Introduction
This article examines how platform workers in India and Italy use a variety of resistance practices to challenge precarious working conditions, and how differences among workers constrain their participation in these strategies. Over the years, various strategies have been formulated to mitigate the precarious and exploitative working conditions in platform-based models. The existing literature has explored these strategies mostly through the lens of resistance, reworking, and resilience (Anwar and Graham Reference Anwar and Graham2020; Barratt et al Reference Barratt, Goods and Veen2020; Stewart and Stanford Reference Stewart and Stanford2017; Heiland Reference Heiland2021; Badger Reference Badger2022). Resistance strategies among platform workers are evolving due to shifts in structural conditions, such as changes in labour laws and market dynamics, contextual factors such as technological advancements and economic pressures, and individual circumstances including workers’ socio-economic backgrounds and personal motivations. Joyce and Stuart (Reference Joyce, Stuart, Haidar and Keune2021) highlight diverse patterns of resistance influenced by specific management control measures: ‘micro-level fiddles and individual resistance’, informal collective actions, and formal strikes and protests. Substantial research examined how interaction between platforms and the structural conditions reshape actions among platform labour (Atzeni and Cini Reference Atzeni and Cini2023; Heiland Reference Heiland2023; Dif-Pradalier et al Reference Dif-Pradalier, Jammet, Tiberghien, Bignami and Cuppini2024).
Indeed, the amalgamation of diverse working arrangements, alongside overarching structural conditions, can both constrain and facilitate agency among platform workers (Kovacs Reference Kovacs2017; Kaine and Josserand Reference Kaine and Josserand2019; Barratt et al Reference Barratt, Goods and Veen2020; Stewart and Stanford Reference Stewart and Stanford2017; Frapporti and Pirone Reference Frapporti and Pirone2023; Heiland Reference Heiland2023). Nonetheless, adding to the structural limitations, certain inherent causes among the workers also limit agential practices, preventing challenges to platforms’ continued accumulation. Most research emphasises how workers perceiving themselves as ‘entrepreneurs’ strive to maximise their income and enhance firms’ market-making, thus consenting to power relations that control them (Kovacs Reference Kovacs2017; Vicente Reference Vicente2019; Barratt et al Reference Barratt, Goods and Veen2020; Purcell and Brook Reference Purcell and Brook2020; Galiere Reference Galiere2020; Mara et al Reference Marà, Pulignano and Stewart2023). Furthermore, intriguing insights have been introduced into how migrant workers, exposed to diverse working conditions and experiences, can adopt distinct strategies for collective action (Alyanak et al Reference Alyanak, Cant, López Ayala, Badger and Graham2023; Niebler and Animento Reference Niebler and Animento2023).
This research explores resistance strategies across various spatial and temporal contexts to reveal emerging forms of collective action, individual agency, and labour mobilisation in the digital age. Furthermore, it highlights that increasing disparities among platform workers hinder cohesive collective actions, as differences in perceptions, interests, and positions restrict their choices, understanding, and decision-making. Hence, this research identifies three crucial determinants influencing workers’ engagement in resistance strategies: migration, socio-economic status, and technological reliance. Moreover, augmenting these assertions, the principal contribution of this research lies in its adoption of a North-South comparative perspective. A North-South comparison offers a rich perspective on global issues, moving beyond Eurocentric frameworks to encompass a wider range of geographical, cultural, and socio-economic contexts. It seeks to capture diverse perspectives and experiences on a global scale, elucidating how disparities in economic, social, and political conditions prompt varied responses among workers, even when engaged in similar labour processes.
The findings section of this paper is divided into three parts: the first section provides a comprehensive classification and explanation of diverse resistance strategies, delineating between formal-informal and collective-individual grounds. The second section delves into an in-depth analysis of the three intricate components that shape agential practices among platform workers. The conclusion summarises the comparison between the Global North and Global South, offering insights into the ramifications on intra-co-worker relationships and spotting potential research lacunae.
Theoretical insights
In opposition to viewing workers as mere subjects of capitalism, Herod (1997, 2) emphasised considering workers as active agents who keenly shape their environments to ensure their survival and reproduction. Labour agency signifies both the intentions and practices among workers to exert some control over their conditions and circumstances, capitalise on available opportunities, and create new possibilities to promote their self-interest as well as interests of others (Sewell, Reference Sewell1992; Barnes Reference Barnes2000; Castree et al Reference Castree, Coe, Ward and Samers2004). It encompasses a range of actions, from entering or leaving employment to migrating for better opportunities and negotiating for higher pay, undertaken to promote both individual and collective interests (Emirbayer and Mische, Reference Emirbayer and Mische1998; Castree et al Reference Castree, Coe, Ward and Samers2004; Rogaly Reference Rogaly2009; Carswell and De Neve Reference Carswell and De Neve2013; Lund-Thomsen Reference Lund-Thomsen2013). In this research, agency is conceptualised as those diverse social acts that platform workers undertake as a mechanism to address and navigate the challenges encountered inherent in hegemonic social relationships.
These acts, resembling resistance, have an ‘explicitly oppositional character’ (Hauge and Fold Reference Hauge and Fold2016: 125) and involve recognisable and organised acts that question and challenge structures of domination and control (Katz Reference Katz2004; Hollander and Einwohner Reference Hollander and Einwohner2004; Sparke Reference Sparke2008; Gotehus Reference Gotehus2021). As Warren (Reference Warren2014, 2303) states, ‘at the level of resistance, agency incorporates “game-changing” actions, expressed in both subterranean acts (a “termite” approach) and larger scale strategies encompassing multiple sites and subjects’. Thus, these activities, whether physical and material, such as protests and rallies or symbolic, such as storytelling and silence, can be individual or collective (Hollander and Einwohner Reference Hollander and Einwohner2004). Hughes (Reference Hughes2019: 2) notes that resistant forms are often identified based on pre-existing categories or criteria rather than empirical data or specific case studies. This research defines resistance as acts emerging from oppositional consciousness to challenge the oppression and exploitation of platform workers. This includes confrontational acts (formal and informal collective resistance) and non-confrontational acts (informal individual resistance) aimed at disrupting the power status quo.
Indeed, resistance intersects with diverse power relations, changing with various contexts and situations, and contributing to its heterogeneous nature (Johansson and Vinthagen Reference Johansson and Vinthagen2015). Hence, it is essential to recognise the individual acts that are non-organised and non-confrontational, often occurring outside the visible realm of political practices and typically not attracting public attention or media coverage (Scott Reference Scott1985). As Ackroyd and Thompson (Reference Ackroyd and Thompson1999) highlight, resistance can even include ‘non-compliant’ or ‘counter-productive’ practices towards work, targeting the time spent on work, and using work material for non-work purposes. These everyday forms of resistance making ‘no headlines’, assume forms of ‘individual self-help’ that seek to avoid ‘any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority’ (Scott Reference Scott1985, xvi-xvii). Nonetheless, despite numerous resistance endeavours in both the Global North and Global South aimed at altering the status quo in favour of platform workers, these have either been suppressed over time or have failed to materialise significant changes.
Moreover, outright oppositional responses are declining among platform workers, particularly in the Global South where unionisation levels, negotiation rights, and collective bargaining are more restricted compared with the Global North. There are several contextual conditions that contribute towards facilitating or hindering resistance practices among workers (Polletta Reference Polletta1999; Dixon et al Reference Dixon, Roscigno and Hodson2004; Atzeni Reference Atzeni2010). Nonetheless, significant emphasis on understanding the organised politics at workplace often blurs the ‘complex relationship between labour as a social category and the communities that surround them’ (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010, 14). Since these platforms are embedded within the broader macro-context in which they operate, workers’ actions are similarly shaped by the same structural factors. As ‘labour agency is always relational, and never completely autonomous’ (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010, 221), it becomes essential to link labour agency with the wider societal and governance structures within which it is inherently situated (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010; Coe Reference Coe2012; Lund-Thomsen Reference Lund-Thomsen2013; Wickramasingha and Coe Reference Wickramasingha and Coe2022).
