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Why so complex? Emotional mediation of revenge, forgiveness, and reconciliation
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2012
Abstract
Humans have the cognitive abilities to implement the revenge and forgiveness systems hypothesized by McCullough et al., but the evidence suggests that simpler processes may underlie most revenge cases in humans and other animals. The mediating role of emotions can be at the basis of the flexibility needed in the hypothesized systems and the associated assessment of social relationships.
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References
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In this target article McCullough et al. present a fascinating view on revenge, forgiveness, and reconciliation. Whereas the existence of forgiveness in nonhuman animals may be controversial (and difficult to demonstrate), there is compelling evidence for revenge and reconciliation. In addition, the key function of revenge in imposing a retaliatory cost on aggressors has already been proposed for macaques (Aureli et al. Reference Aureli, Cozzolino, Cordischi and Scucchi1992; cf. Clutton-Brock & Parker Reference Clutton-Brock and Parker1995). Thus, it seems that humans share both the form and function of revenge with other animals. Why then do McCullough et al. hypothesize that humans have evolved a cognitive system that implements the deterrence strategy, which they label a revenge system? Are McCullough et al. implying that animals, which show similar revenge patterns to those of humans, have the same cognitive revenge system? If so, humans did not evolve it but have adapted it from what a common ancestor already had in place. However, McCullough et al. are more likely implying that humans have evolved a unique cognitive system for revenge that is too complex for other animal species.
The revenge system presented in the target article is indeed complex. Whereas humans certainly have the cognitive abilities to implement such a system, is it really necessary to explain the majority of cases of revenge perpetrated by human beings? Couldn't a simpler mechanism based on emotional mediation be at the core of the patterns of revenge that have been reported for humans and other animals? There has been growing attention to the mediating role of emotions in humans (Frijda Reference Frijda1986; Panksepp Reference Panksepp, Gainotti and Caltagirone1989; Rolls Reference Rolls and Gazzaniga1995) and other animals (Aureli & Schaffner Reference Aureli and Schaffner2002; Aureli & Whiten Reference Aureli, Whiten and Maestripieri2003; Crook Reference Crook, Standen and Foley1989; Lott Reference Lott1991; Owren & Rendall Reference Owren and Rendall1997; Pryce Reference Pryce1996). An important function of emotions is motivating organisms to act (LeDoux Reference LeDoux1996; Rolls Reference Rolls1990). In this respect, emotions interface between sensory inputs and motor outputs in a way that allows the individual to take a particular motivational stance (Aureli & Whiten Reference Aureli, Whiten and Maestripieri2003; cf. Tooby & Cosmides' [1990b] system of coordination), which then constrains its behavior for an appropriate amount of time (e.g., a longish period in the case of fear caused by sighting a snake; cf. Damasio Reference Damasio1994; Johnson-Laird & Oatley Reference Johnson-Laird and Oatley1992).
The concept of relationship value is central to the forgiveness system hypothesized in the target article and to reconciliation between former opponents, as acknowledged by the authors. However, the expected value of social relationships does not need complex computation about the future. Most of our decisions are not taken based on improbable knowledge of the future, but are guided by probabilistic estimates based on past experience (Tooby & Cosmides Reference Tooby and Cosmides1990b). This is especially true for social intercourse as current behavior is affected, entirely or in part, by the individual's memory of past interactions (Aureli et al., in press; Hinde Reference Hinde1979; Seyfarth & Cheney Reference Seyfarth and Cheney2012). The assessment of social relationships requires bookkeeping of the various interactions with the partner, computation of their relative frequencies, and conversion of their quality and associated information into a common currency. Such an assessment seems to be complex. However, emotions can play a critical role.
Emotional mediation has already been suggested to be at the basis of the assessment of social relationships (Aureli & Schaffner Reference Aureli and Schaffner2002). The emotional experience of an individual is certainly affected by the frequency and quality of previous interactions with group members (see Aureli & Schino [Reference Aureli, Schino, Thierry, Singh and Kaumanns2004] for a review). Furthermore, emotional states may express a crucial integration of the information contained in the various interactions between two partners and may change over time depending on the interactions exchanged. The emotional experience can then be functionally equivalent to the aforementioned processes of bookkeeping, computation, and conversion needed for relationship assessment (Aureli & Schaffner Reference Aureli and Schaffner2002). The resulting emotional experience is partner-dependent. Thus, emotional differences can be at the core of the observed variation in social interactions reflecting the variation in relationship quality across partners.
Biological systems do not emerge ex novo as elegant solutions, but develop from pre-existing structures and therefore are constrained by their evolutionary past. Humans have the abilities for complex computations as required by the proposed revenge and forgiveness systems, but they usually rely on evolutionarily older systems. Quick and accurate decision-making is based on the exploitation of how information is structured in the social environment mediated by emotions (Gigerenzer et al. Reference Gigerenzer and Todd1999). Similarly, emotions can serve as somatic markers that allow rapidly rejecting or endorsing certain options based on the reactivation of emotional states associated with previous experiences and permitting the individual to efficiently make a decision (Damasio Reference Damasio1994; Reference Damasio1996).
When revenge spreads from the two opponents to family members, as in mafia vendettas, it seems more cognitively demanding because the individuals involved need to know about the relationships of others and the degree of similarity with their own relationships. Such family based revenge has already been reported in monkeys (Aureli et al. Reference Aureli, Cozzolino, Cordischi and Scucchi1992; Judge Reference Judge1982; Seyfarth & Cheney, in press). This suggests that even the cognitive processes underlying vendettas are not unique to human beings.