Faith, ancient and modern

Contemporary philosophers and theologians often note that ‘faith’, ‘belief’ and cognates possess a wide semantic range. Robert Audi (Reference Audi2011, 53ff.), for example, outlines seven meanings of faith, paralleling Avery Dulles’ description of seven theological models of Christian faith (Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 170–180). Indeed, the discovery that faith (i.e. the English rendering of emunah, pistis or fides) bears multiple meanings is hardly recent. Even before Reformers debated whether faith should primarily be glossed as fiducia, Scholastic theologians including Aquinas had adopted the Augustinian suggestion that faith can mean belief that God exists (credere Deum), assent to divine revelation (credere Deo), and ‘belief' which springs from one's desire for the God who reveals Himself (credere in Deum).Footnote ¹ Given that ‘faith’ bears various meanings, it is unsurprising that analytic philosophers fail to agree upon a definition of even propositional faith (faith that p) which captures its sense across contexts. Yet while offering various analyses of faith, many modern philosophers agree that propositional faith can exist without belief (as opposed to some weaker cognitive stance such as acceptance or hope) in the relevant proposition. Proponents of this view include William Alston (Reference Alston, Jordan and Howard-Snyder1996), Daniel Howard-Snyder (Reference Howard-Snyder2016), John Schellenberg (Reference Schellenberg2005, 138–139), John Bishop (Reference Bishop2005, 120–121), Robert Audi (Reference Audi2011, 68–88), and Jonathan Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018).

By contrast, traditional Christian theology denies that salvific faith can exist without belief. Notably, Catholic tradition typically defines faith as firm assent to divine revelation, on the basis that it is divinely revealed. The Catechism summarizes: ‘Faith is the theological virtue by which we believe in God and believe all that he has said and revealed to us, and that Holy Church proposes for our belief, because he is truth itself’ (CCC 1814). While Catholic theologians sometimes give ‘faith’ a broader sense (e.g. CCC 143; Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 274), the above usage has considerable precedent in Patristic authors (see Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 20–28 and Lamont (Reference Lamont and Crisp2009) ) including AugustineFootnote ² who heavily influenced Aquinas (see ST IIaIIae 2.1). Indeed, the view that faith involves assent to revelation is not peculiar to Catholic theology: Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, for example, claimed that faith consists of fiducia, notitia and assensus (assent to revealed propositions – see Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 52–53).

Where such explicit faith is possible, Catholic doctrine maintains that it is necessary for salvation (CCC 161), although since Vatican II many Catholic theologians have held that ‘anonymous’ Christian faith (i.e. a disposition to faith – see Rahner (Reference Rahner1969), 390–398) can be possessed even by non-theists (Rahner (Reference Rahner1972), 145–164; Bullivant (Reference Bullivant2012), 80–83). Catholic tradition further holds that the assent of faith is certain (CCC 57): at least normatively, it possesses a high (perhaps, perfect) degree of credenceFootnote ³ and is perfectly rationally tenacious.Footnote ⁴ Admittedly, Catholic theologians have differed concerning faith's material object: the object to which faith is directed. While later Scholastics suggested that Catholics have faith in revealed propositions themselves (Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 56–57), Aquinas held that propositions are only mediately objects of faith. Thomas argues that, ultimately, faith assents to God Himself; yet before the beatific vision, our knowledge of the perfectly simple God is necessarily composite and consists of propositional assent (ST IIaIIa 1.2, cf. CCC 172).

Modern theologians might question Aquinas’ assumption that humans can only believe revelation through propositional assent; even analytic epistemologists accept the existence of non-propositional knowledge, including knowledge of God (e.g. Stump (Reference Stump2010), 39–82; Benton (Reference Benton2018), 421–447). Nevertheless, recent Catholic commentators including Matthew Levering (Reference Levering2014, 5–27), Mats Wahlberg (Reference Wahlberg2014, passim), and Gerald O'Collins (Reference O'Collins2016, 12–13), have argued that revelation (and thus, faith) is partly propositional. My discussion below focuses on that ‘habit’ of faith which consists of the supernatural disposition to believe revealed propositions – normatively, with strong certainty and rational tenacity – on the basis that God has testified to their truth. I term this habit ‘Catholic Faith’ (CF), while acknowledging that according to Catholic doctrine, faith need not solely involve propositional assent. By extension, this article defends the ‘Catholic Analysis of Faith’ (CAF), which is the claim that salvific faith – for those who can responsibly assent to propositional revelation – consists partially of CF.

The claim that propositional faith does not typically require belief should not itself alarm Christians who endorse CAF. Proponents of CAF can allow that there are illuminating models of propositional faith which do not characterize faith as necessarily involving firm cognitive commitment. They might note that CAF merely describes one species of faith: salvific faith possessed by those who can responsibly believe propositional revelation. However, one recent contribution to religious epistemology challenges CAF. In Faith and Humility (Reference Kvanvig2018), Jonathan Kvanvig suggests that the best route to developing a unified analysis of faith across contexts lies not via conceptual analysis or genealogy, but by beginning from faith's traditional characterization as a virtue: a disposition ‘worth having’.