As an illustration, the labour market conditions are considered to assume an essential role in shaping labour agency through regulation and networks (Peck Reference Peck1996; Baglioni Reference Baglioni2018; Pattenden Reference Pattenden2016). Indeed, the flexibility to modify working arrangements enables these models to bypass existing regulations, thereby avoiding substantial obligations to workers (Aloisi Reference Aloisi2016; Cherry Reference Cherry2016; Prassl and Risak Reference Prassl and Risak2016; De Stefano Reference De Stefano2016; Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn Reference Howcroft and Bergvall-Kåreborn2018; Prassl Reference Prassl2018; Crouch Reference Crouch2019; Heiland Reference Heiland2020) and undermining worker agency in such capital-labour relationships. As Ong (Reference Ong1991, 304) states, ‘institutions like the state, kinship, gender, and religion, as well as industrial enterprises, play important roles in constituting workers’ activities and consciousness’. Moreover, unions also enhance labour agency by increasing awareness and access by targeting effective sites of action, extending efforts beyond workplaces, and scaling up initiatives thereby, enabling workers to act collectively and negotiate better terms (Aguiar and Ryan Reference Aguiar and Ryan2009; Anderson Reference Anderson2015; Louche et al Reference Louche, Staelens and D’Haese2020; Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2023). Cumbers et al (Reference Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge2008) highlight that union influence on worker mobilisation depends on factors such as national political support, international capital involvement, and the creation of collective resistance zones.
Furthermore, this research also focuses on examining worker-driven factors external to the labour process that facilitate or hinder resistance practices. The platform labour force encompasses diverse socio-economic backgrounds with varied perceptions, interests, and consciousness. Such diversity determines workers’ agency within and beyond these economic spheres. Indeed, workers’ diverse power resources and conceptualisations of their situations and interests (Sayer Reference Sayer2000; Ackroyd Reference Ackroyd and Kowlowski2010) shape their agential capabilities and tendencies towards specific actions. Additionally, the relationships among individual and collective actors, as well as individual subject positions encompassing worker identities, significantly influence agency (Coe Reference Coe2012; Jordhus-Lier and Coe Reference Jordhus-Lier and Coe2023).
Hence, capturing the complex, often intersecting subject positions that workers adopt when engaging in either collective or individual actions can help explain the reasons for inconsistencies in their behaviour and actions. This is significant in the labour platform context, where workers are engaging in certain ‘play along’ (Burawoy Reference Burawoy1979, Reference Burawoy1985) practices that shape and inform the practical aspects of agential strategies. Hence, striving to maximise individual earnings, these workers are eventually benefitting the system through maximising profits, fostering individualism over collective interests, and creating a negative correlation with social support behaviour. Moreover, the concept of role has been considered a vital component in explaining the motivations of individual agency, as well as in contributing to the shaping of collective agency (Archer Reference Archer2000; Elder-Vass Reference Elder-Vass2010; Hauge and Fold Reference Hauge and Fold2016; Jordhus-Lier and Coe Reference Jordhus-Lier and Coe2023). It provides a framework within which individuals operate, influencing their behaviour, decisions, and interactions with others. Indeed, this overlapping exerts substantial influence on their decisions to engage in resistance.
Moreover, specific emphasis is placed on migration, recognising platforms’ reliance on cheap labour in urban centres as integral to migration infrastructure (Van Doorn and Vijay Reference Van Doorn and Vijay2021; Van Doorn et al Reference Van Doorn, Ferrari and Graham2023; Alyanak, et al Reference Alyanak, Cant, López Ayala, Badger and Graham2023; Niebler and Animento Reference Niebler and Animento2023). Migration significantly shapes both collective and individual labour agencies, influenced by factors including reasons for migration, migration routes, political-economic conditions in home countries, and residential locations in host countries (Merton Reference Merton1968; Piore Reference Piore1979; Miller Reference Miller1991; Hudson Reference Hudson2001; Wills et al Reference Wills, May, Datta, Evans, Herbert and McIlwaine2009). Indeed, migrants adopt diverse strategies to cope with their weak positions in the market, their limited access to benefits, and low income compared to the locals (Datta et al Reference Datta, McIlwaine, Evans, Herbert, May and Wills2007; Alberti et al Reference Alberti, Holgate and Tapia2013; Berntsen Reference Berntsen2016; Paret and Gleeson Reference Paret and Gleeson2016). Moreover, achieving collective labour market strategies among migrant workers requires four key preconditions: ‘workers’ closeness, feeling of unity, shared problem perception and reference groups’ (Refslund and Sippola Reference Refslund and Sippola2022, 4-5).
Given the limited research on the embeddedness and potential consequences of these arrangements on collective action among platform workers, the core of this article lies in examining the intersection between resistance, structural factors, and worker-driven conditions that either facilitate or restrict such resistance. This article considers how platform workers create spaces of control within their work to address: how do resistance strategies adapt and evolve when subjected to diverse contexts and situations, thereby contributing to their heterogeneous nature? How do workers contribute to the development and implementation of resistance practices across different contextual settings? In what ways do evolving resistance strategies impact interpersonal relationships among co-workers? The article takes an actor-oriented approach that places individual agency of the platform workers at the centre, while evaluating their actions with respect to the broader structural context.
Research methodology
This research uses a cross-national comparative approach to examine resistance practices and worker-driven factors influencing platform workers in India and Italy. As Andreß et al (Reference Andreß, Fetchenhauer and Meulemann2019) note, such research reveals underlying structures shaping micro-level phenomena and their broader implications. India and Italy were chosen for their contrasting socio-economic and institutional contexts, representing a ‘most different cases’ approach. India, as part of the Global South, has a largely informal labour market and limited social protection, while Italy, from the Global North, features a regulated labour market and broader welfare provisions, albeit with enforcement challenges. The selected cities – Mumbai and Guwahati in India, and Milan and Bologna in Italy – capture diverse urban and regional contexts, with economic hubs like Mumbai and Milan contrasted against non-metropolitan areas like Guwahati and Bologna. Despite these differences, shared features such as the role of family in welfare, regional disparities, informal labour markets, and institutional inconsistencies (Baccaro Reference Baccaro, Burroni, Pavolini and Regini2020; Burroni et al Reference Burroni, Pavolini and Regini2020; Pérez and Matsaganis Reference Pérez and Matsaganis2019) provide a robust basis for comparison.
For this research, three platforms were selected from Italy – IT_1, IT_2, and IT_3 – and two platforms from India – IN_1 and IN_2. Table 1 presents details on these platforms. The organisation of work within the selected platforms across the four cities revealed notable variations; for example, differences were evident in key components such as income structuring, order allocation, work time organisation, delivery zone definition, and rating and ranking mechanisms. While variations in workplace arrangements could directly influence workers’ agency, the research focuses on broader structural factors because, despite the variations encountered across platforms within the countries, the outcomes among workers in each country showed striking similarities. In turn, this suggests that that factors beyond the immediate work environment – such as socio-economic contexts, institutional frameworks, and welfare systems – play a significant role in influencing worker experiences and behaviour, and thus shaping workers’ agency.
General overview of work structurisation in online food delivery companies
Source: Based on fieldwork.
*NA stands for not applicable.
**Misconduct covers treatment from customers and restaurants.
A stratified sampling technique (Patton Reference Patton1990; Teddlie and Yu Reference Teddlie and Yu2007; Teddlie and Tashakkori Reference Teddlie and Tashakkori2009) was employed to select 122 respondents, distributed as follows: Mumbai (38) and Guwahati (30) in India, and Milan (29) and Bologna (25) in Italy. The interviews were conducted in two phases: Phase I from December 2021 to March 2022, and Phase II from May 2022 to August 2022. Subgroups within the target population were identified, and purposive sampling was used to select cases from each subgroup, ensuring diversity across age, education, migration status, economic background, and platform work status. The sample size was determined based on recommendations from methodologists for qualitative research (Creswell Reference Creswell1998; Creswell and Clark Reference Creswell and Clark2011, Reference Creswell and Clark2018; Morse Reference Morse, Denzin and Lincoln1994; Mertens Reference Mertens2005), considering the minimum size needed to ensure depth and diversity of data. Furthermore, the sampling process was guided by the principle of data saturation, with new participants included until no substantial new information emerged, ensuring a robust and comprehensive dataset.
In India, 46% of workers were engaged with platform IN_1, while 54% were with IN_2. In Italy, 20% worked with IT_1, 32% with IT_2, 30% with IT_3, and 18% worked on multiple platforms. As shown in Table 2, around 82%, 93%, and 97% of workers in Mumbai, Guwahati, and Milan, respectively, treated these platforms as full-time work. However, 58% of workers in Bologna engaged part-time due to existing jobs or studies. As depicted in Figure 1, the workers in Milan and Bologna were primarily international migrants from countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India, who migrated for political and economic reasons. In India, the workers were mostly domestic migrants from peripheral areas or non-metropolitan cities, moving for economic reasons. Additionally, in India, over 70% of workers had prior experience in the service sector, compared to 62% in Milan and 44% in Bologna, where workers had experience in both service and industrial sectors.
