Baumard et al. put forward a threefold hypothesis about fairness:
1. Fairness: People's social behavior is often guided by considerations of fairness.
2. Contractualism: People find fair any outcome or action that they would agree upon if they were to enter into a contract with others.
3. Mutualism: Fairness evolved because fair individuals were more likely to be recruited in fitness-enhancing cooperative ventures.
In this commentary, we overlook the merits and shortcomings of this hypothesis, and focus instead on the curious way it is described throughout the target article: Instead of referring to the nature and evolution of fairness, Baumard and colleagues refer to the nature and evolution of morality. A casual reader could easily come to believe that they propose a new theory about morality, but this would be a mistake, for Baumard et al. stipulate in their Note 2 that by “moral” they just mean “fair”:
There is no generally agreed-upon definition of morality, and it may be argued that morality does not necessarily imply fairness and may include a greater variety of forms of interaction that nevertheless have relevant commonalities (. . .). Here, we use morality in a sense that implies fairness, on the assumption that such a sense picks out a set of phenomena worthy of scientific inquiry, in particular from an evolutionary point of view. (target article, Note 2, italics in original)
While Baumard and colleagues are free to use “moral” in any way they want, we find their terminological stipulation perplexing: If by “moral” they really just mean “fair,” why don't they just use that word? What could be simpler than using “fair” and “fairness” throughout their article?
But do Baumard et al. really just mean “fair” when they use “moral”? We think not. Several claims made in the target article are a matter of controversy only if they are understood to be about morality, not just fairness. Consider Baumard et al.'s claim that “[t]he evolution of morality is appropriately approached within the wider framework of the evolution of cooperation” (sect. 2.1.1, para. 4, our emphasis). So formulated, this is a (somewhat) controversial claim, but who would deny that the evolution of fairness is to be understood in the context of the evolution of cooperation? In what other context could it be understood?
So, the situation is this: Because Baumard et al. stipulate that they mean “fair” when they use “moral,” they can counter the charge that they ignore the complexity of morality; because they refer to morality, some of their claims appear more provocative than they really are.
On the other hand, Baumard et al. are certainly right that there is little consensus among philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and evolutionary biologists about what morality consists in. In fact, our continuing ignorance of the proper definition of morality is an egregious shortcoming of the recent literature about the nature and evolution of morality since numerous provocative claims in this area cannot be assessed until a consensus on the proper definition of morality is reached. Consider, for instance, Haidt's claim that “politically liberal researchers” are “inappropriately narrowing the moral domain to issues of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity/justice” while “morality in most cultures (and for social conservatives in Western cultures), is in fact much broader, including issues of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity” (Haidt & Joseph Reference Haidt, Joseph, Carruthers, Laurence and Stich2007, p. 367). Haidt is not accusing liberal moral psychologists of ignoring that people care about different things and embrace different norms in different cultures; he is accusing them of failing to see that these values and norms fall in the moral domain, and to assess this criticism requires knowing what really distinguishes the moral domain from other domains.
One way to establish the proper definition of morality is to determine how lay people in Western cultures and in other cultures delineate the moral domain: Do Westerners distinguish moral norms from other norms? If they do (as seems likely), what distinguishes moral norms from other norms? Do people in other cultures also draw this distinction? In collaboration with colleagues, we have begun addressing these questions.
In our current work, we present participants with sentences describing a norm in foreign cultures. For each sentence, participants are first asked whether they think that people in their culture should also comply with the norm described, and are then asked whether they think that the judgment they just made is a moral judgment. In effect, we ask people to decide whether the concept moral is applicable to their own judgment. By comparing the answers elicited by our 20 stimuli, we will be able to identify which norms are treated similarly and which norms are treated differently. Thus, we will be able to identify what kinds of norms lay people distinguish – in particular whether they distinguish moral from non-moral norms. We can then examine whether demographic variables, including political orientation, religious affiliation, and membership in different cultures, influence the distinctions between norms drawn by lay people.
This experimental approach to the definition of morality has the potential to remedy the egregious shortcoming of the literature on morality noted by Baumard and colleagues: the lack of consensus about the proper definition of morality. Further, this experimental approach could cast doubts on a common assumption in this literature (one that Baumard et al. seem to embrace): It is a live possibility that some cultures do not distinguish moral from non-moral norms and thus that the moral domain fails to be a psychological universal whose evolution calls for explanation (see also Machery & Mallon Reference Machery, Mallon and Doris2010).
