Jones makes extensive use of Optimality Theory (OT) to obtain a fresh new look at kinship as mental knowledge. OT has been typically used in the study of language, mainly phonology, but also morphology, semantics, and syntax. The successful application of OT in the study of kinship opens the possibility for Jones to speculate about general principles of human cognition.
Jones himself, though, is eager to point out that OT has fundamental limitations. In fact, he states “According to OT, constraints or constraint schemas are universal. But where do universals come from? This area of OT is not well-understood” (sect. 5.3). This very important issue about OT reminds me of what I regard as a shortcoming of Lakoff's cognitive semantics (Lakoff Reference Lakoff1987; Reference Lakoff, Eco, Santambrogio and Violi1988. For a similar shortcoming see also prototype theory, Rosch Reference Rosch, Rosch and Lloyd1978). Here, fundamental organizations of knowledge are pointed out, but how these essential aspects of cognition come to be is left unexplained (Lakoff clearly points out that these organizations are rooted in our bodily structures, but he does not delineate what kind of mental processes are involved at those critical stages).
What is crucial to both approaches (Jones' and Lakoff's), however, is the realization (and suggestion) that spatial knowledge contributes in a significant way to the organization of other domains of knowledge, for example, kinship and others. That is, it appears that some fundamental aspects of the way in which human mentally organize knowledge about space is essentially replicated in other domains, and specifically in the conceptual structures module (see Jackendoff Reference Jackendoff2002, for mental modules; and Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009, for the significance of space).
It is here that I see the relevance of Jones's analyses. After taking the OT route to the analysis of kinship, he realizes (and strongly suggests) that “kin terminology, like other abstract semantic domains, such as time, change of state, and possession, borrows much of its organization from the conceptual structure of space” (sect. 5.1). This is a line of thinking that I have pursued extensively in the last decade (see Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009) and that I find very productive in elucidating a number of cognitive phenomena besides supporting a particular mental architecture such a that proposed by Jackendoff (Reference Jackendoff1997; Reference Jackendoff2002).
Space, as an ontological prime, is assigned a module of its own – “spatial representations” – in Jackendoff's (Reference Jackendoff1997) modular architecture of the mind, wherein it is connected to other modules including the “conceptual structures” one. I expanded on this proposal (Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009) and argued for a primacy of the mental organization of spatial knowledge that is later reduplicated in other domains of knowledge, such as time, possession, traditional navigational practices, traditional religion, kinship, and social relationships. This suggestion is also supported from the evidence available in developmental psychology about the very early presence of complex spatial knowledge in infants (e.g., Mandler Reference Mandler2004).
Jones' proposal, then, strikes a familiar chord within my line of thinking, and it might be of interest to slightly expand on this part regarding space. One fundamental content of the “spatial relationships” module is that of Frame of Reference (FoR) (see Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009; Levinson Reference Levinson2003). Choosing a FoR, or perspective-taking, is a universal prerequisite of any spatial description. A FoR is a set of coordinates (three intersecting axes: vertical, sagittal, and transversal) used to construct an oriented space within which spatial relationships among objects are identified. There are three major types of FoR: relative, intrinsic, and absolute. A relative FoR is centered on a speaker and it remains centered on the speaker when the speaker moves; for example, when one says, “The ball is in front of me.” An intrinsic FoR is centered on an object and it remains centered on the object when the object moves; for example, “The ball is in front of the car.” An absolute FoR uses fixed points of reference, for example, north, south, east, west, as in “The town is south of the river.” And there are subtypes of the absolute that use one axis (e.g., land-sea), or even only one point (e.g., Mecca, sacred mountain). In Bennardo (Reference Bennardo2009), I labeled this latter type “radial,” wherein Ego is back-grounded and other-than-ego is fore-grounded.
All three FoRs share some minimal conceptual content like “Ego,” “field of Ego,” “other-than-Ego,” and “vectorial relationship between the two” (toward or away from). For the intrinsic FoR, the “other-than-Ego” element has a field different from Ego's, while the other two FoRs use only Ego's field. Focusing on Ego obtains the relative FoR, focusing on other-than-Ego (in the same field of Ego) obtains the absolute FoR.
Using conceptual organizations of space of this type – that is, FoR – would generate different kinds of kinship systems such as classificatory (with focus on sibling/s or other-than-Ego) and descriptive (with focus on Ego) (Bennardo & Read 2008). In other words, it is the fact that this complex spatial knowledge – in the form of FoRs obtained developmentally very early (Mandler Reference Mandler2004) – contributes to the generation of other domains of knowledge that makes an OT approach appear explanatory (in this case of kinship phenomena). In fact, any FoR, once generated, may be thought of as a constraint on the generation of other knowledge organizations in many domains, including kinship. What is clearer though in this case is the fact that we can now see where constraints come from and how they are generated from conceptual primes, for example, Ego, other-than-Ego, vectors, and so forth (see Levinson Reference Levinson2003, and Lehman & Bennardo Reference Lehman and Bennardo2003, for spatial primitives).
I am convinced that works like Jones' are pushing the field of kinship in the right direction, that is, toward a deeper understanding of the working, both content and structure, of the human mind. Witness to that is the mere fact that I found myself talking about the role of space in human cognition to the readers of this commentary.
