This chapter introduces game theory as a framework for understanding strategic interaction in biological, social, and economic systems. Beginning with the foundations of zero-sum games and the minimax theorem, it explains how rational behavior can be analyzed when outcomes depend on the actions of others. The chapter then turns to John Nash’s generalization to non-zero-sum games, introducing Nash equilibrium as a stable outcome in which no player can benefit by unilaterally changing strategy. Classic examples such as the prisoner’s dilemma illustrate the tension between individual rationality and collective welfare. Moving beyond one-shot games, the chapter explores repeated interactions and shows how cooperation can emerge over time, even among self-interested agents. Strategies such as tit-for-tat demonstrate how reciprocity, punishment, and forgiveness can stabilize cooperative behavior. The discussion then extends to evolutionary game theory, where strategies spread or disappear based on reproductive success rather than conscious choice. Concepts such as evolutionarily stable strategies explain how population-level patterns arise in biology and behavior. Together, these ideas reveal game theory as a unifying logic underlying evolution, cooperation, conflict, and decision-making across living systems.

Liberalism is a foundational school of thought in International Relations with a well-established and rich intellectual heritage dating back to the seventeenth century. It seeks to address core problems in world politics, including the appropriate scope of state authority, the conditions underpinning international cooperation, and the maintenance of international stability. With liberal scholars most notably contributing to debates on the causes and limits of cooperation. Liberal scholars have made their most influential contributions by examining questions such as what enables or constrains cooperation between states, with many claiming that political, economic, and social integration between states leads to more peace and less war. However, liberalism emerged from Western historical and philosophical contexts, and while liberal scholars claim that it is universally applicable, its assumptions can be criticised for not reflecting non-Western experiences. This chapter evaluates liberalism’s applicability to the Middle East by applying liberal theory to the analysis of cosmopolitan law, examining in particular the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on interstate relations. Thus, it applies liberalism to answer the following questions: do SEZs lead to greater economic integration between states in the Middle East? And is there any observable pacifying effect on political relations between trade partners?

This chapter compares the social systems and intergroup relations in chimpanzees and bonobos – our two closest extant relatives – to illuminate the evolutionary roots of human intergroup lethal conflict and peaceful intergroup cooperation. Notably, among chimpanzees, intergroup encounters are typically hostile and sometimes lethal. Bonobos, by contrast, exhibit greater variability in their intergroup behaviour. They do not carry out intergroup coalitionary killings and occasionally engage in some forms of intergroup cooperation, although these are largely confined to one-on-one (dyadic) interactions. By comparing the social systems and intergroup relations of these species, the chapter can help shed light on the roots of the human inclinations for both intergroup lethal conflict and peaceful cooperation.

This chapter draws on Camp 020’s interrogation reports to examine who was sent to this place and what their stories reveal about the nature of the espionage threat that Britain confronted. Two broad patterns emerge. Few detainees appear to have been driven primarily by ideology in undertaking espionage missions. Interrogation reports show a far more complex political landscape, in which loyalties rarely aligned neatly with either Nazi fanaticism or anti-Nazi resistance. It is also striking that few were professional spies. British fears of highly trained enemy agents proved misplaced. Instead, Camp 020 received mostly amateurs: people thrust into espionage with minimal preparation, sent on missions that offered little chance of success and quickly exposed by skilled interrogation. These individuals were, in many ways, ordinary Europeans caught in extraordinary circumstances.

Co-management is in essence about collaboration and participation. In this chapter, definitions are provided for each, with recurring themes identified from definitions of collaboration and collaborative governance. The chapter explores these key themes in relation to the ‘what, who, how and why’ of collaboration, moving to distinguish between cooperation, coordination and collaboration, the nature of leadership in collaboration and the relevance of scale. The chapter then moves on to review the meaning and practice of participation, reflecting on the ‘why, who, how and when’ of participation. Challenges to meaningful participation are identified, noting critique of the adoption of a mechanical, technical approach rather than recognising the political and empowering potential of participation.

Chapter 2 takes an in-depth look into how area-studies scholarship has explained the wide empirical variation in levels of Eurasian natural gas interdependence across nations and over time. It then lays out the empirical design; it introduces the study’s dependent variable — natural gas interdependence in Eurasia — and discusses the definition, operationalization, and measurement of this dependent variable. Next, it introduced the study’s independent variable, a concept labeled new dominant narratives, and lays out the key independent variables contributing to the rise of new dominant narratives: domestic politics, leaders’ dispositions, and international economic and technological incentives. Finally, the chapter situates the book’s key analytical terms — interdependence, cooperation, gas security, and power in Eurasian gas relations — in the existing literature. It specifies that, in this book, these concepts are not treated as context-less or ultimately “real,” but are seen as historically contingent and understood contextually.

