Carey's insights and thorough explication of the literature on conceptual development (Carey Reference Carey2009) could be extended into cognitive ethology, generally defined as the study of the mental experiences of non-human animals in their lives in their natural environment (Griffin Reference Griffin1976/1981; Reference Griffin1992/2001).
First, let us note that a preponderance of the experiments cited by Carey as evidence of attributing agency are based upon relative, not absolute, differences in the measures used. This is true in “looking time” and dishabituation experiments, whereby an infant spends more or less time looking or exhibiting degrees of habituation. Therefore, the infant has not indicated that one scenario represents an agent whereas the other does not; rather, the infant appears to be showing more or less of a proclivity to impute intentionality in circumstances in which one event is a more potent and compelling example than the other.
I agree with Carey that agency attribution is innate, but I suggest that it may be a default mechanism and that humans have a tendency to over-attribute intentionality/agency. In the young child, we see this in occasions such as: Eric, burned as he bumps into the hot radiator, cries, kicks it, and shouts “Bad!” Infants crying, which can secure parental attention, may be promoted not only by the usual reinforcement processes but by the infants' attribution of agency, thus contributing to the infants' control of the parents.
Further extensions may include humans' tendency to seek causes for accidents/events, such as gods, myths, witches (rather than germs), paranoia, or the “other” being a source of personal misery or misfortune. From an evolutionary viewpoint, it may be safer to assume intentionality than not. One is thereby more alert to a potential predator or mate nearby rather than to a being with no such intentions; one may run or become amorous. A gazelle continues grazing when lions are visible but nonattentive, yet is alerted and may run when the lion's gaze becomes focused in the gazelle's direction.
In restricting her analysis to humans and nonhuman primates, Carey notes that “generally” (p. 203) primates do not point and show things to each other, do not establish joint attention. To carefully say “generally” suggests exceptions, as indeed there are. One is immediately led to wonder about the basis for such exceptions and likewise for the restriction in abilities to such exceptions.
Among the exceptions, bonobos are reported to point both in the wild and in captivity. In other instances, animals can simply look in a direction, that is, toward a potential predator, perhaps vocalizing, and individuals follow the gaze and are both alerted and “pointed” in the correct direction.
Exceptions exist beyond primates. Lions have been observed to hunt cooperatively, requiring joint attention to the prey and coordination of their own movements and roles with those of others in the pride.
Although not “joint attention” in the circumstances described by Carey, observations and experiments such as my own with piping plovers, ground nesting birds, do indicate a parent's attention to the direction of locomotion and even attention (gaze) of an intruder toward the plover's nest with eggs (Ristau Reference Ristau and Ristau1991). In these experiments, there were cues available other than direction of gaze, namely the orientation of the human's face and frontal body. (Human intruders walked at a considerable distance from the nest, scanning either the dunes where the nest was located or oppositely toward the sea. Birds' arousal levels varied from mere head turning to leaving the nest.) Parent birds were more aroused by intruders who gazed toward the dunes/ nest location.
Exceptions also exist to the claim that nonhumans “do not create external public representations of quantifiers, sortals, epistemic states…” (p. 464). Various researchers have found evidence for referential information in animal calls. Vervet monkeys have distinctive calls that appear to refer to types of predators (Martial eagle, leopard, snake). Playbacks of such calls elicited different and appropriate reactions, including looking toward the predator's likely location (e.g., up for eagles, down for snakes) (Struhsaker Reference Struhsaker1967; Seyfarth et al. Reference Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler1980). Slobodchikoff's (Reference Slobodchikoff, Kiriazis, Fischer and Creef1991; 2009) studies of prairie dogs provide reasonable evidence for prairie dogs' ability to communicate color, size, and so forth of a human intruder, whereas earlier work by W. J. Smith (Reference Smith1977) revealed the complexity of prairie dog social systems and communication. The creation of new/modified vocalizations has also been reported: macaques for food sites (Green Reference Green1985), prairie dogs for various objects (Slobodchikoff et al. Reference Slobodchikoff, Perla and Verdolin2009), among others. Bonobo chimpanzees communicate quality of food encountered (Clay & Zuberbühler Reference Clay and Zuberbühler2009).
Perhaps some capacities that may be operable in various “exceptions” are attentional and focusing abilities. I hesitate to term them “mere” performance factors, because they appear to vary so substantially between individuals, human and otherwise, and would seem significant in determining the level of competence that individuals/species can achieve. One example was the ability of a young female chimpanzee, Daisy, in the group I observed at the Afi Mountain Wildlife Preserve in Cross River State, Nigeria, to remain impervious to distraction. Others would tempt her to play, but if she was intently digging a hole with her stick or preparing a stick for some use, she ignored their overtures. She was however, a social individual, playing with those same juveniles on other occasions. Most of the other chimpanzees were much more easily dissuaded from any task by social opportunities.
One expects that more focused attention can more readily lead to determining the agent or target from among an array of stimuli. Attentional/focusing abilities may well greatly affect the actual use of concepts and the attained level of conceptual abilities.
Even the ability to imitate, which colloquial term researchers refine into numerous “sub” attributes, can be influenced by attentional abilities as the focused imitator is able to attend to the goal of an action, and not be distracted by activity per se. A case in point: a young child wishing to imitate Mommy is given a small broom and proceeds to “sweep,” irrespective of the dirt.
This is but a partial list of “exceptions,” all requiring closer analysis of conceptual content.
