We agree with and fully endorse the main point of the paper – that developmental science must move toward a deeper understanding of the developing child in context, as well as study the impact of diversity in social and ecological environments. Although we support the argument that the field needs to move from a Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) science to a more inclusive science, it is unfortunate that the authors did not recognize the implications of the acronym they chose – Worldwide, In situ, Local, and Diverse (WILD) may be thought synonymous with non-WEIRD or global majority world, and this is highly problematic (and likely not the authors’ intention). We strongly encourage the authors (of this paper and also all authors!) to state, recognize, and reflect on their place of privilege and power. They become the voice; they direct the focus, the narratives, and the conclusions of the research. They decide on the very acronyms that are being selected. Had the authors included advice, recommendations, or the perspective of a co-author from the global majority world, these assumptions and flawed worldviews may have been given light and possibly revised to encompass a more “culturally conscious” approach. The WILD acronym carries stereotypes and myths of cultures in non-WEIRD societies and furthers the othering and supports the myths and stereotypes about people “resembling our human ancestors” instead of recognizing the complexity of all human social life.
On a theoretical note, we argue that the authors are assuming a problematic view of the scientific process. They claim that Tomasello’s theory is “bottom up” and based on evidence that is problematically primarily from WEIRD samples. However, we suggest that the more fundamental problem is that Tomasello interprets evidence from an individualistic worldview, which assumes that individual cognition must pre-exist for relations with others to become possible. The data do not determine the theory because the data are already “theory laden” (Hansen, Reference Hanson1958). Tomasello’s problematic simulation presupposition depicts the individual infant as applying her own experience to understand others, but this conflates experience with awareness and thus does not explain such development (e.g., Baldwin, Reference Baldwin1906; Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2015; Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, Reference Carpendale, Atwood and Kettner2013; Müller & Carpendale, Reference Müller, Carpendale, Carpendale and Müller2004). It is possible to interpret the same evidence from a process-relational perspective, according to which relations are primary and make the development of communication possible, and language, and in turn, the development of cognition (e.g., Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, Reference Carpendale, Atwood and Kettner2013; Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2021; Carpendale & MacGillivray, Reference Carpendale and MacGillivray2025). Thus, additional research and data would be unlikely to change Tomasello’s individualistic worldview, and what is needed instead to reach Bard et al.’s goal is conceptual analysis leading to an alternative worldview beginning with action and relations to explain development rather than presupposing individual cognition.
What we have tried to show by analyzing Bard et al.’s critique of Tomasello’s theory is that what is needed is a conceptual analysis of the worldviews on which theories are based. Worldviews are the implicit philosophical assumptions that underlie theories as well as influence methodology and interpretation of data, and require conceptual analysis (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2015, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2021).
Finally, the authors’ empirical evidence does not support their main point. Cultural variability is important for understanding the range of human variation and for developing accurate and ethical scientific theories. But the variability the authors discuss is surface-level and limited. Although some data may point to interesting variability in early experience, we would argue that this is interesting for understanding the question of how experience shapes development and perhaps should be in a paper about just that – cultural variation and development – but, at least in the cases the authors put forward, it does not support the need for revising our theories of development. In fact, there is research suggesting that at least the basic tenets of the theories are not in need of revision, as there is evidence for commonalities in the basic experiences of infants and children worldwide (Broesch et al., Reference Broesch, Carolan, Cebioglu, von Rueden, Boyette, Moya, Hewlett and Kline2021; Reference Broesch and Bryant2014; Reference Broesch, Rochat, Olah, Broesch and Henrich2016). The authors refer to work suggesting that multiple caregivers are normative practices in many regions of the world, and the western focus on the caregiver-infant dyad is restricted and yields a limited understanding of development. We agree with this point wholeheartedly. Yet, we disagree with the conclusion that alloparenting and interdependent societies challenge attachment theory. Twenty years of research and observations (and a careful look at the data the authors are claiming is evidence of multiple care situations) reveal that, in fact, most infants are cared for primarily by one caregiver in the first year of life (Broesch et al., Reference Broesch, Carolan, Cebioglu, von Rueden, Boyette, Moya, Hewlett and Kline2021). This suggests that there is interesting variability in the rich social life of infants, but not that the theory itself needs revision. Additionally, we felt there was a body of literature the authors missed due to their worldview and lens of analysis – there is literature suggesting consistency in the basic social experience of infants in various diverse social and cultural settings – for example, infant directed speech, parent-infant interaction – although the larger context is different and interesting, we must exercise caution when exoticizing the “other” cultural ways of human social life.
Our suggestions and recommendations for moving forward are to get WISER (worldview, interactions, social, expand, relations): to evaluate the assumptions our theories and methodologies are based on. Recognizing the centrality of action and relations across the diversity of human development, it is imperative that we not only check our assumptions and worldviews but state them explicitly. If we are to explain how development happens, we need not simply document behavior in a vacuum, but do the messy work of observing and documenting the naturally occurring everyday interactions in a social setting.
