A focus on process is laudable, but…

All psychological research should aim at identifying the specific processes that underly human behavior. However, “mental computational processes” championed by Murayama and Jach (M&J) lack a theoretical framework that is comprised of propositions about how these processes emerge, what influences them, and how they affect experience and behavior. Neuronal activity and the “mental computations” they can compose are not functional in and of themselves. They emerge as functional processes in the context of an individual's interactions with the environment.

Nothing is as process-focused as a good theory

Good theories comprise theoretical constructs that are clearly defined and operationalized, and that have a specific function in the theoretical model. An excellent example of a theory comprising elaborated processes that are integrated into a person-by-situation interaction framework following Lewin's (Reference Lewin and Carmichael1946) axiom, is achievement motivation theory (Atkinson, Reference Atkinson1957; Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen1977; McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, Reference McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell1953) with its risk-taking model in terms of anticipated self-evaluation after success and failure. This theory solves the alleged black-box problem by making distinct predictions about the effects of situational incentives on behavior, such as task choice, effort, and task performance for individuals with predominant hope for success versus predominant fear of failure. Achievement situations with intermediate challenge are the most informative about one's own competence and therefore the most attractive for success seekers and the most threatening for failure avoiders (Brunstein & Heckhausen, Reference Brunstein, Heckhausen, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018). Their task choices, effort investment, emotional responses, causal attributions, and performance vary accordingly along predicted patterns. Such person-by-situation interactions are based on the theoretically proposed and empirically tested process variables of goal setting, causal attribution, and self-evaluation (Brunstein & Heckhausen, Reference Brunstein, Heckhausen, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018; Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen1977; Stiensmeyer-Pelster & Heckhausen, Reference Stiensmeyer-Pelster, Heckhausen, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018). These processes develop as mutually stabilizing individual differences in cognitive and emotional predispositions during goal-directed interactions with the environment in childhood (Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen, Sarason and Spielberger1975; Heckhausen & Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen, Heckhausen, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018). Further compelling evidence for achievement motivation theory comes from the effective use of its models for intervention and change of motive dispositions and associated biases in cognition, emotion, and behavior (Rheinberg & Engeser, Reference Rheinberg, Engeser, Schultheiss and Brunstein2010).

Hence, even several decades ago, motivation was not at all a black box. Instead, theoretical models of specific and functionally interrelated processes interfacing person and situation were developed, operationalized, and thus made accessible for empirical research. More recent developments in achievement motivation research associated with Eccles and Wigfield's Situated Expectancy-Value Theory (Eccles & Wigfield, Reference Eccles and Wigfield2002, Reference Eccles and Wigfield2020) differentiate among different value components as a function of social developmental context and individual preference. This allows for more differentiated and developmentally as well as culturally informed modeling of achievement-motivated behavior.

“Mental computation” or functionality of motivational mindsets

Mental computation and cognitive processes are important, but the energizing and directional function of motivation critically relies on experienced and anticipated affect and its change (e.g., anticipated enjoyment of activity, anticipated pride about own competence). According to the Rubicon model of action-phases, cognition and affect work hand in hand, but have shifting priorities depending on whether the individual is trying to determine the optimal goal (deliberative phase of action cycle) or pursuing an already chosen goal (implemental phase) (Gollwitzer, Reference Gollwitzer, Higgins and Sorrentino1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, Reference Heckhausen and Gollwitzer1987). During the pre-decision phase, objectivity and breadth of mental computation is essential and thus a deliberative mindset is activated, whereas during the post-decision phases, biased information processing following an implementation mindset shields the intended action from distractions and conflicting tendencies (Achtziger & Gollwitzer, Reference Achtziger, Gollwitzer, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018).

Motivation is a product of evolution and development

M&J address the evolution of motivation but ignore individual differences. Motivational mental processes are a product of phylogenetically evolved pre-adaptations and ontogenetically developed strategies and patterns in a specific individual. They are only in part universal outcomes of behavioral evolution at a phylogenetic scale (e.g., classical and operant conditioning and mastery striving, Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen2000). The non-universal motivational processes reflect the ontogeny of individuals and their unique experiences with affective change (self and other-regulated), bearing a strong influence of preverbal exposure to affect–change patterns in the context of the parent–child dyad (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, Reference Heckhausen, Heckhausen, Heckhausen and Heckhausen2018; Kuhl & Völker, Reference Kuhl, Völker and Keller1998). Formative developmental conditions are associated with transitions, for instance the transition from intra-individual to inter-individual reference frames when starting school with its dominant evaluative framework of social comparison. As individuals become more self-regulated in adolescence and adulthood, their potential to follow the motivational predispositions acquired earlier increases exponentially and further stabilizes them. In this process, individuals become increasingly nimble in regulating and optimizing their own motivation in a given situational set of incentives, based on their extensive experience with self-regulation of motivation (Rheinberg & Engeser, Reference Rheinberg, Engeser, Schultheiss and Brunstein2010).

Levels of analyses: From micro to macro to micro

As M&J demand, we do need to get closer to the actual processes that are at play in specific situations. However, we should not throw out the conceptual and empirical progress we already made, just because we cannot yet successfully capture the more molecular processes. On the other hand, having such higher order constructs should not spare us from digging deeper into the more molecular processes. In our discovery endeavor to identify and link up processes at different levels of analysis, different approaches can complement each other. An example is the combination of situated expectancy-value theory (Eccles & Wigfield, Reference Eccles and Wigfield2002, Reference Eccles and Wigfield2020) which addresses goal choice, and motivational theory of lifespan development (Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, Reference Heckhausen, Wrosch and Schulz2010, Reference Heckhausen, Wrosch and Schulz2019), which addresses how long-term goals are pursued and changed across the life course (von Keyserlingk, Rubach, Lee, Eccles, & Heckhausen, Reference von Keyserlingk, Rubach, Lee, Eccles and Heckhausen2022).