This commentary welcomes the main thesis of Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes (DSH) and Chris von Rueden (CvR) (2025). Namely, much of the intellectual output of European thinkers since Rousseau regarding early, less complex human societies is greatly misguided. DSH and CvR portray this body of thought as outcome-egalitarianism – which supposes that individuals are universally motivated by establishing actual equality in their respective societies. Such a supposition assures egalitarianism in the outcome sense, i.e., individuals in early, less complex societies more or less have equal wealth, status, resource access, and autonomy.
According to DSH and CvR, the empirical evidence does not support the supposition that humans are motivated by outcome-egalitarianism. Relying on their work and the work of maverick anthropologists, they show that early, less complex societies are populated by individuals similar to modern contemporary beings: humans per se are motivated by self-interest to accumulate more wealth, status, and resource access than their neighbors. “Humans do not tend to rest once they achieve wealth, status, and resource access that are equal to their neighbors.”
This commentary focuses on a sub-thesis of DSH and CvR. They want to redefine egalitarianism to denote process-egalitarianism, i.e., effectively replacing defunct outcome-egalitarianism. They define process-egalitarianism as the motive of individuals to seek, establish, and nurture socio-ecological circumstances that “enable most individuals to successfully secure their own status, autonomy, and resource access.” At first approximation, what matters is not the outcome but rather functional circumstances, i.e., institutions and rules that make ample opportunities for people to seek status, autonomy, and resource access.
While this commentary welcomes the concept “process-egalitarianism,” it is incomplete. DSH and CvR ultimately treat political authority as a power that acts as an external constraint that people attempt to manage to one extent or another. For DSH and CvR, process-egalitarian individuals in all societies make sure that political authority, or what they call “leadership,” does not become overt and excessive to the point of subverting circumstances, i.e., making them dysfunctional.
DSH/CvR’s conception of political authority basically fails to attend to the fact that – as stressed by Graeber and Wengrow (Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021), whom DSH and CvR cite extensively – political authority is inevitably associated with violence, oppression, and most notably the loss of autonomy. (Note, however, Graeber and Wengrow unfortunately limit such violence, oppression, and loss of autonomy to post-Pharaoh states; Graeber and Wengrow basically deny that violence, oppression, and loss of autonomy also characterize pre-Pharaoh, less complex political communities (see Khalil, Reference Khalil2023, Reference Khalil2025, Reference Khalil2026)).
An anomaly facing process-egalitarianism à la DSH and CvR. How do they account for the fact that people function in political communities – both pre- and post-Pharaoh – that involve oppression and loss of autonomy to one degree or another? Why would individuals, in the first place, surrender, to one extent or another, their autonomy to political authority? Why would they consent to the oppression that their leaders might exercise at any moment under the excuse of “emergency” or “state of exception”?
The most prominent answer in modern political philosophy is social contract theory à la classical (individual) liberalism of Hobbes and Locke (Macpherson, Reference Macpherson2011, (Reference Macpherson1962)). Basically, people are ready to surrender some autonomy to avoid, for Hobbes, outright war of all-against-all, or to avoid, for Locke, confusion and civil chaos. Smith (Reference Smith1978) waged a serious critique of this theory, namely, it neglects allegiance (see Khalil, Reference Khalil1998, Reference Khalil2005). Allegiance is not simply accepting the authority of the magistrate (the police) in order to facilitate commercial contracts and cooperation. Allegiance is rather a deep psychological affinity of the members of the political community with their respective political community – whereas the affinity takes forms such as tribalism, ethnic-nationalism, religious-nationalism, and patriotism. Allegiance is missing even in contemporary liberal theory of justice, such as the later work of Rawls (Reference Rawls1971 (Reference Rawls1999); see Garthoff, Reference Garthoff2025).
Social contract theory basically lacks the analytical tools to easily explain allegiance that individuals express toward their chieftains, princesses, and kings. The political authority of chieftains, princesses, and kings may take abstract forms such as holy books, flags, and constitutions. Allegiance expresses the readiness of individuals to surrender autonomy to a power greater than themselves, even when such power undermines process-egalitarianism. Thus, why would individuals who cherish process-egalitarianism profess allegiance to a political community, i.e., ready to surrender autonomy?
