A Hesitant Israeli-American Alliance

The June 1967 War was the culmination of tensions between Israel and Arab neighboring countries, that peaked in May 1967 when Egypt moved substantial armed forces into the Sinai, demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations peacekeeping force, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, while the Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser made public threats to destroy Israel. On June 5, 1967, Israel attacked and destroyed the Egyptian air force. On the following days, fighting took place between Israel and neighboring countries, on the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian fronts. The 1967 War ended within 6 days, and on June 10, all sides agreed to a ceasefire. By that time, Israel had occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. As a result, more than 1,000,000 Palestinian Arabs came under Israeli rule.Footnote ¹⁰

Following the 1967 War, Israel's potential as a force that could assist the United States in its quest to limit Soviet influence in the Middle East grew clearer.Footnote ¹¹ Although Israel's potential as a strategic asset for the United States was becoming more evident, the United States was reluctant to allow a newly established cooperation with Israel to hamper its ties with Arab countries. The United States was not alone in its apprehension; Israel was also reluctant to trust the United States with issues concerning its national security. The June conflict and the threat that an armed conflict in the Middle East could deteriorate into a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, made the two countries re-evaluate their ties.Footnote ¹²

Although the official American stand regarding the June conflict spoke of neutrality, as cited in President Lyndon B. Johnson's May 23, 1967 speech,Footnote ¹³ sources reflect that behind the scenes, the Americans were holding their breath lest Israel lose. In retrospect, speaking about a meeting held on June 5, by President Johnson and his close advisers, in the White House cabinet room, McGeorge Bundy, Executive Secretary of the Special Committee of the National Security Council (NSC), recalled that the main concern was “the awful shape we would be in if the Israelis were losing.” He added that “when, in the course of that day, it became apparent that the Israeli Air Force had won, the entire atmosphere of the problem changed.”Footnote ¹⁴ An Israeli defeat would have placed the United States in an unfortunate situation, in which it would have to decide whether to live up to its 1957 commitment that the Straits of Tiran were an international waterway.Footnote ¹⁵ The United States was heavily committed in Vietnam, and, therefore, its initial effort was to elicit Soviet and international cooperation and to contain the Middle East conflict.Footnote ¹⁶

In retrospect, the events of 1967 were the opening of a decade in which the Israeli–Arab conflict would become highly critical to American foreign policy.Footnote ¹⁷ That does not imply that the Israeli–American alliance that emerged early in June 1967, was not fraught with hesitation and reluctance on both sides. As early as June 5, President Johnson instructed the State Department to “look into the question of what we do if the Israelis ask us for spare parts or resupply of arms during coming days.”Footnote ¹⁸ A memorandum dated June 8, sent within the secretary of defense's office, pointed to a number of difficulties that close Israeli–American cooperation at that point might cause. The United States was apprehensive that in the case of a protracted period of political inconclusiveness, during which Israeli armed forces would hold their ground, the United States would be under pressure to supply Israel with economic aid and military supplies; that supplying arms to Israel would adversely affect its relations with friendly and neutral Arab states; and, to top it off, that relations with the Soviet Union would deteriorate.Footnote ¹⁹

The Soviet Union was actually a major player in the crystallizing of Israel–United States relations at that juncture. Throughout the war, the “hot line” was operational, and communications testify to the superpowers' deep involvement in the crisis—the Soviet Union maneuvered to put the United States behind Israel, whereas the Soviets backed the Arabs—and how close the crisis was to becoming an open clash between them. The Soviets sent the first message on June 5. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara alerted President Johnson to the Moscow hot-line being operated and that “allegedly Kosygin is at the other end and wants to know if you are in the room.”Footnote ²⁰ In his first message, the Soviet premier already strove to tie the United States to Israel, asking that the United States government influence the Israeli government to cease hostilities “since you have all opportunities of doing so.”Footnote ²¹

Further hot-line communications between Alexei N. Kosygin and Johnson during the 1967 War show that whereas the Americans attempted to maintain a measure of neutrality, the Soviets did not hesitate to threaten that they would intervene on behalf of the Arab countries. The most alarming message arrived on June 10. Kosygin proposed that both the Soviets and the Americans demand that Israel unconditionally cease military action in the next few hours. Kosygin did not spare the Americans the gravity of the situation in Soviet eyes, saying that “A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, to adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these actions may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe.” He then threatened that if the demand was not met, necessary actions would be applied, including military actions.Footnote ²²

The Americans were dumbstruck by the Soviet threat to use force. According to CIA Director Richard Helms's recollections of events, Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson double-checked the Soviet text to be sure the word “military” was indeed correctly translated and that the Soviets were in fact threatening to use military means if they deemed them necessary. McNamara suggested that the Sixth Fleet sail towards the Eastern Mediterranean. His idea met with approval, even though Helms pointed out that Soviet submarines were monitoring the fleet's operations and would immediately report such a change in course to Moscow.Footnote ²³ The orders given to the Sixth Fleet made it clear that the move had a precautionary character only, and came in reaction to the Soviet Union's declaration of the possible use of military force against Israel. It did state that necessary preparatory measures should, however, be taken.Footnote ²⁴ After the fact, Ambassador Thompson summed matters up by stating that “June 10 was a time of great concern and utmost gravity.”Footnote ²⁵

