A major goal of the article by Cimpian & Salomon (C&S), as stated by the authors themselves (see sect. 4), is to argue that their proposed inherence heuristic provides the cognitive foundation on which psychological essentialism emerges. In doing so, the authors seem to take it as a given that psychological essentialism is a fundamental feature of the human mind that needs to be explained.
However, recent evidence suggests that psychological essentialism may not be a universal or immutable human tendency. In a recent set of studies (Machery et al., submitted), we examined the stability of psychological essentialism. The participants in our studies were asked, for example, whether lemons that undergo a chemical transformation, which alters their exterior properties (e.g., taste and appearance) but conserves their genetic structure, would still be considered lemons, or (conversely) whether a liquid discovered on a distant planet that shares all the functional and superficial properties of water, despite having a completely different molecular structure, should be called “water.” An essentialist position would define a category of things (or kind) by their stable, underlying properties. Thus, according to a true essentialist, lemons that undergo a superficial transformation while retaining their genetic structure would still be lemons, whereas the alien liquid would not be considered water (since its molecular structure is different) regardless of how closely it resembles, tastes like, or fulfills the same role as water. Thus, by tallying the proportion of participants who believe the lemon remains a lemon in the chemical transformation scenario, or that the alien liquid is not water in the discovery scenario, we can estimate which proportion of a given sample holds essentialist beliefs.
The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different nations spread across four continents. We found that the likelihood of holding essentialist intuitions varied dramatically (and significantly) across cultures, from less than 10% of participants in a particular country holding essentialist beliefs to more than 70% of those in another country holding these intuitions. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary significantly with gender and education. A second study showed that the type of scenario (transformation vs. discovery) and the category (organic/biological vs. physical/chemical) both significantly (and independently) influenced the likelihood that participants reported essentialist intuitions. Finally, a third study showed that merely varying how we framed the (same) question in a transformation scenario significantly altered the likelihood that participants would report essentialist intuitions.
Taken together, the aforementioned studies show that, far from being universal, essentialist beliefs vary dramatically across cultures, gender, and educational levels – much like many other philosophical intuitions (e.g., Machery et al. Reference Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich2004; Reference Machery, Olivola and de Blanc2009). These studies also show that, far from being stable, the likelihood that people hold essentialist intuitions varies considerably with normatively irrelevant contextual factors, such as the type of scenario used to elicit beliefs or the way the question is being framed.
The results of our studies are consistent with a small, but important, literature on cross-cultural variation in psychological essentialism and on the role of social factors in the prevalence of essentialism. There is substantial variation regarding which properties are thought to be immutable as well as caused by internal features. Pfeffer et al. (Reference Pfeffer, Cole and Dada1998) found that British children are more likely than Nigerian children to view criminal behavior as immutable and internally caused. Giles et al. (Reference Giles, Legare and Samson2008) also found that Black South African children are more likely than African-American children to view aggression as inborn and immutable. Giles et al. argue that this finding is consistent with the social role of essentialism in justifying inequalities during apartheid (see also Mahalingam Reference Mahalingam2003b). There is also substantial variation across cultures and social groups regarding which categories are essentialized. Mahalingam (Reference Mahalingam2003a) has shown that the Aravanis of India (a minority of biological men who dress and live as women) essentialize the female gender, but not the male gender, holding that a male can become a woman by cross-dressing. Mahalingam (Reference Mahalingam2003b) has also provided evidence suggesting that Brahmins and Dalits in India essentialize the Indian castes differently. It would thus seem that, far from being a default mode of thinking, essentialism is used strategically, in a contextual manner, often to fulfill some political goals (see also Pereira et al. Reference Pereira, Estramiana and Gallo2010).
In sum, a growing of body research suggests that psychological essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. Consequently, this research challenges the notion that the human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that produces essentialist intuitions.