Details about respondents across India and Italy
Domicile details of respondents in Milan and Bologna.
Unstructured interviews, averaging 50 to 75 minutes, were conducted to understand workers’ experiences with the platforms and analyse the ‘social contexts, constraints, and resources’ (Smith and Elger Reference Smith and Elger2012, 6) influencing their actions. The objective was threefold: to uncover the motivations behind their actions, to encourage reflective thinking, and to contextualise their explanations within specific domains. This approach aimed to engage interviewees in critical thinking and relate their experiences from both experiential and reflective perspectives. Besides analysing experiences, the research sought to explain the coexistence of conflicting accounts among respondents. The interviews were iterative and cumulative in the sense that these were revised from the insights gained through previous findings especially when the workers belonged to the same organisation.
Each interview was transcribed verbatim and analysed both within and across cases (Stake Reference Stake1995; Yin Reference Yin2003) using MAXQDA for data storage, coding, and thematic analysis. The qualitative analysis began with preliminary exploration by reading transcripts and writing memos. The data were then segmented and coded, with similar codes aggregated to form distinct themes. Thereafter, both connecting and interrelating themes within a case and distinct themes across cases have been evaluated and discussed. Hence, through this phase, the researcher sought to produce a cross-thematic matrix and a visual model of multiple case analysis. To ensure credibility, the researcher triangulated different sources of information, including focus group discussions and observations, to provide a thick description across cases and reviewed any disconfirming evidence encountered.
Unveiling collective and individual resistance strategies in platform models
Mann (Reference Mann2007, 164) states, ‘much, if not most, of working-class political agency is comprised of efforts to alter the relations of production, exchange, distribution, and consumption within the political and ideological framework of capitalism’. Although in the digital era, formal collective resistance is declining nonetheless, as Cumbers et al (Reference Cumbers, Helms and Swanson2010, 61) state, ‘it [resistance] always exists as a possibility and occurs at those moments when the working class is successful in moving from a class in itself to a class for itself’. This research identifies three forms of resistance – formal collective, informal collective, and informal individual – and elaborates on these strategies while explaining the disintegration of formal collective resistance.
Formal collective resistance: are direct confrontations preferred among platform workers?
Formal collective resistance is a structured and organised approach to confront and oppose the platform on a collective basis under well-defined strategies, like strikes, demonstrations, and negotiations that are carried out according to established procedures and agreements. The overarching aim of such strategies is to harness the collective cohesion and unified efforts among workers to effectuate desired alterations or enhancement in their working conditions. Although the initial phases involved softer pressures, changes in management’s responses prompted workers to amend their strike patterns (Johansson and Vinthagen Reference Johansson and Vinthagen2015; Hollander and Einwohner Reference Hollander and Einwohner2004) from refraining from logging into their application to harsher tactics like logging in but not accepting orders or refusing to pick up orders upon reaching restaurants. For example, one respondent explained that,
…every time we have tried raising our voice, they have suppressed it…they will threaten us by calling police or blocking our IDs…anything to scare us…so it becomes difficult to follow the same techniques…you need to keep working on new techniques…that can help us to make them at least listen to our problems… [Transcript_ID 10_Mumbai]
The strikes and protests in the Italian context date back to 2016 when workers began experiencing a precipitous decline in compensation, as a fixed income model was supplanted by a variable income structure, coupled with significant reductions in base rates. Over time, workers have advocated for distinct demands across platforms: IT_1 workers seek higher hourly rates and extended contracts, IT_2 workers push for increased base rates and mitigation of uncompensated labour time, and IT_3 workers call for higher base rates and revisions to the rating system governing their working hours. This led to a
series of protests [which] were launched in this regard…riders often spend extended periods waiting without receiving orders…so, their time was getting wasted…like I work from 7 till 10…I can deliver around two orders and I earn something like 7 to 10 euros…but then the three hours that gets wasted, who will pay me for that? So, a lot of workers protested these issues… [Transcript_ID 01_Milan]
In the Indian context, workers advocated for higher rates per order, increased order allotments, monitoring of unpaid labour time, reduction of excessive incentive-related conditions, and the elimination of subcontracting orders to third parties. As one respondent commented,
…since these third parties came to the market, the orders […] declined by almost 60 to 70 to 80 percent…when we joined in the beginning…around 2018-2019…at that time […] we used to cover around 40 to 50 orders…in a day…now we are not even able to cover even 10 to 15 orders…workers had to go on strike […] after the strike, there was a little improvement but then it has gone down again… [Transcript_ID 20_Guwahati]
Although the concerns triggering organised or formal collective resistance across both countries are similar, notable variations are observed in terms of methodological approaches and their outcomes. Despite the passionate wish to conduct mass strikes, these have reduced over time, although workers appear to be following a more organised process to launch strikes in the Italian context compared to the Indian counterpart. This partly reflected institutional requirements, as one worker noted:
to organise strikes here there needs to be proper paperwork…like the workers need to get permission from Questura…we need to draft a letter…informing them about the process… including the date, time and place the workers are willing to launch the strike…and upon approval we organise the strike… with police escorting the workers during the protest… [Transcript_ID 05_Milan]
The strikes in Milan and Bologna, often held in areas of public significance, strived to maximise prominence and public attention. By contrast, the location choices in India are usually centred around platform hubs or offices. Space matters, as protests in public areas attract media coverage, fostering broader discourse and highlighting worker demands on a larger scale, exerting pressure on platform management to address grievances and avoid the use of force to prevent public backlash. Even in India, when Premium ID workers organise strikes in affluent areas, it prompts quicker management responses without protracted negotiations due to fears of potential brand damage and customer dissatisfaction.
In the Powai zone…the Premium ID workers were able to increase their base rate from 0.39 euro [0.98 euro] to 0.45 euro [1.12 euros]…this is a well-planned strategy of the management…having less premium IDs among the entire workforce do not significantly impact profit levels…secondly, given that these workers hold strategic positions within the platform, management is more inclined to keep them satisfied to better serve their high-end clients… [Transcript_ID 28_Mumbai]
Furthermore, the leverage of collective resistance increases under three conditions: first, when the workforce is small, threatening operational efficiency and capacity; second, when platforms have no scope to re-route orders to third parties, limiting operational flexibility; and third, when workers organise mass strikes, as opposed to scattered or localised protests, disrupting operational continuity and hiking operational cost. However, massive labour force expansion over time has created multiple challenges for the workers to organise formal collective resistance. This includes restricted access to all workers, resulting in unaddressed concerns and queries; ineffective mobilisation of mass support through messaging apps like WhatsApp; and growing fragmented collective resistance across countries, leading to a multifaceted breakdown in the movement. The multi-faceted aspect is because groupings or clusters have developed among workers, sparking non- compliant and counter-productive resistance practices that cripple the overall collective resistance practices.
Informal collective resistance: protesting whenever and wherever workers want!