Arthur Goldberg's report about the Security Council meeting held on June 10 supported Thompson's statement. To begin with, the Soviet representative Arkady N. Shevchenko approached his American counterpart, Richard F. Pedersen, and demanded that the United States take “vigorous measures” to stop the Israelis in Syria. He threatened that if the fighting did not stop, the situation might evolve into a Soviet–American confrontation “undesired by either.” After announcing the severing of diplomatic relations with Israel, the Soviet representative added that “if Damascus were taken by Israelis the USSR would have to respond.”Footnote ²⁶ This Soviet threat led to massive American pressure on Israel to halt its advance into Syria. As Abba Eban described it in his autobiography, “a stage was reached at which Soviet threats became so concrete that the United States was thrown into a global alarm.” He then wrote that President Johnson's urgent request that the Israelis immediately cease fire was conveyed through Goldberg, and that “American representatives were openly hinting to us that Soviet intervention no longer seemed inconceivable.”Footnote ²⁷ Helms, too, described how Nicholas Katzenbach, Under-Secretary of State, left the meeting President Johnson held with his close advisers on June 10, following the Soviet threat to take military steps, “to call in the Israeli Ambassador to put pressure on Israel to accept a ceasefire.” Helms described that “conversation during the first couple of hours was in the lowest voices he had ever heard in a meeting of that kind. The atmosphere was tense. As the morning wore on, everyone relaxed a bit as it became clear that the fighting was petering out.”Footnote ²⁸

Clearly, the United States was deeply concerned about the Soviet threats and intentions. At the same time, it was also aware that the Soviets were interested in polarization of the situation in the Middle East. A memorandum sent a few days earlier, on June 8, from Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to McNamara, suggests as much. Hoopes wrote that although the United States was apprehensive about worsening relations with the Soviet Union, it was aware that the Soviets themselves were interested in “putting the US behind Israel and the USSR behind the Arab world.”Footnote ²⁹ Still, it was understood that if the Soviets continued supplying arms to the United Arab Republic, and perhaps to Syria and Iraq as well, the United States would find it difficult to avoid becoming a major military supplier to Israel, and more closely identified with its interests.Footnote ³⁰ In other words, the United States found itself assuming the role of the superpower backing Israel, against its perception of its overall interests in the Middle East and, to an extent, as a result of Soviet manipulations.Footnote ³¹

As mentioned, one aspect of such forced identification with Israel that the Americans were worried about was that it would cause the United States to lose support among Arab countries. Reports that rumors of American support for Israel had spread among Arab countries were already received during the early days of the war.Footnote ³² Specifically, and of relevance to the Jerusalem issue, the Americans were apprehensive about losing Jordan to the Soviet Union. As early as June 6, Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a telegram instructing that the highest echelons of the Israeli government must be persuaded to reduce attacks against Jerusalem, and take steps toward reaching a ceasefire with Jordan. This was done after King Hussein advised the American Embassy in Jordan that a cessation of hostilities was urgently needed, because his nation had no offensive capabilities. King Hussein added that fighting in Jerusalem was endangering the holy places and that his army was being destroyed.Footnote ³³ A June 12 NSC memorandum cautioned that if the Americans did not get involved and issue a public statement urging Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in the recent fighting, the Soviets would be more than happy to take their place in Jordan.Footnote ³⁴

The NSC report echoed sentiments shared also by the Moroccan King, Hassan II. On June 10, the Moroccan king urged that the United States take a very “strong position” in support for a cease-fire and Israel's return to pre-hostilities lines. The king added that the Soviets were rapidly regaining what prestige they had lost. The Moroccan Ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Laraki, warned the Americans: “If you do not act decisively at this point you will be handing the Arab world to the Soviets on a silver platter.”Footnote ³⁵

In light of such sentiments, the United States continuously applied steps to reassure the Arab states of its neutrality. On the first day of the war, June 5, during a Department of State press briefing, a reporter asked the department's spokesperson, Robert J. McCloskey, whether he would reaffirm United States neutrality. The spokesperson's reply was: “Indeed, I would: I would be more than happy to. We have tried to steer an even-handed course through this. Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed.”Footnote ³⁶ On June 9, in a discussion held in the Security Council, Ambassador Goldberg reiterated President Johnson's May 23 statement supporting the territorial integrity of all states in the area.Footnote ³⁷ A telegram sent on June 13 by the American Ambassador to Morocco, Henry J. Tasca, to the Department of State testified that this was far from satisfactory, because again a warning was sent regarding Arab extremists retaining control over Arab policy.Footnote ³⁸

Although the United States statements of neutrality were doing it little good in its attempt not to lose influence in the Arab world, they were arousing criticism in some parts of American Jewry. Approximately 2 hours after Department of State spokesmen, McCloskey, issued the June 5 neutrality statement, Special Assistant to the President, Joseph Califano, informed Rusk that the statement was “killing us with the Jews in this country.”Footnote ³⁹ Two days later, Walt W. Rostow wrote to Johnson that Abraham [Abe] Feinberg, an influential Jewish private individual who had no official representative role in the Jewish community but had close ties with President Johnson,Footnote ⁴⁰ had told him that although he himself could not be more loyal, “the average United States Zionist doesn't understand.” Rostow's advice to Johnson, as a means to appease criticism from various sections of American Jewry, was to consider “letting it be known how intensively you worked on the Russians.” He advised Johnson that he had already taken steps in that direction, saying that “without going into any details whatsoever—and never mentioning the hot line—I suggested the importance of your role.”Footnote ⁴¹

