Individuals vary. Some are taller, others shorter. Some thrive in teams; others prefer to work alone. Some volunteer to gain attention; others contribute while avoiding credit. More importantly, the context in which individuals find themselves varies too. Some fortuitously find opportunities early; others arrive later and take what options remain. Some are born into larger families; others inherit smaller networks and must build connections through their lifetime. Some recieve generational wealth; others are saddled with generational debt.
However subtle and arbitrary these differences may be, the ways in which individuals organize around them can have major societal consequences. In some cases, institutions form that are ambivalent toward – or even promote opportunities for – individuals to exploit these differences to their benefit. When that is the case, rampant material wealth inequality may emerge and persist, leading to lasting differences in power and authority of some over others. In other cases, institutions may arise that limit those who seek to cement their differences over others. When that is the case, individuals will still compete with one another and may leverage their differences to gain influence, especially in particular domains, but they cannot easily convert those differences into lasting power and authority. These latter outcomes are often referred to as egalitarian societies, or “societies of near-equals” (Woodburn, Reference Woodburn1982, p. 431).
The concept of egalitarian societies is central in political philosophy (e.g., Rousseau, Reference Rousseau1754[Reference Rousseau2018]), evolutionary ecology (e.g., Vehrencamp, Reference Vehrencamp1983), and contemporary political treatises (e.g., Schwartz & Schulman, Reference Schwartz and Schulman2012). It provides theorists with a hypothetical ancestral condition, a point of comparison within a broad range of variation, and a vision for potential futures. Yet, for those of us dwelling in societies that are far from egalitarian, it can be challenging to understand what living as near-equals might be like. It is perhaps no surprise then that some writing on this topic misrepresent the concept or even treat it as fantastic (e.g., Graeber & Wengrow, Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021; Bowles, Reference Bowles2023; Kulchyski, Reference Kulchyski2023).
In this compelling article, Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes and Chris von Rueden note that “…while the concept of egalitarian societies may be seductive, the phenomenon is to some degree not myth but reality.” They argue that we find ourselves in debates over the very concept – rather than working toward understanding it – not due to “…empirical disagreement…” but because of “…definitional ambiguity, and an emphasis of outcome over process in characterising societies.”
Recognizing that egalitarianism does not mean equality and arguing for a focus on process, as opposed to outcome, is in some ways a return to Woodburn (Reference Woodburn1982, p. 431), who used “… the term “egalitarian” to describe these societies of near-equals because the term directly suggests that the “equality” that is present is not neutral, the mere absence of inequality or hierarchy, but is asserted” (emphasis in original). By centering “near-equals” and emphasizing “asserted,” Woodburn was highlighting that egalitarianism is not absolute equality – merely when “…inequalities are at their minimum” – and that its presence represents a process individuals engage in, something they work toward.
For example, Wiessner (Reference Wiessner2002, pp. 413–414) summarizes how “Ju/’hoansi maintained a strongly egalitarian society… Nonetheless, differences in effort and ability were openly recognized and respected. … Despite inequalities in achievement, Ju/’hoansi had complex “leveling” institutions to prevent the stronger or more gifted from turning productive advantage to dominance” (see also Wiessner & Huang, Reference Wiessner and Huang2022).
Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden’s synthesis identifies six such processes: “…demand-sharing, risk-pooling, prosocial reputation-building, status-levelling, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility.” They emphasize how individuals in egalitarian societies adopt, participate in, and bolster these processes not out of a desire for the outcome but out of “…concerns over their social status, resource access, and personal decision-making autonomy…” Indeed, they review how individuals living in many archetypal “egalitarian” societies vary in forms of embodied, social, and economic capital (see their Table 1).