These organised mass movements have undergone significant changes, especially in the Indian context where workers have adopted a more sporadic and localised form restricted to specific geographical areas. In other words, the workers are indulging in geographically delineated protest initiatives, where when those in one region embark on a strike, workers in other areas refrain from concurrent engagement in such collaborative labour actions. As a respondent notes:
… recently in Andheri West, there was another strike where both Bike and Cycle IDs collaborated…we did get a call…that we should also strike in Andheri East…but then the riders in Andheri East did not have any problem at that time…the order flow was okay…so the riders in Andheri East did not join them…here things are localised… Transcript_ID 33_Mumbai]
The perplexing question confronting the workers revolves around understanding the factors influencing workers’ preferences for sporadic strikes as opposed to organised strikes, despite the issues confronting them being uniform across all geographic zones. Therefore, the process has become more informal or unorganised with novice workers hitting the streets with their demands without consulting their seniors or following a proper implementation plan. As a respondent shares,
I believe we should follow a proper channel and process…but you know these days it is like if someone is having some issue with the income…then he will suddenly come to the road and start a protest…but then these things are not working and will not make any difference…’ [Transcript_ID 22_Guwahati]
Although these zones do not establish formal leadership hierarchies, nonetheless, within each zone, certain workers garner a following, mostly based on their extensive experience within the domain or owing to their charismatic leadership attributes. There exists discernible tension among these chosen workers across the zones rooted in their convictions of possessing superior insights into the predicaments at hand, and their divergent approaches towards resolving these issues. As a respondent in India explains,
if you see in foreign countries…there is an understanding…people are educated and aware…they stand together…but here it is not like that…each worker thinks he is smarter than the other…he knows everything…this attitude makes it difficult to accept what the other workers are saying…this is why you will see so many workers fighting for the same reason…but in different ways…this does not help in uniting… [Transcript_ID 11_Mumbai]
These perspectives obstruct shared understanding and attainment of a harmonious consensus, thus allowing the management to use such gaps to their advantage. Hence, isolated strikes enable management to redeploy workers from non-striking zones to cover for striking co-workers, potentially causing tensions and confrontations among the workers, just as one participant noted:
[T]here are some workers who would be participating in these strikes whereas the others would be working happily thinking there is more work [laughs] so, how will it work? [laughs] the orders and the rates increase so, the main purpose to strike gets lost somewhere…this is one trick…to lure the greedy workers…to pull them on their side… [Transcript_ID 01_Milan]
Nonetheless, such acts are not common among the workers in the Italian context as the state with its regulation and policies defines the boundaries within which workers can act (Peck Reference Peck2001; Coe and Kelly Reference Coe and Kelly2002; Chin Reference Chin2003; McDowell and Christopherson Reference McDowell and Christopherson2009). In Italy, when workers plan to initiate a strike or protest, they must first organise themselves and formally notify the Questura (police station) of their intention to protest a particular platform, citing pertinent grievances. Upon police approval, the workers proceed with the strike, accompanied by police presence to oversee and ensure the orderly conduct of their protest actions. One worker explained,
before we organise a protest or a strike, we need to take prior permission from the police…if only they approve, we can organise a strike…we need to write an application stating the platform’s name and the issues we are facing…but then I have seen that police did support the workers a little…the police escort the riders in their rally… [Transcript_ID 05_Milan].
Furthermore, the biggest shortfall in such collective action, according to the assessments of seasoned workers, is the inherent limitation in comprehending the nuances of these actions. Such sporadic and unorganised means to engage in strikes have neither been able to achieve requisite level of worker participation needed to exert substantial influence on the management nor seek adequate management attention. As a respondent commented,
… if you want to do strike then you can go ahead but then I will not participate…I have also worked in a professional environment [MacD]…so I know some basic things…there is a difference between doing a thing professionally and to go and sit somewhere…it is an uncivilised and unreasonable act…it makes no sense… [Transcript_ID 32_Mumbai]
Indeed, the impetus behind selecting small-scale strikes over large-scale strikes is rooted in the conviction that including the entire labour force has not created substantial results in the past, hence, it wipes out even the smallest chance to get themselves heard and improve their conditions. Secondly, bigger strikes also attract more account termination as a response to the financial loss these platforms incur, so these workers are seeking to convince the management without significantly hurting their accumulation process. Thirdly, since these are more trial and error mechanisms, the workers exhibit notable reluctance to invest additional effort, time, and financial resources in persuading their peers to participate in the orchestration of more structured and formal strike. Hence, such impulsiveness has been attenuating the entire movement towards securing decent working conditions.
Informal individual resistance: non-confrontational oppositional acts to avoid attention
As these collective endeavours have not introduced substantial change in their working conditions, workers are inclined towards adopting more individualistic strategies (Scott Reference Scott1985; Ackroyd and Thompson Reference Ackroyd and Thompson1999; Katz Reference Katz2004) to express their discontentment against the platforms. Informal individual resistance encompasses spontaneous and personal responses to perceived injustices or poor working conditions that are not organised or formally sanctioned; such responses often take diverse covert forms that reflect the unique pressures and circumstances faced by workers in different contexts. One such technique, for example, involves picking up orders from the restaurant but not delivering them to the customer, thereby initiating multiple disruptions in the platform-restaurant-customer chain. As a respondent shares,
when there used to be some expensive orders from restaurants like KFC…the riders used to misuse them…like they used to put some fake issues like…there has been an accident…the food got spilled…it has gone bad…so through these things they used to get the order cancelled…so when it gets cancelled, the rider would take it home… [Transcript_ID 08_Mumbai]
Moreover, in response to platforms gradually redirecting orders to third parties, workers in India strategically register with these third parties to pick up orders but intentionally refrain from delivering them to customers. It serves multiple purposes: it undermines the platforms and third-party providers without jeopardising the workers’ positions with the platform; it tarnishes the reputation of third-party workers in the eyes of both platforms and customers; and it shifts attention back to in-house workers, albeit temporarily. As platforms find it challenging to locate or trace these workers within their databases, such actions often go unnoticed, and these workers are indifferent to potential account suspension by third parties. As one respondent noted,
… in fact, most orders have been misplaced due to anger among workers… some workers log in to Shadowfax, accept orders and then on reaching the customer’s location, he eats the order after clicking delivery…but then what will the workers do? do they have any option? we see these workers from third-parties coming and taking the orders…indeed these workers are getting more orders than us [Transcript_ID 03_Guwahati]
Furthermore, the workers are also leveraging technical gaps to adopt harsher measures, such as deliberately mishandling bulk orders when platforms refuse to agree to higher charges for delivering more expensive or heavier items to customers. Such strategies hurt the accumulation process by increasing operational costs while reducing operational efficiency, and reliability. Even when customers complain about spoilage, workers often deflect blame to management, citing their refusal to acknowledge bulk orders. Furthermore, platforms lack means to cross-check such acts, leaving workers unaccountable for such individual actions, as one worker demonstrated.
I applied for bulk charges for one order…but then the company was like “the order is worth 24 euros…you cannot apply for bulk”…though the order is worth 24 euros but then it is not fitting inside the bag and if anything goes wrong then it will be on me…but the company refused to pay…at that time I lost my cool Madam […] after going 2 kms…I took out the order and spilled the Malai over the paper box and took its photo…and then sent the photo to the company and re-applied for bulk [Transcript_ID 14_Mumbai]
Hence, these individual informal resistance practices serve as a strategic response to circumvent surveillance mechanisms and assert agency in their work arrangements. These acts express frustration or dissent against perceived unfair working conditions while avoiding direct confrontations that could lead to punitive measures. Moreover, these actions adapt to local contexts, allowing workers to tailor their strategies according to geographic and socio-economic conditions, thereby enhancing their resilience against platform control and fostering empowerment in challenging their work conditions. However, in the Italian context, workers seldom take such risks because of stricter enforcement protocols and monitoring systems that discourage such actions. Moreover, migrant workers, who constitute a considerable portion of the platform economy workforce in Italy, are particularly cautious. Hence, workers are more likely to seek redress through formal channels rather than risk their jobs and legal status, as one of the migrant workers noted:
… and see we are from a different country…I have seen some workers doing such things and getting their IDs cancelled but I do not prefer these things…not many Asian workers would prefer getting into it…because we have different threats with it…unlike working in our own countries, working here has different issues altogether…and on top of that if you get involved in these things then it becomes a mess… [Transcript_ID 06_Milan].
Structural conditioning: reconnecting agency to wider societal structures
Structural conditioning is crucial in shaping and delimiting individual and collective agency among workers (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010; Coe Reference Coe2012; Lund-Thomsen Reference Lund-Thomsen2013; Wickramasingha and Coe Reference Wickramasingha and Coe2022) and influencing their choices and decisions on these platforms. Given the significant structural differences between the two countries, it is essential to understand how similar accumulative pressures interact with diverse worker practices under different contexts. This section reflects on the varied political, economic, and social arrangements of both nations facilitating and impeding specific behavioural trajectories.
Labour agency within the framework of state authority and practices
The state’s role in shaping labour agency through establishing employer-employee relationships (Ong Reference Ong1991; McDowell and Christopherson Reference McDowell and Christopherson2009) has been challenging in the Italian context, given substantial ambiguities in rulings against platform employment practices. Approximately 80 per cent of Italian food delivery workers are engaged under contracts like Collaborazioni Coordinate E Continuative or Prestazioni Occassionali (Gabanelli and Querze 2018 cf. De Stefano and Aloisi Reference De Stefano and Aloisi2018; Recchia Reference Recchia2021), which increase legal ‘grey areas’ and reduce protections. In contrast, the non-interventionist stance adopted by the state in India, especially regarding unjust termination, unilateral rate changes, and harassment in collective activities, coupled with the classification of workers as self-employed contractors, enables companies to evade standard employment obligations. The inadequate provisions in the Code on Social Security perpetuate worker vulnerability, exacerbate labour market inequalities, and obstruct efforts to advocate for their rights and improvements in working conditions. One of the workers remarked that:
the government does not intervene in the matters of the private sector…it will not… despite working so hard we are not even able to earn a stable and decent income…see we might not be highly educated or aware but then we do understand certain things, right…the government needs to investigate these things [reference to unstable income and unreasonable account terminations] but then why will it do? It must survive in the market [Transcript_ID 28_Guwahati].
