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I examine Anglo-Russian relations during the early Cold War (1941–1947), focusing on the evolution of British estimates of Stalin’s intentions and their policy consequences. I contribute to the historiography by highlighting the critical role of Anthony Eden’s 1941 visit to Moscow and demonstrating that a single, dominant assessment framework shaped British estimates during this period. In 1941, British leaders were uncertain about Stalin’s motivations and speculated about many possible principles underlying Soviet foreign policy. They believed that a clear private statement from Stalin was key to understanding Soviet strategic intentions. Following Eden’s visit, during which Stalin articulated his motivation as securing Soviet borders from external threats, British analysts developed a framework for interpreting Soviet actions relative to Stalin’s declared principle. Over the next several years, British elites interpreted Stalin’s actions through this lens, maintaining optimism even as Stalin orchestrated a coup in Romania and installed a communist government in Poland. British optimism shifted after the Iran Crisis, when elites struggled to reconcile Stalin’s push for control over Iran with the principle of Soviet security, leading them to recognize the vastness of Stalin’s ambitions.
This chapter offers a comprehensive introduction to the history and politics of nuclear sharing in Europe. It traces the historical origins of the practice, examining its strategic and political rationale, particularly during the late Cold War and the Euromissiles crisis. The chapter also delves into the post-Cold War debates up until 2010, when the last significant proposal to withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe was abandoned. Furthermore, it introduces more recent discussions surrounding nuclear sharing, highlighting the influence of the humanitarian disarmament movement and the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This chapter serves as a foundational overview for understanding the evolving dynamics and challenges of nuclear sharing in Europe.
Most scholars regard Lin Yutang’s 1949 novel, Chinatown Family, as a failure. The novel did not sell many copies when it was published, and it failed to impress critics. Decades on, the novel has been largely dismissed as reactionary and crude by literary scholars, especially Asian Americanist critics. Readers then and now dismiss Lin’s attempts to create a definitive work of “Asian American literature” but this chapter carefully reconstructs the novel’s making in order to explore the potential affordances of Lin’s failure. What would it mean to take seriously the novel’s chief virtues, otherwise seen as limitations, such as “collaboration,” as the basis for rethinking the history of the Asian American novel, and where it might go today?
The Cold War threw Australian’s postwar hopes into stark relief. Social and economic rights became associated with a menacing global ideology, while the imperative of a new type of war saw political and civil rights challenged like never before. This chapter analyses the career of Australian civil libertarians in this decade, particularly in light of the 1949 trial of Communist Party of Australia leader Lance Sharkey for sedition and a 1951 referendum on whether to ban the party wholesale. While such moves drew calls of government hypocrisy in light of the recently passed Universal Declaration from civil libertarians, supporters could equally point to communism’s human rights abuses abroad. These usages commingled with and were enabled by earlier claims of British citizenship rights as instruments of political power and contestation. Similar problems emerged for Indigenous rights campaigners in the 1950s, who saw the UDHR as a roadmap for Indigenous equality. Such hopes soon gave way to the difficult reality of translating the Declaration's precepts into a very alien context and frustration at the limitations of their global influence or enforceability.
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