Later that day, Johnson was advised in a memorandum written by Larry Levinson and Ben Wattenberg of the White House staff that the McCloskey statement concerning “neutrality in word, thought, and deed” had incited harsh feelings among part of America's Jewish community. The memorandum suggested that this evaluation was made by David Brody of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. According to the report of Brody's opinion and in a somewhat simplified view of American Jewry as a monolithic entity, the memorandum stated that although the [American] “Jewish leadership” did not think the McCloskey statement reflected President Johnson's policy, “they” believed it to be a true reflection of the State Department's point of view, according to which “Israel was just another country on the map.” However, it was reported that (American) Jewish leadership was pleased with the American position in the United Nations so far, and the fact that no withdrawal was stipulated.Footnote ⁴²

The major concern reported among American Jewish leaders was “that Israel, apparently having won the war, may be forced to lose the peace—again (as in 1956).” They were looking to Johnson to prevent that, and to ensure the acceptance of guaranteed meaningful peace in the Middle East. The president's advisors suggested that he make use of a large-scale gathering of American Jews scheduled for the following day in Lafayette Park, to send a message that would “neutralize the ‘neutrality' statement.”Footnote ⁴³

Later that week, on June 11, the Lafayette Park gathering was mentioned at an Israeli government meeting. Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, reported that 40,000 Jews had made their way to Washington to protest the imminent danger facing Israel. By the time they reached the capital, Israel's situation had totally changed, and, therefore, the Jewish leaders who met with Vice President Hubert Humphrey urged instead that the Israeli victory not be wasted. Eban reported that President Johnson was said to be irritated by the gathering. Johnson was quoted saying: “what do they want of me? I am in trouble with seven Arab states, a ship of ours was bombed [reference to the Israeli attack on USS Liberty],Footnote ⁴⁴ why don't they trust me? What is this gathering?”Footnote ⁴⁵ In a sense the Americans were in a no-win situation. On the one hand, they issued neutrality statements, among others to avoid severing relations with Arab counties; however, those countries did not believe in their neutrality. And on the other hand, some parts of American Jewry were vehemently opposed to what its members conceived as American indifference toward Israel.

While the United States administration was battling not to be identified with Israel to an extent that would cost it moderate Arab support, Israel too had its doubts as to the extent to which it should trust the Americans. On June 5, the first day of the 1967 War, the Israeli stand was that they did not want American assistance, “they would do the job themselves.” What Israel asked of the United States was “to keep the Russians off their backs” and allow Israel freedom of military action: “two or three days to finish the job.”Footnote ⁴⁶ Similarly, during his June 6 speech before the Security Council, Abba Eban, Israel's Foreign Minister, was quick to point out Israel's independence, saying that “I have just come from Jerusalem to tell the Security Council Israel, by its independent effort and sacrifice, has passed from serious danger to successful resistance.”Footnote ⁴⁷ However, by June 10, the last day of the 1967 War, the Israeli stand and tone had changed, and an urgent request for American Skyhawks was issued.Footnote ⁴⁸

In addition to military equipment, the Israelis were striving for the Americans to support them in their demand that the current hostilities would end with a peace treaty and nothing less, such as armistice lines, an issue that became an “acid test” for trust between Israel and the United States. The 1948 War ended with the 1949 ceasefire agreements between Israel and her Arab neighbor countries, rather than peace treaties.Footnote ⁴⁹ These agreements did not establish final borders and did not include recognition of Israeli statehood.Footnote ⁵⁰ Israel now sought peace agreements that would include formal Arab recognition of Israel's existence.Footnote ⁵¹ Israel was particularly opposed to any mention of Israeli withdrawal other than in the context of a peace agreement, a lesson from the 1957 withdrawal forced by the United States and the Soviet Union, when Israel withdrew from the Sinai only to have the Straits of Tiran closed again within 10 years.Footnote ⁵² As Eban put it in a conversation with Goldberg, “we should banish all concept of armistice from our minds, our hearts and our vocabulary.”Footnote ⁵³

An anecdote Eban related at an Israeli government meeting on June 11, 1967, reflected the Israeli sense that they had some measure of influence in Washington. Eban related that while he was in New York, Goldberg showed him a draft resolution in which the words “ceasefire” and “armistice” appeared. Eban described his reaction in these words: “I screamed terrible screams and told him there can be no armistice after twenty years.” As Eban reported it, Goldberg disappeared into a room, spoke with someone, and emerged with an amended text in which the word “armistice” was not mentioned. Eban's conclusion was that the Americans were very much in need of Israel, if it was possible to make them alter the text in such a manner.Footnote ⁵⁴

Support for the assessment that the United States was indeed attentive to Israel's demand for a peace agreement is found in an admission that Rusk made in a conversation on June 16 with the Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin. When the Soviet ambassador asked Rusk why the United States was opposed to Israel's withdrawal to the armistice lines, Rusk replied that over the years the United States had acted more often on behalf of the Arabs than of Israel, but that now some recognition of Israeli statehood should be made.Footnote ⁵⁵

This was the background to the debate held by the Israeli government over the future of East Jerusalem. The question of East Jerusalem's future was discussed at a moment characterized by reshaping alliances in the Middle East. The June 1967 War had deteriorated to a threat of a military clash between the superpowers, mostly as a result of the aggressive Soviet stand. The Soviet Union was intensively attempting to secure its influence among Arab countries at the expense of the United States, and the United States found itself being pushed to back Israel against Arab countries, both by the Soviet Union and by events. Both Israel and the United States, in the early days of their emerging alliance, were unwilling to trust each other with their national security considerations.