Nonetheless, since no such legal authorisation is pursued in India, such discrepancies embolden the platform to involve law enforcement, leveraging the ability to issue threats and press legal charges against the workers. Instilling such apprehension among the workers serves to disrupt the movement, leading to the evacuation of a significant number of workers from the premises. Furthermore, the workers in both Milan and Bologna assert that numerous labour advocates have been advocating on behalf of the riders, urging platforms to afford fundamental rights to the workforce.
[so that] around 23 advocates also tried to fight for the riders…so the companies at once agreed to give bonus to the workers…but then that also did not make any sense because it started giving bonus by reducing the rates…so in a way it is giving us back our own money in the form of bonuses…’ [Transcript_ID 19_Milan].
Unlike the Italian context, workers in India exhibit reluctance in approaching the courts because the legal proceedings in the country are not as expeditious and require exorbitant time and resources. Moreover, discrepancies in the current Data Regulation Act in India have created resentment among workers seeking legal recourse, fearing that it could expose their data to manipulation; thereby, enabling platforms to furnish alternative explanations for the termination of their IDs. Hence, there is an apprehension among the workers that these corporate behemoths can exploit any procedural lapse or proffer an unreasonable explanation, thereby further ensnaring the workers in potential financial liabilities. As one respondent shared:
… even if you go to any court and all to file a case against these people then they will trap us only…put up some false case and gone…so out of fear who will go there…’ [Transcript_ID 11_Mumbai].
Furthermore, as Lund-Thomsen (Reference Lund-Thomsen2013) has highlighted, examining worker agency necessitates a nuanced contextualisation within the framework of ‘local social relations’ and the prevailing conditions within the labour market. The labour market conditions as shown by Peck (Reference Peck1996) and others in both host and home countries, exert significant influence over choices, decisions, and actions among the workers (see e.g. Baglioni Reference Baglioni2018; Pattenden Reference Pattenden2016). Thus, amidst challenging labour market conditions, workers prioritise adaptive measures within the established framework, as opposed to challenging strategies, to improve their working conditions. As a respondent shares,
…but then if there is no work then what will a person do? people who have come from villages and have started living here…they need to earn something to look after their food and shelter expenses…there is not much option in these cities for them…and it is not possible for these people to stand against these companies…what will they do if their account gets closed [Transcript_ID 20_Mumbai].
The intricate interaction between resistance in relation to the broader political-economic context or the economic situation (Herod Reference Herod2001; Gough Reference Gough2003) also has a significant influence over the outcomes. For instance, the outcomes resulting from strikes conducted in the pre-COVID era with a smaller workforce exhibited more favourable results compared to the post-COVID phase. In addition to the reduced bargaining power arising from an increase in the workforce and limited alternative options, the outlook among the workers towards the platform is also changing. A worker remarked that:
pre-COVID the workers conducted strikes to bring about some change and all but then after COVID all these things have stopped…there are some people who think that there is no other job for them in Italy, so it is no point to get into such trouble…even if the working conditions are not right at the moment…the workers do not care much about these things… [Transcript_ID 04_Milan].
Political intervention diluting the actual concerns among workers
The interaction between political opportunities and social movements (McAdam Reference McAdam1986; Goldstone and Tilly Reference Goldstone, Tilly, Aminzade, Goldstone and McAdam2001; Meyer Reference Meyer2004; Tarrow Reference Tarrow2011) emphasises how institutional support, external allies, or changing electoral alignments facilitate or restrict collective actions. In cities like Mumbai, where political parties are more active in labour-related concerns, there is seen to be an undue interference in the workers’ activities. Political intervention in union activities can manifest in various forms, including direct involvement of political entities, party affiliations, or ideological alignments within the leadership structures of unions (Cini et al Reference Cini, Maccarrone and Tassinari2021; Cini and Goldmann Reference Cini and Goldmann2021; Atzeni 2021; Martin and Quick Reference Martin and Quick2020; Nowak Reference Nowak2021). However, such interventions may arise autonomously or be precipitated by workers petitioning relevant leaders for assistance in contesting platform policies. Although local political parties intervene in workers’ strikes to garner electoral support, however, after undisclosed negotiations, they often withdraw from the activities.
… the old workers launched a strike two to three months before the lockdown…in Chembur…after the strike, the company suspended all the workers who participated in the strike…some workers in Chembur were seeking help from this political party [MNS]…these people at first were enthusiastic…some restaurants were also made to quit these platforms… but nothing worked…and later we got to know that the company has settled its issue with the political party… [Transcript_ID 29_Mumbai].
The infiltration of political agendas into labour unions can distort the fundamental objectives, compromising the genuine representation of workers. Indeed, most workers in Guwahati and Mumbai claim that political interference distracts the focus from workers’ interests in pursuit of broader political objectives, potentially diluting the efficacy of the union as an advocate for labour rights. According to one worker:
union should behave like unions…these people in Mumbai…the political parties…these create unions…lead unions…unions should be meant to help workers…but then in our place, unions serve as a means to make money…big politicians come and seek to get involved in it and tell us that ‘it is our union and you all will be provided with these things from now on’…but then who gets those things? [Transcript_ID 14_Mumbai].
Indeed, political intervention can contribute to internal divisions within the workforce, as different factions align themselves with divergent political ideologies. Therefore, when workers from separate zones organise strikes under their respective political figures, it hinders the establishment of cohesive workers’ interests and instead dilutes their bargaining power. As a result, the actualisation of such strikes becomes untenable, and, in most cases, the introduction of external leadership poses a formidable obstacle for the other group attempting analogous actions. Moreover, although demonstrations commence with noble intentions, unwarranted external interventions have led peaceful protests into violent measures against the management teams.
… see the main thing is I do not want to get into any trouble…because these days people fight more and talk less…there are instances where things have escalated and people from the group end up vandalising the offices…we do not know who does that…but at the end, workers face the consequences…that is not the way to deal…’ [Transcript_ID 32_Mumbai].
The role of labour unions in supporting platform workers
Union positionalities assume an essential role in conditioning the agency among different worker groups and their abilities to establish spaces of resistance (Freeman and Medoff Reference Freeman and Medoff1979, Reference Freeman and Medoff1984; Cumbers et al Reference Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge2008; Bonomi et al Reference Bonomi, Gennaioli and Tabellini2021; Matzat and Schmeißer Reference Matzat and Schmeißer2022). Italian national trade unions like CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro) and Si-Cobas (Sindacato Intercategoriale Cobas Lavoratori Autorganizzati) have been fostering informed dialogue and concerted advocacy to negotiate improved remuneration, increased order allocations, and enhanced worker protections. Additionally, these unions also educate workers about their rights and benefits, including occasional government initiatives aimed at stabilising market conditions. Thus, these unions empower workers to actively participate in decisions affecting their work lives, providing the knowledge and resources to assert their rights and enhancing their collective bargaining power within the broader socio-economic context, as is apparent in the next comment.
the government recently announced that it will give a €200 as bonus to all the workers…like initially we did not know about this bonus but then the boys who are working in close collaboration with the CGIL informed us regarding it…so, we filled up a form and submitted to IT_1…the bonus was then included in our income… [Transcript_ID 04_Bologna].
However, despite these advantages, concealed implications arise when larger union bodies lack sufficient experience in navigating the complexities pertaining to diverse working arrangements. As an illustration, in a conflict involving IT_2 workers and the platform, CGIL’s intervention persuaded the platform to introduce a Free Log-in system, discontinuing the fixed working hour system and the practice of assigning orders based on ratings. This Free Log- led to an unprecedented surge in workers, including a significant influx of daily commuters from peripheral areas. As a result, the platforms experienced a three to fourfold increase in logged-in applications, leading to a precipitous decline in orders and income, an increase in unpaid and unproductive labour, a notable shift in the attitude among the restaurants and the customers towards the workers, and a surge in remote area pick-up and deliveries. As a respondent shares,
riders from far places come here to work…so, the previous workers who have been working in Milan and earning something like 70 to 80 euros per day…are now earning around 30 to 40 euros…due to such influx of foreign riders…I apologise for saying this but then it is overcrowded…all you can see even in these tourist places is riders…here and there [Transcript_ID 11_Milan].