To answer the question, it would be fruitful to start with the theory of slavery by Steiner (Reference Steiner1949) in his unpublished PhD thesis. This theory has been largely neglected – noting that Graeber and Wengrow (Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021, pp. 519‒521) discussed it in their concluding chapter. As Graeber and Wengrow theorize, we can understand the various social structures throughout history if we understand two great motives of humans. The first is the quest after “identity” – a motive that makes them seek to adopt rituals, clothing, and even particular melodies and items of food in order to distinguish themselves from neighboring social structures. In their extensive discussion of identity, Graeber and Wengrow rely on the concept “schismogenesis” advanced by Bateson (Reference Bateson1935).
The motive after identity, however, falls outside the scope of this commentary. Of immediate relevance is the second motive that Graeber and Wengrow propose, namely, humans seek freedom. Humans have the imagination to construct diverse social structures that all aim to avoid repression and coercion.
However, if the quest for freedom is a serious motive, slavery is a puzzle. How could we explain social structures with slavery institutions enduring for centuries – where servants submit to the authority of the owners of the household? More broadly, how could we expound the submission to authority per se, i.e., whether it is in the form of the sovereign chieftain of the tribe or the head of the state? (Note, however, Graeber and Wengrow exclude the state – starting with the Pharaoh-type state – as a legitimate entity toward which humans secede autonomy (see Khalil, Reference Khalil2025)).
To answer the question, Graeber and Wengrow lean on Franz’s theory of slavery. According to Franz, the origin of slavery is charity. Some people in society fall behind with supporting the self – as a result of injury, death in the family, or other accidents. These people seek the help of a successful person in society, who helps out of charity, humanity, or in short, philanthropy. The people who receive help express gratitude by expressing allegiance – which might become exaggerated, taking the form of aggrandizing their benefactor. In this relationship of dependence, the beneficiaries start to offer services to the now-called “master” – services that advance the master’s wealth and wellbeing. Such services are not based on symmetrical exchange among equals. Rather, they are based on the asymmetrical relationship of master-and-servant that expresses allegiance per se toward political authority.
In summary, this commentary takes to task process-egalitarianism à la DSH and CvR. It cannot be a complete theory unless it also accommodates a fact: there is undeniable human readiness to surrender, to one extent or another, individual autonomy to the political community, whether it is the tribe, the empire, or the modern nation-state. One need not subscribe to Franz’s theory, but it might show the road to answer the question of how the quest for equality and freedom can be reconciled with surrendering autonomy to political authority.
You have
Access
This commentary welcomes the main thesis of Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes (DSH) and Chris von Rueden (CvR) (2025). Namely, much of the intellectual output of European thinkers since Rousseau regarding early, less complex human societies is greatly misguided. DSH and CvR portray this body of thought as outcome-egalitarianism – which supposes that individuals are universally motivated by establishing actual equality in their respective societies. Such a supposition assures egalitarianism in the outcome sense, i.e., individuals in early, less complex societies more or less have equal wealth, status, resource access, and autonomy.
According to DSH and CvR, the empirical evidence does not support the supposition that humans are motivated by outcome-egalitarianism. Relying on their work and the work of maverick anthropologists, they show that early, less complex societies are populated by individuals similar to modern contemporary beings: humans per se are motivated by self-interest to accumulate more wealth, status, and resource access than their neighbors. “Humans do not tend to rest once they achieve wealth, status, and resource access that are equal to their neighbors.”
This commentary focuses on a sub-thesis of DSH and CvR. They want to redefine egalitarianism to denote process-egalitarianism, i.e., effectively replacing defunct outcome-egalitarianism. They define process-egalitarianism as the motive of individuals to seek, establish, and nurture socio-ecological circumstances that “enable most individuals to successfully secure their own status, autonomy, and resource access.” At first approximation, what matters is not the outcome but rather functional circumstances, i.e., institutions and rules that make ample opportunities for people to seek status, autonomy, and resource access.
While this commentary welcomes the concept “process-egalitarianism,” it is incomplete. DSH and CvR ultimately treat political authority as a power that acts as an external constraint that people attempt to manage to one extent or another. For DSH and CvR, process-egalitarian individuals in all societies make sure that political authority, or what they call “leadership,” does not become overt and excessive to the point of subverting circumstances, i.e., making them dysfunctional.
DSH/CvR’s conception of political authority basically fails to attend to the fact that – as stressed by Graeber and Wengrow (Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021), whom DSH and CvR cite extensively – political authority is inevitably associated with violence, oppression, and most notably the loss of autonomy. (Note, however, Graeber and Wengrow unfortunately limit such violence, oppression, and loss of autonomy to post-Pharaoh states; Graeber and Wengrow basically deny that violence, oppression, and loss of autonomy also characterize pre-Pharaoh, less complex political communities (see Khalil, Reference Khalil2023, Reference Khalil2025, Reference Khalil2026)).