The Application of Israeli Law to East Jerusalem

Although surprising in retrospect, in June 1967 the possibility of “liberating Jerusalem,” as it was referred to in Israeli governmental debates, was a mere side effect of the battles on the main Egyptian frontier. In the evening of June 5, the first day of the war, Israeli government ministers were called to an urgent night meeting to discuss the fighting on all fronts, and specifically in Jerusalem. Opening the meeting, Israel's Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, defined the dilemma saying: “I assume that tonight we will have to reach a decision regarding Jordan if they indeed keep on with their attack. It depends on what we will be occupied with in Sinai, as that is indeed the heart of the matter.”Footnote ⁵⁶ Whereas Eshkol was of the opinion that the question of occupying the Old City of Jerusalem should be thought through and its international implications weighed, others called for swift action. Yigal Allon, Minister of Labor, suggested that the Jordanian hostility gave Israel military justification to attack the Old City. Menachem Begin, a Minister without Portfolio,Footnote ⁵⁷ joined in and opined that a governmental decision should be passed “to free the Old City.”Footnote ⁵⁸

The question of Jerusalem's Old City's future, if it were to be occupied, was already being raised at that early stage. Addressing the possibility that Israel would take over the Old City, Zalman Aran, Minister of Education, asked “to whom will it later return it [the Old City].” The answer given by Haim Moshe Shapira, Minister of Interior, actually the only option raised, was that it could become international.Footnote ⁵⁹ The meeting was adjourned without the question being further discussed. As will be discussed, once the Old City actually fell into Israeli hands, the options the Israeli government were willing to consider changed dramatically, and internationalization was no longer one of them.

On June 7, 1967, Israeli forces took control of the Western Wall, deep within Jerusalem's Old City. Visiting the Western Wall, Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Dayan declared: “The Israel Defense Forces have liberated Jerusalem. We have reunited the torn city, the capital of Israel…”Footnote ⁶⁰ The same intense feelings were described in a report sent by Harry C. McPherson, Special Counsel to President Johnson. McPherson wrote “every Israeli I talked to said in effect that no government could survive that gave up the Old City… Regaining the Old City is an event of unimaginable significance to the Israelis. Even the non-religious intellectuals feel this way.”Footnote ⁶¹ This observation was supported by many reports on public feelings in Israel at the time.Footnote ⁶²

Shortly after taking over East Jerusalem, Israel removed the physical barriers that had divided the city since the 1948 War, and began treating it as a united municipality in terms of services.Footnote ⁶³ Governmental discussions then turned to whether the physical union should be accompanied with a formal legal one. In the celebratory government meeting held the day after the war ended, on June 11, an item on the agenda was “the status of United Jerusalem.”Footnote ⁶⁴ Contrary to at the June 5 meeting, when the only suggestion openly raised was internationalization, now the annexation option was being discussed, among others as a means to prevent initiatives for internationalizing the city. As Begin put it, if Israel did not make haste and legislate, and present the world with a “done deed,” pressure could mount for Jerusalem to be handed over to an international body.Footnote ⁶⁵

Still, opinions varied on whether annexation was advisable and if it required Israeli legislation. The Minister of Justice, Ya'akov Shimshon Shapira, suggested that if annexation was decided upon, an appropriate law should be passed, as well as a law that would safeguard the holy places.Footnote ⁶⁶ Begin supported the minister of justice's stand that legislation was necessary, but suggested avoiding use of the term “annexation.” His rationalization was that annexation means taking over territory to which Israel had no rights, which in his view was not the case with Jerusalem.Footnote ⁶⁷ He supported the option of adopting a law called “Jerusalem – Capital of Israel.” Its first article would state that “Jerusalem in its entirety is the capital of Israel,” which, he explained, would resolve any phrasing difficulty.Footnote ⁶⁸

The Foreign Minister, Eban, was also of the opinion that legislation, or a different sort of state act stipulating that Jerusalem was one, whole, and united, was needed, and urgently. He cautioned that in a few days Israel would come under enormous pressure to withdraw its forces, and, therefore, that speedy political moves were needed to foil attempts at internationalizing the city. He added that whereas in the past Israel was never the only one to reject Jerusalem's internationalization, as the Arabs also opposed the idea, Israel was now facing a different situation: that of being the sole opposition.Footnote ⁶⁹

Although he supported legislation, Eban suggested refraining from public declarations and focusing on practical moves that would create a unification of Jerusalem and demonstrate Israeli sovereignty. One such avenue, in his opinion, was Israel's newly gained control of the holy places. He suggested that instead of the government declaring Jerusalem's annexation, it would declare the rules of conduct in the holy places. The logic behind this suggestion was that he who makes such a declaration is bound to be the one in control.Footnote ⁷⁰