On an individual basis, the union assisted workers with contract interpretation, addressed specific work-related concerns, and offered legal representation for workers pursuing action against platforms for unjust termination or suspension. The unions also assess cases and advise both local and migrant workers on pursuing legal action, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Legal recourse tends to be more prevalent among resident or long-term migrant workers due to the significant risks involved. As one worker asserted,
. ‘I went to Pakistan for some treatment…I took one month’s leave before going there…but then when I came back my contract [with IT_1] was terminated […] I went to all these big unions like CGIL…seeing the case, it will run for three to four years, and if I lose the case then I’ll be charged…so they advised me it is better to accept the compensation…something around 300 euros…and look for some other job…’ [Transcript_ID 27_Milan].
In India, emerging regional and sector-specific unions such as the All-India Gig Workers Union, Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers, and Telangana Gig and Platform Workers Union address the concerns of platform workers. However, in both the cities, there is a significant gap in organised labour representation for this workforce as no larger unions intervene. Thus, inadequate guidance and leadership impede the cultivation of shared understanding and equitable participation among workers in asserting their rights, whether through passive or latent engagement, limit networking with unions across diverse urban centres, constrain the acquisition of sufficient resources for effective mobilisation, and expose the process to political interference. As a respondent shares,
… we need qualified people in the union…I told you about these bigger unions…where you are more into imposing on the workers…not understanding them…at first the company rules over you…and then the union takes over to rule you…we do not want people who rule us…we want people who understands and solves our issues… [Transcript_ID 14_Mumbai].
Deconstructing platform labour agency: worker-centric factors influencing perceptions, interests, and decisions
‘…a worker is acting as the enemy for the other worker…whenever a worker has been killed; it has been due to another worker…it is the workers themselves who decrease their own value…who allows the third parties to decrease their worth…’
[Transcript_ID 01_Milan]
As Hastings and MacKinnon (Reference Hastings and MacKinnon2017, 105) state, workers’ ‘rationales and social backgrounds’ should be approached in understanding labour practices. Thus, keeping aside structural constraints, certain interest groups are not able to articulate their demands as it does not have the ‘conceptual resources and/or moral rationales’ (Thompson and Vincent Reference Thompson, Vincent, Thompson and Smith2010). Hence, with varied subjectivities and positionalities, workers may exhibit diverse agential potential, reflecting varied attitudes towards these resistance practices.
Borderlines in the workplace: how migration matters and shapes worker bonds
Migrant workers are regarded as active participants in the labour market, endeavouring to enhance their living conditions, which in turn assumes an essential role in shaping their labour market behaviour (Stark Reference Stark1991; Mitchell Reference Mitchell1996; Berntsen Reference Berntsen2016). Despite the labour force in Milan and Bologna having high mobility across platforms, due to the diversities in their migration motives, modalities, and interests, these workers are unable to outdo local power geometries. Hence, their participation is influenced by the experiences encountered in crossing borders with unstable and limited working options, combined with the exclusion encountered across contexts. The following quote highlights such problems:
… see we are living and working in a foreign land…since we are living here with a Permit…it is not possible to form union…it becomes riskier…either it might lead to positive result or it might backfire […] it will affect our livelihood…we can do it in Bangladesh because that is our birth place but then if we go about doing these things here…then it will be a problem… [Transcript_ID 05_Milan]
Moreover, the limited cohesion between migrant and local workers, particularly in IT_2 and IT_3 with a significantly skewed ratio of migrant-to-local workers, impedes their ability to unite towards shared objectives. This difference underscores the significant role that local workers assume in advocating or bargaining, as their greater integration within the nation’s political-economic system, local policies, and labour regulations provides them with a strategic advantage in labour negotiations.
they [local workers] also do not maintain any contact with the other riders…it is just that we greet each other in the area we meet and apart from that there is nothing…and if someone becomes a good friend then we exchange contact with each other…but nobody listens to anyone in this job…and everyone is into their own business…’ [Transcript_ID 07_Milan]
In Milan and Bologna, workers from countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, or Bangladesh often hesitate to engage in resistance or stronger reworking strategies compared to workers from Nigeria or Ghana. This is because migration, especially driven by political need, fundamentally undermines the negotiating leverage of workers upon entering foreign territories, thereby diminishing their ability to assert favourable terms and conditions. Indeed, the state’s regulation of individuals entering their territories as workers and the methods through which migrant workers are integrated exert a substantial influence on these workers’ ability to act (Chin Reference Chin2003; McDowell et al Reference McDowell, Batnitzky and Dyer2007; McDowell et al Reference McDowell, Batnitzky and Dyer2009; Rogaly Reference Rogaly2009). As one respondent said:
there are these Italian people who are a little vocal about these issues…these people can even work in collaboration with the unions to put forward their concerns…but our people cannot…if 100 people are protesting…I doubt even one worker will be from our Asian countries […] our people do not want to get into such mess…’ [Transcript_ID 21_Bologna].
Moreover, it could be attributed to, firstly, their higher levels of boldness and assertiveness enabling them to raise their voices without fearing other reprisals stemming from owning valid IDs and proper documentation; secondly, having a clear ideological stance enables these workers to align their perspectives, interests, and actions, and it is uncommon for them to abandon their groups during strikes or protests; and thirdly, unlike Asian workers, most workers from these countries do not see the platforms as their last resort. One worker argued,
our Asian workers prefer to stay out of these things…they would rather prefer someone else taking the initiative and putting forward the issues that we face at work… like if I tell one worker not to go to work today then he would tell me “I will go, I have the freedom to go to work…nobody can stop me’’…so, in that case, it becomes difficult to convince our people… [Transcript_ID 13_Bologna]
The environments encompassing both the workplaces and residential areas, along with the resources provided to facilitate their mobilisation, can exert significant influence on agency among workers (Miller, Reference Miller1991; Hudson Reference Hudson2001). Thus, migrants sharing accommodation with other co-workers are seen to exert stronger agential practices because social relations within shared territories foster stronger social ties that build confidence and attachment among co-workers. However, regular commuters from peripheral areas have limited interaction time with their co-workers and, being preoccupied with meeting targets, possess distinct outlook towards collective action.
… there are pockets…where you will find 4 to 5 workers sharing the same room […] after work…we spend time cooking…talking…talking about our work…families…what can be done to make things better…we understand each other […] yes, if one worker agrees to participate in the strike, the others does the same…you see…we are living together…so we need to support each other…this thing is strong here … [Transcript_ID 08_Guwahati]
Migration processes are claimed to encompass ‘complex combinations of individual and household decisions within increasingly institutionalised social networks’ (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010: 7) that can significantly influence their agential practices. As an illustration, the obligation to lend financial support to one’s family back home is also observed to affect the decisions and actions among migrant workers in both the Italian and Indian contexts,
… and moreover some people are running their families based on the income that they get working here…so when a family is dependent on this income, that effects his participation in these strikes…the worker has to see how much they are earning and is it sufficient to meet their expenses in Italy and also send back a specific amount to their families … [Transcript_ID 10_Bologna]
Moreover, as the cause behind migration does matter in defining one’s agency (Wills et al Reference Wills, May, Datta, Evans, Herbert and McIlwaine2009), the workers migrating for political reasons hesitate more to participate in resistance strategies because the workers fear deportation or legal repercussions while participating in strikes and protests. However, workers migrating for economic reasons might have more tangible and immediate motivation to participate, as the working conditions have a direct influence over their livelihoods and financial gains, as noted by this worker.
…we were protesting in Duomo…I don’t know what happened […] but the police came and started asking for their permits…and started breaking it into pieces […] we were standing there in one corner…afraid to even utter one word […] you would not want to unnecessarily mess up with the system […] particularly, when the worker does not have proper documents…they have a fear that they will be thrown out of the companies and might be even deported … [Transcript_ID 21_Milan]
Furthermore, migrant workers often compare the working conditions in their home country (Merton Reference Merton1968; Piore Reference Piore1979), a perspective that propels them to accept the inferior working conditions in the host countries despite knowing the precarious nature of employment. Hence, there is an inclination to accept lesser working conditions as it uses workers in their home countries as reference groups while analysing the need to engage in collective resistance strategies.
