Wilson et al. propose a synthetic theory that articulates a unified evolution-based framework accounting for individual, group, and societal levels of phenomena of change. The theory seeks to fuse traditionally isolated levels and styles of analysis, such as psychology, social psychology, and sociology, under a broadly conceived evolutionary umbrella in order to enable human communities “to become wise managers of evolutionary processes” (sect. 1, para. 3). The authors not only offer a set of evolutionary concepts, but they argue for the intentional change of the relevant processes serving to benefit the wider community, as well. In our estimate, extending an evolutionary model is a fertile idea. At the same time, it is clear that the authors aim at nothing less than scientifically guided social change. This we find problematic.
Our commentary focuses on facing the proposed science of intentional change with facts and concepts pertaining to the level of large populations or changes on a worldwide scale.
The authors claim that the scope of their proposal can be extended to “changing behavioral and cultural practices at a large spatial and temporal scale” (sect. 3.3, para. 1), and they mention “global problems such as climate change and the worldwide economy” (sect. 3.3, para. 3) as examples. In our view, they exemplify their thesis more by middle-scale than by large-scale changes in space and time. Changing routines of selling tobacco to minors in two states of the United States and improving parenting practices in 18 South Carolina counties are important, major public-policy programs. Obviously, they are good examples of social constructivism, but resorting to evolutionary theory seems redundant here in both descriptive and analytic senses. In addition, a significant issue, which we do not have space to elaborate here, is that the examples' key characteristic is that given the aims, a consensus is readily attained.
In our view, truly profound and important social changes require a greater spatial and temporal scale. There is general agreement among historians that the attainment of Western-type social organization took roughly three centuries. Various authors seem to share this view: Weber (Reference Weber1930) eloquently argued on how the Protestant world view and the corresponding value system instigated the coming era of capitalist society, with its peculiar work ethic, puritanism in consumption, and emerging bureaucracy as the manner of organization; Elias (Reference Elias2000) provided a detailed analysis of how the courtly manners of everyday life, with its control of emotions, permeated the lower strata of society and with appropriate modifications become the European habitus, the normative manner of everyday life and emotionality for civilized Europe; Foucault (Reference Foucault1970; Reference Foucault1977) investigated the gradual changes of structures of the power–knowledge complex, prefiguring the modern way of discipline in school, at work, in the military, and in legal and penal systems and such diverse endeavors as the human sciences, including psychology, economy, and linguistics.
Still other historians such as Jackson Lears strongly believe that “all history is the history of unintended consequences” (in Cohen Reference Cohen2013). Would a science of intentional transformation apply to this process, as well? It seems that stretching social transformation to such an extent would not be all that alien to the authors, as, by way of illustration, they cite issues such as ecology and globalization. Therefore, properly posed, the question is one of enabling intentional transformations via diffusion of cultural innovations over generations. Is this compatible with the authors' preference for an evolutionary approach?
Indeed, there is a chapter in social science devoted to the issues of diffusion of innovations – either the behavioral innovations the target article deals with or technical ones, about which the target article is interestingly quiet – on a really large scale: Continents and centuries are involved (Geroski Reference Geroski2000; Kornai Reference Kornai2010; Modelski & Gardner Reference Modelski and Gardner2002). For example, diffusion of technological innovations such as hybrid corns, train lines, cars, mobile phones, and Internet hosts all can be described by a general model of logistic function; furthermore, social phenomena such as geographical discoveries, activity of space research, and urban guerrilla activities also share these kind of formal properties (Fokas Reference Fokas2007). Those studies are more descriptive than explanatory, however, and applying evolutionary theory to these changes without hesitation seems a dubious move. This is all the more germane because in European social theory there is a trend of thought preceding Darwin; indeed, one that exerted an influence on him through Malthus, and which works with a concept of development much like Darwin's. This “shows how complex, orderly and, in a precisely defined sense, suitable institutions may develop through interpersonal relations, which owe little to planning, which we do not make up, but derive from the autonomous actions of many people, who were acting unawares” (Hayek Reference Hayek1960, pp. 58–59). As Hayek maintains, the development of this social order would really be “the result of adaptive evolution” (p. 58) but without any intentionality.
This line of reasoning on large-scale historical changes was also formulated by Popper (Reference Popper1957), instigated by a seminar headed by Hayek in which Popper participated, and the arguments of which are perhaps less well known among cognitive scientists than are Popper's seminal ideas on the philosophy of science. Popper fiercely criticized the grand-scale models of historical change, which he called historicism, while also arguing for gradual change in improving society, the task he delegated to social engineers. At the same time, he maintained that social institutions are mainly emerging from human activity in a not-intentional manner: “Only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed while the vast majority have just ‘grown,’ as the undesigned results of human actions” (Popper Reference Popper1957, p. 54).
We fail to see any possibility of truly long-term social changes guided by science – a grasp of which may well call for the authors' proposed extended evolutionary theory. Further, in our estimate, given our East European experiences, this frankly is rather fortunate. In sum, it seems to us, it is a long but promising journey to fulfill the authors' wish “to become wise managers of evolutionary processes” (sect. 1, para. 3). Till that time we can only hope to be if not wise at least not to be charlatan agents in the overall process of evolutionary bricolage.
