Trying to define yourself is like trying to bite your own teeth.
— Alan Watts (Reference Watts1961)
Philosophy classes often start by considering Bertrand Russell's “Barber's paradox” – if an island has a male barber and all and only those men who do not shave themselves are shaved by him, does he shave himself? Logically, if the barber does not shave himself, then he must shave himself; but if he does, he cannot. The only solution to this quandary is to accept that, as defined, no such island could exist.
The authors' positive, provocative, and controversial paper posits a world much like that of Russell's hypothetical Barber. It follows in the footsteps of J. B. Watson's early claims for the world-changing potential of behaviourism (Watson Reference Watson1924) and B. F. Skinner's Reference Skinner1948 novel Walden Two. As in these earlier works, Wilson et al. are trying to anticipate and explain a world they believe can be completely predicted, controlled, and shaped for the common good. It forms part of a growing interest in how we humans might have influenced and may be able to influence our own evolution (Cochran & Harpending Reference Cochran and Harpending2009; Wrangham Reference Wrangham2009).
The target article promises a satisfying bite at these issues, but perhaps the authors have tried to bite off something no one can chew.
I agree that a pragmatic methodology for change requires the integration of current knowledge across a number of overlapping domains. I also agree that the most intuitive and best empirically supported framework for such a transdisciplinary perspective needs to integrate behavioural analysis with social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology and psychobiology. Where I take issue is with the authors' assumptions on a number of more specific points and the resultant conclusions that can be drawn about our ability to be the “wise managers of evolutionary processes.”
They appear to suggest:
-
1. That the revision to evolutionary psychology and its integration with other branches of current science possible through their proposed synthesis would approach a definitive articulation of the understanding required;
-
2. That knowledge in these areas is effectively as good as it is going to get and is more or less complete except for its integration;
-
3. That successful management of the process of evolutionary change could be actively, effectively, and prospectively directed using this approach.
Many of the examples used here concern redress, not progress. For example, how to increase play behaviour where it is poor, or alter alcohol and tobacco sales when they produce health or economic problems. The results in the studies cited are impressive, and it is a useful exercise to open this material to critical scrutiny from a wider scientific audience. I came away from reading it not convinced that I had read about a methodology for proactive positive change, however, but rather about one that can be used in addressing concerns.
A logical non sequitur in this argument lies in assuming some understanding of a desired progression and endpoint. Human history is liberally strewn with well-intentioned failed attempts to wield such control.
The focus is largely on effecting a process of change in the individual rather than a reflexive process of change in all relevant aspects across a social–evolutionary context (including those trying to consciously introduce and direct such change).
A feature of comprehensive behavioural accounts is that they should be reflexive. This is a well-recognised issue with unidirectional analyses of behaviour (Bandura Reference Bandura1978; Hineline Reference Hineline1980).
Evidence-based practice has become a key concept for clinicians (Satterfield et al. Reference Satterfield, Spring, Brownson, Mullen, Newhouse, Walker and Whitlock2009), and the development of comparative models by PCORI (the Patient Centered Outcome Research Institute; Gabriel & Normand Reference Gabriel and Normand2012) and of RDoC (Research Diagnostic Criteria) by the National Institute of Mental Health (see Aitken Reference Aitken2013) will develop this further. This methodology has been largely concerned with addressing problems or with their primary prevention. Even large-scale datasets using this approach have often been surprisingly poor at prediction across populations (Brindle et al. Reference Brindle, Emberson, Lampe, Walker, Whincup, Fahey and Ebrahim2003). This may be partly due to a tendency to assume that mathematical/statistical and behavioural equivalence are synonymous (Saunders & Green Reference Saunders and Green1992), and partly to assuming that the same explanatory model will hold irrespective of population differences.
Much is made in the paper of being able to use “evidence-based kernels” of knowledge to drive the process of change. This sounds sensible where such a knowledge base exists. The examples referred to are useful but largely concern either prevention (stopping a problem from developing) or treatment (dealing with a problem) and not with moulding the process of evolving more successful behaviour, which I take to be the authors' intent.
Development can be channelled but is often serendipitous. Its influences cannot be readily predicted; it can, however, be affected by changes in environmental affordances. Many such factors are outside previous knowledge or control and can only be adapted to post hoc.
Perhaps a good example of change outside the scope of this model is the impact exerted by changing climatic conditions on human behaviour (see, e.g., Hsiang et al. Reference Hsiang, Burke and Miguel2013). Increasing global temperature and rainfall are precursors to higher levels of inter-group violence. A proximal focus on conflict de-escalation to target the human response might help to address these issues. We are currently unable to positively modify climate to any significant degree. It is probable that only approaches based on things such as reducing carbon dioxide, deforestation, levels of animal farming, and fossil fuel use (assuming these were possible and the science behind their roles to be accurate) will alter these more distal factors. In our prehistory, glaciation obviously shaped evolution through factors our ancestors would have been unable to appreciate or modify.
We have the methods to engage in changing behaviour and to tell when we have succeeded. I think we are still some way off from an intentional science that can mould evolutionary change, and like Sir Karl Popper (Senn Reference Senn1991), I am not sure if or how we could tell we had ultimately succeeded.
What men have seen they know,
But what shall come hereafter,
No man before the event can see,
Nor what end waits for him.