The complexity of the legal situation Israel found itself in with regard to East Jerusalem is evident in comments made by the Minister of Religious Affairs, Zerach Warhaftig. Whereas Eban stressed the symbolic effect of administrating the holy places, Warhaftig indicated the practical need for immediate Israeli legislation regarding the holy places, in order to do exactly that. He described how, following the prime minister's instructions to regulate the holy places, he initiated a relevant order but was blocked by the Israeli military governor. The military governor explained that, because the territory was not part of the State of Israel, only an edict that he issued could apply there. Thus Warhaftig supported legislation, seconding Eban's logic. He emphasized that allowing the military governor to issue an order regarding the holy places would also constitute fact creation, implying that Israel did not see them as part of its territory.Footnote ⁷¹

Exceptional among the many voices calling for a swift annexation of East Jerusalem were those of Eliyahu Sasson, Minister of Police, and Mordechai Bentov, Minister of Housing. Sasson claimed that Israel should refrain from annexation and make do with attending to practical matters such as providing municipal services to the whole of Jerusalem, it being unwise to turn 500,000,000 Christians with differing stands, against Israel.Footnote ⁷² Bentov referred also to the demographic aspect, noting that if legislation enlarging Jerusalem's territory was passed, all its inhabitants—meaning the Arabs living on the eastern side of the city—would become Israeli citizens. When Begin answered that the Arabs would not automatically become Israeli citizens, Bentov cautioned that this would mean Israel would be creating discrimination and endangering her character as a democracy.Footnote ⁷³ The prime minister's decision was clear: “If nothing can be done without legislation, legislation is needed, and its guidelines will be drawn up by the best jurists and attorneys.”Footnote ⁷⁴

At this point, the minister of justice added a legal justification for legislation, even if not a coherent one. He said that one of the issues Germany was berated for after World War II was that it administered occupied territory using a civilian administration, not a military one as international law requires. Under international law, he pointed out, Israel was occupying Jerusalem. If Israel did not want to be in violation of international law in dealing with occupied territory using a civilian administration, it should make a declaration to that effect. As long as no legislation was passed applying Israeli law to the area, only the military government had authority there, not the civilian authorities.Footnote ⁷⁵ It should be noted that, because according to international law, the occupier has the duty to respect “unless absolutely prevented” the laws in force in the country he has occupied,Footnote ⁷⁶ the case that the minister of justice made could be understood as arguing for the Israeli government to apply Israeli law to occupied East Jerusalem, a move contrary to international law, so as to avoid the accusation of administrating occupied territory using civilian administration in violation of the said international law.Footnote ⁷⁷ The official conclusion reached at the government meeting was that “a committee of ministers will be requested to present to the government a proposal on arranging united Jerusalem's status, legally and administratively.”Footnote ⁷⁸

The issue of how to regulate Jerusalem's status as a united city was discussed further on June 18. The prime minister's opening remarks revealed the tactics he was willing to adopt to ensure that among others, information about the planned annexation would not become public and create pressure on Israel to refrain from such a move. Eshkol announced that the government would convene twice that day. One meeting would have a “regular” character and be followed by a press release. The other would be declared as having the status of a “ministerial committee of security matters,” a status exempting the government from issuing an announcement about the decisions reached.Footnote ⁷⁹ The defense minister added to the prime minister's explanation that “some of the matters I want published, as they are good things, the not so good things are better left unpublished. We will decide later what to publish.”Footnote ⁸⁰ As will be shown, the issue of legislation regarding Jerusalem, although not one of security character, would not be published.

One item on the agenda addressed the possible negative consequences that an Israeli declaratory act regarding Jerusalem might have on Israeli interests in the United Nations Special Session that had convened the day before. The emergency session was called following a request from the Soviet Union to consider the question of “liquidating the consequences of Israel's aggression against the Arab States and the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops behind the armistice lines.”Footnote ⁸¹ At this point the legislation suggested for the annexation was of a general character; that is, legislation that would not name Jerusalem but would be used for its annexation. Still, the prime minister, the foreign minister, and others raised concerns that the move would be understood as it was and cause difficulties, and should, therefore, be postponed.Footnote ⁸² Despite the concerns, the defense minister's opinion that the legislation should not be postponed was accepted.Footnote ⁸³

During the debate, Bentov asked the minister of justice for an explanation regarding the character of territory to which the legislation would apply. As the legislation's language was purposely left general, and Jerusalem was not mentioned, he asked about the limits of usage that could be made or, in his words: “according to this he [the Minister of Interior] could annex Ramat Gan to Tel Aviv…” The Minister of Justice's reply was that the legislation was applicable “only to additional territory occupied by the military, if the government had decided on its annexation.”Footnote ⁸⁴ This clarification by the minister of justice seems to leave no doubt that the legislation's purpose was annexation of occupied territory, and that the Israeli government was fully aware of this.