While this approach does not axiomatically eliminate the possibility that CF is a species of virtuous faith, Kvanvig swiftly denies this. Writing from a Christian perspective, Kvanvig argues that neither belief in revealed doctrines nor belief in God's existence is a necessary constituent of salvific faith (Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018), 9–21 et passim). Further, he alleges that a powerful reason to reject traditional analyses of faith including CAF is that doxastic faith (faith which consists of belief) is not much worth having, even if Christianity is true. How does Kvanvig support this contention? Kvanvig suggests the aforementioned beliefs do not possess much intrinsic value. Admittedly, believing correctly or in line with evidence is epistemically virtuous. Still, ‘the importance of faith is disproportionate to the intellectual value and virtue of believing truths supported by evidence’ (ibid., 11). Moreover, Kvanvig suggests that any claim that doxastic faith is valuable because God has simply stipulated that belief is necessary for salvation would not satisfy Christian intuitions about faith's value and God's justice. Rather, if some alleged requirement for salvation seems arbitrary, this constitutes reason to believe that the requirement does not hold. For instance, if it were proposed that God requires one to receive a tattoo to be saved, we should resist believing that God would determine anyone's eternal fate by such a triviality (ibid., 106).

Kvanvig does not simply show what virtuous faith is not (i.e. neither belief in Christian doctrine nor ‘trust’ in God as Saviour (ibid., 32–36) ). He constructs a functional account of ‘faith worth having’ as a ‘disposition to behave or respond to the circumstances of life in service of an ideal’, which can give one's actions structure and coherence (ibid., 16). Crucially, various doxastic and affective states can underlie dispositions to action, so Christian faith (i.e. dispositional commitment to God and His purposes) need not involve belief in God's existence or revelation. Moreover, Kvanvig urges that his understanding of faith is compatible with biblical commendations of faith, including texts such as Hebrews 11:3 and James 2:5 which have been used to argue that Christian faith necessarily involves or entails belief in God's existence (ibid., 105–129).

Three aspects of Kvanvig's project invite response from proponents of CAF. First, his suggestion that doxastic faith is not particularly valuable if Christianity is true; second, his claim that commitment to an ideal is the broadest genus of valuable faith; and third his argument that in Scripture, ‘faith’ refers to commitment to God which need not involve belief in God's existence or revealed propositions. In this article, I contest the first claim by arguing that one species of doxastic faith (CF) is worth having. I also touch on Kvanvig's second claim by arguing that without at least a disposition to CF, one lacks appropriate respect for God. I do not discuss Kvanvig's third claim, which is exegetical rather than philosophical. However, this article is an exercise in philosophical theology. I write from within a Christian – in my case, Catholic – tradition which holds that God has revealed Himself through Christ, that this revelation is partly propositional, and that some people can responsibly assent to this propositional revelation. I aim to show that CF is virtuous if these and the broader claims of Christian orthodoxy are true.

One might wonder whether Kvanvig himself endorses these (for Christians, modest) claims; if not, this article might seem a dialectically ineffective response to his work. Yet since Kvanvig intends his argument that salvific faith is not necessarily doxastic to have broad appeal to Christians ‘who place greater authority in Scripture itself [than in tradition]’,Footnote ⁵ this article suggests that regardless of Kvanvig's personal views, his argument should fail to convince a key portion of its target audience (i.e. orthodox Protestants). Moreover, since Kvanvig's argument might not appear to rest on controversial theological premises, those who endorse CAF because of its support in Christian tradition might take Kvanvig to have developed a powerful argument that tradition has not characterized salvific faith accurately. This article reassures such readers that their wider theological commitments supply reason to reject his analysis. Naturally, this article will not move readers who reject Christian orthodoxy to conclude that CF is worth having. But it might show why Christians should value CF.

To this end, in the first section below, I analyse Kvanvig's argument that doxastic faith is insufficiently valuable to form a necessary part of salvific faith. I suggest that Kvanvig's argument need not be considered conclusive by Catholics or Protestants.Footnote ⁶ The following section then canvases some extant attempts to explain doxastic faith's value. I suggest that Kvanvig illustrates how these attempts plausibly fail, because they explain doxastic faith's worth instrumentally, alleging that it is necessary for the pursuit of further religious projects. As Kvanvig suggests, cognitive attitudes to God's existence or revelation weaker than belief can facilitate pursuit of these projects. In my final substantive section, therefore, I present a novel account of CF's value, arguing that if Christianity is true, CF is intrinsically valuable because through (responsible) firm belief in divine testimony, one honours God qua testifier.