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Carey's insights and thorough explication of the literature on conceptual development (Carey Reference Carey2009) could be extended into cognitive ethology, generally defined as the study of the mental experiences of non-human animals in their lives in their natural environment (Griffin Reference Griffin1976/1981; Reference Griffin1992/2001).
First, let us note that a preponderance of the experiments cited by Carey as evidence of attributing agency are based upon relative, not absolute, differences in the measures used. This is true in “looking time” and dishabituation experiments, whereby an infant spends more or less time looking or exhibiting degrees of habituation. Therefore, the infant has not indicated that one scenario represents an agent whereas the other does not; rather, the infant appears to be showing more or less of a proclivity to impute intentionality in circumstances in which one event is a more potent and compelling example than the other.
I agree with Carey that agency attribution is innate, but I suggest that it may be a default mechanism and that humans have a tendency to over-attribute intentionality/agency. In the young child, we see this in occasions such as: Eric, burned as he bumps into the hot radiator, cries, kicks it, and shouts “Bad!” Infants crying, which can secure parental attention, may be promoted not only by the usual reinforcement processes but by the infants' attribution of agency, thus contributing to the infants' control of the parents.
Further extensions may include humans' tendency to seek causes for accidents/events, such as gods, myths, witches (rather than germs), paranoia, or the “other” being a source of personal misery or misfortune. From an evolutionary viewpoint, it may be safer to assume intentionality than not. One is thereby more alert to a potential predator or mate nearby rather than to a being with no such intentions; one may run or become amorous. A gazelle continues grazing when lions are visible but nonattentive, yet is alerted and may run when the lion's gaze becomes focused in the gazelle's direction.
In restricting her analysis to humans and nonhuman primates, Carey notes that “generally” (p. 203) primates do not point and show things to each other, do not establish joint attention. To carefully say “generally” suggests exceptions, as indeed there are. One is immediately led to wonder about the basis for such exceptions and likewise for the restriction in abilities to such exceptions.
Among the exceptions, bonobos are reported to point both in the wild and in captivity. In other instances, animals can simply look in a direction, that is, toward a potential predator, perhaps vocalizing, and individuals follow the gaze and are both alerted and “pointed” in the correct direction.
Exceptions exist beyond primates. Lions have been observed to hunt cooperatively, requiring joint attention to the prey and coordination of their own movements and roles with those of others in the pride.
Although not “joint attention” in the circumstances described by Carey, observations and experiments such as my own with piping plovers, ground nesting birds, do indicate a parent's attention to the direction of locomotion and even attention (gaze) of an intruder toward the plover's nest with eggs (Ristau Reference Ristau and Ristau1991). In these experiments, there were cues available other than direction of gaze, namely the orientation of the human's face and frontal body. (Human intruders walked at a considerable distance from the nest, scanning either the dunes where the nest was located or oppositely toward the sea. Birds' arousal levels varied from mere head turning to leaving the nest.) Parent birds were more aroused by intruders who gazed toward the dunes/ nest location.
Exceptions also exist to the claim that nonhumans “do not create external public representations of quantifiers, sortals, epistemic states…” (p. 464). Various researchers have found evidence for referential information in animal calls. Vervet monkeys have distinctive calls that appear to refer to types of predators (Martial eagle, leopard, snake). Playbacks of such calls elicited different and appropriate reactions, including looking toward the predator's likely location (e.g., up for eagles, down for snakes) (Struhsaker Reference Struhsaker1967; Seyfarth et al. Reference Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler1980). Slobodchikoff's (Reference Slobodchikoff, Kiriazis, Fischer and Creef1991; 2009) studies of prairie dogs provide reasonable evidence for prairie dogs' ability to communicate color, size, and so forth of a human intruder, whereas earlier work by W. J. Smith (Reference Smith1977) revealed the complexity of prairie dog social systems and communication. The creation of new/modified vocalizations has also been reported: macaques for food sites (Green Reference Green1985), prairie dogs for various objects (Slobodchikoff et al. Reference Slobodchikoff, Perla and Verdolin2009), among others. Bonobo chimpanzees communicate quality of food encountered (Clay & Zuberbühler Reference Clay and Zuberbühler2009).
Perhaps some capacities that may be operable in various “exceptions” are attentional and focusing abilities. I hesitate to term them “mere” performance factors, because they appear to vary so substantially between individuals, human and otherwise, and would seem significant in determining the level of competence that individuals/species can achieve. One example was the ability of a young female chimpanzee, Daisy, in the group I observed at the Afi Mountain Wildlife Preserve in Cross River State, Nigeria, to remain impervious to distraction. Others would tempt her to play, but if she was intently digging a hole with her stick or preparing a stick for some use, she ignored their overtures. She was however, a social individual, playing with those same juveniles on other occasions. Most of the other chimpanzees were much more easily dissuaded from any task by social opportunities.
One expects that more focused attention can more readily lead to determining the agent or target from among an array of stimuli. Attentional/focusing abilities may well greatly affect the actual use of concepts and the attained level of conceptual abilities.
Even the ability to imitate, which colloquial term researchers refine into numerous “sub” attributes, can be influenced by attentional abilities as the focused imitator is able to attend to the goal of an action, and not be distracted by activity per se. A case in point: a young child wishing to imitate Mommy is given a small broom and proceeds to “sweep,” irrespective of the dirt.
This is but a partial list of “exceptions,” all requiring closer analysis of conceptual content.