The second government meeting held the same day disclosed further steps taken to avoid revealing the planned annexation of East Jerusalem, in defiance of democratic principles such as freedom of the press and the public's right for information. Eshkol advised participants that the censor had delayed newspaper publications on this subject, a move that aroused much resentment among the newspaper editors, who claimed that the censor had no authority to intervene in matters of a political nature. Moreover, the censor himself brought the issue before the prime minister, saying that he too believed he lacked authority to prohibit such publications.Footnote ⁸⁵ The decision reached was that a ministerial committee would negotiate an understanding with the newspaper editors regarding the manner in which certain issues under discussion by the government and its committees would be published.Footnote ⁸⁶

In the government meeting held on June 25, in light of pressure from both Washington and London that Israel refrain from legislation annexing East Jerusalem, Prime Minister Eshkol again raised the question of whether legislation was necessary. He reported that the United States had demanded that Israel not legislate before the opening of the General Assembly session, and added that Rusk had held a meeting with Eban during that week in which he had warned Eban that Israeli legislation on Jerusalem might arouse anti-Semitism.Footnote ⁸⁷ Begin was prominent among those who supported passing the Jerusalem legislation without further delay. Again, the reasoning was that any further postponement would leave Israel vulnerable to severe and persisting international pressure. He mentioned that the Vatican and Latin American states had already sent telegrams to that effect.Footnote ⁸⁸ Once again, Bentov was the main speaker for the dissenting opinion, arguing that Israel was facing a long and difficult political campaign in which international public opinion would determine a great deal, and that this should be taken into account. Despite Bentov's warning, when the prime minister suggested that the legislation be brought before the parliament, the “Knesset,” that very week, there was no opposition.Footnote ⁸⁹

Having decided to proceed with the legislation, the government went on to discuss the boundaries of “united Jerusalem” to which it would apply. Even though “Jordanian Jerusalem” was a mere 6 square kilometers, it was suggested that Jerusalem's boundaries would include up to 200 square kilometers. At a certain point, Minister of Defense Dayan intervened and suggested more moderate boundaries.Footnote ⁹⁰ Following Dayan's suggestion, the territory annexed ended up being approximately 70 square kilometers, the 6 square kilometers of Jerusalem under Jordanian rule and another 64.Footnote ⁹¹

The protocol of the government meetings held on June 25 and June 26 reflected the great lengths that the government exercised to avoid publication of the coming legislation annexing East Jerusalem before it was a done deed. In the June 25 meeting, the prime minister cautioned that “it should be endeavored that the issue of Jerusalem not be stressed in the newspapers.” He also suggested that the Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek, and army officials, would all be asked to refrain from making announcements in this regard. Eshkol added that steps should be taken to prevent speeches being made in the Knesset concerning the passing of legislation about Jerusalem. Regarding contacts with the press, he said that the situation that had been created, in which “two or three or four ministers meet with the journalists” to persuade them to refrain from publication, was “an exaggeration.” Perhaps it was better, he suggested, that only one minister would meet with the press, adding bitterly that “Schocken from Haaretz [a liberal Israeli newspaper] will always complain.”Footnote ⁹²

The minutes of the government meeting held on June 26—the day before the legislation was scheduled to be voted on—show that coordination was achieved between the government and the newspaper editors. The minister of justice advised that he had met with the newspaper editors and “like always” in these instances, “all the journalists were very sympathetic, apart from one editor who thinks it is more important that his readers know what was happening than keeping it secret, [which he thinks] is undemocratic.” The minister of justice added that he had obtained the editors' consent not to make “a big fuss” around the issue.Footnote ⁹³ When ministers still voiced apprehension over the possibility of early exposure of the legislation initiative, the prime minister took another step to assure secrecy and awarded the meeting—which dealt mainly with legislation—the status of a “ministerial committee on security matters.”Footnote ⁹⁴ Allon clarified that the prime minister's move meant that no governmental announcement would be published following the meeting, and that, therefore, discussions about the forthcoming legislation would not be revealed.Footnote ⁹⁵

Having taken measures to limit the chances that the impending vote in the Knesset would become public, the ministers then discussed how to limit the tone and scope of the debate in the Knesset itself. The minister of justice clarified that the request was not that no debate be held in the Knesset, but rather that it be kept low key. Eshkol asked that speakers from the coalition parties confine themselves to practical straightforward speeches, emphasizing the Israeli wish to “live here in peace,” rather than giving bombastic historical speeches. This topic was concluded with Pinchas Sapir, Minister of Finance, saying that “I only ask that none of the Members of Knesset get up tomorrow and ask to sing ‘Ha'Tikva’ [Israel's national anthem].”Footnote ⁹⁶

On the day of the vote, June 27, an urgent unscheduled government session was called, following a telegram from the Israeli delegation to the United Nations General Assembly's special session. The delegation strongly advised postponing legislation on Jerusalem until after the conclusion of the special session. In the stormy debate that followed, the prime minister raised the issue of public reaction if the legislation was postponed. He pointed out that the evening newspapers had already composed articles and that TV reporters were invited to the Knesset. In his words, if the legislation would be postponed “the Gentiles will say: have you panicked?” international pressure would only mount, and it would be even more difficult to bring the legislation before the Knesset in a later date.Footnote ⁹⁷ After further debate, the decision was taken to present the legislation to the Knesset that very day.Footnote ⁹⁸

In the debate in the Knesset later that day, despite the intention and plans to maintain a “low tone,” the enormity of the legal and political implications of the legislation were verbalized. The minister of justice himself presented the legislation over Jerusalem as an act of sovereignty, saying that in addition to the army's control, “a clear act of sovereignty was necessary in order to apply Israeli law to this area.”Footnote ⁹⁹ Knesset Member Menachem Porush, of the Agudat Israel party, which was not part of the coalition, was among the few who spoke, perhaps voicing what others refrained from saying. Porush said: “Maybe we dreamed of emerging from this battle alive. But who amongst us could have imagined just one month ago that we would find ourselves … with Israeli sovereignty over the holy city of Jerusalem?”Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Another indication of the atmosphere in the Knesset were the calls of “traitor,” and “shameful” that were addressed towards Meir Vilner, a Knesset Member for the New Communist list (Rakah) from the opposition, who criticized the proposed legislation.Footnote ¹⁰¹