Kvanvig against doxastic faith

We should first examine Kvanvig's argument against salvific faith necessarily involving belief. Although Kvanvig does not outline his argument formally, it can be summarized as follows:

1. (1) A central pre-theoretical insight about salvific faith, consistent with secular forms of faith, is that salvific faith is a valuable virtue.Footnote ⁷

   So,

2. (2) If an attempt to analyse salvific faith cannot account for this insight by explaining how faith so analysed is a valuable virtue, it should prima facie be rejected.Footnote ⁸

3. (3) Accounts of salvific faith which render belief a necessary constituent of faith cannot explain how faith so analysed is a valuable virtue.Footnote ⁹

   So,

4. (4) Accounts of salvific faith which render belief a necessary constituent of faith should prima facie be rejected.Footnote ¹⁰

We can now examine these premises from an orthodox Christian perspective. (1) initially seems to have abundant support in Scripture and tradition. Omitting discussion of the Hebrew Bible, faith (pistis) is commended throughout the New Testament: Christ enjoins his disciples to have faith (e.g. Mark 1:15, 11:22; John 20:27), holding them culpable for its absence (e.g. Matthew 14:31; John 3:18). While the details of how faith facilitates salvation are controversial, New Testament texts also indicate that faith is necessary for salvation; at least for those appropriately presented with the gospel (e.g. Mark 16:16; John 3:36). As Kvanvig notes, faith receives extensive praise in Hebrews 11, which claims that ‘without faith, it is impossible to please God’ (Hebrews 11:6; cf. Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018), 111–115; 120–121). Moreover, Kvanvig suggests that given God's universal salvific will, it would be surprising if God were, by fiat, to impose any arbitrary constraint on who can be saved, which would seem to follow if faith is not a virtue or disposition required for right relationship with Him (ibid., 11).

Yet (1)'s plausibility further depends upon how ‘virtue’ is understood. Kvanvig implies that faith is a moral virtue, which explains its importance and necessity for salvation.Footnote ¹¹ On Kvanvig's account, wherein Christian faith is construed as loyalty to God or a disposition to act in His service,Footnote ¹² faith is morally valuable in two ways. First, faith disposes believers to perform actions which reflect commitment to God, including loving obedience to His commands (ibid., 14–15). Second, Christian faith gives unity to believers’ actions, disposing them to act consistently in commitment to God (ibid., 104).

Unfortunately, Kvanvig does not develop an account of (moral?) virtue, beyond noting that virtues are dispositions to action, necessary for a well-lived life (ibid., 2, 9, 103). But for present purposes, we can say that a disposition is intrinsically morally valuable or virtuous if its possession is itself morally valuable: if its possession immediately contributes to an agent's moral excellence by disposing her to act well, because in exercising that disposition (responsibly, in appropriate circumstances) the agent necessarily performs a moral act. A disposition is merely instrumentally morally valuable or virtuous if its possession does not thus immediately contribute to an agent's moral excellence, but if it enables an agent to possess or exercise an intrinsically moral disposition, or to perform a moral act. While (1) is naturally read as claiming that salvific faith is intrinsically virtuous, we should also note that faith might contribute to an agent's moral flourishing by being instrumentally virtuous, so defined.

Moreover, we can delineate two salient ways in which dispositions typically contribute to an agent's moral excellence. First, the very possession of (intrinsically morally valuable) dispositions contributes to an agent's excellence of moral character. Second, dispositions may further contribute to an agent's moral excellence because their exercise is morally praiseworthy, accruing moral credit to the agent. Natural moral virtues (e.g. courage) both add to the excellence of one who possesses them and often merit praise when exercised, so I assume that Kvanvig imagines faith to be virtuous in both ways.Footnote ¹³

The claim that exercising faith is intrinsically virtuous qua morally praiseworthy is complicated by Christian tradition, which emphasizes that because faith is God's gracious gift, humans cannot claim credit for (at least) its initial possession, even if they can culpably resist God's offer of faith.Footnote ¹⁴ Moreover, as Kvanvig briefly acknowledges, classical Protestant soteriology denies that Christian faith possesses much intrinsic moral value by directly contributing to one's moral excellence (Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018), 120). Some Reformers deny that salvific faith is an intrinsically moral disposition of much worth; or at least that its intrinsic moral value explains faith's salvific efficacy. Thus Calvin (Institutes, III.11.7; Calvin (Reference Calvin, McNeill and Battles1960), 733) claims that although salvific faith may be ‘in itself of no dignity or value’, it can nevertheless connect us with Christ, as a clay vessel may contain gold. On this understanding, faith does not have salvific potency due to its intrinsic moral value.Footnote ¹⁵ Faith is principally valuable because it (alone) facilitates a believer's justification, associating her with Christ, whose ‘external’ righteousness is thereby imputed to her. Faith can even be contrasted with praiseworthy actions and virtues (Wahlberg (Reference Wahlberg2015), 203–204). So, some Protestants have reason to doubt (1) if it means to claim that salvific faith's possession contributes significantly to a believer's moral excellence.

But such Protestants should claim (contra (3) ) that salvific faith is instrumentally morally valuable, in that it connects a believer to Christ, facilitating her justification and sanctification. Is God's choice to confer salvific potency upon Christian faith objectionably arbitrary on this analysis? Not entirely. There is some explanation for God's choice of faith as the instrument of salvation: because faith is of dubious intrinsic moral worth yet oriented towards God, it is a fitting medium for the imputation of unmerited, extrinsic righteousness to sinners. Accordingly, premise (3) need not appear plausible to some Protestants who claim that salvific faith necessarily involves belief.

