In the beginning (the Logical Positivist one) was the distinction (between science and values), and to violate it was to commit an egregious fallacy (the naturalistic fallacy of deriving values from facts).
In “Evolving the Future: Toward a Science of Intentional Change,” Wilson et al. argue for a theoretical foundation for the sciences of human behavior, including intentional behavior, based on a generalized theory of evolution by natural selection, and they present substantial evidence for successful positive applications of theories of intentional change to problems faced by individuals, groups, and larger populations.
Have our authors disavowed the distinction and committed the fallacy? Maybe and maybe not. I argue that they have provided us with good reasons to disavow and commit. But, maybe, my naturalistic proclivities lead me astray. So, in the end, I turn to our authors for assistance.
Roughly, logical positivists told us that, on the factual side of things, the natural and social sciences were unified hierarchically (physics on top and the social sciences at the bottom) by deductive and reductive relationships reflecting, respectively, epistemic and ontological features. On the value side, science deals with facts; and values find their bases elsewhere.
Nevertheless, they and their successors have conceded that values may affect the selection of research projects and scientific applications. But only cognitive values, such as heuristic, predictive, explanatory, and unifying power, can serve as means to establish the truth of scientific claims. No noncognitive values (e.g., moral values) enter into either the justification or the content of scientific claims. Therefore, the idea of a science of values is incoherent, and indeed, known historically to be pernicious. Though challenged by feminist philosophers and advocates of the strong program in sociology of science, this separatist view endures, particularly in the biological sciences, where attempts to formulate and put into practice such sciences of values as social Darwinism and Nazi race science have tarnished any aspiring science of values.
Our authors address the more limited question of the unity of the biological and social sciences, arguing that a generalized theory of natural selection unifies all these disciplines. In doing so, they implicitly both reject a reductionistic unification of the sciences, one based on a mechanistic account of the causal factors, and offer an emergentist one. Key to their account is selection by consequences (a broadly teleological process) that distinguishes the activities of living things from nonliving. Change has two sources: both antecedents and consequences bring about significant changes.
What explanation by consequences captures is the goal directedness of living things, including humans and their achievements. The genetic, social/cultural, and intentional consequences explain the presence of the capacities and processes that achieve them. They explain the why of things. The law-like regularities explained by these selection accounts are natural norms: As that is the consequence to be achieved, then you ought to do this. So reason number one for understanding our authors to be presenting a science of values: They are arguing for explanatory sciences of natural norms.
Now for reason number two: Our authors present very strong evidence that we have a science of intentional change embodied in a comprehensive theory of cognitive behavioral change and its multiple successful applications. We understand the natural mechanisms that lead to successful intentional actions and know how to apply them intentionally and successfully. Our authors are claiming that there is an empirically well-established explanatory science of intentional natural norms.
Here is reason number three: They claim to be proposing an intentional science of “positive” change. The human behavioral sciences and their applications are successful not only because they provide reliable means for carrying out goals whose positive character has been independently ascertained by some nonscientific means. They are positive because they also provide reliable means for knowing what are worthy human goals. The sciences of human behavior are sciences of ends and means, not merely means. Our authors are arguing for a science of objective values.
A fourth reason: Consider the kinds of positive consequences that the applications of the science of intentional change produce and the theories of intentional change explain: avoiding harmful substances, fostering good educational practices and parenting skills – no need to mention the many more. These positive consequences fall under one or other of the categories of behaviors that researchers have found people throughout the world consider part of the moral realm: (1) care/harm; (2) fairness/cheating; (3) liberty/oppression; (4) loyalty/betrayal; (5) authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation. Our authors are arguing for a science of objective moral values. Maybe so.
But, maybe not! Theoretical and historical reasons prompt a traditional reading: The application of theories that enable successful intentional change ensures, merely, that, given any goal of intentional change (whether worthy or not) that might be achieved using the methods of behavior therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, or “third wave” cognitive behavioral methods, that goal likely will be obtained. The consequences aimed for derive from the preferences or decisions of the individual, group, or population. The science of intentional change does not tell us what goals to pursue. Hence, our authors' science of positive intentional change tells us the best way to achieve our goals, but not what makes them positive. We have a science of values, manqué. Moreover, that science adheres to the venerable fact/value and nature/norm distinctions. And it does not commit the naturalistic fallacy, thereby escaping any new versions of the likes of social Darwinism or Nazi science.
Yet, our authors' language wavers between objective descriptions of positive consequences and passages where positive consequences are described in terms of what is preferred or desired. And, alas, some passages are open to either reading.
