Jara-Ettinger and Dunham propose that an institutional stance, reasoning about behavior in terms of roles and their normative expectations, constitutes a core system of human social cognition distinct from mental-state reasoning. Many of the roles they discuss, however, appear to rely on a legal – rational scaffolding, leaving others, particularly those associated with group identities, unexplained. Identities such as “American” or “scientist” are not merely positions defined by codified rules but also roles embedded in norm-governed systems that define entitlement, moral standing, and membership boundaries. This raises the question of how decentralized groups determine who legitimately occupies a role and how free riding on group identity is prevented.

I propose that such roles are often stabilized through sacred values – nonnegotiable commitments that signal intrinsic devotion and define the normative foundations of rightful role occupancy. In such cases, commitments function not merely as behavioral guidelines but as role-constitutive norms that signal intrinsic commitment and thereby define legitimate role occupancy. These cases suggest that institutional cognition must represent two distinct classes of norms: compensatory norms governing role performance and role-constitutive norms defining legitimate role occupancy.

Jara-Ettinger and Dunham’s conception of roles frequently presupposes a legal–rational scaffolding. As a result, role occupancy is stabilized through formal structures that define who is entitled to act and how violations are repaired. In such systems, legitimacy is grounded in formally codified rules and procedural regularity (Beetham, Reference Beetham2013; Weber, Reference Weber1922/Reference Weber2019): a barista may negotiate payment terms and a janitor’s entry hours without jeopardizing their role. Although Jara-Ettinger and Dunham’s framework allows that institutional reasoning also applies to informal roles such as group membership, it does not specify how the legitimacy of role occupancy is determined in the absence of formal authority.

In Weber’s (Reference Weber1922/Reference Weber2019) terms, such roles more closely resemble traditional forms of authority, in which legitimacy rests not on procedural rules but on shared belief and customary recognition. Berger and Luckmann (Reference Berger and Luckmann1966) similarly argue that shared beliefs become institutionalized when they are widely recognized as legitimate foundations of social roles. In decentralized groups lacking bureaucratic enforcement, legitimacy must therefore be sustained through mechanisms that stabilize shared commitments and transform contingent norms into obligations.

Sacred values, commitments treated as absolute and resistant to instrumental tradeoffs, may provide one such mechanism. Unlike ordinary norms, sacred values resist tradeoffs and motivate costly, even self-sacrificial commitments. Across cultural and political contexts, individuals treat certain principles, such as land, sovereignty, or religious sites, as nonnegotiable, refusing material compromises even when they would produce substantial benefits (Atran & Ginges, Reference Atran and Ginges2012; Dehghani et al., Reference Dehghani, Atran, Iliev, Sachdeva, Medin and Ginges2010; Ginges & Atran, Reference Ginges and Atran2013; Tetlock et al., Reference Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green and Lerner2000). Empirical work shows that when such values become fused with group identity, individuals may express willingness to incur extreme personal costs, including fighting or dying to defend them (Hamid et al., Reference Hamid, Pretus, Atran, Crockett, Ginges, Sheikh and Vilarroya2019). Because these commitments demand sacrifice, they function as credible signals of legitimate role occupancy (Tetlock et al., Reference Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green and Lerner2000; Tetlock, Mellers & Scoblic, Reference Tetlock, Mellers and Scoblic2017). By making commitment visible and costly, sacred values stabilize expectations about legitimate role occupancy in decentralized communities.

From the perspective of the institutional stance, such commitments function as role-constitutive norms that help determine who legitimately occupies a role. Their function is not merely to regulate behavior but also to establish legitimate role occupancy itself. Because sacred values are non-compensatory – resistant to material substitution or procedural repair – their endorsement signals intrinsic commitment rather than strategic compliance. Violations, therefore, call an individual’s standing within the role into question rather than simply triggering a sanction.

This dynamic can be seen in communities whose identities are organized around sacred values that demand absolute commitment. Identifying as a Quaker, for instance, does not depend solely on formal membership in the Religious Society of Friends or compliance with institutional rules. Rather, the identity is anchored in a central sacred value: the belief that every individual possesses an “inner light.” Because this commitment imposes an obligation to extend forgiveness even in the face of serious wrongdoing, failing to uphold it calls into question one’s claim to the identity – and thus one’s standing within the role.

A similar dynamic operates in non-religious contexts. Although scientists may work in different institutions or disciplines and frequently disagree about particular theories, the identity of “scientist” is sustained by a shared commitment to the authority of the scientific method as a pathway to truth. When this epistemic commitment is violated – for example, through fabrication or deliberate disregard for evidence – the issue is not merely procedural misconduct. Such violations call into question whether the individual legitimately occupies the role of scientist at all.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that decentralized institutions stabilize legitimacy through commitments treated as intrinsic rather than negotiable. Formal institutions achieve this through procedural legitimacy, whereas decentralized groups rely on costly commitments that signal devotion to shared principles. Social groups, therefore, reveal that the institutional stance must represent not only norms governing how roles are performed, but also norms determining who is entitled to occupy them.