consequentiality of the problems being studied.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) study an important question in the psychology of human reasoning: To what extent are prescriptive, normative models useful in understanding how people think? Their conclusion that prescriptive normative models are not useful seems reasonable. But they do not go far enough. The problem is fundamentally that these models, right or wrong, apply only to a very narrow sliver of the kinds of problems that people face in their everyday lives.
When we study deductive reasoning, the question of whether there are normative solutions to which we should pay attention appears weighty and important. But few problems of consequence in our lives have deductive or even any meaningful kind of “correct” solution. Try to think of three, or even, one! When we look at inductive-reasoning problems such as those listed earlier, in which we try to predict future events that matter to us, the question of whether there is a normative solution seems rather remote. Obviously, there is not. It does not even matter whether we are talking about prescriptive or empirical normative models.
The problem, of course, is not limited to psychologists studying reasoning. Most of the standardized tests used in the United States are of the multiple-choice format or are short essays that have normative or at least empirically scorable “correct” answers. The advantage of such items is that they give the appearance of objectivity, can be easily scored, and yield impressive-looking statistics. The disadvantage is that they are remote from the kinds of problems people face in their lives, which may be why people are so much less than adequate in making real-world decisions. Schooling gives them so little experience in dealing with the kinds of problems of consequence they really will face. If one looks at government leaders, it is truly hard to find many (any?) who seem to be adept at inductive reasoning of the kind they need to govern.
We need a new psychology of human reasoning, one devoted to the world in which people live rather than the world in which academic psychologists live.
It is really hard for me to concentrate on writing this commentary, because I'm worried about so many other things besides this. It is March 12, 2011, and my worries of the day include: (a) whether the reactors affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan will melt down, spewing radiation across that country and, potentially, the world; (b) whether Libya will end up continuing with the Gaddafi dictatorship or fall to the rebels; (c) whether there is any prospect of my getting a raise in the next several years, given the total mess of state governments in the United States; and (d) whether our 2-month-old triplets will get through the night peacefully or whether instead tonight will prove to be a “screamer.” Surely you can understand how these issues can seem more important than writing a commentary! I hate it when radiation leaks from a nuclear reactor all across the world! I also hate not getting a raise for several years on end.
Come to think of it, problems such as these are what frustrate me with the literature on human thinking, and in particular, on reasoning. The field has done a marvelous job of studying the problems that consume us just so little of the time. I'm used to this. My own field is human intelligence, and it too specializes in studying the problems that are easy to quantify (e.g., how should we measure IQ) rather than the problems that are important (e.g., if humans are so smart and their IQs increasing over the generations, why are they destroying the world in which they live?). As a field, psychology has mastered the study of the expedient instead of the consequential.
Although the psychology of reasoning has overwhelmingly concentrated on deductive reasoning, most problems we deal with in our everyday lives are inductive. And even when inductive reasoning has been studied, much of the work (including my own early work) has focused on IQ-test-like problems such as analogies, series completions, and classifications, or on problems that lend themselves to the potential application of quantifiable formulas. But the problems we most often face are not like these at all. What are the kinds of reasoning problems of consequence that people face?
If I continue to smoke, what is the likelihood that smoking will kill me or cause me grievous illness?
If I continue to gamble at the rate I am gambling, what is the likelihood I will drive myself and my family into financial ruin?
If I try meth or cocaine or some illegal drug once, what are the chances I will become addicted?
What are the chances that the sexual encounter I'm planning will end up giving me VD?
If I marry the woman (man) I'm dating, what are the chances that it will end in divorce, and especially, an ugly divorce?
If I keep gaining weight, what are the chances I'll end up with Type II diabetes?
If I take this job, will I get tenure or end up jobless after a few years?
These are the kinds of problems that weigh heavily on people's minds and have profound consequences. What is odd is how little psychologists of reasoning have given them any thought, perhaps because they are hard to study and harder, if one does study them, to lead to articles in prestigious journals that are more concerned with tightness of design and analysis than with the real-world consequentiality of the problems being studied.
Elqayam & Evans (E&E) study an important question in the psychology of human reasoning: To what extent are prescriptive, normative models useful in understanding how people think? Their conclusion that prescriptive normative models are not useful seems reasonable. But they do not go far enough. The problem is fundamentally that these models, right or wrong, apply only to a very narrow sliver of the kinds of problems that people face in their everyday lives.
When we study deductive reasoning, the question of whether there are normative solutions to which we should pay attention appears weighty and important. But few problems of consequence in our lives have deductive or even any meaningful kind of “correct” solution. Try to think of three, or even, one! When we look at inductive-reasoning problems such as those listed earlier, in which we try to predict future events that matter to us, the question of whether there is a normative solution seems rather remote. Obviously, there is not. It does not even matter whether we are talking about prescriptive or empirical normative models.
The problem, of course, is not limited to psychologists studying reasoning. Most of the standardized tests used in the United States are of the multiple-choice format or are short essays that have normative or at least empirically scorable “correct” answers. The advantage of such items is that they give the appearance of objectivity, can be easily scored, and yield impressive-looking statistics. The disadvantage is that they are remote from the kinds of problems people face in their lives, which may be why people are so much less than adequate in making real-world decisions. Schooling gives them so little experience in dealing with the kinds of problems of consequence they really will face. If one looks at government leaders, it is truly hard to find many (any?) who seem to be adept at inductive reasoning of the kind they need to govern.
We need a new psychology of human reasoning, one devoted to the world in which people live rather than the world in which academic psychologists live.