… we are mostly benefitting because in our currency it amounts to a lot…so, you like it or not…you are earning more than what you would earn back home…so people ignore strikes to continue working…because ultimately it is helping you cover your costs…live in a foreign land…and also support your families back home … [Transcript_ID 10_Bologna]
Growing labour force, diminishing shared understanding: socio-economic variations fuelling inconsistent and problematic acts among co-workers
The influx of individuals with diverse perceptions, interests, and consciousness undermines shared understanding among workers (Archer Reference Archer2000; Sayer Reference Sayer2000; Ackroyd Reference Ackroyd and Kowlowski2010; Elder-Vass Reference Elder-Vass2010; Coe Reference Coe2012) when the market becomes oversaturated with workers, far exceeding demand. Moreover, the practice of maintaining distinct zones and worker categories further hinders channelling the diverse interests towards organised collective resistance. Thus, variations within and between zones create divisions, fostering reluctance to collaborate in strikes or refrain from logging into the platforms; consequently, when one zone strikes, workers from another are brought in to cover, often motivated by the prospect of increased earnings, as a respondent shares,
I am not working alone here…where 2.5 to 3 lakh workers are involved…one cannot stop the company from these practices alone…if 10 or 100…okay 200 workers also stop working and sit at home…will the company care? the company will not care…nothing matters…because the other 2 to 3 lakh workers are working … [Transcript_ID 04_Mumbai]
As the labour force expands, the diverse socio-economic backgrounds of the workers significantly influence their perceptions, choices, and decisions regarding collective resistance. This does not signify that individuals who abstain from participating in these activities align with bourgeois perspectives or remain indifferent to the broader issues affecting all workers. Even when a worker comprehends and shares common concerns, they may be unable to make certain decisions because of their economic or social constraints.
… we want to go there and raise our concern…but going into strike means losing out a day’s earning…we are already struggling to meet our day-to-day expenses…there are some workers who are burdened with loans…it is like every day counts for us…if our background or family conditions would have been good na Madam…then we would have done many things…but after this COVID, our lives have become tougher … [Transcript_ID 22_Mumbai]
Furthermore, religion in India wields considerable influence over collective actions as the workplace and non-workplace ties among Muslim workers, resulting from strong communal bonds, often manifest into political strategies implemented through coalitions with other social networks (Wright, Reference Wright1999; Wills Reference Wills2001). These workers often establish their own communities, bringing in relatives and friends from their villages. Thus, as designated ‘leaders’, they aid in various processes such as documentation and accommodation, or providing guidance through practical demonstrations during deliveries. These existing ties provide an economic and social cushion for dependent workers, who feel compelled to follow their ‘leaders’ even during collective actions. As one respondent shares,
I have seen this […] there is a strong unity among the Muslim workers […] if one worker goes to his village then he brings around four more workers with him […] when we initiate a discussion over a topic, it seems that these people have already discussed about these things before…strange! their uneducated people will also know about things that we don’t know… [Transcript_ID 22_Guwahati]
Furthermore, as Pastor (Reference Pastor2002) states, individuals assume multiple subject positions, both within and outside the workplace, which influence their decision to assert agency. The workers in India also encounter differences based on disparities between longstanding and recent workers. The experienced workers face substantial challenges in explaining exploitative capitalist practices to newer platform workers, as the latter often readily adapt to the frequent structural changes imposed by the platforms. Despite using extensive means to explain the consequences of their submissiveness, like showing the indirect impact of accepting changes in multi-order policies, new workers remain hesitant to question the platform or advocate for their rights. Thus,
the old workers in the group did not do such things…meaning they raised their voice and then the problem was solved in one or two days…but then these new workers do as the company tells them…and then these practices are then implemented across all the workers… [Transcript_ID 08_Mumbai]
Moreover, the part-timers exhibit a distinct orientation towards resistance strategies and often opt for working in isolation, avoiding extensive involvement with Regular ID workers and their activities. The temporality of gains emerges as a significant factor in shaping agency (Coe and Jordhus-Lier Reference Coe and Jordhus-Lier2010), wherein workers with alternative income sources or students working on part-time basis exhibit less interest in long-term benefits. This is because part-timers often have supplementary income sources, and with plans to relocate, these workers hesitate to engage in activities that might threaten their current position on these platforms. One respondent noted:
I feel these things are for those who are working on full-time basis or for long period of time…I mean this is their right…to do strike or increase their salaries or facilities…but personally I am not going to engage myself in these issues because it would be a kind of distraction for me…I am trying to concentrate more on my university and my thesis… [Transcript_ID 08_Bologna]
Furthermore, workers struggle to trust their co-workers who initiate discussions about forming unions or organising strikes, as these individuals are often seen to continue working when others engage in full-fledged strikes. Such inconsistent acts undermine trust and bonding between workers, making collective actions challenging. Nonetheless, the non-participating workers often have diverse assertions to support their behaviour, including scepticism about the effectiveness of strikes due to past outcomes, financial burdens from abstaining, contentment with current platform conditions amidst a challenging labour market, and the minimal financial impact on platforms using third-party delivery services during strikes. For example, one respondent commented
there have been some strikes but then it did not prove to be beneficial…so that is why the workers hesitate to strike…if we strike…the orders are passed on to Rapido, Shadowfax and some other third parties…if all the orders are passed then what is the use of strike? [Transcript_ID 03_Guwahati]
Unwarranted reliance on app-switching and online mobilisation: diverse positionalities breeding individualism and conflicting interests
App-switching is a practice where workers switch between multiple applications to maximise earnings, especially during lean seasons, and use it as a backup in case their accounts are blocked or terminated on one platform. Such diversification of income streams fosters significant detachment in the long run, hindering participation in collective actions as it reduces the compulsion for workers to deeply engage in such activities, while also challenging their ability to form strong affiliations with any single platform, akin to part-time workers’ experiences. Indeed, it is used as an escape route during strike in one platform, where the worker switches application to continue working on the other platform. Thus, it enables them to disengage from collective actions while avoiding direct opposition to their co-workers. This was evident in comments such as,
how do I manage a family with 1100 euros? […] I have IDs with Uber and IT_3 also…so whenever I get time I switch on these applications and start working […] it also helps when workers go for strike…I do not want to ruin my relationship with my colleagues…so, I do not go to work in IT_1…but I log-in to other applications and continue working… [Transcript_ID 05_Bologna]
Moreover, it presents a dilemma where associating oneself with multiple applications is akin to creating multiple identities that offer more choices and decisions for workers but restrict their engagement in collective strategies. The workers working in one platform resist devaluing their efforts; for instance, while some workers on platforms like IT_2 accept orders at rates significantly below the market average, others prefer to cancel such orders until the platform offers a reasonable rate. As a respondent shares,
…most of the time I am not satisfied with the rates…and when I do not like the rate, I do not accept the order…but the moment I cancel the order…if it is assigned to a another worker who is standing or waiting near me…he will accept it immediately…so, there will be no effect of my cancellation on the overall rate…it is the worker who decreases his own value [Transcript_ID 01_Milan]
In addition to the aforementioned factors, app-switching practices have facilitated a reluctance to initiate coordinated strikes or protests, despite their potential to provide workers with knowledge and experience across multiple platforms. A unified collective action across all platforms might exert substantial pressure on platforms, who are on the lookout for circumventing regulations, as well as the workers less inclined to participate. Moreover, mass participation can extend greater assurance to the workers as platforms cannot go for mass terminations, unlike the unilateral changes it implements during small-scale strikes. As a respondent states,
…we need to support each other…maybe if we come together and we all are serious about it, then maybe there can be some change…all riders are riders…it should not make a difference whether he’s working in Uber or IT_2…we have to be together…if IT_2 workers are protesting then IT_1 workers should help them […] but you see in Milan the workers are not so much united…’ [Transcript_ID 24_Milan]
Furthermore, with the social and technical forms of organising becoming entwined, workers are becoming more conscious regarding their conditions (Maffie Reference Maffie2020; Tassinari and Maccarrone Reference Tassinari and Maccarrone2020; Sharma Reference Sharma2021). For instance, WhatsApp groups serve as a common means to keep workers informed about recent changes, current problems, and even the whereabouts of workers when they are made to travel to remote location. However, using online means is claimed to have different implications: creating awareness on one hand and reducing cohesion among the workers, on the other. As one respondent noted,
there is a difference between the unity in WhatsApp and what you see in face-to-face meeting…suppose the workers who meet near Mac D…if workers discuss and decide that since the company is paying us less so we will not go to work tomorrow…then the rider explains that if we oblige now then, the company will do it again…we understand and we do not log in […] if some random person in the WhatsApp group asks us to do the same thing…can we do it? [Transcript_ID 03_Mumbai]
The impersonal nature of online communication hinders cohesive action among workers, as it impedes understanding of strike rationale, fails to build trust amid escalating conflictual practices among co-workers, leads to disengagement due to unproductive discussions, and dilutes focus due to diverse interests, resulting in fragmented efforts instead of a unified movement. For example, one respondent explained,
…there is one group in Facebook…something called Deliverance Milano…so, there workers can discuss about the decreasing rates compared to their previous rates…then the workers discuss about their difficulties and questions related to income or orders or even the application…but then it is just discussion…from that nothing comes up… [Transcript_ID 06_Milan]
Furthermore, there can be concerns about surveillance and data privacy wherein discussions and plans for collective action can be monitored by platform management, leading to potential repercussions for workers. As a respondent shares,
… it was almost two years after joining, I got to know that there is a group for IT_2 workers…but then someone from the office joined that group as a worker…the accounts of all the workers who were members of the group…were blocked…their ID was closed…so not all worker can come out and discuss their issues freely… [Transcript_ID 01_Milan]
Conclusion
This article provides new insights into the scholarly and policy literature, comparing collective and individual resistance strategies among online food delivery workers in India and Italy. It identifies oppositional acts (Hauge and Fold Reference Hauge and Fold2016) among workers aimed at challenging domination and control mechanisms (Katz Reference Katz2004; Hollander and Einwohner Reference Hollander and Einwohner2004; Sparke Reference Sparke2008; Warren Reference Warren2014; Gotehus Reference Gotehus2021). These are classified into three categories: formal collective resistance, informal collective resistance, and informal individual resistance. The article illustrates how resistance strategies encompass both confrontational and non-confrontational practices (Scott Reference Scott1985; Ackroyd and Thompson Reference Ackroyd and Thompson1999), intersecting with diverse power dynamics across contexts and leading to heterogeneous forms (Johansson and Vinthagen Reference Johansson and Vinthagen2015). These acts are targeted to hurt the accumulation process by affecting their operational capacity, efficiency, cost, flexibility, and reliability, compelling platforms to address workers’ grievances.