This is certainly not new information (e.g., Winterhalder, Reference Winterhalder1997; Smith et al., Reference Smith, Hill, Marlowe, Nolin, Wiessner, Gurven, Bowles, Mulder, Hertz and Bell2010; Thomson et al., Reference Thomson, Lew-Levy, von Rueden and Stibbard-Hawkes2025) but does provide nuanced context that has been forgotten or omitted in recent syntheses. Moving past misunderstandings and strawmen, Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden present several areas to advance research (see their Table 2).
The behavioral ecological approach they advocate for emphasizes studying the interactions between individual decisions in local environmental and social contexts to identify factors that lead to the emergence of more egalitarian social relations (see, e.g., Smith et al., Reference Smith, Smith and Codding2023). This not only has the benefit of elucidating the diversity of social organizations that exist, but also advancing our understanding of general processes.
One common observation among many egalitarian societies is that individuals find greater benefits from redistribution than from exclusion. A promising area of research is understanding the circumstances under which it pays more to give away the products of one’s labor than it does to accumulate them (e.g., Bird & Bliege Bird, Reference Bird, Bliege Bird, Vaughn, Eerkens and Kantner2009; Bliege Bird et al., Reference Bird, Rebecca, Brooke, Douglas and Smith2012; Hawkes, Reference Hawkes and Diehl2000; Kramer & Codding, Reference Kramer, Codding, Codding and Kramer2016). The tipping points at which the costs and benefits of sharing vs hoarding switches back and forth represents a fundamental pivot in the manifestation of social relations between egalitarianism and systemic wealth inequality (e.g., Dow & Reed, Reference Dow and Reed2023; Smith & Codding, Reference Smith and Codding2021; Wilson et al., Reference Wilson, Cole and Codding2023).
Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden have done a service in helping to refocus scholarship on very real egalitarian societies and the theoretically-informed empirical study of the process that allows them to emerge and persist. By following this approach, we may gain insight into the factors that lead some societies to reward those who seek to leverage their arbitrary differences, and the circumstances that encourage individuals to reject formal differentiation and to live as near equals.
Individuals vary. Some are taller, others shorter. Some thrive in teams; others prefer to work alone. Some volunteer to gain attention; others contribute while avoiding credit. More importantly, the context in which individuals find themselves varies too. Some fortuitously find opportunities early; others arrive later and take what options remain. Some are born into larger families; others inherit smaller networks and must build connections through their lifetime. Some recieve generational wealth; others are saddled with generational debt.
However subtle and arbitrary these differences may be, the ways in which individuals organize around them can have major societal consequences. In some cases, institutions form that are ambivalent toward – or even promote opportunities for – individuals to exploit these differences to their benefit. When that is the case, rampant material wealth inequality may emerge and persist, leading to lasting differences in power and authority of some over others. In other cases, institutions may arise that limit those who seek to cement their differences over others. When that is the case, individuals will still compete with one another and may leverage their differences to gain influence, especially in particular domains, but they cannot easily convert those differences into lasting power and authority. These latter outcomes are often referred to as egalitarian societies, or “societies of near-equals” (Woodburn, Reference Woodburn1982, p. 431).
The concept of egalitarian societies is central in political philosophy (e.g., Rousseau, Reference Rousseau1754[Reference Rousseau2018]), evolutionary ecology (e.g., Vehrencamp, Reference Vehrencamp1983), and contemporary political treatises (e.g., Schwartz & Schulman, Reference Schwartz and Schulman2012). It provides theorists with a hypothetical ancestral condition, a point of comparison within a broad range of variation, and a vision for potential futures. Yet, for those of us dwelling in societies that are far from egalitarian, it can be challenging to understand what living as near-equals might be like. It is perhaps no surprise then that some writing on this topic misrepresent the concept or even treat it as fantastic (e.g., Graeber & Wengrow, Reference Graeber and Wengrow2021; Bowles, Reference Bowles2023; Kulchyski, Reference Kulchyski2023).