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Jones makes extensive use of Optimality Theory (OT) to obtain a fresh new look at kinship as mental knowledge. OT has been typically used in the study of language, mainly phonology, but also morphology, semantics, and syntax. The successful application of OT in the study of kinship opens the possibility for Jones to speculate about general principles of human cognition.
Jones himself, though, is eager to point out that OT has fundamental limitations. In fact, he states “According to OT, constraints or constraint schemas are universal. But where do universals come from? This area of OT is not well-understood” (sect. 5.3). This very important issue about OT reminds me of what I regard as a shortcoming of Lakoff's cognitive semantics (Lakoff Reference Lakoff1987; Reference Lakoff, Eco, Santambrogio and Violi1988. For a similar shortcoming see also prototype theory, Rosch Reference Rosch, Rosch and Lloyd1978). Here, fundamental organizations of knowledge are pointed out, but how these essential aspects of cognition come to be is left unexplained (Lakoff clearly points out that these organizations are rooted in our bodily structures, but he does not delineate what kind of mental processes are involved at those critical stages).
What is crucial to both approaches (Jones' and Lakoff's), however, is the realization (and suggestion) that spatial knowledge contributes in a significant way to the organization of other domains of knowledge, for example, kinship and others. That is, it appears that some fundamental aspects of the way in which human mentally organize knowledge about space is essentially replicated in other domains, and specifically in the conceptual structures module (see Jackendoff Reference Jackendoff2002, for mental modules; and Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009, for the significance of space).
It is here that I see the relevance of Jones's analyses. After taking the OT route to the analysis of kinship, he realizes (and strongly suggests) that “kin terminology, like other abstract semantic domains, such as time, change of state, and possession, borrows much of its organization from the conceptual structure of space” (sect. 5.1). This is a line of thinking that I have pursued extensively in the last decade (see Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009) and that I find very productive in elucidating a number of cognitive phenomena besides supporting a particular mental architecture such a that proposed by Jackendoff (Reference Jackendoff1997; Reference Jackendoff2002).
Space, as an ontological prime, is assigned a module of its own – “spatial representations” – in Jackendoff's (Reference Jackendoff1997) modular architecture of the mind, wherein it is connected to other modules including the “conceptual structures” one. I expanded on this proposal (Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009) and argued for a primacy of the mental organization of spatial knowledge that is later reduplicated in other domains of knowledge, such as time, possession, traditional navigational practices, traditional religion, kinship, and social relationships. This suggestion is also supported from the evidence available in developmental psychology about the very early presence of complex spatial knowledge in infants (e.g., Mandler Reference Mandler2004).
Jones' proposal, then, strikes a familiar chord within my line of thinking, and it might be of interest to slightly expand on this part regarding space. One fundamental content of the “spatial relationships” module is that of Frame of Reference (FoR) (see Bennardo Reference Bennardo2009; Levinson Reference Levinson2003). Choosing a FoR, or perspective-taking, is a universal prerequisite of any spatial description. A FoR is a set of coordinates (three intersecting axes: vertical, sagittal, and transversal) used to construct an oriented space within which spatial relationships among objects are identified. There are three major types of FoR: relative, intrinsic, and absolute. A relative FoR is centered on a speaker and it remains centered on the speaker when the speaker moves; for example, when one says, “The ball is in front of me.” An intrinsic FoR is centered on an object and it remains centered on the object when the object moves; for example, “The ball is in front of the car.” An absolute FoR uses fixed points of reference, for example, north, south, east, west, as in “The town is south of the river.” And there are subtypes of the absolute that use one axis (e.g., land-sea), or even only one point (e.g., Mecca, sacred mountain). In Bennardo (Reference Bennardo2009), I labeled this latter type “radial,” wherein Ego is back-grounded and other-than-ego is fore-grounded.
All three FoRs share some minimal conceptual content like “Ego,” “field of Ego,” “other-than-Ego,” and “vectorial relationship between the two” (toward or away from). For the intrinsic FoR, the “other-than-Ego” element has a field different from Ego's, while the other two FoRs use only Ego's field. Focusing on Ego obtains the relative FoR, focusing on other-than-Ego (in the same field of Ego) obtains the absolute FoR.
Using conceptual organizations of space of this type – that is, FoR – would generate different kinds of kinship systems such as classificatory (with focus on sibling/s or other-than-Ego) and descriptive (with focus on Ego) (Bennardo & Read 2008). In other words, it is the fact that this complex spatial knowledge – in the form of FoRs obtained developmentally very early (Mandler Reference Mandler2004) – contributes to the generation of other domains of knowledge that makes an OT approach appear explanatory (in this case of kinship phenomena). In fact, any FoR, once generated, may be thought of as a constraint on the generation of other knowledge organizations in many domains, including kinship. What is clearer though in this case is the fact that we can now see where constraints come from and how they are generated from conceptual primes, for example, Ego, other-than-Ego, vectors, and so forth (see Levinson Reference Levinson2003, and Lehman & Bennardo Reference Lehman and Bennardo2003, for spatial primitives).
I am convinced that works like Jones' are pushing the field of kinship in the right direction, that is, toward a deeper understanding of the working, both content and structure, of the human mind. Witness to that is the mere fact that I found myself talking about the role of space in human cognition to the readers of this commentary.