This chapter examines Amartya Sen’s ethical writings in relation to Critical Ethical Naturalism (CEN). While Sen’s capability approach and later work on ethics are often read as alternatives to consequentialism and deontology, he never presents them as a systematic moral theory. His emphasis on freedom, capabilities and functionings reflects an implicit realist orientation which some, notably Martins and Lawson, interpret as ontological in character. Lawson further suggests that Sen’s framework might be viewed as a special case of CEN. It is argued, however, that the two projects diverge: Sen’s ethics rests on implicit ontological tensions, whereas CEN is explicitly grounded in ontological coherence. The chapter highlights these tensions, contrasts the orientations of the two projects toward Aristotle and mainstream ethics, explores the sources of Sen’s ontological reticence, and considers the form of embedded liberalism shaping his stance. It concludes by reflecting on whether limited synthesis between the two frameworks is possible.

This chapter examines the interpretive consequences of Amartya Sen’s ontological reticence. While Sen recognises the social world as open and processual, his continued reliance on formal, taxonomic methods generates a deep tension that shapes how his work has been received and operationalised. It is argued that the plurality of interpretations surrounding the capability approach reflects not theoretical flexibility but ontological ambiguity. Drawing on developments in Social Choice Theory and mainstream empirical modelling, the chapter shows how Sen’s framework has been adapted within methodologies that presuppose closed systems, thereby diluting its relational orientation. It then contrasts these uses with heterodox applications that foreground an evolutionary outlook. Finally, by examining the contributions of Nussbaum and Robeyns, it is highlighted how liberal conceptions of personhood reinforce ontological inconsistencies and preliminary counters to their claims are offered. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the stakes of these tensions for the future development of the capability approach and its role in the revival of political economy.

This chapter extends the implications of free will skepticism into the broader realm of social justice. While critics argue that justice requires belief in free will and basic desert, the author contends that many compelling theories of justice – such as those of John Rawls, David Hume, and Amartya Sen – do not rest on desert-based foundations. The chapter introduces and defends the capabilities approach, developed by Sen and Martha Nussbaum, as a promising framework for promoting justice without reliance on retributive or meritocratic notions. This approach emphasizes enhancing individuals’ real freedoms and opportunities – what they are actually able to do and be – while acknowledging the profound effects of luck, social structures, and unequal starting points. Free will skepticism reinforces the moral urgency of this view by highlighting the arbitrariness of birth and circumstance in shaping life outcomes. Rather than attributing success or failure to personal choice alone, this perspective demands attention to systemic barriers and privileges. By rejecting the myth of the self-made individual, the chapter makes a strong case for redistributive justice, inclusion, and structural reform. Ultimately, it argues that free will skepticism not only coheres with the pursuit of social justice but provides a compelling moral rationale for greater compassion, equity, and solidarity.

This chapter describes the internal environment of a financial institution.

Chapter 1 opens with a discussion of values, which frames the volume. It then reviews four well-known works/groups of work to introduce a debate about cultural ownership, beginning with the Bamiyan Buddhas, followed by Guernica, the Parthenon sculptures, and Gilbert Stuart’s portrait of George Washington.

Remote working – strongly widespread during the covid-19 pandemic –is today one of the main forms of innovation in the world of work. As always, within innovation phenomena we have static elements, from the past, and dynamic elements, looking to change the status quo. Consequently, the evaluation of remote work may be either conservative or innovative. Remote work can be considered as a simple re-proposition of the Fordist-Taylorist Enterprise that does not actually change the characteristics of employment as a not democratic relationship involving the worker submission to the employer managerial, control and disciplinary power. On the other hand, remote work can be recognized as the symptom of a broader cultural, organizational and process change in the firm, allowing the worker to conquer new spaces of freedom and autonomy, which not only allow for a new balance in the relationship between work and life, but also redefine both the factual and juridical connotations of subordination. This chapter analyzes this second perspective and, on the basis of legislation and collective bargaining, tries to define the elements of change in the concept and morphology of subordination within the employment relationship.