Catholics need not deny that faith is intrinsically virtuous qua contributing to moral excellence.Footnote ¹⁶ Unlike Reformed soteriology, Catholic doctrine teaches that in justification, one is not merely ‘reckoned’, but really becomes righteous.Footnote ¹⁷ One receives justification when one is united to Christ through faith joined to the supernatural virtues of hope and charity.Footnote ¹⁸ In addition to conferring justification, hope and charity contribute directly to one's moral excellence; perhaps this partially explains their necessity for salvation. So plausibly, faith similarly bestows moral value. If Catholics allow that faith may possess significant intrinsic moral value which partly explains its salvific efficacy, they should not endorse the Reformed explanation of faith's instrumental value suggested above.

Yet should Catholics share Kvanvig's intuition that faith is in fact morally valuable? To my knowledge, nothing in Catholic doctrine necessitates this. Like Protestants, Catholics can deny (1) if it means to claim that faith is intrinsically morally valuable in that it contributes to believers’ moral value by directly disposing them to perform moral actions in this life, through its exercise.Footnote ¹⁹ But Catholic doctrine clearly affirms that faith is of instrumental moral (or minimally, all-things-considered) value. It asserts that salvific faith is a supernatural virtue, which prepares us for beatitude: perfect happiness consisting of intimate knowledge of God, which surpasses the natural happiness to which we would be ordered save for grace.Footnote ²⁰ In this state, we will love, praise, and serve God perfectly, knowing Who He is.

Since on this reading (1) is plausible by Catholic lights, we can consider whether Catholic defenders of CAF should accept (2). (2) plausibly follows from (1), because analysis of any reality should account for (justified) pre-theoretical intuitions about it. Naturally, such intuitions may be reasonably revised or abandoned in the process of theorizing; but analysis should initially seek to accommodate pre-theoretic intuitions (particularly, strong intuitions), ceteris paribus. Yet given (1), any analysis of salvific faith which cannot explain salvific faith's value will be unable to account for a key pre-theoretic intuition about faith. One might object that since salvific faith is a theological virtue, its moral (or, all-things-considered) value should be of peripheral concern to philosophical theologians investigating its nature. But according to Kvanvig, it is central to our theological understanding of salvific faith that faith is somehow valuable, because this explains faith's necessity for salvation (Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018), 105–107).

Kvanvig's argument for (2) has some force: granting (1), it is desirable that an analysis of salvific faith explains faith's value. However, if we plausibly lack the epistemic resources to discern salvific faith's value, the failure of an analysis to deliver such an explanation will be less damning. When evaluating (2), we should consider whether we would be cognitively competent to understand how faith is valuable, if we were to correctly develop an analysis of faith such as CAF. According to Catholic tradition, humans enjoy a reasonably accurate grasp of what constitutes natural moral (and perhaps, broader) flourishing through ‘natural law’ (CCC 1954–1960). If natural law gives humans an intuitive grasp of which actions contribute to moral excellence, we might expect that humans will reliably identify candidate dispositions as moral virtues. Thus Catholics might incline to endorse (2), holding that we should be confident of our ability to gauge CF's moral value and/or broader contribution to human flourishing.

Yet as noted above, Catholics hold that faith is not a natural but a supernatural virtue. If faith is a supernatural virtue which directs us to beatitude, we should be less confident that we are cognitively competent to understand its contribution to human flourishing. For plausibly, we should doubt our ability to understand (sans revelation) how humans require transformation for beatitude. As 1 John 3:2 remarks, ‘We are God's children now; what we will be has not yet been revealed.’ St John then claims that ‘We will be like him [God], because we will see him as he really is.’ This assertion further motivates scepticism about our natural capacity to discern which dispositions equip humans for beatitude. Even proponents of kataphatic natural theology recognize that our natural knowledge of God's nature is limited. Accordingly, it seems that we are not in a propitious position to assess, without revelation, how humans might become ‘like God’, and therefore which dispositions are necessary for beatitude.

Admittedly, Christians do possess considerable understanding of some dispositions necessary for beatitude – including faith – through revelation (see e.g. Matthew 5:3–12). Moreover, since according to Catholic theology ‘grace perfects nature’ (see Aquinas, ST Ia8.8 ad2), Catholics can have confidence that natural virtues – or minimally, their infused analogues – contribute to our flourishing even given our supernatural end.Footnote ²¹ But (excluding the Reformed explanation of faith's salvific potency) neither Scripture nor tradition offers any extensive, authoritative explanation of why faith is virtuous or otherwise necessary for salvation. So while one might hope that the resources of natural reason and revelation will allow us to understand how faith prepares us for beatitude – I gloss some traditional explanations below – it remains plausible that salvific faith is valuable because it contributes to beatitude in some way which we are presently ill-equipped to understand. We should therefore be cautious about our ability to accurately assess salvific faith's value, at least regarding its necessity for beatitude. Accordingly, I suggest that Catholics can doubt (2). It perhaps counts against an analysis of salvific faith if it cannot explain faith's value; but not decisively.

