The explanation of mental states and processes in terms of biological and brain states and processes is fundamental for the science of psychology. This reductionism, however, can be complex; a specific recognized brain state may not correspond to a specific recognized mental state. As correctly pointed out by Borsboom et al. in the target article, for claiming “reductionism” it is insufficient to identify neural correlates of psychiatric conditions. Finding such correlates could be a first step in a long and complicated process of scientific research proving causal relations. However, the fact that a road to explanatory reductionism might be complex does not mean that it “is out of the question in network models” (target article, sect. 4, para. 3). This discussion is necessary because psychology does not yet reach the status of a hard science, and the authors of the target article make excellent examples of this; still, it is not fully acknowledged. Nevertheless, the hard science of psychology must be the goal. Steps toward this goal are taken by physics of mind (Perlovsky Reference Perlovsky2006; Reference Perlovsky2010a; Reference Perlovsky2010b; Reference Perlovsky2016; Reference Perlovsky2017a; Reference Perlovsky and Kreinovich2017b; Schoeller et al. Reference Schoeller, Perlovsky and Arseniev2018), a new science that turns psychology into a hard science. To the credit of physics of mind are the elucidating of psychological mechanisms that have not been understood for hundreds of years, including, for example, why musical emotions strongly affect us, a question that Darwin called the greatest mystery. I agree with the authors that demanding explanatory reductionism as a condition for grant awards might be premature; still, I argue that we must maintain a possibility and a goal of physics of mind – the hard science of psychology – and eventually, of clinical psychology and psychiatry.
Borsboom et al. ask: “What is the evidence for uniquely biological explanations of mental disorders?” (sect. 1, para. 3). They cite a 2013 Nature editorial according to which, “despite decades of work, the genetic, metabolic and cellular signatures of almost all mental syndromes remain largely a mystery” (Adam Reference Adam2013, p. 417). Uncovering biological background did not lead to reductive explanations of mental disorders. Borsboom et al. then go on to say: “Given this absence of compelling evidence, it seems sensible to entertain the possibility that explanatory reductionism is wrong” (sect. 1, para. 4). I argue here against this premise of the target article.
The authors see an ideal “reductive explanation in the history of science” in “the reconstruction of the ideal gas laws in terms of statistical mechanics” (sect. 2, para. 1). Using an example from physics, I agree, is “the best,” because physics is the paramount prototype of science, the first, and I would argue the only “hard science” is physics. Still, I would argue against such a straightforward comparison of physics and psychology or psychiatry. The reason is that the ideal gas and the human brain are incomparable in complexity. The ideal gas is one of the simplest natural systems, whereas the brain is among most complex.
For many years it has not been considered possible to develop a brain-mind theory with the same accuracy as physics describes physical systems. Nevertheless, recently this step has been undertaken. For developing the physics of mind, it is essential to establish the fundamental aspects that sets physics aside from other branches of science. This fundamental methodology specific to physics is unique for all areas of physics and is not used in any other area of science. The three specific aspects of the methodology of physics are: (1) identifying a few fundamental laws and their mathematical formulation, which serve as a basis for the considered area of physics; (2) mathematically formulating the theory of this area of physics based on these fundamental laws and making experimentally verifiable unexpected predictions; and (3) the experimental verifications of predictions.
Using this methodology of the physics of mind, it was possible to solve most of the complicated problems in psychology which had remained unsolved for decades and even millennia, such as: the interactions between cognition and language; the cognitive mechanisms of emotions of the beautiful; and the cognitive mechanisms of the emotions evoked by music (which Darwin considered a mystery, a most complex problem in human evolution). This proves that explanatory reductionism is capable of explaining the most complicated problems in psychology, even when network structures are involved (cognition, language, beauty, music). The proper methodology of physics of mind has been used in these examples; an essential step is identifying appropriate fundamental laws for each problem. This conclusion points us in the right direction for further research. But it is far from a ready-made solution for every problem.
