According to rule consequentialism, the moral status of actions is determined by their conformity to authoritative moral rules, and the authoritativeness of rules is determined by their consequences. While ideal rule consequentialism focuses on the consequences the adoption of rules would have, actual rule consequentialism focuses on occurrent consequences. In this paper, I criticize two recent versions of actual rule consequentialism. According to Richard B. Miller’s account, actions are morally right unless they are proscribed by sufficiently weighty, legitimate ethical rules that are actually adopted in the agent’s society. According to Caleb Perl’s Patterned View, while rules can be authoritative without being actually adopted, the evaluation of rules turns on the occurrent consequences of actually obtaining behavior. I argue that both Miller’s and Perl’s views share the problems of earlier versions of actual rule consequentialism, originally identified by D.H. Hodgson and Fred Feldman: they are overly conservative and objectionably conventionalist.

This paper investigates Bentham’s declaration in an unpublished manuscript of the first chapter of Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) that he “had” the “Principle of Utility” from, among other sources, the ancient Greek philosophers Epicurus and Carneades. The paper confirms Epicurus’ influence on Bentham’s development of the “Principle of Utility” by identifying deep connections and similarities in the philosophical doctrines expressed by Epicurus with Bentham’s views relating to three key issues: the goal in life and what has value for human beings; how human beings make choices to act; and what actions are right or just, and what is justice. The paper also shows that Bentham developed the “Principle of Utility” to satisfy Carneades’ three requirements for any ethical theory: a criterion for choices in every action, what constitutes a right action; grounded on a consideration external to the theory; and adapted to a motivating factor originally present in human nature.

This paper reconceptualizes aesthetic action in John Stuart Mill’s art of life as a distinct, world-regarding action, oriented toward ideals such as justice, beauty, and nobility. While morality is guided by obligations to others and prudence by rationality and the cultivation of virtues, aesthetics concerns the aspirational pursuit of collective human flourishing. Rejecting character-based interpretations, the paper distinguishes aesthetic action by its transformative effect and expressive quality. Though not enforceable, aesthetic ideals expand moral imagination and inspire long-term social progress. Drawing on Mill’s separation between action and character evaluation, the argument clarifies that aesthetic action cannot be reduced to virtue or character. Instead, it completes Mill’s tripartite normative framework by illuminating a third domain that motivates ethical life through nobleness and imagination. Aesthetic action thus becomes essential to understanding Mill’s perfectionist aspiration and his vision of higher happiness.

This paper highlights the fundamental importance of the family as a pre-political institution for moral education and a signaling mechanism for cooperation in Locke’s state of nature. Conjugal societies moderate children by teaching them to follow the law of nature. They also serve as signaling mechanisms that enable moderate individuals to trust others and collectively enforce the law of nature. The family, as a pre-political moderating institution, underpins the fragile peace in Locke’s state of nature. Contrary to common beliefs, I argue that the family makes Locke’s depiction of the state of nature more credible than Hobbes’s. This has significant implications: exegetically, it explains why individuals in Locke’s state of nature (imperfectly) follow the law of nature; normatively, it provides reasons to prefer Locke’s liberalism over Hobbes’s authoritarianism; and speculatively, it invites social contract theorists to seriously consider the extent to which liberal political institutions rely on informal institutions.

This paper reconstructs Adam Smith’s theory of human behavior à la rational choice theory. The reconstruction shows how the emotions and morality are different phases of rationality. The reconstruction is based on two sets of distinctions. The first distinguishes between two moments of rationality: (i) the rationality of making the best decisions; and (ii) the rationality of commanding those decisions. The second set includes four genera of satisfaction: (1) substantive satisfaction arises upon consuming pecuniary goods, e.g., food and clothes; (2) transcendent satisfaction takes place when the decision maker bonds with loved ones and aspires great goals; (3) self-possession satisfaction is the “warm glow” that emerges as a by-product of keeping promises, which occasions integrity, and avoiding excessive bonding and attachments, which occasion dignity; and (4) worthiness satisfaction emerges as a by-product of choosing worthy acts, i.e., acts free of toxic preferences (self-aggrandizement and malevolence).

