Levine and colleagues’ novel agreement-based framework offers an intriguing synthesis of deontological and consequential reasoning, where both are cognitively cheap substitutes for negotiating an actual agreement in a resource-rational bargaining process. This process aims for mutual benefits and, through that, to maintain harmonious relationships. Like others, the authors approach morality as a solution to social coordination problems, but they position the rational motive of coordination within the controlled human cognition at a level of process selection.
True to a rational model, resource availability determines what kind of negotiation process takes place and how moral judgments are made. The target article presents convincing arguments that consequentialist and deontological processes are efficient heuristics for ad-hoc negotiations. However, the proposed hierarchy within the model, both along the dimensions of abstraction and anticipation, might not be as self-evident as described and likely follows a more complex pattern than linear progression.
The authors propose a strict logical order among the three methods where consequentialist decision-making is the first substitute for baseline ad-hoc negotiations, and then, with even fewer cognitive resources, people retreat to moral decisions based on action-based abstractions. This order aligns with the observed resource dependence of different moral decisions (Suter & Hertwig, Reference Suter and Hertwig2011) and corresponds with other works describing deontological judgments as proxies for consequentialist ones. However, there is also evidence that the outcomes of these various types of assumed substitute moral decisions (consequentialist and deontological) often fail to converge. The specific scholarly interest in contrasting these two systems may have us focused too much on the differences between their respective outcomes (Greene, Reference Greene2014). Yet, if the system of moral contractualism is governed by rationality, then an efficient substitute for a costly process should not lead to a substantially different solution. The price of efficiency may be a larger margin of error, but the often characteristically different decision patterns provided by a process and its assumed substitute suggest that the distinction between them is not merely one of cognitive resources but also of function. Maintaining two substitute processes may already be excessive, but having two with possibly competing outcomes can undermine the harmony that is meant to be achieved by them. It is easy to imagine two interacting individuals who invoke different levels of approximations as a substitute for negotiation and, as a result, arrive at different, conflicting conclusions. While it is convincing that the welfare-based and action-based processes can both serve as proxies for ad-hoc negotiations, they are less likely to function solely as each other’s substitutes.
The resource-rationality determined hierarchy between the two types of abstractions also indicates a clear difference in quality and value between them. The more resources we invest in reaching an agreement and the closer we approximate the ideal process, the better the outcome should be. This implies that people should more highly appreciate and be more strongly influenced by approximations that are closer to the ideal negotiating process. For example, decisions based on welfare standards should be favored over decisions based on action standards. However, this is not always the case, and deontological arguments are often more convincing and influential (Bartels, Reference Bartels2008; Everett et al., Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016).
Another observation suggesting that action-based moral judgments are not simply last resort back-up plans is that their generalized versions are often activated contextually and automatically. In fact, it is difficult to think of a real or imagined moral decision-making situation where relevant generalized action standards do not influence the deliberation. Once activated, these standards are also not necessarily efficient shortcuts for negotiations. Instead, they can obstruct (real or imagined) negotiations and agreements (Berns et al., Reference Berns, Bell, Capra, Prietula, Moore, Anderson, Ginges and Atran2012; Fiske & Tetlock, Reference Fiske, Tetlock, Renshon and Duckitt2000).
The other dimension of the hierarchy is the process order. In this hierarchy, the model and its structuring rational resource management principle suggest that model-based processes have primacy and thus higher perceived quality than model-free processes, while real negotiations should be favored over both. We know that model-free solutions, whether from precedent or generalization, are potent guides of moral judgments. But whether people indeed demonstrate a preference hierarchy between model-based, model-free, and negotiation-based judgments as the model predicts remains an unanswered empirical question. Maybe once model-free versions are available, they will offer such an easy solution with such decisional gravity that deviation from it becomes difficult. It is even possible that the process (selection) preference goes in the opposite direction, where generalized standards are the ultimate goals, and people only move toward more cognitively taxing negotiation methods when they are motivated and have enough cognitive resources.
This alternative would align with the understanding that deviation from generalized moral standards is not only a matter of cognitive effort but of social consequence. The target article presents morality as an individual-level process, but many argue that morality is a feature and product of groups (Ellemers & van den Bos, Reference Ellemers and van den Bos2012). Beyond regulating interpersonal behavior, morality helps establish and maintain identity. Attempts to renegotiate existing standards can be construed as challenging the group’s values and image, explaining the remarkable inertia of model-free standards. From a purely resource-rational perspective, it’s difficult to explain the numerous examples where people adhere to moral commands that are detrimental to their group or choose even death over renegotiating moral directives.
The resource-rational contractualist model is an intriguing integration of moral processes. It also reflects an inherent hierarchy of moral judgment quality and preference that invites empirical testing. Observed preferences may very well reflect the model’s predictions, and the findings would undoubtedly further enhance our understanding of moral cognition.