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The explanation of mental states and processes in terms of biological and brain states and processes is fundamental for the science of psychology. This reductionism, however, can be complex; a specific recognized brain state may not correspond to a specific recognized mental state. As correctly pointed out by Borsboom et al. in the target article, for claiming “reductionism” it is insufficient to identify neural correlates of psychiatric conditions. Finding such correlates could be a first step in a long and complicated process of scientific research proving causal relations. However, the fact that a road to explanatory reductionism might be complex does not mean that it “is out of the question in network models” (target article, sect. 4, para. 3). This discussion is necessary because psychology does not yet reach the status of a hard science, and the authors of the target article make excellent examples of this; still, it is not fully acknowledged. Nevertheless, the hard science of psychology must be the goal. Steps toward this goal are taken by physics of mind (Perlovsky Reference Perlovsky2006; Reference Perlovsky2010a; Reference Perlovsky2010b; Reference Perlovsky2016; Reference Perlovsky2017a; Reference Perlovsky and Kreinovich2017b; Schoeller et al. Reference Schoeller, Perlovsky and Arseniev2018), a new science that turns psychology into a hard science. To the credit of physics of mind are the elucidating of psychological mechanisms that have not been understood for hundreds of years, including, for example, why musical emotions strongly affect us, a question that Darwin called the greatest mystery. I agree with the authors that demanding explanatory reductionism as a condition for grant awards might be premature; still, I argue that we must maintain a possibility and a goal of physics of mind – the hard science of psychology – and eventually, of clinical psychology and psychiatry.
Borsboom et al. ask: “What is the evidence for uniquely biological explanations of mental disorders?” (sect. 1, para. 3). They cite a 2013 Nature editorial according to which, “despite decades of work, the genetic, metabolic and cellular signatures of almost all mental syndromes remain largely a mystery” (Adam Reference Adam2013, p. 417). Uncovering biological background did not lead to reductive explanations of mental disorders. Borsboom et al. then go on to say: “Given this absence of compelling evidence, it seems sensible to entertain the possibility that explanatory reductionism is wrong” (sect. 1, para. 4). I argue here against this premise of the target article.
The authors see an ideal “reductive explanation in the history of science” in “the reconstruction of the ideal gas laws in terms of statistical mechanics” (sect. 2, para. 1). Using an example from physics, I agree, is “the best,” because physics is the paramount prototype of science, the first, and I would argue the only “hard science” is physics. Still, I would argue against such a straightforward comparison of physics and psychology or psychiatry. The reason is that the ideal gas and the human brain are incomparable in complexity. The ideal gas is one of the simplest natural systems, whereas the brain is among most complex.
For many years it has not been considered possible to develop a brain-mind theory with the same accuracy as physics describes physical systems. Nevertheless, recently this step has been undertaken. For developing the physics of mind, it is essential to establish the fundamental aspects that sets physics aside from other branches of science. This fundamental methodology specific to physics is unique for all areas of physics and is not used in any other area of science. The three specific aspects of the methodology of physics are: (1) identifying a few fundamental laws and their mathematical formulation, which serve as a basis for the considered area of physics; (2) mathematically formulating the theory of this area of physics based on these fundamental laws and making experimentally verifiable unexpected predictions; and (3) the experimental verifications of predictions.
Using this methodology of the physics of mind, it was possible to solve most of the complicated problems in psychology which had remained unsolved for decades and even millennia, such as: the interactions between cognition and language; the cognitive mechanisms of emotions of the beautiful; and the cognitive mechanisms of the emotions evoked by music (which Darwin considered a mystery, a most complex problem in human evolution). This proves that explanatory reductionism is capable of explaining the most complicated problems in psychology, even when network structures are involved (cognition, language, beauty, music). The proper methodology of physics of mind has been used in these examples; an essential step is identifying appropriate fundamental laws for each problem. This conclusion points us in the right direction for further research. But it is far from a ready-made solution for every problem.