In this compelling article, Duncan Stibbard-Hawkes and Chris von Rueden note that “…while the concept of egalitarian societies may be seductive, the phenomenon is to some degree not myth but reality.” They argue that we find ourselves in debates over the very concept – rather than working toward understanding it – not due to “…empirical disagreement…” but because of “…definitional ambiguity, and an emphasis of outcome over process in characterising societies.”
Recognizing that egalitarianism does not mean equality and arguing for a focus on process, as opposed to outcome, is in some ways a return to Woodburn (Reference Woodburn1982, p. 431), who used “… the term “egalitarian” to describe these societies of near-equals because the term directly suggests that the “equality” that is present is not neutral, the mere absence of inequality or hierarchy, but is asserted” (emphasis in original). By centering “near-equals” and emphasizing “asserted,” Woodburn was highlighting that egalitarianism is not absolute equality – merely when “…inequalities are at their minimum” – and that its presence represents a process individuals engage in, something they work toward.
For example, Wiessner (Reference Wiessner2002, pp. 413–414) summarizes how “Ju/’hoansi maintained a strongly egalitarian society… Nonetheless, differences in effort and ability were openly recognized and respected. … Despite inequalities in achievement, Ju/’hoansi had complex “leveling” institutions to prevent the stronger or more gifted from turning productive advantage to dominance” (see also Wiessner & Huang, Reference Wiessner and Huang2022).
Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden’s synthesis identifies six such processes: “…demand-sharing, risk-pooling, prosocial reputation-building, status-levelling, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility.” They emphasize how individuals in egalitarian societies adopt, participate in, and bolster these processes not out of a desire for the outcome but out of “…concerns over their social status, resource access, and personal decision-making autonomy…” Indeed, they review how individuals living in many archetypal “egalitarian” societies vary in forms of embodied, social, and economic capital (see their Table 1).
This is certainly not new information (e.g., Winterhalder, Reference Winterhalder1997; Smith et al., Reference Smith, Hill, Marlowe, Nolin, Wiessner, Gurven, Bowles, Mulder, Hertz and Bell2010; Thomson et al., Reference Thomson, Lew-Levy, von Rueden and Stibbard-Hawkes2025) but does provide nuanced context that has been forgotten or omitted in recent syntheses. Moving past misunderstandings and strawmen, Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden present several areas to advance research (see their Table 2).
The behavioral ecological approach they advocate for emphasizes studying the interactions between individual decisions in local environmental and social contexts to identify factors that lead to the emergence of more egalitarian social relations (see, e.g., Smith et al., Reference Smith, Smith and Codding2023). This not only has the benefit of elucidating the diversity of social organizations that exist, but also advancing our understanding of general processes.
One common observation among many egalitarian societies is that individuals find greater benefits from redistribution than from exclusion. A promising area of research is understanding the circumstances under which it pays more to give away the products of one’s labor than it does to accumulate them (e.g., Bird & Bliege Bird, Reference Bird, Bliege Bird, Vaughn, Eerkens and Kantner2009; Bliege Bird et al., Reference Bird, Rebecca, Brooke, Douglas and Smith2012; Hawkes, Reference Hawkes and Diehl2000; Kramer & Codding, Reference Kramer, Codding, Codding and Kramer2016). The tipping points at which the costs and benefits of sharing vs hoarding switches back and forth represents a fundamental pivot in the manifestation of social relations between egalitarianism and systemic wealth inequality (e.g., Dow & Reed, Reference Dow and Reed2023; Smith & Codding, Reference Smith and Codding2021; Wilson et al., Reference Wilson, Cole and Codding2023).
Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden have done a service in helping to refocus scholarship on very real egalitarian societies and the theoretically-informed empirical study of the process that allows them to emerge and persist. By following this approach, we may gain insight into the factors that lead some societies to reward those who seek to leverage their arbitrary differences, and the circumstances that encourage individuals to reject formal differentiation and to live as near equals.
Financial support
The author is financially supported by the University of California, Santa Barbara.
Competing interests
The author declares there are no competing interests.