This chapter examines how commercial firms like the Belgian grocer Delhaize did not initially respond to the Single Market Program in the mid-1980s, but they did mobilize swiftly in the late 1980s to prepare for the "threat" of the new business and regulatory environment of an integrated regional market governed by social and environmental protections. Together with other food retailers, Delhaize formed sectoral clubs and associations to defend its interests: Buying clubs collectivized price negotiating power against producer consolidation and protected profit margins, while interest associations brought distributors and retailers together to influence European policymaking. At the same time, Delhaize and other commercial firms saw in the opening of Eastern Europe a profitable business opportunity, and they expanded quickly into the markets of Poland, Hungary, and the new Czech Republic in the early 1990s. As a result, the case of Delhaize gives us purchase on the complexity of business responses to market integration and demonstrates the diverse paths to regionalization for and against the Single Market.

Chapter 6 examines zero-sum thinking (ZST) – the idea that one party’s gain must be another’s loss – and contrasts it with the Economist Mental Model (EMM), which recognizes that economic interactions can be positive-sum. Historically adaptive in static, resource-scarce settings, ZST becomes counterproductive in modern, dynamic economies built on cooperation and specialization. Using survey data from the US, the chapter differentiates between generic ZST (a broad tendency to see life as win-lose) and policy-specific ZST, which can reveal partisan divides. Democrats often display zero-sum views about redistribution, whereas Republicans do so regarding immigration or trade. Crucially, people with higher economic knowledge – those more aligned with the EMM – show markedly lower generic ZST and are less inclined toward protectionist policies than those with lower economic knowledge – aligned with Alternative Mental Models (AMMs).

While ownership of private goods enables an actor to exclude others’ ownership, public goods are available to others. Because of this, there is a social dilemma associated with public goods: why would a person contribute to a public good if they can use it even if they don’t contribute? The traditional response is that some cost must be added to not paying so that the public good such as community parks could be created and maintained. This response was a clear outcome of early economic theories. However, empirical anomalies emerged that did not support these earlier theories. Cooperation among theorists enabled the development of new theories of how social characteristics of group members could intervene and solve some social dilemmas.

Fairness norms operate in virtually every area of social endeavor. There are several common behavioral responses to exchanges between social actors. Exploitation and retaliation, both of which are threats to fairness, are closely associated with narcissism. Other behavioral responses include cooperation, reciprocity, acquiescence, withdrawal, and altruism. Social movements such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo are collective responses to profound unfairness.

Tencent’s well-known ‘horse racing’ programme, launched two decades ago, encourages multiple teams to independently and proactively develop similar products, fostering competition for internal resources and more innovation efforts. This approach has led to major innovative and successful products like WeChat and Honor of Kings. This chapter argues that Tencent’s innovation thrives on a dynamic mix of internal competition and cooperation – what we term ‘coopetition’. While often overlooked by scholars and underestimated by business leaders, coopetition at Tencent has proven central to generating creative ideas, energising teams, and enabling cross-functional knowledge recombination. Remarkably, this process was not designed by executives through a top-down mechanism but rather happened naturally from Tencent’s culture of autonomy and tolerance for risk. Rich interview evidence reveals how coopetition enhances individual growth, team development, and product competitiveness, contributing to Tencent’s overall innovation capacity.

This volume sets out to provide a concise and accessible overview of the history of today’s European Union. A brief account of such a sprawling topic obviously cannot be comprehensive. Instead, I hope to lay out the broad sweep of developments, without getting bogged down in the details. These days all the EU’s significant moves are documented online, including all its treaties, major decisions, national positions, specific policies, and other technicalities. The institutions themselves provide deep insights into their ongoing work, often also supplying snapshots of historical developments. Even more importantly, there are entire libraries of books on specific policies and the roles of institutional actors such as the European Commission, the Parliament, the Council, and the various member states. Amidst such a wealth of information, it is all too easy to get tangled up in the details. In response, this book seeks to provide a coherent survey of the EU’s history for the general reader.

The media tends to portray a European Union lurching from one crisis to the next. And in this brief history I have had plenty to say about problems, dangers, risks, and threats in the decades-long process of European integration. The founders were well aware of this aspect. Jean Monnet always believed that ‘Europe would be built through crisis, and that it would be the sum of their solutions’. Indeed, the European Union – as the European Communities before it – does seem to have a knack for turning crises to its advantage. Rather than leading to any kind of reversal, challenges have tended to reorient and expand the European project. So, we should not get carried away by excitable headlines, which often fail to do justice to the EU’s complex and sometimes contradictory trajectory.

Chapter 4 considers how duties of international cooperation safeguard sovereign equality by reconciling the territorial sovereignty of coastal states with landlocked states’ rights to access the oceans through negotiation or binding arbitration.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that states have accepted obligations of mandatory cooperation with respect to a variety of other transboundary harms, including piracy, terrorism, and at least some cyberattacks.

Chapter 13 concludes by recapping the book’s key themes, considering potential obstacles to mandatory cooperation, and identifying other matters of international concern, such as pandemics, that are good candidates for mandatory cooperation under the equitable conception of sovereign equality.