You have
Access
Wilson et al. propose a synthetic theory that articulates a unified evolution-based framework accounting for individual, group, and societal levels of phenomena of change. The theory seeks to fuse traditionally isolated levels and styles of analysis, such as psychology, social psychology, and sociology, under a broadly conceived evolutionary umbrella in order to enable human communities “to become wise managers of evolutionary processes” (sect. 1, para. 3). The authors not only offer a set of evolutionary concepts, but they argue for the intentional change of the relevant processes serving to benefit the wider community, as well. In our estimate, extending an evolutionary model is a fertile idea. At the same time, it is clear that the authors aim at nothing less than scientifically guided social change. This we find problematic.
Our commentary focuses on facing the proposed science of intentional change with facts and concepts pertaining to the level of large populations or changes on a worldwide scale.
The authors claim that the scope of their proposal can be extended to “changing behavioral and cultural practices at a large spatial and temporal scale” (sect. 3.3, para. 1), and they mention “global problems such as climate change and the worldwide economy” (sect. 3.3, para. 3) as examples. In our view, they exemplify their thesis more by middle-scale than by large-scale changes in space and time. Changing routines of selling tobacco to minors in two states of the United States and improving parenting practices in 18 South Carolina counties are important, major public-policy programs. Obviously, they are good examples of social constructivism, but resorting to evolutionary theory seems redundant here in both descriptive and analytic senses. In addition, a significant issue, which we do not have space to elaborate here, is that the examples' key characteristic is that given the aims, a consensus is readily attained.
In our view, truly profound and important social changes require a greater spatial and temporal scale. There is general agreement among historians that the attainment of Western-type social organization took roughly three centuries. Various authors seem to share this view: Weber (Reference Weber1930) eloquently argued on how the Protestant world view and the corresponding value system instigated the coming era of capitalist society, with its peculiar work ethic, puritanism in consumption, and emerging bureaucracy as the manner of organization; Elias (Reference Elias2000) provided a detailed analysis of how the courtly manners of everyday life, with its control of emotions, permeated the lower strata of society and with appropriate modifications become the European habitus, the normative manner of everyday life and emotionality for civilized Europe; Foucault (Reference Foucault1970; Reference Foucault1977) investigated the gradual changes of structures of the power–knowledge complex, prefiguring the modern way of discipline in school, at work, in the military, and in legal and penal systems and such diverse endeavors as the human sciences, including psychology, economy, and linguistics.
Still other historians such as Jackson Lears strongly believe that “all history is the history of unintended consequences” (in Cohen Reference Cohen2013). Would a science of intentional transformation apply to this process, as well? It seems that stretching social transformation to such an extent would not be all that alien to the authors, as, by way of illustration, they cite issues such as ecology and globalization. Therefore, properly posed, the question is one of enabling intentional transformations via diffusion of cultural innovations over generations. Is this compatible with the authors' preference for an evolutionary approach?
Indeed, there is a chapter in social science devoted to the issues of diffusion of innovations – either the behavioral innovations the target article deals with or technical ones, about which the target article is interestingly quiet – on a really large scale: Continents and centuries are involved (Geroski Reference Geroski2000; Kornai Reference Kornai2010; Modelski & Gardner Reference Modelski and Gardner2002). For example, diffusion of technological innovations such as hybrid corns, train lines, cars, mobile phones, and Internet hosts all can be described by a general model of logistic function; furthermore, social phenomena such as geographical discoveries, activity of space research, and urban guerrilla activities also share these kind of formal properties (Fokas Reference Fokas2007). Those studies are more descriptive than explanatory, however, and applying evolutionary theory to these changes without hesitation seems a dubious move. This is all the more germane because in European social theory there is a trend of thought preceding Darwin; indeed, one that exerted an influence on him through Malthus, and which works with a concept of development much like Darwin's. This “shows how complex, orderly and, in a precisely defined sense, suitable institutions may develop through interpersonal relations, which owe little to planning, which we do not make up, but derive from the autonomous actions of many people, who were acting unawares” (Hayek Reference Hayek1960, pp. 58–59). As Hayek maintains, the development of this social order would really be “the result of adaptive evolution” (p. 58) but without any intentionality.
This line of reasoning on large-scale historical changes was also formulated by Popper (Reference Popper1957), instigated by a seminar headed by Hayek in which Popper participated, and the arguments of which are perhaps less well known among cognitive scientists than are Popper's seminal ideas on the philosophy of science. Popper fiercely criticized the grand-scale models of historical change, which he called historicism, while also arguing for gradual change in improving society, the task he delegated to social engineers. At the same time, he maintained that social institutions are mainly emerging from human activity in a not-intentional manner: “Only a minority of social institutions are consciously designed while the vast majority have just ‘grown,’ as the undesigned results of human actions” (Popper Reference Popper1957, p. 54).
We fail to see any possibility of truly long-term social changes guided by science – a grasp of which may well call for the authors' proposed extended evolutionary theory. Further, in our estimate, given our East European experiences, this frankly is rather fortunate. In sum, it seems to us, it is a long but promising journey to fulfill the authors' wish “to become wise managers of evolutionary processes” (sect. 1, para. 3). Till that time we can only hope to be if not wise at least not to be charlatan agents in the overall process of evolutionary bricolage.