Although resistance practices at first involved large-scale strikes and protests in both countries, in India, these practices have fragmented as the platform labour force has expanded, diminishing their effectiveness. This shift has led to sporadic and localised informal resistance, whereas workers in Italy maintain organised strike processes with higher labour force engagement, significant union guidance, and state protection. Furthermore, workers in India are resorting to individual resistance tactics that are aggressive but non-confrontational to challenge work arrangements, while Italian workers refrain from such disruptive behaviour due to strict monitoring and enforcement protocols. Moreover, the legal and social framework in Italy offers robust protection and support mechanisms, providing workers with formal channels to seek redressal without risking their jobs and legal status in foreign lands.
The structural conditions exert substantial influence over workers’ activities. Within the context of state power and practices (Peck Reference Peck2001; Coe and Kelly Reference Coe and Kelly2002; Chin Reference Chin2003; McDowell and Christopherson Reference McDowell and Christopherson2009), the indeterminate legal status and restricted access to welfare provisions significantly weaken workers’ bargaining positions and impede their access to legal recourse. The Indian regulatory regime, unlike Italy, adopts an absolute non-interventionist stance. It exerts no control over working arrangements or social welfare benefits for workers, provides no support for legal recourse, and lacks established guidelines for collective action. Furthermore, the intervention of labour unions in the Italian context (Cini et al Reference Cini, Maccarrone and Tassinari2021; Atzeni and Cini Reference Atzeni and Cini2023) lends support to shaping labour actions and their engagement in collective resistance activities.
The active support for both collective and individual actions enables workers in the Italian context to engage in formal collective activities and pursue legal recourse. In contrast, the lack of such support in India pushes workers towards informal collective actions and resilience practices to improve their conditions. Moreover, in India, the involvement of local political parties (McAdam Reference McAdam1986; Goldstone and Tilly Reference Goldstone, Tilly, Aminzade, Goldstone and McAdam2001; Meyer Reference Meyer2004; Tarrow Reference Tarrow2011) undermines collective action, fostering a shift towards reworking and resilience practices. In contrast, Italian unions maintain ideological independence and a more supportive environment for collective action. These differences, along with ideological disparities among workers, contribute to growing individualism within platform work. While a unified struggle remains challenging due to workplace politics and structural constraints, it is not entirely unfeasible.
This research also explains how alongside the structural pressures, the lateral relation (Sayer Reference Sayer2000; Ackroyd Reference Ackroyd and Kowlowski2010) within the workplace assumes importance in influencing the strategies workers adopt to express their grievances. These factors, including migration status, socio-economic conditions, and technological competence, have been observed to exert substantial influence on workers’ positions, identities, and roles (Archer Reference Archer2000; Elder-Vass; Reference Elder-Vass2010; Coe Reference Coe2012; Hauge and Fold Reference Hauge and Fold2016; Jordhus-Lier and Coe Reference Jordhus-Lier and Coe2023), thus shaping their interests, choices, and decision-making. In India, worker differences stem from conflicting interests, reluctance to cooperate due to religious or regional disparities, increased competition from a labour demand-supply gap, and challenges in achieving shared understanding due to diverse socio-economic backgrounds. Despite being geographically and culturally diverse, workers in Milan and Bologna show a greater inclination towards organised collective resistance. In Italy, differences in resistance strategies arise from structural barriers and an unwillingness to cooperate, whereas in India, it is more a matter of choice.
Hence, adopting diverse resistance strategies reflects impulsive behaviour that diminishes shared understanding, breeds resentment and mistrust, and fosters fear and suspicion, especially when some workers strike while others continue working. This divergence complicates communication and coordination, essential components for effective resistance that require a high degree of organisation and consensus. Furthermore, inconsistent resistance strategies reflect varying levels of commitment, leading to perceptions of inequity and reduced mutual support within the workforce. Divergent objectives cause conflicts over priorities and methods, exacerbating divisions and hindering the development of a cohesive movement, thereby weakening the overall strength and effectiveness of collective actions. This fragmentation minimises financial losses and operational disruptions that a unified strike might entail and enables platforms to negotiate from a position of strength, imposing terms favourable to their interests or implementing changes or policies unfavourable to workers.
Hence, given the multifaceted nature of resistance practices, influenced by diverse political, economic and social arrangements, there is a need for context-specific approaches to examine their forms, causes, and implications. Future research should investigate interaction patterns, influence, and information flow among workers to uncover the mechanisms shaping their relationships. Cross-cultural studies are essential to explore how cultural norms, values, and social contexts affect relationships among platform workers, comparing dynamics across different contexts. Additionally, longitudinal studies should track the evolution of co-worker relationships over time, examining how they develop, change, or deteriorate in response to changes in platform policies, market conditions, or individual experiences.
While this paper does not delve deeply into race, caste, or religion, these factors are significant in shaping platform workers’ experiences and warrant further investigation. Future research could explore how these socio-cultural dimensions intersect with labour dynamics, influencing agency, vulnerabilities, and resistance strategies in platform work.
Acknowledgements
I extend my sincere gratitude to my doctoral supervisor, Professor Roberto Pedersini, for his support and guidance throughout the research process. I am also grateful to Professor Lorenzo Cini for his thoughtful suggestions and detailed comments during the thesis review, which helped sharpen the theoretical framing and streamline the arguments. I further appreciate Professor Premilla D’Cruz, Professor Ernesto Noronha, and Professor Martin Krzywdzinski for their insightful feedback, which has been instrumental in enhancing the quality of this research.
Funding statement
This research was undertaken as part of a doctoral thesis funded through a scholarship from the Università degli Studi di Milano.
Padmini Sharma is a Research Associate at Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. She holds a Ph.D. in Economic Sociology and Labour Studies (2023) from Università degli Studi di Milano. Her research focuses on the impact of digital technologies on work, particularly within digital platforms. She has contributed to the field through research on work and labour relations in the gig economy, logistics, and civil society organisations. Her work has been published in reputable outlets such as Economic and Industrial Democracy, Work Organisation, Labour & Globalisation, Management and Labour Studies, and the International Journal of Rural Management.