Egalitarianism and prioritarianism are competing views about the ethics of distribution. Both views have wide scopes of concern. But, writing in this journal, Michael Otsuka has discovered a case that seems to show an interesting asymmetry between the limits of egalitarian and prioritarian concern. In that case, intuitively one outcome is better than another (in a respect relevant to the ethics of distribution); prioritarianism can recover that intuitive judgment; but egalitarianism seems unable to recover it. I show, however, that egalitarianism can recover the intuitive judgment in question on a well-motivated basis. That result is of interest because it shows the possibility and prima facie plausibility of a version of egalitarianism with a surprisingly wide scope of concern – one according to which it matters that some are worse off than those who (merely) could have existed.

This paper reevaluates the importance of John Taurek’s article “Should the Numbers Count?” putting his arguments in the context of work on the role of love in ethics. We can fruitfully read Taurek as attempting to ground a duty of beneficence in love. Taurek’s article should be read as having three distinct strands of thought. It articulates beneficence as responding to a value that is non-aggregative, criticizes the aggregation of human value as such, and assumes that beneficence has a very wide scope – from ordinary helping actions to disaster cases. What critics overlook is that even if there is some aggregative account of human value, Taurek gives powerful reasons for thinking that it is patently not the value typically taken to underlie our duty of beneficence. This leaves us, however, with difficult questions about the scope and limits of the duty of beneficence – and so of love – in ethics.

Many believe that relationships can make a constitutive difference to the moral status of paternalistic treatment. For example, it is often assumed that it’s easier to justify paternalizing a spouse than a stranger. But although this thought is widespread, there exists no detailed account of how relationships could mitigate paternalistic complaints. The aim of this paper is to develop an account of this phenomenon, drawing on the work of Margaret Gilbert and the notion of joint commitments. According to the resulting view, close relations can constitutively mitigate paternalistic complaints by rendering paternalistic interference consistent with the will of the paternalized agent.

Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism. One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood. A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for welfare subjecthood, conscious welfare subjects have a greater welfare capacity. We argue that the most likely source of support for either version of phenomenalism – hedonism about welfare goods and bads – provides no support at all. Along the way, we discuss an alternative view of welfare subjectivity and welfare capacity that does not appeal to consciousness but only to mentality, a view we call mentalism.

What is it to treat people with respect when commenting upon their appearance? What duties does widespread vulnerability to body anxiety impose on us concerning the remarks we make about people’s looks? I provide partial answers to these questions by engaging with three proposals. First, the account of aesthetic exploration developed by Sherri Irvin. Second, the principle of the unmodified body defended by Clare Chambers. Third, the ideal of body reflexivity advocated by Kate Manne. I argue that none of the moral duties these accounts point towards can be justified straightforwardly as a requirement of treating people with equal respect, but the idea that it is disrespectful to treat a person’s appearance as inadequate can be defended when hierarchies of attractiveness translate into differences in perceived moral status. Furthermore, qualified versions of each can be justified by the protection they provide when body shaming is liable to cause debilitating anxiety.

Pleasure is widely thought to have intrinsic value. However, this thesis has been threatened by the argument that pleasure is a mental state that essentially involves the subject’s conative attitudes. Its value, then, would be subjective. Though the existing version of the argument can be resisted by simply rejecting the attitudinal theories of pleasure on which it is based, I will develop a new and more general version based on the reasonable hypothesis that the phenomenal character of pleasure is reducible to a physical or functional property. If this new version is convincing, then the most promising way to secure the intrinsicality of the value of pleasure and to escape all versions of the subjectivity argument might be to embrace a non-reductionist account of pleasure and its value.