In the beginning (the Logical Positivist one) was the distinction (between science and values), and to violate it was to commit an egregious fallacy (the naturalistic fallacy of deriving values from facts).
In “Evolving the Future: Toward a Science of Intentional Change,” Wilson et al. argue for a theoretical foundation for the sciences of human behavior, including intentional behavior, based on a generalized theory of evolution by natural selection, and they present substantial evidence for successful positive applications of theories of intentional change to problems faced by individuals, groups, and larger populations.
Have our authors disavowed the distinction and committed the fallacy? Maybe and maybe not. I argue that they have provided us with good reasons to disavow and commit. But, maybe, my naturalistic proclivities lead me astray. So, in the end, I turn to our authors for assistance.
Roughly, logical positivists told us that, on the factual side of things, the natural and social sciences were unified hierarchically (physics on top and the social sciences at the bottom) by deductive and reductive relationships reflecting, respectively, epistemic and ontological features. On the value side, science deals with facts; and values find their bases elsewhere.
Nevertheless, they and their successors have conceded that values may affect the selection of research projects and scientific applications. But only cognitive values, such as heuristic, predictive, explanatory, and unifying power, can serve as means to establish the truth of scientific claims. No noncognitive values (e.g., moral values) enter into either the justification or the content of scientific claims. Therefore, the idea of a science of values is incoherent, and indeed, known historically to be pernicious. Though challenged by feminist philosophers and advocates of the strong program in sociology of science, this separatist view endures, particularly in the biological sciences, where attempts to formulate and put into practice such sciences of values as social Darwinism and Nazi race science have tarnished any aspiring science of values.
Our authors address the more limited question of the unity of the biological and social sciences, arguing that a generalized theory of natural selection unifies all these disciplines. In doing so, they implicitly both reject a reductionistic unification of the sciences, one based on a mechanistic account of the causal factors, and offer an emergentist one. Key to their account is selection by consequences (a broadly teleological process) that distinguishes the activities of living things from nonliving. Change has two sources: both antecedents and consequences bring about significant changes.
What explanation by consequences captures is the goal directedness of living things, including humans and their achievements. The genetic, social/cultural, and intentional consequences explain the presence of the capacities and processes that achieve them. They explain the why of things. The law-like regularities explained by these selection accounts are natural norms: As that is the consequence to be achieved, then you ought to do this. So reason number one for understanding our authors to be presenting a science of values: They are arguing for explanatory sciences of natural norms.
Now for reason number two: Our authors present very strong evidence that we have a science of intentional change embodied in a comprehensive theory of cognitive behavioral change and its multiple successful applications. We understand the natural mechanisms that lead to successful intentional actions and know how to apply them intentionally and successfully. Our authors are claiming that there is an empirically well-established explanatory science of intentional natural norms.
Here is reason number three: They claim to be proposing an intentional science of “positive” change. The human behavioral sciences and their applications are successful not only because they provide reliable means for carrying out goals whose positive character has been independently ascertained by some nonscientific means. They are positive because they also provide reliable means for knowing what are worthy human goals. The sciences of human behavior are sciences of ends and means, not merely means. Our authors are arguing for a science of objective values.
A fourth reason: Consider the kinds of positive consequences that the applications of the science of intentional change produce and the theories of intentional change explain: avoiding harmful substances, fostering good educational practices and parenting skills – no need to mention the many more. These positive consequences fall under one or other of the categories of behaviors that researchers have found people throughout the world consider part of the moral realm: (1) care/harm; (2) fairness/cheating; (3) liberty/oppression; (4) loyalty/betrayal; (5) authority/subversion; and sanctity/degradation. Our authors are arguing for a science of objective moral values. Maybe so.
But, maybe not! Theoretical and historical reasons prompt a traditional reading: The application of theories that enable successful intentional change ensures, merely, that, given any goal of intentional change (whether worthy or not) that might be achieved using the methods of behavior therapy, cognitive behavioral therapy, or “third wave” cognitive behavioral methods, that goal likely will be obtained. The consequences aimed for derive from the preferences or decisions of the individual, group, or population. The science of intentional change does not tell us what goals to pursue. Hence, our authors' science of positive intentional change tells us the best way to achieve our goals, but not what makes them positive. We have a science of values, manqué. Moreover, that science adheres to the venerable fact/value and nature/norm distinctions. And it does not commit the naturalistic fallacy, thereby escaping any new versions of the likes of social Darwinism or Nazi science.
Yet, our authors' language wavers between objective descriptions of positive consequences and passages where positive consequences are described in terms of what is preferred or desired. And, alas, some passages are open to either reading.