We have seen that given independent theological commitments, orthodox Protestants and Catholics may reasonably doubt the force of Kvanvig's argument, even if they cannot explain salvific faith's value. Yet from a Catholic perspective, it would be a virtue of CAF if we could understand CF's value. It is plausible that salvific faith possesses intelligible value in this life in addition to its (potentially mysterious) ability to prepare us for beatitude, and the fact that Catholic theologians have sometimes regarded even belief in human testimony as valuable might support this intuition (see e.g. Augustine, Confessions, VI.7; Aquinas, In Symbolum Apostolorum, Prol.). Accordingly, I will seek to explain why – if Christianity is true – CF is worth having.

Instrumental explanations of doxastic faith's value

I shall shortly argue that – if Christianity is true – CF is virtuous. But I should first explain how my reasons for regarding CF as valuable differ from some current and historical suggestions. Although the explanations of CF's value which I explore in this section are given by prominent theologians, I do not pretend to give an exhaustive examination of extant explanations of CF's value. Rather, I highlight these accounts of CF's value because they are representative of arguments that CF is instrumentally valuable, because it facilitates the pursuit of further religious goals.

Some authors hold that belief in salient religious propositions is necessary to motivate and regulate Christian living. The latter prepares Christians for beatitude through affectively and epistemically transformative moral and Sacramental practices which contribute to justification and sanctification. Both Augustine and Aquinas suggest that CF is necessary for this reason. Augustine, for example, asserts that without belief in God, one cannot rationally consider conversion to Christianity:

Aquinas similarly argues:

However, Kvanvig provides a rejoinder to such explanations of doxastic faith's importance. Augustine and Aquinas fail to show that belief – or high and stable credence – in God's existence or revealed truth is required for Christian living. Weak belief, acceptance, hope or desire that Christian claims are true might equally motivate the relevant actions (Kvanvig (Reference Kvanvig2018), 19; 128). Thus, Kvanvig notes that although Hebrews 11:8 commends Abraham's faith in leaving Ur (cf. Genesis 12), Abraham need not have believed that God's promise of future blessings was true to have had rational motivation for his journey. He might merely have hoped or desired that the promise was true. What matters, Kvanvig argues, is not that Abraham believed God's promise, but that he showed commitment to God in starting his journey. (ibid., 28–30). By parallel reasoning, arguments for CF's value which allege that belief in revelation is necessary to motivate engagement in religious practices tacitly accept that CF is only of instrumental value. They remain vulnerable to the suggestion that non-doxastic faith can equally motivate such engagement, and is therefore as valuable as CF.Footnote ²²

A reviewer objects that cognitive attitudes weaker than firm belief are insufficient to provide strong, rational motivation for action, unless their subject possesses further firm beliefs which determine their choices. Perhaps Abraham could only have been rational in setting out if he strongly believed that doing so was his best chance of securing descendants, or (if he only weakly believed this) if he firmly believed some other relevant decision-making principle (e.g. that he lacked time for further reflection). Even granting this (dubious) claim, the relevant firm beliefs necessary to motivate Christian living need not include even ‘natural’ belief in divine testimony, or God's existence. For example, hope for beatitude – combined with firm belief that Christian life is the most promising route to heaven – can motivate Christian living even if one has low credence that God has revealed Himself in Christ.

Another explanation of doxastic faith's value given by Catholic theologians (see also Wahlberg (Reference Wahlberg2014), 25–26) asserts that belief in God's existence is necessary for a personal relationship with Him. Newman, for example, offers the following argument against those who maintain that Christian faith has ‘its seat in the heart’, consisting of belief (i.e. trust) in God as Saviour rather than belief that ‘God is Saviour’:

Although Newman writes of affection rather than relationship, his point might be expressed otherwise: without belief in God, humans cannot relate to God personally. Lately, John Schellenberg has propounded this claim in his ‘argument from hiddenness’ against God's existence (Schellenberg (Reference Schellenberg2007), 204; Idem (Reference Schellenberg2015), 56–60). However, it is noteworthy that while Christian philosophers have advanced various replies to Schellenberg's argument, many deny that one must believe that God exists to have a personal relationship with Him (e.g. Cuneo (Reference Cuneo2016), 52–65; Benton (Reference Benton2018), 431–433; Rea (Reference Rea2018) ). The objects of personal relationships are persons rather than propositions, even granting that ‘personal’ relationships must be consciously experienced. Accordingly, one can plausibly relate personally to someone without holding any beliefs about her. This is particularly clear if, as Matthew Benton argues, knowledge of persons is fundamentally non-propositional (Benton (Reference Benton2018), 423); but even if it must be mediated by some attitude towards the proposition that the relevant person exists, this attitude could be weaker than belief (e.g. acceptance).

Terence Cuneo highlights Jesus’ Parable of the Sheep and the Goats as an example which indicates that one need not believe that Christ is present to relate to Him personally. According to Matthew 25, we will be judged on the basis of our relationship to Christ through our treatment of others, even if we fail to recognize that our actions are directed towards Him (Cuneo (Reference Cuneo2016), 52–54). Arguably, it is even clearer that one can lovingly relate to a person whom one could certainly consciously relate to if she exists, but whose existence one currently doubts. For example, I can have a loving relationship with a relative on her deathbed, even if I am unsure whether she is still alive. Pace Schellenberg (Reference Schellenberg2007, 208–209), there is something subjectively and objectively suboptimal about loving relationships where one party does not believe that the other exists; but belief that God exists is not necessary for a personal relationship with Him.

