Clark and Fischer (C&F) make a compelling case that people experience social robots as depictions of social agents. I focus my comments on the claims they make in the section “Interacting with characters.” I suggest that their analysis requires some adjustments in the context of people's habitual responses to other types of depictions.

In their section on interacting with characters, C&F make brief mention of the concept of transportation (Clark & Van Der Wege, Reference Clark, Van Der Wege, Tannen, Hamilton and Schiffrin2015; Gerrig, Reference Gerrig1993). They suggest that “we imagine ourselves transported into the world of the scene depicted” (target article, sect. 6.1, para. 2). Although transportation is surely relevant to their analysis, the focus on depictions resonates more with the concept aesthetic illusion that has been explored broadly in the cognitive humanities (Wolf, Bernhart, & Mahler, Reference Wolf, Bernhart and Mahler2013). In one analysis, Wolf (Reference Wolf, Hühn, Meister, Pier and Schmid2009) suggested that aesthetic illusion “consists predominantly of a feeling, with variable intensity, of being imaginatively and emotionally immersed in a represented world and of experiencing this world in a way similar (but not identical) to real life” (p. 144). Scholars have discussed the capacity of different types of depictions to foment aesthetic illusion. Those discussions have often called to the type of layering that is an important feature of the analysis C&F provide. Consider these assertions about viewers' experiences of computer-generated images (CGI): “Simply put, one will see a photograph, despite knowing that it is actually CGI, which, in turn, is to say that the beholder is simultaneously positioned at the extreme poles of complete rational distance from, and total immersion in, the referential illusion” (Bantleon & Tragatschnig, Reference Bantleon, Tragatschnig, Wolf, Bernhart and Mahler2013, p. 287). This type of analysis parallels claims made by C&F and holds the potential to enrich their discussion of depictions.

This evocation of aesthetic illusion (as well as the original mention of transportation) provides a context for a disagreement with one claim that C&F make. They define importation, and then argue, “Importation is different from transportation. With paintings, movies, and stage plays, recipients engage in pretense that they are covert observers in the scenes depicted, where a covert observer is present in a scene, but invisible, mute, and unable to intervene” (target article, sect. 6.1, para. 4). However, at least in the context of movies, viewers unmute themselves and produce content that appears to count as interventions.

Consider a study by Bezdek, Foy, and Gerrig (Reference Bezdek, Foy and Gerrig2013; see also Gerrig & Bezdek, Reference Gerrig, Bezdek, Wolf, Bernhart and Mahler2013) in which participants were asked to speak aloud while they watched brief excerpts (2–5 minutes) from feature films. One excerpt came from Alfred Hitchcock's film “Marnie.” In a scene early in the film, Marnie is trying to exit a building after robbing an office safe. To slip by a woman cleaning the office, she removes a noisy pair of shoes so that she can walk on tip toes in stocking feet. She tucks the shoes into the pockets of her trench coat. As Marnie moves along, viewers are able to see that her shoes are becoming dislodged. Marnie, however, is unaware of this eventuality. As they spoke aloud in response to this scene, participants often looked into Marnie's future. One viewer remarked:

Another viewer expressed much the same content but offered advice directly to Marnie:

These two examples echo the types of language C&F illustrate that people direct to social robots. For example, the latter viewer's language provides evidence for interaction in parallel to Beth's utterances quoted in their Table 1.

C&F might suggest that this viewer is pretending to give the character advice. Given the intensity of the viewer's emotions – and the final “ha!” which approximates “I told you so!” – I would disagree. I argue that, in the moment, the viewer is genuinely behaving as if the character can benefit from their advice (Gerrig & Jacovina, Reference Gerrig, Jacovina and Ross2009). With brief reflection, the viewer would certainly acknowledge that Marnie's world is inaccessible. But, in the moment, the experience of an aesthetic illusion generates behavior that is real rather than pretense.

These observations are not problematic for C&F's overall perspective that people experience social robots as depictions of social agents. Rather, the claim that people habitually function as if they are interacting with depictions provides a richer context to consider how people experience social robots. To put it plainly, people's experiences with other types of depictions make them cognitively and emotionally prepared to interact with social robots.

Still, it is hard not to wonder to what extent people's attempts to interact with social robots regularly call attention to them as depictions. Viewers behave as if they can interact with movie characters because they are “imaginatively and emotionally immersed in a represented world” (Wolf, Reference Wolf, Hühn, Meister, Pier and Schmid2009, p. 144). The physical reality of social robots' presentation might regularly counteract the possibility of an aesthetic illusion. Similarly, social robots' limited behavioral repertory may largely prevent people from being transported into a goal-directed narrative. C&F's theoretical analysis provides a rich context to contemplate these issues.