Lee Jussim's book (Jussim Reference Jussim2012) argues – against current orthodoxy – that the judgments we make about the people we actually encounter are largely unaffected by faulty expectations we have regarding those people. Furthermore, he argues, cultural stereotypes are mostly correct; so even in cases where cultural expectations do affect the judgments we make about a particular individual, those expectations are more likely to increase rather than decrease our knowledge of that person.
Jussim's use of the term “perception” is very broad. Any judgment we make about someone that we observe is considered a “person perception.” Such judgments can be more or less specific, more or less confident, more or less evaluative, more or less explanatory, and more or less lasting. Jussim distinguishes perceptions from mere associations – suggesting that students may associate a lecturer with warmth versus coldness rather than perceive that lecturer as warm versus cold. But the format of many of the studies he reviews – insofar as they force subjects to choose between competing attributions – tends to obliterate this distinction. The distinction between interpretations and perceptions is also lost here. Many might wonder whether certain subjects interpreted rather than perceived an African-American's shove as more violent than a white person's shove, interpreted rather than perceived an essay attributed to John as better than (the same) essay attributed to Joan, interpreted rather than perceived one patient's behavior as introverted and another patient's similar behavior as extroverted. (Jussim usefully highlights some flaws in these influential studies, but neither he nor they distinguish between interpretations and perceptions.) To the extent that interpretations are automatic and unreflective, the resulting judgments may have the experiential immediacy of perceptions; but many interpretations are more tentative and more indirect than perceptions. It would be interesting, then, to distinguish between cases in which expectations affect the very look of some behavior (e.g., the physical force of a shove) and cases in which expectations merely affect the interpretation of that behavior (e.g., the degree of threat posed by the shove, its contextual significance). Insofar as a correction is called for, changing our interpretations is probably easier than changing our perceptions.
Jussim maintains that if an individual is presented to us in enough detail, our antecedent expectations and associations actually do not have much effect on our judgments about that individual. He defends this claim through an extensive review of the literature on teachers’ judgments regarding the intelligence of their students, for example – a review that shows teachers’ judgments to be largely correct as long as they are given sufficient time to get to know their students. If we are presented with very little information about an individual, however, our judgments about that individual will be affected by our antecedent expectations and associations – but that is as it should be, according to Jussim, since (with some notable exceptions) our antecedent expectations and associations tend to be more accurate than not. After all, the information that teachers receive about their entering students is usually correct.
Jussim is fully aware of the charge that our social expectations, rather than simply tracking the truth, tend to create the truth; they become self-fulfilling prophesies. Although there is some variation across domains (the influence of teacher expectations being greater for African-Americans, for low-income students, and for previously low-achievers), his review of the data suggests that expectations actually alter the behavior of only ten percent of the targets of those expectations. Even ten percent is not insignificant, especially when it affects opportunities in education and in jobs; and, of course, the costs of self-fulfilling prophesies are likely to be compounded over time. Jussim notes that our self-conceptions tend to limit our susceptibility to others’ expectations, but surely our self-conceptions are themselves heavily influenced by parental expectations (none of the studies discussed in this book cover very early childhood or parental expectations). Furthermore, the self-conceptions of many people are quite fragile (none of the studies cover people known to have a personality disorder, for example).
Jussim makes a good case for thinking that self-fulfilling prophesies are not nearly as powerful or pervasive as the literature suggests. In my opinion, however, the value of his book lies less in its reining in of exaggerated claims about the power of expectations than in its contribution to sorting out, more precisely, where and when expectations do distort our judgments and what forms of intervention (e.g., longer and more detailed exposure) are best suited to counter these distortions.
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Lee Jussim's book (Jussim Reference Jussim2012) argues – against current orthodoxy – that the judgments we make about the people we actually encounter are largely unaffected by faulty expectations we have regarding those people. Furthermore, he argues, cultural stereotypes are mostly correct; so even in cases where cultural expectations do affect the judgments we make about a particular individual, those expectations are more likely to increase rather than decrease our knowledge of that person.
Jussim's use of the term “perception” is very broad. Any judgment we make about someone that we observe is considered a “person perception.” Such judgments can be more or less specific, more or less confident, more or less evaluative, more or less explanatory, and more or less lasting. Jussim distinguishes perceptions from mere associations – suggesting that students may associate a lecturer with warmth versus coldness rather than perceive that lecturer as warm versus cold. But the format of many of the studies he reviews – insofar as they force subjects to choose between competing attributions – tends to obliterate this distinction. The distinction between interpretations and perceptions is also lost here. Many might wonder whether certain subjects interpreted rather than perceived an African-American's shove as more violent than a white person's shove, interpreted rather than perceived an essay attributed to John as better than (the same) essay attributed to Joan, interpreted rather than perceived one patient's behavior as introverted and another patient's similar behavior as extroverted. (Jussim usefully highlights some flaws in these influential studies, but neither he nor they distinguish between interpretations and perceptions.) To the extent that interpretations are automatic and unreflective, the resulting judgments may have the experiential immediacy of perceptions; but many interpretations are more tentative and more indirect than perceptions. It would be interesting, then, to distinguish between cases in which expectations affect the very look of some behavior (e.g., the physical force of a shove) and cases in which expectations merely affect the interpretation of that behavior (e.g., the degree of threat posed by the shove, its contextual significance). Insofar as a correction is called for, changing our interpretations is probably easier than changing our perceptions.
Jussim maintains that if an individual is presented to us in enough detail, our antecedent expectations and associations actually do not have much effect on our judgments about that individual. He defends this claim through an extensive review of the literature on teachers’ judgments regarding the intelligence of their students, for example – a review that shows teachers’ judgments to be largely correct as long as they are given sufficient time to get to know their students. If we are presented with very little information about an individual, however, our judgments about that individual will be affected by our antecedent expectations and associations – but that is as it should be, according to Jussim, since (with some notable exceptions) our antecedent expectations and associations tend to be more accurate than not. After all, the information that teachers receive about their entering students is usually correct.
Jussim is fully aware of the charge that our social expectations, rather than simply tracking the truth, tend to create the truth; they become self-fulfilling prophesies. Although there is some variation across domains (the influence of teacher expectations being greater for African-Americans, for low-income students, and for previously low-achievers), his review of the data suggests that expectations actually alter the behavior of only ten percent of the targets of those expectations. Even ten percent is not insignificant, especially when it affects opportunities in education and in jobs; and, of course, the costs of self-fulfilling prophesies are likely to be compounded over time. Jussim notes that our self-conceptions tend to limit our susceptibility to others’ expectations, but surely our self-conceptions are themselves heavily influenced by parental expectations (none of the studies discussed in this book cover very early childhood or parental expectations). Furthermore, the self-conceptions of many people are quite fragile (none of the studies cover people known to have a personality disorder, for example).
Jussim makes a good case for thinking that self-fulfilling prophesies are not nearly as powerful or pervasive as the literature suggests. In my opinion, however, the value of his book lies less in its reining in of exaggerated claims about the power of expectations than in its contribution to sorting out, more precisely, where and when expectations do distort our judgments and what forms of intervention (e.g., longer and more detailed exposure) are best suited to counter these distortions.