We agree with and fully endorse the main point of the paper – that developmental science must move toward a deeper understanding of the developing child in context, as well as study the impact of diversity in social and ecological environments. Although we support the argument that the field needs to move from a Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) science to a more inclusive science, it is unfortunate that the authors did not recognize the implications of the acronym they chose – Worldwide, In situ, Local, and Diverse (WILD) may be thought synonymous with non-WEIRD or global majority world, and this is highly problematic (and likely not the authors’ intention). We strongly encourage the authors (of this paper and also all authors!) to state, recognize, and reflect on their place of privilege and power. They become the voice; they direct the focus, the narratives, and the conclusions of the research. They decide on the very acronyms that are being selected. Had the authors included advice, recommendations, or the perspective of a co-author from the global majority world, these assumptions and flawed worldviews may have been given light and possibly revised to encompass a more “culturally conscious” approach. The WILD acronym carries stereotypes and myths of cultures in non-WEIRD societies and furthers the othering and supports the myths and stereotypes about people “resembling our human ancestors” instead of recognizing the complexity of all human social life.
On a theoretical note, we argue that the authors are assuming a problematic view of the scientific process. They claim that Tomasello’s theory is “bottom up” and based on evidence that is problematically primarily from WEIRD samples. However, we suggest that the more fundamental problem is that Tomasello interprets evidence from an individualistic worldview, which assumes that individual cognition must pre-exist for relations with others to become possible. The data do not determine the theory because the data are already “theory laden” (Hansen, Reference Hanson1958). Tomasello’s problematic simulation presupposition depicts the individual infant as applying her own experience to understand others, but this conflates experience with awareness and thus does not explain such development (e.g., Baldwin, Reference Baldwin1906; Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2015; Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, Reference Carpendale, Atwood and Kettner2013; Müller & Carpendale, Reference Müller, Carpendale, Carpendale and Müller2004). It is possible to interpret the same evidence from a process-relational perspective, according to which relations are primary and make the development of communication possible, and language, and in turn, the development of cognition (e.g., Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, Reference Carpendale, Atwood and Kettner2013; Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2021; Carpendale & MacGillivray, Reference Carpendale and MacGillivray2025). Thus, additional research and data would be unlikely to change Tomasello’s individualistic worldview, and what is needed instead to reach Bard et al.’s goal is conceptual analysis leading to an alternative worldview beginning with action and relations to explain development rather than presupposing individual cognition.
What we have tried to show by analyzing Bard et al.’s critique of Tomasello’s theory is that what is needed is a conceptual analysis of the worldviews on which theories are based. Worldviews are the implicit philosophical assumptions that underlie theories as well as influence methodology and interpretation of data, and require conceptual analysis (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2015, Reference Carpendale and Lewis2021).
Finally, the authors’ empirical evidence does not support their main point. Cultural variability is important for understanding the range of human variation and for developing accurate and ethical scientific theories. But the variability the authors discuss is surface-level and limited. Although some data may point to interesting variability in early experience, we would argue that this is interesting for understanding the question of how experience shapes development and perhaps should be in a paper about just that – cultural variation and development – but, at least in the cases the authors put forward, it does not support the need for revising our theories of development. In fact, there is research suggesting that at least the basic tenets of the theories are not in need of revision, as there is evidence for commonalities in the basic experiences of infants and children worldwide (Broesch et al., Reference Broesch, Carolan, Cebioglu, von Rueden, Boyette, Moya, Hewlett and Kline2021; Reference Broesch and Bryant2014; Reference Broesch, Rochat, Olah, Broesch and Henrich2016). The authors refer to work suggesting that multiple caregivers are normative practices in many regions of the world, and the western focus on the caregiver-infant dyad is restricted and yields a limited understanding of development. We agree with this point wholeheartedly. Yet, we disagree with the conclusion that alloparenting and interdependent societies challenge attachment theory. Twenty years of research and observations (and a careful look at the data the authors are claiming is evidence of multiple care situations) reveal that, in fact, most infants are cared for primarily by one caregiver in the first year of life (Broesch et al., Reference Broesch, Carolan, Cebioglu, von Rueden, Boyette, Moya, Hewlett and Kline2021). This suggests that there is interesting variability in the rich social life of infants, but not that the theory itself needs revision. Additionally, we felt there was a body of literature the authors missed due to their worldview and lens of analysis – there is literature suggesting consistency in the basic social experience of infants in various diverse social and cultural settings – for example, infant directed speech, parent-infant interaction – although the larger context is different and interesting, we must exercise caution when exoticizing the “other” cultural ways of human social life.
Our suggestions and recommendations for moving forward are to get WISER (worldview, interactions, social, expand, relations): to evaluate the assumptions our theories and methodologies are based on. Recognizing the centrality of action and relations across the diversity of human development, it is imperative that we not only check our assumptions and worldviews but state them explicitly. If we are to explain how development happens, we need not simply document behavior in a vacuum, but do the messy work of observing and documenting the naturally occurring everyday interactions in a social setting.
Financial support
We received no funding for the preparation of this commentary.
Competing interests
We have no competing interests.