To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This chapter examines how Russian state media adapted their service propaganda model to justify and normalize the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that began in February 2022. Analyzing Channel One’s prime-time broadcasts from 2000 to 2025, it shows that wartime propaganda did not abandon the reaffirming and informative tactics that had built audience loyalty in peacetime—instead, it integrated them into war coverage. Ukraine-related topics came to dominate broadcasts, accounting for nearly 40 percent of segments, but Channel One preserved reaffirming narratives about Russian heroism, military might, and the anti-Nazi struggle, as well as signals of journalistic credibility. The chapter also investigates whether propaganda prepared Russians for the war. It argues that deliberate pre-invasion priming for the specific conflict is unlikely: state media personnel were almost certainly unaware of invasion plans, and the Kremlin expected a swift victory rather than a prolonged war. Instead, years of anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian messaging had cultivated a general disposition that made the invasion easier to accept. Wartime propaganda represented a calibration of the established service model rather than an overhaul—preserving audience trust while selling a costly and unprovoked military campaign.
This chapter examines informative propaganda—state media’s effort to appear as a credible news source, retaining pro-regime audiences. Rather than relying on political narratives alone, Russian state television invested in diverse reporting to meet news consumers’ informational needs. The chapter distinguishes informative propaganda from “honest” propaganda: its aim is not to admit inconvenient facts but to construct an impression of journalistic authority. Analyzing Channel One’s prime-time broadcasts in 2000–2021, it identifies nineteen news topics across five domains—international affairs, domestic policy, domestic problems, general interest, and soft news—showing that about a quarter of broadcasts covered non-political content. The chapter also analyzes how state media mimic journalistic credibility through signals of timeliness, field reporting, and investigative effort, documenting their growing use over time. Finally, it reexamines the “confounding” hypothesis, arguing that incoherent propaganda messaging reflects improvisation rather than a deliberate strategy to confuse. The findings explain how service propaganda keeps pro-regime audiences satisfied and reduces demand for independent journalism.
This chapter examines why most Russians trust state-controlled media over independent news sources, even as they acknowledge the political bias of the former. Drawing on an online survey and a large-scale source reputation experiment, it shows that trust in propaganda outlets is deeply rooted in political orientations: Putin supporters overwhelmingly trust state television and other state-controlled media, perceiving them as accurate and patriotic, while extending little credibility to independent outlets. Opposition-minded citizens are considerably more skeptical of propaganda but often still consume and trust state news agencies. The chapter demonstrates that state media’s perceived credibility boosts belief in propaganda stories by 2–5 percentage points—a modest but cumulatively significant effect. It also examines how citizens justify trust in biased media and why common news literacy practices, such as cross-checking with other sources, can backfire in state-dominated information environments, where coordinated propaganda reinforces itself across outlets. Together, these findings explain why independent journalism struggles to attract audiences in autocracies: the Kremlin’s service propaganda cultivates genuine loyalty among supporters, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of consumption and trust that independent reporting cannot easily break.
This chapter investigates reaffirming propaganda in Russian state television under Vladimir Putin. It argues that state media sustain authoritarian rule by validating the collective identities and beliefs of pro-regime citizens. The chapter first documents shared sources of pride among Putin supporters—the Great Patriotic War, the space program, international prestige, sports, military might, and cultural heritage—drawing on surveys. It then presents a quantitative analysis of more than 89,000 prime-time news transcripts by Channel One, Russia’s flagship state television station, covering 2000 to 2021. Using machine learning, the chapter identifies seven reaffirming themes constituting a substantial and growing share of daily news coverage. An in-depth examination of selected broadcasts reveals eight recurring rhetorical narratives, including appeals to Russia’s centrality, external validation, collective pride, and national identity. The findings show that Russian state television consistently offered an emotionally resonant, identity-affirming story of national greatness—designed not to persuade skeptics, but to reinforce the bond between the regime and its supporters.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.