Even if belief in God's existence – alongside propositions concerning His nature which can only be reasonably believed on divine testimony – were necessary for a personal relationship with Him, this would not show that wider belief in revelation is virtuous. Many propositions held to be divinely revealed by Catholics (e.g. concerning Mariology) are not principally concerned with God's character. One could plausibly have a loving relationship with God without believing them. Further, even were belief in all revealed propositions necessary for a loving relationship with God, it is not obvious why the strong and rationally tenacious belief which is normatively constituent of CF would be commendable.Footnote ²³

There is doubtless more to say about the contention that belief in God or divine testimony is necessary for a personal relationship with Him. Perhaps even abstruse doctrines reveal something about God's character, allowing believers to deepen their relationship with Him. But for argument's sake, I grant Kvanvig that both explanations of CF's importance discussed above are flawed.

Catholic faith as testimonial justice

We have seen that attempts to explain CF's value in instrumental terms are vulnerable to the objection that CF is not necessary to attain the relevant external goods. This might motivate defenders of CAF to show that belief in divine testimony is intrinsically valuable. In doing so, one might develop suggestions to this effect which are extant in theological discussions of faith. For example, one might follow Aquinas in arguing that because humans are ordered to perfect supernatural knowledge of God in the beatific vision, CF is intrinsically valuable because it presently affords believers preparatory and anticipatory supernatural knowledge of God (see De Veritate, XV.11 resp.; In Symbolum Apostolorum, Prol.). Thus, in ST IIaIIae 2.3, Aquinas argues that it is a necessary (i.e. fitting?) part of preparation for beatitude that one is taught by God (cf. John 6:45). This involves believing God's testimony about Himself; just as those seeking understanding (scientia) in secular disciplines must begin by believing their teachers about the relevant subject. Thomists might argue that mere acceptance of revelation would not provide similar cognitive preparation for beatitude. But instead, I now offer a novel account of CF's value, drawing on work which emphasizes the intrinsically ethical nature of testimonial belief.

In her seminal Epistemic Injustice (2007), Miranda Fricker persuasively argues that the choice to believe testimony is ethically charged. Human testimony, which Fricker exclusively discusses, is often accepted or rejected on the basis of prejudicial stereotypes. Importantly, Fricker suggests that when receiving testimony, a hearer makes a ‘credibility judgement’ concerning the testifier's knowledge and sincerity, in light of which she believes or rejects the testimony. This judgement need not be reflexive or conscious, and is often the immediate perception that the testifier is in/credible.Footnote ²⁴

Unfortunately, negative social stereotypes about testifiers who belong to (e.g.) some race, gender or class can lead to the rejection or downplaying of testimony because the testifier is inaccurately perceived to lack knowledge or sincerity. In such cases, Fricker argues, the testifier is harmed in her role as a conveyer of knowledge: she suffers testimonial injustice (Fricker (Reference Fricker2007), 17–29). By contrast, there is a virtue of testimonial justice. In Fricker's preferred narrow sense, testimonial justice is the virtue by which a ‘hearer neutralizes the impact of prejudice in her credibility judgements’, though in a broader sense it can refer to ‘all the virtues relevant to receiving the word of another’ (ibid., 92). Both uses of ‘testimonial justice’ are illuminating: it is important to overcome unfair prejudices which skew our credibility judgements, and likewise to minimize the extent to which any competent and sincere testimony is ignored or downplayed (through prejudice or otherwise). We can use Fricker's account to define the virtue of testimonial justice:

What is wrong with testimonial injustice; or, at which good does testimonial justice aim? On Fricker's account, testimonial justice is a ‘hybrid’ epistemic/ethical virtue: it aims at fostering true belief/knowledge and the just treatment of testifiers (ibid., 121–128). Kvanvig concedes that if Christianity is true, belief in revelation is epistemically valuable. So, with a view to arguing that CF fosters testimonial justice towards God, I focus here on Fricker's suggestion that testimonial justice is a moral virtue. Fricker notes that testimonial injustice can have malign consequences for individuals immediately involved and for the wider community due to the suppression of useful knowledge from disadvantaged groups, and the consequent erosion of their epistemic self-confidence (ibid., 46–59). Thus, testimonial justice aims at the sharing of knowledge and the fostering of appropriate confidence in the cognitive abilities of all community members. Yet Fricker suggests that even without these effects of testimonial injustice, ‘the [testifying] subject is wronged in her capacity as a knower [i.e. communicator of knowledge]’ (ibid., 44). Fricker (ibid., 46) argues that in denying her competence and sincerity (against available evidence), one who exercises epistemic injustice towards a testifier dishonours her, by failing to recognize characteristics central to her moral worth (i.e. competence as a knower and sincerity as a communicator).