You have
Access
Levine and colleagues’ novel agreement-based framework offers an intriguing synthesis of deontological and consequential reasoning, where both are cognitively cheap substitutes for negotiating an actual agreement in a resource-rational bargaining process. This process aims for mutual benefits and, through that, to maintain harmonious relationships. Like others, the authors approach morality as a solution to social coordination problems, but they position the rational motive of coordination within the controlled human cognition at a level of process selection.
True to a rational model, resource availability determines what kind of negotiation process takes place and how moral judgments are made. The target article presents convincing arguments that consequentialist and deontological processes are efficient heuristics for ad-hoc negotiations. However, the proposed hierarchy within the model, both along the dimensions of abstraction and anticipation, might not be as self-evident as described and likely follows a more complex pattern than linear progression.
The authors propose a strict logical order among the three methods where consequentialist decision-making is the first substitute for baseline ad-hoc negotiations, and then, with even fewer cognitive resources, people retreat to moral decisions based on action-based abstractions. This order aligns with the observed resource dependence of different moral decisions (Suter & Hertwig, Reference Suter and Hertwig2011) and corresponds with other works describing deontological judgments as proxies for consequentialist ones. However, there is also evidence that the outcomes of these various types of assumed substitute moral decisions (consequentialist and deontological) often fail to converge. The specific scholarly interest in contrasting these two systems may have us focused too much on the differences between their respective outcomes (Greene, Reference Greene2014). Yet, if the system of moral contractualism is governed by rationality, then an efficient substitute for a costly process should not lead to a substantially different solution. The price of efficiency may be a larger margin of error, but the often characteristically different decision patterns provided by a process and its assumed substitute suggest that the distinction between them is not merely one of cognitive resources but also of function. Maintaining two substitute processes may already be excessive, but having two with possibly competing outcomes can undermine the harmony that is meant to be achieved by them. It is easy to imagine two interacting individuals who invoke different levels of approximations as a substitute for negotiation and, as a result, arrive at different, conflicting conclusions. While it is convincing that the welfare-based and action-based processes can both serve as proxies for ad-hoc negotiations, they are less likely to function solely as each other’s substitutes.
The resource-rationality determined hierarchy between the two types of abstractions also indicates a clear difference in quality and value between them. The more resources we invest in reaching an agreement and the closer we approximate the ideal process, the better the outcome should be. This implies that people should more highly appreciate and be more strongly influenced by approximations that are closer to the ideal negotiating process. For example, decisions based on welfare standards should be favored over decisions based on action standards. However, this is not always the case, and deontological arguments are often more convincing and influential (Bartels, Reference Bartels2008; Everett et al., Reference Everett, Pizarro and Crockett2016).
Another observation suggesting that action-based moral judgments are not simply last resort back-up plans is that their generalized versions are often activated contextually and automatically. In fact, it is difficult to think of a real or imagined moral decision-making situation where relevant generalized action standards do not influence the deliberation. Once activated, these standards are also not necessarily efficient shortcuts for negotiations. Instead, they can obstruct (real or imagined) negotiations and agreements (Berns et al., Reference Berns, Bell, Capra, Prietula, Moore, Anderson, Ginges and Atran2012; Fiske & Tetlock, Reference Fiske, Tetlock, Renshon and Duckitt2000).
The other dimension of the hierarchy is the process order. In this hierarchy, the model and its structuring rational resource management principle suggest that model-based processes have primacy and thus higher perceived quality than model-free processes, while real negotiations should be favored over both. We know that model-free solutions, whether from precedent or generalization, are potent guides of moral judgments. But whether people indeed demonstrate a preference hierarchy between model-based, model-free, and negotiation-based judgments as the model predicts remains an unanswered empirical question. Maybe once model-free versions are available, they will offer such an easy solution with such decisional gravity that deviation from it becomes difficult. It is even possible that the process (selection) preference goes in the opposite direction, where generalized standards are the ultimate goals, and people only move toward more cognitively taxing negotiation methods when they are motivated and have enough cognitive resources.
This alternative would align with the understanding that deviation from generalized moral standards is not only a matter of cognitive effort but of social consequence. The target article presents morality as an individual-level process, but many argue that morality is a feature and product of groups (Ellemers & van den Bos, Reference Ellemers and van den Bos2012). Beyond regulating interpersonal behavior, morality helps establish and maintain identity. Attempts to renegotiate existing standards can be construed as challenging the group’s values and image, explaining the remarkable inertia of model-free standards. From a purely resource-rational perspective, it’s difficult to explain the numerous examples where people adhere to moral commands that are detrimental to their group or choose even death over renegotiating moral directives.
The resource-rational contractualist model is an intriguing integration of moral processes. It also reflects an inherent hierarchy of moral judgment quality and preference that invites empirical testing. Observed preferences may very well reflect the model’s predictions, and the findings would undoubtedly further enhance our understanding of moral cognition.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
None.