The legislation was presented for the Knesset's approval in a special procedure, without giving the Knesset members a formal notice regarding the agenda, as required. After a short debate, the legislation was passed over to the necessary parliamentary committees and hastily returned to the assembly for the vote. Three hours after the legislation was presented to the parliament, it was approved by a vast majority.Footnote ¹⁰² The application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem was completed on the following day through an executive act.Footnote ¹⁰³ Although in Jerusalem it was reported that those involved in passing the legislation annexing East Jerusalem had wept, in New York, Minister of Foreign Affairs Eban claimed that the prime minister had misled him and Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador to Washington, and called the move a “disaster.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴

Israel–United States Relations Following the Occupation of East Jerusalem and its Annexation: The First Days

In a discussion held between United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Goldberg, and Israel's Foreign Minister, Eban, on June 8, 1967, a day after Israel occupied Jerusalem's Old City, the future of the occupied territories was raised. Although Eban was quoted as saying that Israel was not seeking territorial aggrandizement and had no “colonial” aspirations, it was reported that he did not mention the status of Jerusalem per se. Eban did imply that Israel was seeking a peace treaty with Jordan, and stressed that Israel would make every effort to allay the concerns of all religious groups regarding the holy places. Goldberg for his part strongly emphasized the necessity, for both American and world public opinion, for Israel not to emerge as a country that infringed the territorial integrity of others.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ It is interesting to note that public opinion was the aspect mentioned, with no reference made to the breach of international law that such an action would constitute.

The next day, June 9, President Johnson was advised that Israel was beginning to discuss the terms it hoped to achieve in a permanent settlement with the Arab countries. Among them, the Israelis were reportedly planning to insist on an “as yet undefined ‘new status' for a unified Jerusalem.” It was stipulated that such a status would guarantee adherents of all religions access to the holy places.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ A memorandum dated June 11, from McPherson to Johnson, reflected unawareness of Israeli government's practically “no-negotiation” stand regarding united Jerusalem. McPherson wrote that the feeling about the city's future was that Israel must either keep the Old City, or find a way to absolutely guarantee free access to it.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ McPherson's mistake is understandable if one takes into account that in their dealings with the Americans at the end of the 1967 War, the Israelis kept repeating that things had changed so dramatically that Israel needed time to rephrase its political agenda.Footnote ¹⁰⁸ That being said—to the Americans, already on June 11, at a meeting of the management of Israel's Foreign Ministry—Eban was quite clear regarding the government's plans. He informed the officials that the government's policy regarding Jerusalem's Old City was one of quiet de facto integration.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

Eban's comments at the Israeli government meeting held the same day reflected satisfaction with American support, but also awareness that it had its limits. Eban reported that in the 2 days he spent in New York he received 5,000 telegrams, with the recurring theme of “don't get pushed around.” He stipulated how important it was that Israel make use of the international attention in order to voice its “demands, rights and aspirations.”Footnote ¹¹⁰ On the other hand, after noting that there was absolute cooperation in tactical planning between the Israeli and the United States delegations to the United Nations, which could hold back any Soviet or Arab resolution calling for a ceasefire and withdrawal, he remarked that although the United States was not suggesting that Israel return to the status quo, that did not mean that it supported Israel's historical claims.Footnote ¹¹¹

As mentioned, a memorandum dated June 12, from the NSC warned that American silence could lead to its losing Jordan to the Soviets. It suggested that the president strive to influence Israel's prime minister to settle for guarantees for certain Israeli rights, such as access to international waterways and to the “Holy City,” as well as the right to defensible borders, but should not expect territorial changes apart from a few small exceptions. The memorandum also warned that although the president might be hesitant to get involved, non-action would lead to less moderate Israeli forces taking the political lead: “unless we weigh in on Tel Aviv, Dayan, rather than Eshkol, will call the tune.”Footnote ¹¹²

On June 16, Rusk attempted to convince Israeli Ambassador Harman of the “overriding necessity” of making long-term calculations pertaining to Israel's need to live in peace with its neighbors. Rusk cautioned that if the Israeli parliament were to take steps to “take over Old Jerusalem” the Arabs would be signaled that there was no time for the deliberations needed to reach an agreement. He strongly urged that no action that could be viewed by the international community as a fait accompli should be taken regarding Jerusalem. Harman in reply emphasized the depth of the feelings toward Jerusalem among Israelis. The conversation ended with Rusk's cautioning that if the Knesset were to act on Jerusalem in the next few days, it would be “very unfortunate.”Footnote ¹¹³ Despite this, when Richard Nixon asked Eshkol on June 24 whether the Jerusalem issue was open for negotiation, Eshkol answered with a plain negative.Footnote ¹¹⁴

The minutes of the June 29 Israeli government meeting, held after the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem was approved by the Knesset and completed with an executive order, reflect how negative the American reaction to this move was. In an urgent telegram sent from Eban in New York and brought before the ministers, he wrote that apparently, no attempt had been made to inform Walworth Barbour, United States Ambassador to Israel, that the legislation's postponement had terminated and that “the President [Johnson] sees himself cheated and taken by surprise.” Eban added that this, together with other points of friction, such as the USS Liberty incident, and claims regarding deportations of civilians from the West Bank,Footnote ¹¹⁵ were causing a decline in the United States' ability—and perhaps also willingness—to stand by Israel, while the Soviet peril was steadily increasing.Footnote ¹¹⁶

