Stibbard-Hawkes and von Rueden (S&V) usefully separate out motivations, processes, and outcomes. As summarized in Figure 1 (in the target article), they suggest four individual motivations that can sometimes lead to egalitarian processes that can sometimes lead to high levels of egalitarian outcomes in a group. Importantly, in their analysis, the motivations that eventually lead to egalitarian outcomes might not themselves be egalitarian: even selfish motivations (e.g., to secure resource access) can ultimately lead to egalitarian outcomes at the group level.

We suggest that a similar division is useful when considering meritocracy, in which resources are distributed according to some definition of ability or merit. Specifically, humans have a variety of motivations that can sometimes lead to meritocratic processes that can sometimes lead to high levels of meritocratic outcomes in a group. Importantly, in our analysis, the motivations that eventually lead to meritocratic outcomes might not themselves be meritocratic: even selfish motivations (e.g., to secure resource access) can ultimately lead to meritocratic outcomes at the group level.

We have intentionally used parallel phrasing in the two paragraphs above, and the list of motivations and processes that S&V use in their analysis of egalitarianism overlaps with the ones that we suggest can lead to meritocracy. The general framework for this comes from contractualism (Levine et al., Reference Levine, Chater, Tenenbaum and Cushman2024) and mutualistic morality (Baumard, André, & Sperber, Reference Baumard, André and Sperber2013), which emphasize the role of mutually beneficial interaction in which each individual receives benefits corresponding to their merit. Imagine Abel can choose between two options: (a) collaborate with Bob (who is half as productive as Abel) and split the 1.5 pooled outcome equally (0.75 each), or (b) collaborate with Carly (who is five times as productive as Abel) and receive the “merited” portion of the outcome (1 to Abel and 5 to Carly). Abel receives 0.25 more from the meritorious division with Carly than the egalitarian division with Bob. Returning to the individual motivations, Abel maintains his resource access by maintaining his reputation as someone who takes only his “merited” share of resources. Expanding to Abel’s resource access over time, both economists and political philosophers (see Rawls, Reference Rawls1971) have observed that compensation that is linked to economic productivity can grow the size of the social pie, benefiting even those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder; thus, even those who would seem to fare worst in a merit-based competition may have a self-interested reason to favor merit-based compensation.

It is possible for both V&P’s egalitarian analyses and our meritocratic analysis to sit side-by-side and for a group to have elements of both egalitarianism and meritocracy. Indeed, although they can be in tension in the real world and can certainly be pitted against one another in lab experiments, these constructs are closer to orthogonal than many expect. For example, outcomes can be low on both egalitarian and meritocratic analyses, such as when resources accrue to powerful but minimally productive individuals in a corrupt authoritarian regime; similarly, one argument in favor of standardized testing for university admissions is that it increases both meritocracy and egalitarianism by reducing the influence of criteria like an elite private school pedigree in favor of tests that are relatively more objective and less socioeconomically biased.

S&V’s processes will likely promote meritocratic outcomes to the extent that they favor competence. To illustrate, let’s consider a more elaborate version of the Abel and Bob scenario introduced above. They now go out hunting together, and the more meritorious Abel kills a stag (500 lbs), while the less meritorious Bob kills a hare (10 lbs). The purely egalitarian outcome is that Abel and Bob each get 255 lbs, while the purely meritocratic outcome is that Abel gets 500 lbs. and Bob gets 10 lbs. Another “pure” outcome could be a dictatorship led by the less meritorious Bob, in which he gets 510 lbs and Abel – despite being more responsible for the outcome – gets 0 lbs.

The real world will usually exist in between the “pure” extremes described above, as a result of many interacting processes. In S&V’s list, an example of an anti-meritocratic process is demand-sharing, in which Abel would “tolerate theft” from Bob. An example of a pro-meritocratic process is reputation, in which Abel and Bob both maintain access to future hunting trips with others by maintaining a reputation for taking their merited share (and not more than that). Other processes have a more complicated relationship with meritocracy. Risk pooling can be seen as anti-meritocratic in a narrow sense but is neutral over time. Specifically, risk pooling is consistent with meritocracy when the influence of luck evens out over time: even a great hunter may get unlucky on occasion, and so some amount of risk pooling ensures that rare cases of bad luck are not disastrous, while ensuring that hunters who are more productive on average are also gaining more over time. This can be contrasted with gathering, in which luck plays a lower role and risk pooling is likewise rarer.

To be clear, we are not advocating that the groups S&V refer to as “egalitarian societies” be relabeled as “meritocracies.” They discuss the difficulties of the terminology and have reasons for preferring their label. We accept that any human-made category is going to involve tradeoffs about what label to use and how to define membership. However, whatever label is used, what is clear is that all human societies have a complex mix of individual motivations and contextual factors, leading to complex interactions and processes between individuals, leading to multiple outcomes (e.g., egalitarianism and meritocracy) that exist on spectra.