Baumard et al. put forward a threefold hypothesis about fairness:
1. Fairness: People's social behavior is often guided by considerations of fairness.
2. Contractualism: People find fair any outcome or action that they would agree upon if they were to enter into a contract with others.
3. Mutualism: Fairness evolved because fair individuals were more likely to be recruited in fitness-enhancing cooperative ventures.
In this commentary, we overlook the merits and shortcomings of this hypothesis, and focus instead on the curious way it is described throughout the target article: Instead of referring to the nature and evolution of fairness, Baumard and colleagues refer to the nature and evolution of morality. A casual reader could easily come to believe that they propose a new theory about morality, but this would be a mistake, for Baumard et al. stipulate in their Note 2 that by “moral” they just mean “fair”:
There is no generally agreed-upon definition of morality, and it may be argued that morality does not necessarily imply fairness and may include a greater variety of forms of interaction that nevertheless have relevant commonalities (. . .). Here, we use morality in a sense that implies fairness, on the assumption that such a sense picks out a set of phenomena worthy of scientific inquiry, in particular from an evolutionary point of view. (target article, Note 2, italics in original)
While Baumard and colleagues are free to use “moral” in any way they want, we find their terminological stipulation perplexing: If by “moral” they really just mean “fair,” why don't they just use that word? What could be simpler than using “fair” and “fairness” throughout their article?
But do Baumard et al. really just mean “fair” when they use “moral”? We think not. Several claims made in the target article are a matter of controversy only if they are understood to be about morality, not just fairness. Consider Baumard et al.'s claim that “[t]he evolution of morality is appropriately approached within the wider framework of the evolution of cooperation” (sect. 2.1.1, para. 4, our emphasis). So formulated, this is a (somewhat) controversial claim, but who would deny that the evolution of fairness is to be understood in the context of the evolution of cooperation? In what other context could it be understood?
So, the situation is this: Because Baumard et al. stipulate that they mean “fair” when they use “moral,” they can counter the charge that they ignore the complexity of morality; because they refer to morality, some of their claims appear more provocative than they really are.
On the other hand, Baumard et al. are certainly right that there is little consensus among philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and evolutionary biologists about what morality consists in. In fact, our continuing ignorance of the proper definition of morality is an egregious shortcoming of the recent literature about the nature and evolution of morality since numerous provocative claims in this area cannot be assessed until a consensus on the proper definition of morality is reached. Consider, for instance, Haidt's claim that “politically liberal researchers” are “inappropriately narrowing the moral domain to issues of harm/care and fairness/reciprocity/justice” while “morality in most cultures (and for social conservatives in Western cultures), is in fact much broader, including issues of ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity” (Haidt & Joseph Reference Haidt, Joseph, Carruthers, Laurence and Stich2007, p. 367). Haidt is not accusing liberal moral psychologists of ignoring that people care about different things and embrace different norms in different cultures; he is accusing them of failing to see that these values and norms fall in the moral domain, and to assess this criticism requires knowing what really distinguishes the moral domain from other domains.
One way to establish the proper definition of morality is to determine how lay people in Western cultures and in other cultures delineate the moral domain: Do Westerners distinguish moral norms from other norms? If they do (as seems likely), what distinguishes moral norms from other norms? Do people in other cultures also draw this distinction? In collaboration with colleagues, we have begun addressing these questions.
In our current work, we present participants with sentences describing a norm in foreign cultures. For each sentence, participants are first asked whether they think that people in their culture should also comply with the norm described, and are then asked whether they think that the judgment they just made is a moral judgment. In effect, we ask people to decide whether the concept moral is applicable to their own judgment. By comparing the answers elicited by our 20 stimuli, we will be able to identify which norms are treated similarly and which norms are treated differently. Thus, we will be able to identify what kinds of norms lay people distinguish – in particular whether they distinguish moral from non-moral norms. We can then examine whether demographic variables, including political orientation, religious affiliation, and membership in different cultures, influence the distinctions between norms drawn by lay people.
This experimental approach to the definition of morality has the potential to remedy the egregious shortcoming of the literature on morality noted by Baumard and colleagues: the lack of consensus about the proper definition of morality. Further, this experimental approach could cast doubts on a common assumption in this literature (one that Baumard et al. seem to embrace): It is a live possibility that some cultures do not distinguish moral from non-moral norms and thus that the moral domain fails to be a psychological universal whose evolution calls for explanation (see also Machery & Mallon Reference Machery, Mallon and Doris2010).