Fricker seems correct that when extrinsic harms do not affect a testifier who suffers testimonial injustice, she is still wronged by the failure to recognize her value as a knowing subject: she suffers disrespect. Since this harm may be extrinsic to the testifier's well-being, we might say that testimonial injustice consists of failure (of respect) on the hearer's part, rather than harm to the testifier. We can also state the essential moral good at which testimonial justice aims: the appropriate honour and recognition of a testifier as a competent knower and sincere communicator. Although I lack space to develop an extended account of ‘honour’ and ‘recognition’, I use these terms to signify the appropriate response given to a person's excellence through one's actions and reasoning about them. Intuitively, certain valuable qualities demand theoretical and practical acknowledgement. When the Queen enters, I should attend to this fact, and bow. Where testifiers are concerned, one can appropriately acknowledge or respond to their competence and sincerity by (inter alia) exercising testimonial justice to accurately evaluate their credibility, by paying appropriate attention to their testimony, and by making appropriate epistemic use of it.

One might wonder whether recognition of someone's valuable characteristics is always requisite; wouldn't this over-state the importance of respect? Still, we are plausibly (ceteris paribus) obliged to recognize/honour another's moral dignity at appropriate moments; particularly when that dignity is brought into question. When one is addressed with (even, alleged) testimony, one is confronted with the question of the testifier's credibility, and so one is plausibly (ceteris paribus) obliged to fairly evaluate and recognize their credibility. Even if such recognition is not obligatory, it seems virtuous. On this understanding, belief in testimony is not a merely epistemic matter: it is the output of a morally loaded credibility judgement. This judgement should honour the testifier's competence and sincerity to an appropriate degree. Because each token offer of testimony obliges (ceteris paribus) an appropriate recognition of the testifier's competence, it also allows a recognition that the testifier is acting competently and sincerely in each offer of testimony.

One might infer from this analysis that it is the judgement that a testifier is credible which renders her due recognition, rather than belief in her testimony which normally follows. But I suggest that belief in testimony further honours a competent and sincere testifier. This is because a testifier (usually, intentionally) offers a good to her audience: knowledge, or belief with positive epistemic status. By believing her testimony, her audience accepts the proffered good. This acceptance further honours the testifier as one who provides an epistemic good, through appropriate use of the latter. By analogy, if someone offers me a gift, it is a matter of respect that I both recognize their generosity and enjoy its intended benefits. Appropriately honouring a testifier in this way does not always involve believing testimony; one can recognize a testifier's sincerity and competence while responsibly judging that their sincerity or competence is imperfect, or while possessing evidence that their testimony is false. Rather, one honours a testifier appropriately by making appropriate epistemic use of their testimony (i.e. including it in one's evidence and forming appropriate beliefs accordingly), in light of a fair judgement of their credibility. When one is certain that a testifier is perfectly competent and sincere, however, one should believe their testimony to the extent to which one is certain that it has been successfully communicated.

We can now explore why it might be morally creditable to believe revelation, if one responsibly believes that God is offering testimony. When one responsibly assents to revelation, one exercises testimonial justice towards God. That is, as per Fricker's account, one appropriately judges that (i) God has revealed some proposition and (ii) God is a competent and sincere testifier. In light of this credibility judgement, one believes the revealed proposition. CF thus involves a credibility judgement which appropriately recognizes God as a knower and sincere communicator. Moreover, one who believes divine testimony further honours God by appropriately utilizing His gift of testimony. When responsibly exercised, CF thus involves giving God due honour and recognition. As Avery Dulles explains, ‘In adhering to God as revealer, the believer accepts God as the one who is supremely deserving of assent, trust, and obedience’ (Dulles (Reference Dulles1994), 188). Indeed, since on some accounts worship consists in paying God appropriate respect, CF may be owed to God – by one who can responsibly believe revelation – as an act of worship (see Burling (Reference Burling2019) ).

A reviewer wonders whether Catholics should consider acts of CF ultimately valuable (i.e. as directed to or meriting beatitude) on my analysis. According to Catholic theology, only actions performed by those possessing formed faith can be thus ‘worth having’. But on my account, (the reviewer continues) the credibility judgement through which one honours God with testimonial justice precedes CF. This misunderstands my account. On my account, after honouring God through an appropriate credibility judgement, one with CF continues to honour God qua testifier through appropriate epistemic use of (i.e. belief in) divine testimony (to which CF is the disposition).

Further, we can see how, if God has revealed Himself as Christianity claims, believing divine testimony can involve the exercise of narrowFootnote ²⁷ and broad testimonial justice. Firstly, as per Fricker's analysis, belief in divine testimony will involve the accurate judgement that God is a competent and sincere testifier. Philosophers often note that humans can be inclined to reject belief in God's existence or divine testimony because these facts challenge our moral and epistemic autonomy (see Plantinga, (Reference Plantinga2000), 208ff.; Kahane (Reference Kahane2011) ). As Newman observes, ‘[A] man who fancies that he can find out truth by himself, disdains revelation . . . fears that it will interfere with his own imaginary discoveries, he is unwilling to consult it’ (Newman (Reference Newman1966), 218). Just as exercising narrow testimonial justice involves overcoming the cognitive effects of prejudice, exercising CF may involve overcoming animus against acknowledging God as a sincere and competent testifier, which disposes one to inappropriately diminish one's credence that God has given testimony, or that His testimony is accurate. Second, provided one's belief in divine testimony is morally and epistemically responsible, exercising CF will be an act of broad testimonial justice, since such testimonial justice is just the disposition to appropriately receive testimony.