An anomaly facing process-egalitarianism à la DSH and CvR. How do they account for the fact that people function in political communities – both pre- and post-Pharaoh – that involve oppression and loss of autonomy to one degree or another? Why would individuals, in the first place, surrender, to one extent or another, their autonomy to political authority? Why would they consent to the oppression that their leaders might exercise at any moment under the excuse of “emergency” or “state of exception”?
The most prominent answer in modern political philosophy is social contract theory à la classical (individual) liberalism of Hobbes and Locke (Macpherson, Reference Macpherson2011, (Reference Macpherson1962)). Basically, people are ready to surrender some autonomy to avoid, for Hobbes, outright war of all-against-all, or to avoid, for Locke, confusion and civil chaos. Smith (Reference Smith1978) waged a serious critique of this theory, namely, it neglects allegiance (see Khalil, Reference Khalil1998, Reference Khalil2005). Allegiance is not simply accepting the authority of the magistrate (the police) in order to facilitate commercial contracts and cooperation. Allegiance is rather a deep psychological affinity of the members of the political community with their respective political community – whereas the affinity takes forms such as tribalism, ethnic-nationalism, religious-nationalism, and patriotism. Allegiance is missing even in contemporary liberal theory of justice, such as the later work of Rawls (Reference Rawls1971 (Reference Rawls1999); see Garthoff, Reference Garthoff2025).
Social contract theory basically lacks the analytical tools to easily explain allegiance that individuals express toward their chieftains, princesses, and kings. The political authority of chieftains, princesses, and kings may take abstract forms such as holy books, flags, and constitutions. Allegiance expresses the readiness of individuals to surrender autonomy to a power greater than themselves, even when such power undermines process-egalitarianism. Thus, why would individuals who cherish process-egalitarianism profess allegiance to a political community, i.e., ready to surrender autonomy?
To answer the question, it would be fruitful to start with the theory of slavery by Steiner (Reference Steiner1949) in his unpublished PhD thesis. This theory has been largely neglected – noting that Graeber and Wengrow (Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021, pp. 519‒521) discussed it in their concluding chapter. As Graeber and Wengrow theorize, we can understand the various social structures throughout history if we understand two great motives of humans. The first is the quest after “identity” – a motive that makes them seek to adopt rituals, clothing, and even particular melodies and items of food in order to distinguish themselves from neighboring social structures. In their extensive discussion of identity, Graeber and Wengrow rely on the concept “schismogenesis” advanced by Bateson (Reference Bateson1935).
The motive after identity, however, falls outside the scope of this commentary. Of immediate relevance is the second motive that Graeber and Wengrow propose, namely, humans seek freedom. Humans have the imagination to construct diverse social structures that all aim to avoid repression and coercion.
However, if the quest for freedom is a serious motive, slavery is a puzzle. How could we explain social structures with slavery institutions enduring for centuries – where servants submit to the authority of the owners of the household? More broadly, how could we expound the submission to authority per se, i.e., whether it is in the form of the sovereign chieftain of the tribe or the head of the state? (Note, however, Graeber and Wengrow exclude the state – starting with the Pharaoh-type state – as a legitimate entity toward which humans secede autonomy (see Khalil, Reference Khalil2025)).
To answer the question, Graeber and Wengrow lean on Franz’s theory of slavery. According to Franz, the origin of slavery is charity. Some people in society fall behind with supporting the self – as a result of injury, death in the family, or other accidents. These people seek the help of a successful person in society, who helps out of charity, humanity, or in short, philanthropy. The people who receive help express gratitude by expressing allegiance – which might become exaggerated, taking the form of aggrandizing their benefactor. In this relationship of dependence, the beneficiaries start to offer services to the now-called “master” – services that advance the master’s wealth and wellbeing. Such services are not based on symmetrical exchange among equals. Rather, they are based on the asymmetrical relationship of master-and-servant that expresses allegiance per se toward political authority.
In summary, this commentary takes to task process-egalitarianism à la DSH and CvR. It cannot be a complete theory unless it also accommodates a fact: there is undeniable human readiness to surrender, to one extent or another, individual autonomy to the political community, whether it is the tribe, the empire, or the modern nation-state. One need not subscribe to Franz’s theory, but it might show the road to answer the question of how the quest for equality and freedom can be reconciled with surrendering autonomy to political authority.
Financial support
Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.
Competing interests
None.