—Sophocles (Grene & Lattimore Reference Grene and Lattimore1957)
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Trying to define yourself is like trying to bite your own teeth.
— Alan Watts (Reference Watts1961)Philosophy classes often start by considering Bertrand Russell's “Barber's paradox” – if an island has a male barber and all and only those men who do not shave themselves are shaved by him, does he shave himself? Logically, if the barber does not shave himself, then he must shave himself; but if he does, he cannot. The only solution to this quandary is to accept that, as defined, no such island could exist.
The authors' positive, provocative, and controversial paper posits a world much like that of Russell's hypothetical Barber. It follows in the footsteps of J. B. Watson's early claims for the world-changing potential of behaviourism (Watson Reference Watson1924) and B. F. Skinner's Reference Skinner1948 novel Walden Two. As in these earlier works, Wilson et al. are trying to anticipate and explain a world they believe can be completely predicted, controlled, and shaped for the common good. It forms part of a growing interest in how we humans might have influenced and may be able to influence our own evolution (Cochran & Harpending Reference Cochran and Harpending2009; Wrangham Reference Wrangham2009).
The target article promises a satisfying bite at these issues, but perhaps the authors have tried to bite off something no one can chew.
I agree that a pragmatic methodology for change requires the integration of current knowledge across a number of overlapping domains. I also agree that the most intuitive and best empirically supported framework for such a transdisciplinary perspective needs to integrate behavioural analysis with social, cognitive, and evolutionary psychology and psychobiology. Where I take issue is with the authors' assumptions on a number of more specific points and the resultant conclusions that can be drawn about our ability to be the “wise managers of evolutionary processes.”
They appear to suggest:
1. That the revision to evolutionary psychology and its integration with other branches of current science possible through their proposed synthesis would approach a definitive articulation of the understanding required;
2. That knowledge in these areas is effectively as good as it is going to get and is more or less complete except for its integration;
3. That successful management of the process of evolutionary change could be actively, effectively, and prospectively directed using this approach.
Many of the examples used here concern redress, not progress. For example, how to increase play behaviour where it is poor, or alter alcohol and tobacco sales when they produce health or economic problems. The results in the studies cited are impressive, and it is a useful exercise to open this material to critical scrutiny from a wider scientific audience. I came away from reading it not convinced that I had read about a methodology for proactive positive change, however, but rather about one that can be used in addressing concerns.
A logical non sequitur in this argument lies in assuming some understanding of a desired progression and endpoint. Human history is liberally strewn with well-intentioned failed attempts to wield such control.
The focus is largely on effecting a process of change in the individual rather than a reflexive process of change in all relevant aspects across a social–evolutionary context (including those trying to consciously introduce and direct such change).
A feature of comprehensive behavioural accounts is that they should be reflexive. This is a well-recognised issue with unidirectional analyses of behaviour (Bandura Reference Bandura1978; Hineline Reference Hineline1980).
Evidence-based practice has become a key concept for clinicians (Satterfield et al. Reference Satterfield, Spring, Brownson, Mullen, Newhouse, Walker and Whitlock2009), and the development of comparative models by PCORI (the Patient Centered Outcome Research Institute; Gabriel & Normand Reference Gabriel and Normand2012) and of RDoC (Research Diagnostic Criteria) by the National Institute of Mental Health (see Aitken Reference Aitken2013) will develop this further. This methodology has been largely concerned with addressing problems or with their primary prevention. Even large-scale datasets using this approach have often been surprisingly poor at prediction across populations (Brindle et al. Reference Brindle, Emberson, Lampe, Walker, Whincup, Fahey and Ebrahim2003). This may be partly due to a tendency to assume that mathematical/statistical and behavioural equivalence are synonymous (Saunders & Green Reference Saunders and Green1992), and partly to assuming that the same explanatory model will hold irrespective of population differences.
Much is made in the paper of being able to use “evidence-based kernels” of knowledge to drive the process of change. This sounds sensible where such a knowledge base exists. The examples referred to are useful but largely concern either prevention (stopping a problem from developing) or treatment (dealing with a problem) and not with moulding the process of evolving more successful behaviour, which I take to be the authors' intent.
Development can be channelled but is often serendipitous. Its influences cannot be readily predicted; it can, however, be affected by changes in environmental affordances. Many such factors are outside previous knowledge or control and can only be adapted to post hoc.
Perhaps a good example of change outside the scope of this model is the impact exerted by changing climatic conditions on human behaviour (see, e.g., Hsiang et al. Reference Hsiang, Burke and Miguel2013). Increasing global temperature and rainfall are precursors to higher levels of inter-group violence. A proximal focus on conflict de-escalation to target the human response might help to address these issues. We are currently unable to positively modify climate to any significant degree. It is probable that only approaches based on things such as reducing carbon dioxide, deforestation, levels of animal farming, and fossil fuel use (assuming these were possible and the science behind their roles to be accurate) will alter these more distal factors. In our prehistory, glaciation obviously shaped evolution through factors our ancestors would have been unable to appreciate or modify.
We have the methods to engage in changing behaviour and to tell when we have succeeded. I think we are still some way off from an intentional science that can mould evolutionary change, and like Sir Karl Popper (Senn Reference Senn1991), I am not sure if or how we could tell we had ultimately succeeded.