Belief in divine testimony can also issue from morally or epistemically inappropriate judgements that God has given testimony and is credible. One might believe divine testimony to appear pious, or through credulity. But if one believes revelation for inappropriate reasons – particularly, if one does not intend to honour God qua testifier through love for Him – Catholic tradition holds that one's exercise of CF is defective. Many virtue ethicists suggest that a disposition to act well must be properly motivated to be a virtue. Accordingly, Fricker denies that someone lacking commitment to either goal of testimonial justice (i.e. the formation of true beliefs, or the fair treatment of testifiers) possesses that virtue (Fricker (Reference Fricker2007), 127–128). Similarly, on my account, only those who exercise CF because they wish to honour God as a testifier exercise testimonial justice towards Him. The intellectually compelled faith of demons, for example, is not an exercise of testimonial justice (see James 2:19; Aquinas ST IIaIIae 5.2). While Catholic doctrine holds that CF can exist without its proper motivation,Footnote ²⁸ it insists that only CF ‘formed’ by supernatural hope and love is salvific.Footnote ²⁹

With this in mind, we can see why, according to Catholic doctrine, it is fitting that propositions revealed by God are believed with strong certainty and rational tenacity. Since, according to Catholic tradition, God is a perfectly competent and sincere testifier (CCC 215) it is appropriate that this is recognized by perfect certainty in the believer that what God has revealed is true; at least in proportion to her rational confidence that He has revealed that proposition, and that He is perfectly competent and sincere in His testimony. Ideally, a believer will be completely confident that God has revealed a proposition (with perfect competence and sincerity), so that she can make full use of His epistemic gift. Yet when one cannot rationally be certain that God has revealed a proposition, one can still honour God as a competent and sincere testifier by believing a proposition to the extent that one is certain that it is divinely revealed.

A reviewer wonders whether this explanation of faith's normative firmness is compatible with epistemic fallibilism: the thesis that no human belief can be rationally certain. If fallibilism holds, one can never (rationally) be perfectly certain that God is perfectly competent and sincere and that He has testified to any proposition; so one need never believe revelation with perfect certainty to honour God as a testifier. I have two replies. First, even if fallibilism holds generally, my analysis nevertheless explains why, with sufficient evidence, one should believe divine testimony with strong (albeit imperfect) certainty. Second, perhaps – as Catholic doctrine teaches – grace can enable one to responsibly believe divine testimony with a certainty surpassing that with which one can rationally believe revelation through natural reason.Footnote ³⁰ The reviewer further worries that since cooperation with grace is intrinsically virtuous, this latter suggestion renders otiose my explanation of CF's value as a means of honouring God qua testifier. But the fact that faith is a divine gift, which we can virtuously accept with supernatural assistance, does not explain why faith is itself valuable, or why God has chosen it as a necessary means of salvation. Kvanvig seeks such an explanation, and this article endeavours to provide one.

My rejoinder to Kvanvig's claim that doxastic faith is not worth having should now be evident: one who responsibly exercises CF honours God as a testifier, exercising testimonial justice towards Him. But can one honour God qua testifier without CF? I have argued that certain situations demand appropriate recognition of a testifier's competence and sincerity. I further suggested that when addressed with testimony, one is plausibly prima facie obliged to recognize the testifier's worth qua testifier by fairly evaluating her credibility and believing her testimony to an appropriate degree. Since according to Catholic theology CF is the virtue by which we believe divine testimony, it seems that CF is required for the appropriate recognition of God qua testifier.Footnote ³¹

One might suggest that the disposition to believe revelation (when one can responsible do so) is fundamentally valuable, rather than actual belief in revelation. Yet this suggestion is compatible with CAF and is accepted by Catholic theologians who claim that those who non-culpably lack explicit belief in divine testimony may be saved by ‘anonymous’ (implicit) Christian faith. In nuce, I suggest that such faith is best understood as a person's disposition to believe divine revelation which is grounded in her broader ethical and cognitive practices (on implicit belief, see Audi (Reference Audi1994) ). Besides, if CF is a virtue, its exercise is valuable. Accordingly, it would not seem unreasonable of God to make salvation conditional on the exercise of CF, if He gives all humans opportunity to responsibly exercise CF before judgement.

Moreover, one can possess faith as defined by Kvanvig – potentially non-doxastic ‘commitment to the Lord’ – without honouring God qua testifier. For example, yielding to sinful disinclination to believe divine testimony despite possessing strong evidence that God has revealed Himself in Christ, one might fail to believe that Christ is risen, even if one's broader attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) impel one to act as if He is risen. We can therefore see what is lacking in someone who possess the motivational faith in God's promises which Kvanvig praises, but culpably fails to believe that God's promises are true, or that He exists. Such a person may not exercise narrow or broad testimonial justice towards God, failing to honour Him as a testifier. Faith, on Kvanvig's account, is a ‘disposition to respond in the service of an ideal’. Yet God is no ideal: He is a supremely valuable person. As such, He is entitled to recognition under certain circumstances, including when one perceives that He is offering testimony.