A major goal of the article by Cimpian & Salomon (C&S), as stated by the authors themselves (see sect. 4), is to argue that their proposed inherence heuristic provides the cognitive foundation on which psychological essentialism emerges. In doing so, the authors seem to take it as a given that psychological essentialism is a fundamental feature of the human mind that needs to be explained.
However, recent evidence suggests that psychological essentialism may not be a universal or immutable human tendency. In a recent set of studies (Machery et al., submitted), we examined the stability of psychological essentialism. The participants in our studies were asked, for example, whether lemons that undergo a chemical transformation, which alters their exterior properties (e.g., taste and appearance) but conserves their genetic structure, would still be considered lemons, or (conversely) whether a liquid discovered on a distant planet that shares all the functional and superficial properties of water, despite having a completely different molecular structure, should be called “water.” An essentialist position would define a category of things (or kind) by their stable, underlying properties. Thus, according to a true essentialist, lemons that undergo a superficial transformation while retaining their genetic structure would still be lemons, whereas the alien liquid would not be considered water (since its molecular structure is different) regardless of how closely it resembles, tastes like, or fulfills the same role as water. Thus, by tallying the proportion of participants who believe the lemon remains a lemon in the chemical transformation scenario, or that the alien liquid is not water in the discovery scenario, we can estimate which proportion of a given sample holds essentialist beliefs.
The first study considered essentialist intuitions in 10 different nations spread across four continents. We found that the likelihood of holding essentialist intuitions varied dramatically (and significantly) across cultures, from less than 10% of participants in a particular country holding essentialist beliefs to more than 70% of those in another country holding these intuitions. Furthermore, these intuitions were found to vary significantly with gender and education. A second study showed that the type of scenario (transformation vs. discovery) and the category (organic/biological vs. physical/chemical) both significantly (and independently) influenced the likelihood that participants reported essentialist intuitions. Finally, a third study showed that merely varying how we framed the (same) question in a transformation scenario significantly altered the likelihood that participants would report essentialist intuitions.
Taken together, the aforementioned studies show that, far from being universal, essentialist beliefs vary dramatically across cultures, gender, and educational levels – much like many other philosophical intuitions (e.g., Machery et al. Reference Machery, Mallon, Nichols and Stich2004; Reference Machery, Olivola and de Blanc2009). These studies also show that, far from being stable, the likelihood that people hold essentialist intuitions varies considerably with normatively irrelevant contextual factors, such as the type of scenario used to elicit beliefs or the way the question is being framed.
The results of our studies are consistent with a small, but important, literature on cross-cultural variation in psychological essentialism and on the role of social factors in the prevalence of essentialism. There is substantial variation regarding which properties are thought to be immutable as well as caused by internal features. Pfeffer et al. (Reference Pfeffer, Cole and Dada1998) found that British children are more likely than Nigerian children to view criminal behavior as immutable and internally caused. Giles et al. (Reference Giles, Legare and Samson2008) also found that Black South African children are more likely than African-American children to view aggression as inborn and immutable. Giles et al. argue that this finding is consistent with the social role of essentialism in justifying inequalities during apartheid (see also Mahalingam Reference Mahalingam2003b). There is also substantial variation across cultures and social groups regarding which categories are essentialized. Mahalingam (Reference Mahalingam2003a) has shown that the Aravanis of India (a minority of biological men who dress and live as women) essentialize the female gender, but not the male gender, holding that a male can become a woman by cross-dressing. Mahalingam (Reference Mahalingam2003b) has also provided evidence suggesting that Brahmins and Dalits in India essentialize the Indian castes differently. It would thus seem that, far from being a default mode of thinking, essentialism is used strategically, in a contextual manner, often to fulfill some political goals (see also Pereira et al. Reference Pereira, Estramiana and Gallo2010).
In sum, a growing of body research suggests that psychological essentialism is neither a universal nor stable feature of human cognition. Consequently, this research challenges the notion that the human mind is “fitted” with a built-in inherence heuristic that produces essentialist intuitions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Christopher Y. Olivola acknowledges the support of the British Academy and the Royal Society.