The disvalue objection from pain is a key objection against perfectionistic views of well-being. In response, perfectionists have attempted to develop refined versions of perfectionism that circumvent the disvalue objection. One recent novel attempt is by Antti Kauppinen, who develops what he calls “Telic Perfectionism.” Kauppinen argues that negative experiences like painful experiences have a “formal aim,” viz., to eliminate the negative experiences themselves. This formal aim is an internal standard contained within our human capacities to have positive or negative experiences. Kauppinen thinks that the frustration of this formal aim (i.e., the subject continuing to have negative experiences) is in fact robustly bad. This would thus allow the badness of pain to be accounted for in perfectionistic terms. In this reply, I argue that Kauppinen’s attempt is unsuccessful due to an asymmetry present within his framework.

In ‘Individualist Theories and Interpersonal Aggregation’, Erik Zhang attempts to reconcile partial aggregation with the individualist restriction: the aggregate value we forgo to satisfy a claim enters moral deliberation indirectly as a criterion for equal consideration. We argue that Zhang’s understanding of forgone value is flawed and requires two refinements. First, Zhang remains vague on which interests can count for forgone value. To accommodate partial aggregation, however, forgone value must be restricted to relevant interests. Second, his account entails an implausible principle of outweighing: we ought to satisfy weaker claims only if their number is much greater than their relative strength suggests. We offer a better understanding of forgone value that avoids the problem. While both refinements revise Zhang’s account, they retain its individualist character.

Does Benatar’s anti-natalism – the view that it is better never to have been – imply that death is better than continued living? This is known as the pro-mortalist question, a compelling, unresolved question surrounding anti-natalist discourse. In order to answer this question, I analyse two theories about the badness of death that Benatar uses to argue against the idea that anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism. The first is that death deprives one of the good things in life. The second is that death annihilates the person. However, I argue that these theories fail to block pro-mortalism. As such, I conclude that Benatar’s anti-natalism implies pro-mortalism, suggesting that if it is better never to have been, then it is better to cease to be.

Many of the most significant goods in human life are fleeting, fragile, and subject to loss. But this aspect of such goods, what I call their preciousness, is undertheorized. Here I provide an account of the nature of precious goods, and argue that this category of goods is significant. I argue that while the preciousness of goods is not a consistent contributor to their intrinsic value, preciousness nevertheless calls for a distinct attitudinal response on the part of rational agents: a focused, joyful attention I refer to as cherishing.

In this paper, I argue that Taurek’s positive view, namely that we ought to show equal respect and concern to those affected by our actions, commits him to saving the bigger number in some cases. This leads to an adjustment of his negative claim, namely that numbers don’t count. Numbers don’t count in the sense he was interested in, i.e., sums of harms or benefits (across different people) lack moral significance. Numbers do count, however, when considering how to act fairly which is what equal respect demands. This adjustment supports Taurek’s general view on how to think about moral matters.

The claim is commonplace that harm-benefit analysis (HBA), a weighing procedure widely used in ethics reviews of animal experiments, is utilitarian. We argue this is false and misleading for three reasons: (1) HBA does not compare, let alone maximize, utility across different options, but merely assesses whether the consequences of one option are net-positive, thereby ignoring opportunity costs; (2) HBA does not aggregate utility coherently, as it allows for varying degrees of speculation in the assessment of harms and benefits; (3) HBA is not concerned with moral evaluation or moral goodness. From our discussion, we derive positive suggestions for how to improve animal experimentation policy and public communications about it. Most straightforwardly, scholars and institutions should stop claiming that HBA is “utilitarian.”

This paper puts forward a novel argument for realism about corporate agents. We begin with the observation that philosophical theories of trust generally require that any putative trustee is a moral agent. We then consider sources of evidence from practice that suggest that people speak, behave, and theorise as-if they trust corporations. This amounts to taking a realist view about corporate moral agency. Corporations can thus be conceived as agents that emerge from, among other things, the individuals, rules, and the internal organisational complexity that constitutes them. Our methodological approach throughout involves arguing that our behaviour and our theorising about a particular kind of entity (the corporation) can be used to justify a position in social metaphysics.