This chapter further develops the framework presented in the previous chapter. It does so by elaborating upon the value pluralism involved in the umbel view and the substantial interior of the framework. The chapter begins by accounting for the pluralism involved in the umbel view and discussing what that implies for political priority-setting. It then argues that the capability approach, developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, provides the best available currency of justice for a multiple threshold sufficientarian theory. The chapter then moves on to provide a suggested index of eight spheres of capabilities relevant for sufficientarian justice. The index includes the following items: Basic Needs, Health, Education, Meaningful Work, Political Equality, Community, Social Status, Reasonable Autonomy. The purpose of the index is to serve as input into the further interdisciplinary and public debate on the identification of the justice-relevant threshold. The chapter ends by emphasizing that public policy should give particular priority to manifest deficiencies, such as cases of deficiency clusters, where the same group of people face insufficiency in several value spheres.

For most employees, pay typically comprises three main elements: base pay, employment-related benefits and performance-related pay, with base pay being the primary component of total pay for most non-executive employees. Benefits plans are also assuming increased importance in the fixed or foundational component of total pay, alongside base pay. In this chapter, we consider the nature and purpose of each component of fixed or foundational pay, particularly their pivotal role in attracting and retaining staff. We also consider the options for configuring these components and the strategic priorities to which each might be best suited. We examine the two main options for configuring base pay: (1) pay for the content of the job/position to which the employee is assigned; and (2) pay for job-holder capabilities. We explore the pay structures associated with each option, the evaluation methods and processes associated with the development of pay systems based on each of these approaches, and the general strengths and weaknesses of each approach. It is vital to have a solid understanding of the structures and pricing processes associated with each of these broad approaches to base pay configuration.

What are the core capacities that make for a flourishing life? It is an incredibly difficult question to answer. Every philosopher, public commentator, and backyard critic seems to have a different view on the matter. Occasionally the terms of what makes for a good life are developed explicitly, but mostly the grounding of such claims is either left implicit or undeveloped, as if we all agree and spelling out the terms of a good life is unnecessary. In the Global North, the most common appeals assume some variation on the capacities for freedom, connectivity, democracy, and inclusion, with the ideology of freedom usually prevailing. The dominant approach to human development, called the capabilities approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum and expressed in the Human Development Index, appeals to these liberal notions. This chapter sets out an alternative framework for understanding human capacities. It builds a matrix of capacities around the domains of vitality, relationality, productivity, and sustainability. These are seen as basic to a flourishing human condition.

Here I move from historical analysis to philosophical explication of the concept of liberty, and I introduce the main conceptual components of the idea of freedom I defend.

Here I defend the view that freedom requires more than merely opportunities to act but also the provision of resources needed for agents to enjoy capabilities to pursue valued activities and ways of life.

This chapter introduces basic concepts of AI to lawyers, deals with key concepts, the capabilities and limitations of AI, and identifies technological challenges which might require legal responses.

This chapter offers a rereading of Amartya Sen’s capability approach (CA) from the perspective of the Andean region that highlights their differences. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the engagement of the CA with indigenous philosophies, and to use the latter’s insights to push the former’s boundaries. In particular, the authors discuss the differences between the relational ontology that underpins the BV framework with the dualistic ontology upon which Sen’s CA is built. While Sen’s ethical considerations in development remain of paramount importance for contemporary thinking and practice, the focus on individual freedom within the CA is embedded within a dualistic ontology that separates humans from nature and individuals from their societies. A consideration of the challenges associated with the BV framework allows the authors to address some of the most contentious areas within the CA literature: those relating to collective capabilities and sustainability issues.

The aim of this chapter is to explore how social choice theory and the capability approach can help in clarifying important ethical dilemmas and issues of injustice that need to be addressed for cities to become sustainable cities. Six types of important injustices are identified, covering both intra- and intergenerational fairness. Some important criticisms of smart cities are considered and important safeguards and policy priorities for smart cities from the social choice and capability approach framings are identified. The main message of this chapter is that the sustainability of cities is an ethical issue and not one of technology or measurement, and it is all about the six types of injustices, with cities needing to tackle all six of them in their quest to become sustainable. Nudging and smart cities can help, but these must be contextualized to prioritize participation and equality. Social choice theory as formulated by Amartya Sen provides important insights to understand and deal with conflicts between the different demands on the freedoms of different individuals.