A report by Israel's head of Diplomatic Mission in Washington, Ephraim Evron, added that Rusk was furious because of the timing of the Israeli move regarding Jerusalem. Evron wrote that Rusk had voiced the accusation that while Israel asked the United States to apply the utmost pressure in the United Nations, including President Johnson's personally approaching Latin American heads of states, and while he himself was personally struggling in New York to get the needed voices, Israel's moves had pulled the carpet from under the Americans' feet. Rusk said that the Yugoslavs and the Indians were rejoicing, estimating that the Israeli move had shifted at least twenty votes over to their side.Footnote ¹¹⁷

It is difficult to understand the Israeli aloofness, reflected in the tone of voice and the conclusions reached following those updates. As for criticism that Israel had not coordinated the timing of the legislation with the Americans, the blame was shifted to the Americans. It was said that Barbour was told that the legislation would not be brought to the Knesset “today or tomorrow,” and he had no reason to assume that the postponement would be a long one or that he would be warned beforehand; regarding the American's distrust of Israel's version of the USS Liberty incident, whereas the Americans urged that those responsible be brought to justice, the Israeli response was that an inquiry committee was being appointed and they would await its conclusions.Footnote ¹¹⁸ Regarding claims about the deportation of civilians from the West Bank, the prime minister's response was to ask whether it was expected that Israel “take draconian measures to prohibit people from crossing the Jordan.”Footnote ¹¹⁹

When one considers the United States' formal response to the annexation of East Jerusalem, the question arises whether that aloofness of Israeli government members was not actually appropriate. On June 28, 1967, two formal American statements were issued regarding the status of Jerusalem, one by the White House and the second by the State Department.Footnote ¹²⁰ The White House statement said among others that the United States president “assumes that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned.” In other words, it simply disregarded the unilateral action that Israel had taken the previous day.

The State Department's statement was more critical. It began by noting that “the hasty administrative action taken today cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.” In other words, it acknowledged—as opposed to the White House statement—that a unilateral act had already been made. On the other hand, it referred to the annexing of Jerusalem by legislation as a mere administrative action, thus diminishing it to a practical means of regulation as opposed to the act of sovereignty that it was, according to its nature as primary legislation and the statement made of Israel's minister of justice in the Knesset.Footnote ¹²¹ The statement stressed that the United States “has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem.”Footnote ¹²² That being said, it also made clear that the United States policy would be governed by the president's statement of June 19,Footnote ¹²³ and the White House statement issued the same morning. Therefore, although the June 28 statements were made in response to Israeli acts that quite clearly applied Israeli jurisdiction to East Jerusalem, the United States official stand was that it disregarded the unilateral act that had already been taken.

Perhaps not coincidentally, the one operative suggestion that was raised in the June 29 Israeli government meeting corresponded with that American presentation of Israeli legislation as an administrative act. As a measure to stop further deterioration in Israel–United States relations, Eban suggested that the Israelis issue a governmental announcement regarding Jerusalem. The announcement was to make clear that the administrative and practical steps taken in no way annulled Israel's willingness to continue the search, in consultation with international elements, for effective ways to address international interest in the holy places.Footnote ¹²⁴ In other words, Eban suggested that Israel present the annexation of Jerusalem as a mere administrative step, as it was portrayed in the June 28 State Department statement. Eban's letter of July 10, 1967 to United States Secretary-General, U Thant, stated as much.Footnote ¹²⁵

On July 4, 1967, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2253 was passed by a vote of 99 to 0, with 20 abstentions. It declared that the steps Israel had taken to change the status of Jerusalem were invalid, and called upon Israel “to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem.” The United States chose to abstain rather than join the denunciation of Israel's unilateral acts in Jerusalem, the only one of the five permanent members of the Security Council to do so.Footnote ¹²⁶ Accordingly, the meeting of Bundy, Eban, and Harman on July 5 conveyed a feeling that the Rubicon had been crossed. The United States refrained from joining the General Assembly's harsh recrimination of Israel for its actions in Jerusalem and thus publically “took sides.” The issue negotiated in this meeting was: according to which parameters would that relationship proceed.

During the meeting, Bundy described the bond between the United States and Israel by saying that the American interest in Israel's self-defense was even greater than before the crisis, whereas Israel's ability to rely on others had lessened.Footnote ¹²⁷ Having admitted to the vested American interest in Israel's security, Bundy went on to state the price tag. The four issues Bundy specified as crucial to American–Israeli cooperation were: the future of Jerusalem, the future of the Arabs who had come under Israel's military control, the continuing desirability of preventing the Soviets from supplying arms to Jordan, and the nuclear problem. Bundy made it clear that “if I knew President Johnson at all” no major arms deal could be handled without ties to these issues.Footnote ¹²⁸ Having described Eban's reaction as forthcoming, Bundy concluded his report in what may seem to be symbolic words: “we parted friends.”Footnote ¹²⁹ Despite Bundy's prediction, the United States continued to supply Israel with military aid, without Israel picking up that price-tag.Footnote ¹³⁰